Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Institute of Professional Education Pty Ltd
[2021] FCA 1516
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2021-12-03
Before
Bromwich J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (7 paragraphs)
- The respondent pay the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty of $153,000,000.
- The respondent pay the applicants the costs of and incidental to this proceeding.
- Order 2 of the orders made on 16 May 2017 be vacated and replaced by the following order 4.
- The applicants not seek to enforce against the respondent: (a) order 1 above for pecuniary penalties; (b) order 2 above for costs; (c) orders 1 and 2 made on 1 March 2021 for compensation under s 237 of the Australian Consumer Law (contained in Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (ACL); or (d) any orders made for refunds under s 232(6)(a) of the ACL, without first obtaining the leave of the Court to do so.
- Order 4 does not apply to action taken seeking to prove compensation and costs in the external administration of the Australian Institute of Professional Education Pty Ltd (in liquidation) as unsecured creditors for which no leave of the Court is required. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
BROMWICH J: 1 Substantial penalties are called for when a commercial enterprise systematically predates on both a government education support scheme designed to help disadvantaged members of the Australian community, and consequently, upon those consumers. Such penalties are essential to advance the principal objective of deterrence in civil pecuniary penalty proceedings. General deterrence is especially important in the circumstances of this case. 2 The applicants, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the Commonwealth of Australia, brought their case against the respondent, the Australian Institute of Professional Education Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (AIPE), for contraventions of ss 21(1), 29(1)(g), 29(1)(i), 76 and 78 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), being Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA). While AIPE was liable for penalties under s 224(1)(a)(ii) of the ACL for contraventions of each of those provisions, penalties are only sought in respect of the unconscionable conduct proven contrary to s 21 of the ACL. 3 The Vocational Education and Training Fee Higher Education Loan Program (VET FEE-HELP or VFH Scheme) is funded by the Australian Government (and thus taxpayers) to improve access to vocational education and training (VET). The applicants brought their case in relation to the enrolment of plainly unsuitable consumers in online VET courses provided by AIPE and funded under the VFH Scheme. The applicants proved their case in a contested trial in two separate but related ways: (a) They made out an overall case in relation to a system of unconscionable conduct (system conduct) in enrolment practices; and (b) They made out an illustrative case in respect of a small sample of individual consumers, dealing with recruitment conduct antecedent to enrolment (illustrative conduct), which enabled much greater detail of the conduct leading to the system conduct to be exposed. 4 Most of the case was defended unsuccessfully by AIPE. Only the case in respect of the individual consumers was largely conceded as to conduct which was substantially beyond challenge, but not as to the consequences that should flow from that conduct. 5 AIPE's enrolment scheme was designed to maximise revenue from the VFH Scheme, and to minimise costs. An essential part of these costs was to provide educational services to each enrolled consumer. The system conduct case affected approximately 9,000 consumers. The illustrative conduct was proven in respect of 12 out of 13 individual consumers. This created two classes of penalties for determination. For the following reasons, I have decided that the total appropriate penalty to be imposed is $153 million. This is made up of: (a) $150 million for the overall system of unconscionable conduct; and (b) $3 million for separate unconscionable conduct in respect of the 12 individual consumers, being $250,000 per consumer. 6 My reason for imposing these penalties is that they may serve as a clarion call as to the consequences of engaging in such behaviour. I regret that AIPE is in now in liquidation so that, at best, a small proportion of that amount is going to be paid. A further regret is that no individual associated with AIPE's conduct is being made accountable. This latter regret in particular extends to AIPE's former Chief Executive Officer, Mr Amjad Khanche, who is not a party to the proceeding and is therefore not able to be made the subject of any liability or other adverse findings against him in person, or any related penalty. That is so despite his conduct forming an important part of basis for AIPE's liability, as detailed at some length in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Institute of Professional Education Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2019] FCA 1982 (liability judgment). 