Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation v Commonwealth

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Dafne & Lodin has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. On 5 September 2025, a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2), made property settlement orders in proceedings between Ms Lodin ("the wife") and Mr Dafne ("the husband"). The husband has appealed against those orders.

1. The proceedings were commenced on 7 December 2018. There is no apparent explanation as to why the matter took some seven years to be finalised. Clearly that is not at all ideal.
2. The parties were divorced in mid-2019. There were no children of the relationship.
3. The relationship between the parties commenced on 28 September 2005. They were married in early 2007 and separated on 13 January 2015 (at [52(qqq)]).
4. The primary judge found that the total net property and superannuation to be divided (including some $347,015 of add backs) was $1,032,028.
5. His Honour found that the initial financial contributions favoured the husband and that he brought into the relationship the bulk of the property to be divided, in particular, his one half share of a property at Suburb B.
6. Nonetheless, the primary judge found that the wife had brought with her "the financial resources and the monies then available to her which were utilised to support her and injected into the family expenses for both her and the husband" (at [124]).
7. His Honour went on to find that the husband's financial contributions were greater than those of the wife during the period of cohabitation, but the non-financial contributions of each of the parties were approximately equal. The post-separation contributions were found to favour the husband.
8. This led his Honour to conclude that the wife's contribution entitlement was 20 per cent and the husband's 80 per cent.
9. Having regard to the disparity between the party's capital positions and the fact that the wife had difficulty finding accommodation in Australia, as opposed to the husband who had two properties available to him in which to live, the appropriate division was 26.5 per cent to the wife and 73.5 per cent to the husband.

1. On 26 November 2025, the wife filed an Application in an Appeal seeking leave to join Ms C and Ms D as respondents to the appeal and to adduce further evidence.
2. The first proposed respondent, Ms C, is the husband's current partner. The second is the husband's adult daughter from his earlier relationship. It is necessary to delve a little into the matter to understand the relevance of the Application in an Appeal.
3. The wife filed a Summary of Argument on 22 December 2025. It does not deal with the grounds of appeal at all but rather challenges the primary judge's findings as to the content of the property pool. In particular, she complained that the pool of property to be divided did not include any part of a property at Suburb F.
4. The proposed further evidence goes to those issues and not those raised in the Notice of Appeal.
5. Quite clearly the wife is seeking to run a cross-appeal. She attempted to file a Notice of Cross-Appeal on 3 November 2025, but it was rejected by the appeal judicial registrar because it was out of time. The wife also attempted to file an Application in an Appeal for an extension of time in which to file a Notice of Cross-Appeal but that application was defective in a number of respects and was ultimately not accepted. The appeal judicial registrar sent two letters advising the wife as to the correct procedure to be followed in order to seek an extension of time to file a Notice of Cross-Appeal, but the wife did not take any of those steps.
6. Thus, at the hearing of the appeal, the only issues before the Court were those raised by the husband's Notice of Appeal.
7. The husband and the wife are acting for themselves and I was concerned that a procedural injustice may have occurred as a result of the wife filing her cross-appeal too late. I sought submissions from the wife as to what she said the errors in the primary judgment were. I must confess, I had much difficulty understanding them. Doing the best I can, the following are her submissions.
8. The husband was previously married to Ms E, who owned a number of properties. Ms E died in 2004. The probate of her Will was granted in mid-2005, with the husband as the executor.
9. The probate documents reveal that Ms E owned a number of properties, including a 50 per cent interest in the Suburb B property. The other 50 per cent interest was held by the husband.
10. Pursuant to Ms E's will, the husband's two children, Ms D and Mr G, were to receive half each of the estate of Ms E.
11. As to the Suburb B property, his Honour found:
    1. ...[Ms D] ended up with a transfer of a half share (held with the husband) of the [Suburb B] property and a transfer of the [Suburb H] property into her sole name ... Given the above history, the Court accepts the beneficial entitlements of both [Ms D] and [Mr G] in that regard, which support the dismissal of the wife's application to set aside the transfer of 50% of the [Suburb B] property to [Ms D] on 14 September 2001...
12. This led to the conclusion that "The Court is satisfied that none of the circumstances set out in section 106B of the Act apply and accordingly, the wife's application to so set aside those transfers must be set aside" (at [110]).
13. The wife was unable to explain why this reasoning was erroneous. The 50 per cent interest owned by Ms E went to her estate and then to her beneficiaries. The husband had no beneficial interest in it and that one half share interest could not form part of the matrimonial property to be divided between the parties.
14. As to the Suburb F property, his Honour found (at [110]):
    • [Ms D] also ended up with a transfer of the husband's interest in the [Suburb F] property as part of a purchase arrangement with him and with the other 2 registered proprietors of that property who were business partners and friends of the husband.
    • The [Suburb F] property did not form part of the estate of the late [Ms E].
    • The husband gave evidence that, as a result of financial difficulties facing, it would appear, the other 2 registered proprietors whereby their business was facing insolvency mortgage instalments owing to the National Australia Bank had not been paid and the bank had taken enforcement steps and had arranged for the sale of the [Suburb F] property.
    • The husband said that he had only had very short notice of this and that the sale had been arranged for 11 days after he became aware of this issue.
    • The husband said that he and his partners sought to see whether any of their extended family could step in and pay out the National Australia Bank. The families of the other 2 partners were unable to do so. The husband's recollection was that [Ms D], at the time, worked for the National Australia Bank and that she was able to assist with implementing a refinance whereby she became the sole proprietor of the [Suburb F] property taking out a new mortgage in her own name and paying out the then existing mortgage to National Australia Bank to prevent the property being sold.
15. In short, Ms D brought the Suburb F property from the mortgagee in possession.
16. Again, there is no basis for treating that as a disposition of what otherwise would have been marital property available for division, because had Ms D not acquired the property by re-financing the mortgage, it would have been sold by the bank.
17. The wife sought to challenge this by referring to the accounts in some way that I did not understand.
18. I formed the view that it would have been futile and not in the interests of justice to have adjourned the appeal to join the two proposed respondents and to enable the wife to file a Notice of Cross-Appeal out of time. That made the Application in an Appeal otiose and I dismissed it. The above are the reasons for doing so.

