PENALTIES
21 That brings me the issue in dispute - the quantum of the penalty to be imposed by Dimmeys under s 76E(1) of the TPA. The ACCC seeks a total pecuniary penalty of $500,000 comprised of a total pecuniary penalty of $330,000 for the Glamour Girl Gowns Contraventions and the Apache Boys Gowns Contraventions and a total pecuniary penalty of $170,000 for the Minitong Gowns Contraventions and the Zhong Da Gowns Contraventions. Dimmeys submits that the penalty should be $100,000 - $150,000 for the Glamour Girl Gowns Contraventions and the Apache Boys Gowns Contraventions and $30,000 for the Minitong Gowns Contraventions and the Zhong Da Gowns Contraventions.
22 As noted above (see [8]), s 76E came into force on 15 April 2010.
23 Section 76(1) empowers the Court, in respect of a contravention of Pt V of the TPA, to order the contravener to pay "such pecuniary penalty, in respect of each act or omission … as the Court determines to be appropriate". Section 76E(3) of the TPA provides that the Court may impose a maximum penalty of 10,000 penalty units (or $1.1 million) for each act or omission. The parties acknowledge that each supply of a non-compliant gown on or after 15 April 2010 may constitute a separate contravention of s 65C of the TPA. However, the parties submit it is appropriate to treat the supply of non-compliant gowns as two courses of conduct, with each course attracting one penalty: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ABB Transmission and Distribution Ltd (No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 169 at [38]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Rural Press Ltd [2002] FCA 1065 at [19] and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CI & Co Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1511 at [27]. The Glamour Girl Gowns Contraventions and the Apache Boys Gowns Contraventions is one course of conduct and the Minitong Gowns Contraventions and the Zhong Da Gowns Contraventions is the second course of conduct.
24 Some guidance on the question of the "course of conduct" is obtained from looking at the Court's approach when contraventions of Pt V of the TPA were deemed to be offences under s 79(1) of the TPA. The principal authority was Trade Practices Commission v Advance Bank Australia Limited (1993) ATPR 41-229 at 41,164. The case concerned charges in relation to a series of misleading advertisements. In assessing penalty, Gummow J cited with approval the following passage from Trade Practices Commission v Bata Shoe Company of Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) (1980) 44 FLR 149 at 176:
Guidance is given in the field of sentencing for criminal offences by the well known principle that where several offences are heard together and arise out of the same transaction it is a sound working rule that the sentences imposed for those offences should be made concurrent; it is inappropriate to sentence consecutively when the offences were all really involved in the same episode … I accept that the contraventions arose out of the one course or pattern of conduct. Although it is necessary to look at each contravention separately, nevertheless consideration must be given to the facts common to each contravention.
25 The "one course of conduct" principle has also been applied to other contraventions of the TPA which have attracted pecuniary penalties under s 76 of the TPA: see by way of example Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v IPM Operation and Maintenance Loy Yang Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCA 11 (dealing with contraventions of s 45E); ABB Transmission and Distribution at [38]; Rural Press Ltd at [19] and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2010] FCA 790 at [221] - [227].
26 Section 76E(2) provides that in determining the appropriate pecuniary penalty, the Court is required to have regard to all relevant matters including:
1. the nature and extent of the act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission;
2. the circumstances in which the act or omission took place; and
3. whether the contravener has previously been found by the Court in proceedings under Pt V or Pt VI to have engaged in similar conduct.
27 The ACCC submitted that the principles that have been applied by the Court in determining penalties for contraventions of Pt IV of the TPA under s 76 of the TPA may be appropriately adapted and taken into account in the Court's assessment of an appropriate penalty under s 76E of the Act. In my view, the underlying contraventions of the TPA dealt with by ss 76 and 76E are of a different nature but the general principles applied by the Court in determining penalties under s 76 can and should be relied upon to the extent relevant in setting a penalty under s 76E of the TPA. Such a conclusion is not surprising. Sections 76 and 76E are drafted in similar terms and the matters to which the Court must have regard under s 76E(2) are the same mandatory considerations under s 76(1) of the TPA.
28 In Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited (1991) ATPR 41-076 at 52,152-52,153, French J identified the following additional considerations relevant to the assessment of a pecuniary penalty under s 76:
1. the nature and extent of the contravening conduct;
2. the amount of loss or damage caused;
3. the circumstances in which the conduct took place;
4. the size of the contravening company;
5. the degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market;
6. the deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended;
7. whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level;
8. whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the TPA as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention; and
9. whether the company has shown disposition to cooperate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the TPA in relation to the contravention.
29 Those considerations were approved and expanded upon by the Full Court in NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 and J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 172 ALR 532 as follows:
1. whether the respondent has engaged in similar conduct in the past;
2. the respondent's financial position; and
3. whether the conduct was systematic, deliberate or covert.