7 The liquidators of AIPE considered that the question of penalty could be determined on the papers without the need for the additional costs of a hearing to be incurred. In the event that a further oral hearing was required, the liquidators suggested in subsequent written submissions that it may be appropriate that the Court make an order that the applicants fund them to appear as a contradictor in relation to the question of the appropriate penalty to be imposed. I did not consider imposing any further outlay on the Australian taxpayer as result of AIPE's actions to be appropriate and declined to make such an order. The bulk of the submissions were made in writing by the applicants, to which AIPE has responded by way of brief written submissions, including the suggestion of funding the liquidator referred to above. AIPE's submissions addressed the question of costs postdating the liability judgment, and the enforcement of costs orders and compensation orders. No submissions were made as to the quantum of the penalty to be imposed. There was ultimately only a short oral hearing, at which only the applicants appeared, in order to address the approach to be taken in arriving at an appropriate quantum of penalty. 8 The key conclusions reached in the liability judgment are reflected in declarations made on 1 May 2020, a copy of which are set out in Schedule A to these reasons. There was also a judgment adjudicating on how the Court should determine whether enrolment by AIPE of a consumer in an online course was the result of the unconscionable system of conduct or pattern of behaviour which was found to have existed in the liability judgment: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Institute of Professional Education Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 4) [2020] FCA 1811 (ACCC v AIPE No 4). That further adjudication resulted in compensation orders being made on 1 March 2021 in favour of the applicants, totalling just over $142 million between the two of them. 9 The compensation sum of just over $142 million was made up as follows. AIPE was paid $197 million in respect of almost 13,000 consumers enrolled as students. Of that sum, over $138 million (just over 70%) was ordered to be paid back in respect of students for whom it was established that they should never have been enrolled, corresponding to about 9,000 consumers. A further sum of just over $4.3 million was ordered to be paid to the Commonwealth in respect of 322 consumers enrolled in an AIPE online VET course during the period between 1 May 2013 and 1 December 2015 (relevant period) who completed one or more units of study in the course in which they were enrolled and met the criteria specified in sub-paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (c) of the orders made on 1 May 2020. 10 For the purposes of ACCC v AIPE No 4, key passages in the liability judgment were reproduced in a schedule to that judgment, and are reproduced again in Schedule B to these reasons. Those passages are a useful way in which to comprehend the seriousness of the conduct of AIPE. 11 The penalty must be appropriate to ensure deterrence, but not oppressive in the sense of being greater than deterrence requires. Because AIPE is in liquidation, there is no work for specific deterrence, which makes general deterrence the critical consideration. The applicants therefore seek penalties for the system of unconscionable conduct of $140 to $170 million and penalties of $6 to $7.2 million for the illustrative conduct involving 12 individual consumers (that is, $500,000 to $600,000 per consumer) for the following reasons, none of which can be seriously disputed: (a) Businesses must be deterred from unconscionably taking advantage of a power imbalance to engage in exploitative business practices, in order to adequately protect consumers. The need for that protection is greater when consumers are vulnerable to exploitative practices. This was specifically proven in respect of the 12 consumers, and that in turn was illustrative in relation to the separately proven system conduct. (b) A feature of VET FEE-HELP is that it was designed to help members of the community who would otherwise not embark upon further education or training for vocational (that is, employment) purposes. The 12 consumers had characteristics such as economic instability, low levels of education, limited literacy and numeracy skills, limited computing skills and in some cases, limited computer and/or internet access. (c) The type of consumer targeted by AIPE's sales and marketing techniques as designed and as deployed via its staff and recruitment agents, had an inherently higher risk of being unsuitable for the courses being sold, and a correspondingly inherently lower prospect of being able to detect any false or misleading aspect of the information provided to them. This was especially marked in respect of the Indigenous communities towards whom these techniques were directed. The evidence established that this conduct was callous and deliberately targeted. (d) The use of commission-remunerated agents created additional incentives to engage in unconscionable conduct. This creates a need for corresponding penalty incentives to make sure that such arrangements, including systems and incentives, contain appropriate precautions and checks. Those who deploy these methods of sale must not be able to merely characterise the actions of these agents as being the unauthorised conduct of individuals in circumstances such as these. (e) When any unconscionable conduct occurs in systems and incentives, serious penalty consequences are appropriate for any failure to address these issues promptly and effectively, or at all. (f) Thwarting the public interest purpose of the VFH Scheme is an important factor to take into account. The end of this particular scheme does not lessen the need for deterrence as there will always be government schemes in which the need to provide assistance, sometimes with a measure of urgency, may outweigh the ability or time to implement sufficient systemic protections. The arguable laxness of a government scheme it not a reason to reduce the penalties to be imposed on those who predate upon it. To do that is tantamount to victim blaming. If anything, that tends to heighten the need for general deterrence. (g) Penalties cannot be merely a cost of doing business, allowing them to be a calculated risk. 12 The maximum penalty for the contraventions for which penalties are sought was $1.1 million per contravention. The maximum penalty is a penalty yardstick. As there were many thousands of contraventions constituting the proven unconscionable system conduct, particular features require consideration in determining an appropriate penalty. 