1. A judgment is presumed to be correct until an appeals court determines that it is beset by error (Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation v Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621).
2. A property division is a discretionary judgment and the following principles from House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 apply (at 504-505):

...The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred...

1. Notwithstanding that the appellant is acting for himself, it is still incumbent upon him to demonstrate error. It is not for the Court to search through the record to try and find an error, unless one is reasonably apparent on its face.
2. As the Full Court of the Federal Court said in Bahonko v Sterjov [2008] FCAFC 30; (2008) 166 FCR 415:
   1. ...it is a fundamental aspect of the appellate process that appeals are made available for the correction of error. This basic principle imposes an obligation upon an appellant to identify where error is to be found in a judgment under appeal, whether it be an error of fact, law or general principle. It is not necessary for an appeal court to hunt through all the material at first instance and recanvass every aspect of it unless an occasion arises for suspecting, on reasonable grounds (generally those provided by the appellant), that such an examination may yield a conclusion of appellable error.
3. The husband's contention at the trial was that the wife's application for property settlement should be dismissed because it was not just and equitable to make any property settlement order at all. Many of the husband's submissions were based upon the premise that the relationship was only two years in length. In doing so, the husband relied upon what was described as a "divorce agreement" dated 29 May 2009. His Honour placed little weight on that agreement and found that it was not binding. It certainly did not bind the Court under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). In any event, and importantly, his Honour found that the relationship continued with mutual contributions being made until 2015. It follows that even if the agreement was accurate in recording a separation, the relationship was renewed shortly after.
4. Thus, the premise for a lot of the husband's submissions was not established.

Ground 1 - Did his Honour conflate the considerations to be made under s 79(2) with non-legal considerations?

1. In Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52; (2012) 247 CLR 108, the High Court said at [52]:

Whether it was just and equitable to make a property settlement order in this case was not answered by pointing to moral obligations. Reference to "moral" claims or obligations is at the very least apt to mislead. First, such references appear to invite circular reasoning. On its face, the invocation of moral claims or obligations assumes rather than demonstrates the existence of a legal right to a property settlement order and further assumes that the extent of that claim or obligation can and should be measured by reference to the several matters identified in s 79(4). Second, the term "moral" might be used to refer to a claim or obligation that is based on the kind of contribution described in s 79(4)(b) - "the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage ... to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them". But nothing is gained by describing such a contribution as founding a "moral" claim or obligation. Moreover, if the word "moral" was being used in this context with some wider meaning or application, it is important to recognise that it is used in a way that finds no legal foundation in the Act or elsewhere. It is, therefore, a term that may, and in this case did, mislead. The rights of the parties were to be determined according to law, not by reference to other, non-legal considerations. The references by Brennan J in Fisher v Fisher to moral claims should not be misunderstood as suggesting otherwise.