30 It is apparent that at least the fifth factor identified by French J (the degree of power it has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market) is not relevant in the context of s 76E. With this exception, each of the other factors identified by French J and the Full Court may be applied to the assessment of a penalty under s 76E.
31 A principal object of a penalty under s 76 is deterrence: Trade Practices Commission v Stihl Chain Saws (Aust) Pty Ltd (1978) ATPR 40-091 at 17,896 and Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited at 52,152-52,153. In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 215 ALR 301 at [39], Goldberg J concluded that:
The penalty imposed must be substantial enough that the party realises the seriousness of its conduct and is not inclined to repeat such conduct. Obviously the sum required to achieve this object will be larger where the court is setting a penalty for a company with vast resources.
32 Similarly, the principal object of a penalty under s 76E is deterrence, both specific and general. The Explanatory Memorandum to the bill which become Amendment Act No 1 (Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 - Explanatory Memorandum, pp 49-50) referred to deterrence as an objective and adverted to facilitation of civil proceedings in which both penalties and compensation could be sought, in the following terms:
4.3 The lack of availability of civil pecuniary penalties and disqualification orders for enforcement of consumer law represents a significant gap in the range of enforcement options available to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). While criminal sanctions provide an important deterrent against the most serious forms of contravening misconduct, and civil remedies can achieve timely outcomes for consumers, there is currently no means of obtaining sanctions in the timely manner available under the civil regime.
4.4 Civil pecuniary penalties and disqualification orders are a feature of other national regulatory regimes - including the restrictive trade practices provisions in Part IV of the TP Act. Their availability will enable a more targeted and proportionate regulatory response, in addition to increasing the deterrent effect of consumer law provisions.
4.5 Moreover, at present the ACCC and ASIC are unable to obtain compensation for consumers when bringing a criminal action alone. If a matter is serious enough to warrant a penalty, the ACCC or ASIC must institute both civil and criminal proceedings in order to secure any type of compensation. Civil pecuniary penalties and disqualification orders will provide an alternative to this duplicative process, and provide timely and proportionate resolutions to instances of illegal conduct that do not call for criminal sanctions to be sought.
33 Of course, a penalty must not be so high as to be oppressive: Stihl Chainsaws (Aust) Pty Limited; NW Frozen Foods (at 293) and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum (No 2) [2005] FCA 254 at [5].
34 As the parties submitted, the cases that have considered s 76E (see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Gourmet Goody's Family Restaurant Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1216 at [10]; CI & Co Pty Ltd at [31] - [32] and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Le Sands Restaurant and Le Sands CafÉ Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 105 at [9]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Al Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1377) are of limited or no assistance in determining an appropriate penalty in this case. They did not concern product safety. Each was concerned with a contravention of ss 52 or 53C of the TPA.
35 In Gourmet Goody's Family Restaurant, Jagot J imposed penalties under s 76E of the Act. The Respondents had contravened s 53C of the TPA by failing to specify in a prominent way and as a single figure the single price for the goods supplied in their restaurant. In imposing a penalty of $13,200 for each contravention, her Honour stated that:
... it is important that I record that I am satisfied on the agreed statement of facts that the penalty which the parties have agreed between themselves in an appropriate reflection of the circumstances of the culpability of each respondent in the proceedings. In reaching this conclusion I have had regard to the fact that a principal object of a penalty under s 76 is deterrence.
…
… Specific deterrence of the respondents themselves is not a weighty consideration in this case because as soon as the respondents were notified of the problem by the ACCC, they took immediate action to rectify the problem
…
… That having been said, general deterrence remains critical.
36 The process to be applied in arriving at a particular penalty was considered in the context of criminal sentencing by the High Court in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357. That process is applicable to the assessment of pecuniary penalties under s 76 of the TPA: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd (2005) ATPR 42-070 at [68]. In Markarian, the plurality judgment held:
1. the Court's assessment of the appropriate penalty is a discretionary judgment based on all relevant factors (see [27]);
2. "… careful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors, a yardstick." (see [31]);
3. it will rarely be appropriate for a Court to start with the maximum penalty and proceed by making a proportional deduction from that maximum (see [31]);
4. the Court should not adopt a mathematical approach of increments or decrements from a pre-determined range, or assign specific numerical or proportionate value to the various relevant factors (see [37] citing Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at 611-612 [74] - [76] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ);
5. it is not appropriate to determine an "objective" sentence and then adjust it by some mathematical value given to one or more factors such as plea of guilty or assistance to authorities (see [37] citing Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at 611-612 [74] - [76] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ);
6. the Court "may not add and subtract item by item from some apparently subliminally derived figure" to determine the penalty to be imposed (see [39]); and
7. since the law strongly favours transparency, accessible reasoning is necessary in the interests of all, and, while there may be occasions where some indulgence in an arithmetical process will better serve the end, it does not apply where there are numerous and complex considerations that must be weighed (see [39]).
In my view, that process is also applicable to the assessment of pecuniary penalties under s 76E of the TPA.