13 Section 224(4) of the ACL provides that there can only be one penalty imposed when conduct contravenes two or more provisions in respect of the same conduct, as opposed to merely similar or repeated conduct: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Yazaki Corporation [2018] FCAFC 73; 262 FCR 243 at [217]-[224]. As already noted, penalties are only sought for s 21 contraventions in respect of the 12 consumers, not the ss 29(1), 76 and 78 contraventions arising out of the same conduct. No system conduct penalties are sought in respect of those 12 consumers. 14 While separate penalties should ordinarily be imposed for separate contraventions, grouping inextricably interrelated events as a course of conduct is an analytical tool permitted when appropriate: Yazaki at [234]-[235]. In a case such as this, in relation to the system conduct contravention, there may be no meaningful maximum penalty because of the sheer number of contraventions: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181; 340 ALR 25 at [157]. In this case, even if there was only one breach per consumer affected, there were some 9,000 contraventions, with a maximum penalty of $1.1 million each. In those circumstances a single penalty is appropriate for that course of conduct and individual penalties are appropriate for each contravention in respect of each of the 12 consumers. Once the two classes of penalty have been ascertained, there needs to be a final "totality" check, and any adjustment made to ensure the penalties are appropriate overall. 15 The applicants submit that I should consider the following aspects in determining an appropriate penalty: (a) The systemic and protracted nature of the conduct, already detailed above, warrants a very strong deterrent penalty. The system deployed by AIPE was such that it rewarded unconscionable conduct and failed to protect consumers against it. (b) The conduct was deliberate and arose out of the conduct of both management going to the very top of the organisation, and lower level staff, including a network of inadequately trained, monitored and disciplined recruiters who made misleading statements and engaged in unfair sales tactics as representatives of AIPE. (c) A windfall profit motive was a dominant consideration in AIPE's conduct which was allowed and encouraged, or at least not meaningfully discouraged. (d) There was accordingly no adequate and effective culture of compliance, and indeed an active culture of non-compliance. (e) Significant loss to the Commonwealth (and through it, the public) and corresponding harm has taken place, in the sum of at least $142 million. (f) Liquidators were appointed to AIPE in October 2016 and were granted leave to defend the proceedings. They made admissions as to liability and contest liability on a narrowed basis following those admissions. The applicants submit that these admissions were "limited" and that the proceedings were otherwise vigorously contested, and that there is no real basis for a cooperation discount. (g) There are no prior contraventions by AIPE to take into account. (h) AIPE obtained overall revenue in excess of $210 million from the Commonwealth, only a minority legitimately, or at least not shown to be illegitimately. As revenue and enrolments rose over time, the size of AIPE's operations and accordingly expenditure, did not, strongly supporting the inference that there was never any real intention to provide services to most of the additional consumers enrolled as students. 16 The first class of penalties to consider are the penalties in respect of the 12 individual consumers. The penalties sought by the applicants of $500,000 to $600,000 per consumer for the 12 individual consumers was arrived at by reference to the maximum per individual consumer contravention of $1.1 million. The focus in these proposed penalties is on the vulnerable consumer features identified at [11(b)] above. The applicants correctly submit that AIPE was callously indifferent to the interests of those consumers and deliberately engaged in the unconscionable conduct directed to them. Each was exposed to the risk of loss of around $14,000, plus a reduction in the lifetime amount that they could borrow from the federal government through the VFH Scheme. The conduct directed towards the 12 individual consumers is also correctly characterised by the applicants as being inconsistent with their basic dignity, and exposing them to financial and social consequences beyond their means. 