(Emphasis in original)

1. The correct procedure to be followed was set out by the High Court in paragraph [42] as follows:

In many cases where an application is made for a property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife. No less importantly, the express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements have been brought to an end by the voluntary severance of the mutuality of the marital relationship. That is, any express or implicit assumption that the parties may have made to the effect that existing arrangements of marital property interests were sufficient or appropriate during the continuance of their marital relationship is brought to an end with the ending of the marital relationship. And the assumption that any adjustment to those interests could be effected consensually as needed or desired is also brought to an end. Hence it will be just and equitable that the court make a property settlement order. What order, if any, should then be made is determined by applying s 79(4).

(Emphasis in original)

1. The primary judge said:
   1. The Court accepts that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable that there should be a property adjustment order in terms of the principles set out in Stanford, including that without such an order the wife's expectation of support and financial assistance to her arising from her marriage with the husband would be negated by his view that she should receive no such support.
2. The husband submits that the words "the wife's expectation of support and financial assistance" are a reference to a moral claim which does not justify a property division. However, his Honour's reasons must be read as a whole.
3. I have already referred to the finding that the wife contributed all of the assets and funds she had available to her from China when she came into the relationship.
4. The primary judge found that during the relationship, the wife had engaged in some casual employment, the income from which was used to acquire furniture, pay for training courses for one of the children and pay for family expenses (at [129]). The wife assisted the husband in the care of his two young children (from his previous relationship) and looked after, to some degree, his aging father when he was dying.
5. In addition, the wife carried out garden maintenance, mowing lawns, house maintenance and repairs including some construction work on the five properties that the husband said he owned. In addition, the wife did much of the domestic household work.
6. These contributions made by the wife had the effect that the property holdings held at the end of the relationship did not reflect those contributions. Accordingly, it was not an error of the primary judge to find that it was therefore just and equitable to embark on property settlement orders. The implicit assumptions as to the use of the property that lasted throughout the relationship ceased to apply.
7. This ground is not made out.

Ground 2 - Did the primary judge fail to undertake an independent consideration of s 79(2) at each step of the decision-making process?

1. This ground was expanded by some 10 sub-grounds, each of which is, in reality, a complaint that the matter raised in that sub-ground was not considered by the primary judge and if considered, would have led to a different outcome.

1. His Honour was well aware of this and said:
   1. ...The Court accepts that there were no joint bank accounts and no real estate properties jointly acquired by the husband and the wife. In fact, the husband acquired no property, himself, after the death of [Ms E] other than through the implementation of the provisions of [Ms E's] Will.
2. That of course does not negate the contributions already noted. I am unable to accept the evidence that this coupled with the wife's proposal from 2014, that she reside at the Suburb B property by paying $100 per week, confirms that "both parties understood they had no claim to each other's property and conducted their affairs on that basis" (husband's Summary of Argument filed 25 November 2026 as amended at the hearing, paragraph 11).

Both parties were unaware of the other party's financial situation

1. The fact that neither party was completely aware of the extent of the other party's property situation does not lead to a finding that there should be no property settlement. It is clear enough that some matters were known about the property and it is also clear that the wife needed to issue numerous subpoenas to understand the full extent of the financial dealings of the husband. The fact that they had some, but not complete knowledge, does not seem to me to be a factor that weighs particularly heavily as to whether or not it would be just and equitable to make a property settlement order.

1. The "divorce agreement" is dated 29 May 2009 and states "As of today, we have terminated our marriage and no obligation will be held to each other; we will be free to do things we each like" (Exhibit 15). It was obviously not a binding financial agreement under the Act (which the agreement itself noted).
2. Such an agreement may be a factor that the Court will take into account, but in this matter his Honour gave it very little weight because it was not binding and, on his Honour's findings, the relationship did continue for another six years with mutual contributions being made.

The delay in commencing proceedings and applying for divorce

1. I do not understand why a delay in commencing proceedings bears upon whether or not it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order.
2. The proceedings were commenced within the time provided for within the Act. The husband submitted that he only realised that he needed to go through a formal process of divorce and not rely on the agreement of 29 May 2009 when he received a Letter of Demand from the wife's then solicitor on 16 August 2018. That may be so, but it cannot justify dismissal of the wife's claim.

1. The fact that the husband is in poor health does not necessarily mean it was not just and equitable to make a property settlement order, although of course, it may well bear upon what order is just and equitable in all of the circumstances.

The wife's entitlement to a retirement pension in China

1. The finding challenged by the husband (which is emphasised in the following quote) must be seen in the relevant context. His Honour said:
   1. The Court determines as follows: -

...