17 The applicants submit that a penalty of or approaching half the maximum would properly signify the gravity of the wrongdoing. While the circumstances varied as between each of the 12 consumers, the overall seriousness of each circumstance was comparable, warranting a uniform penalty for each. 18 Synthesising all of the reasons above, with a particular focus on those specifically advanced in relation to the 12 individual consumers, I consider that the penalty proposed per contravention is excessive when regard is had to the amounts of money involved of some $14,000 per contravention. This is so given the range of conduct which is contemplated with a maximum possible penalty of $1.1 million. That said, there is no simple mathematical equation between the sum lost by the consumers and the possible penalty. Further, while the sum of money concerned per consumer may appear small to some, particularly in the context of the larger sums involved in this matter, the manner in which the 12 consumers were targeted and taken advantage of by AIPE (all set out in detail in Schedule A) must be reflected in the penalty amount. However, there remains a need for some degree of proportionality to reflect these factors. I consider that at a penalty of $400,000 per individual contravention would have been sufficiently stern to achieve the necessary level of general deterrence. A higher figure would have been justified if there was a serious issue of specific deterrence. However, taking totality into account both for the combined penalty for the 12 consumers, and for the very substantial system penalty considered below, I will adjust that downwards to a figure of $250,000 per consumer. This produces a combined penalty of $3 million in respect of the 12 consumers the subject of the illustrative conduct. 19 In relation to the quantum of the second class of penalty, for the rest of the 9,000 or so consumers constituting those affected by the system conduct, the applicants submit that the maximum penalty is not a useful guide for the reasons advanced as summarised above at [14]. However, the following points were advanced in support of a penalty range of $140 to $170 million in respect of the system conduct: (a) Benefits of at least $142 million were obtained from the conduct. (b) The conduct underpinned most of the operations of AIPE's business. Training and operations did not expand in line with revenue, indicating that this outcome was intentional. The expenditure that did take place then essentially appeared part of a design to obtain public money. (c) The profits were an extraordinary proportion of income - while the information available was limited, AIPE's own unaudited profit and loss assessment for the 2014-2015 financial year, capturing only a small proportion of the wrongdoing, suggested a gross profit margin of more than 80% and a net profit margin of almost 70%. In real monetary teams, AIPE had a total income of just over $50 million in that financial year, which resulted in a gross profit of over $41 million and a net profit of almost $35 million. Revenue for AIPE increased after that without a corresponding increase in expenses. (d) Any penalty must address the potential judgment call a company may make that conduct would not be detected, or if detected, would only incur a penalty in respect of the wrongfully gained benefits. The penalty should be more than a mere disgorging of profit, otherwise it may be thought to be worth the risk given the difficulties in detection and successful litigation. (e) While the existing compensation orders should be taken into account, they serve a fundamentally different function, being redress, rather than prevention or deterrence: see Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; 258 CLR 482 at [24], where compensation was described as a "competing consideration" of prevention and deterrence. (f) Even though the compensation will almost certainly not be paid, given the current state of AIPE's affairs, the penalty should not be reduced in light of this being likely. (g) Whatever weight is given to the competing factors explored, it should not be a crude dollar for dollar accounting process. (h) A penalty in the range of $140 to $170 million is necessary to take into account the need for deterrence. 20 The most startling figure revealed above is the huge profitability of AIPE's operations, which reinforces the liability judgment conclusion that the delivery of educational services to most of the consumers who were enrolled was never seriously in contemplation. This makes it clear that a high level of immorality stood behind the deliberate and protracted unconscionable conduct of a highly predatory nature. Given that little if any compensation is likely to be paid, the penalty needs to be a strong signal that it will exceed the gross benefit of the conduct. There should be no deduction for the costs of obtaining that benefit, because they are costs in aid of an illegal enterprise. However, taking compensation into account to some degree, the appropriate penalty for the system conduct is $150 million. This is a notable excess over the minimum amount of revenue likely to have been obtained as a result of the conduct, being some $142 million. 21 The total pecuniary penalty to be ordered will therefore be $153 million, taking into account totality. 22 I cannot see any good reason why costs should not follow the event, subject to the constraint of obtaining leave of the Court before enforcing them. However, both the costs now ordered, and the compensation orders previously made on 1 March 2021, may be proved in the external administration of AIPE without the leave of the Court being required. I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bromwich.