(k) Items 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35- The Court is of the view that Item 32 appears to be the same as Item 30 as there is no evidence to support the wife having any other superannuation in Australia, other than [Super Fund 1], at Item 30. Further, there is no evidence to support the wife having any other pension entitlements in China and, accordingly, Items 31, 33 and 34 are excluded from the Balance Sheet. Further, there is no evidence to support the husband's assessment of a value of $865,795.00 at Item 31 or the value of $116,279.00 at Item 34. Similarly, there was no evidence to support the wife's assertion that the husband has superannuation either in Australia or China. Accordingly, Item 35 is excluded from the Balance Sheet.

1. Clearly, in that context, his Honour is referring to superannuation and similar entitlements.
2. In cross-examination, the wife did say that she was entitled to a pension in China which she could access at the age of 60. However, she added:

I did ask question. I made the inquiry with the Chinese consulate and I was told you have to go back. The problem is I can't go back

(Transcript 28 March 2022, p.63 lines 17-19)

1. There was some cross-examination as to payments to a social security fund made on her behalf. The wife said that merely gave her the entitlement to the pension which she had already described.
2. In any event, it appears from that evidence that there was no present entitlement to any payment unless the wife returned to China. His Honour found that the evidence available to him, including the documents from China, did not indicate any quantifiable financial benefit to the wife receivable while she was in Australia.
3. That would appear to be entirely correct.

The wife's financial resources and accommodation by Mr J

1. The husband complains that the primary judge failed to take into account the support of the wife by Mr J.
2. The primary judge accepted the evidence of Mr J and the wife that Mr J had lent money to the wife for use to pay her legal fees and living expenses. One loan was excluded as relating to post-separation expenses, but the Court accepted that the wife owed Mr J $44,000 and that she would at least seek to repay some of that sum to him (at [185]).
3. The husband repeated his contention that the wife's evidence that she was effectively homeless should be rejected and found that she was being supported by Mr J. The fact that he may have rented her a property from time-to-time does not necessarily indicate financial support.
4. The submission is simply that the case of the husband should have been preferred to that of the wife.
5. There is no attempt to identify error in the findings that were made.

The wife's discontinuation of her urgent application for spousal maintenance

1. I do not understand the relevance of this submission.

The wife's non-disclosure of real property in China

1. The husband asserted the wife held an interest in a property described as "[Property 1]" in China.
2. His Honour found that there was no evidence to support that proposition and the submissions did not seek to challenge that finding.
3. The husband submitted that in cross-examination the wife had admitted that she owned a business in China. A perusal of the transcript (Transcript 12 March 2025, p.589-590) reveals that it is impossible to draw such a finding from that evidence.

1. None of the above errors have been established and this ground does not succeed.

Ground 3 - The orders are not just and equitable

1. The husband contends that the primary judge erred by failing to take account of the following four matters.

Did the primary judge fail to consider the husband's actual circumstances?

1. The husband's submission is that he is a 72 year old pensioner with bank funds of approximately $2,000. He says he will be required to sell his family home in which he has lived for 28 years in order to raise the funds necessary to pay the wife. He does not refer to any evidence to support that proposition.
2. The primary judge was well aware that the husband did not have the ready funds to make the requisite payment. His Honour said:
   1. Given the history of the husband and his potential ability to source financial assistance at least from either or both of [Ms D] and [Mr G], there is a potential for him to pay the wife the Settlement Sum, noting that [Ms D] is a joint owner with him in the [Suburb B] property and has other property which would, potentially, be available to assist him in obtaining sufficient monies to pay out the wife. Clearly, if the wife wished to repay [Mr J] any monies, she would have the funds provided by the husband in the form of the Settlement Sum available to her. If she paid out the sum of $44,000.00 to [Mr J], she would be left with in the order of $210,660.00. Orders will be made to implement a position whereby each party will, otherwise, retain their own personal property including life insurance policies, superannuation funds, shares and bank accounts. That appeared a common position.
3. His Honour is here doing no more than asserting that there may be other avenues available for the husband to raise the funds without the sale of the property. But the primary judge was well aware that if that was not the case, the property would have to be sold.
4. There was no other means to give effect to the orders and the fact that a property had to be sold does not mean the orders are not just and equitable.

Did the primary judge treat the husband's adult children's personal assets as the financial means of the husband?

1. In this submission the husband refers to the finding that has just been quoted and said that this in effect treated the husband's children's property as part of his financial means. It does not go as far as that. It simply says that there is more than one option available to the owners of the property to avoid its sale.

Did the primary judge err by ordering Ms D to sign sale documents and vacate her family home without any reference to s 90AE and when all claims under s 106B had been dismissed?

1. That is beside the point. No financial interest of Ms D is being diminished. She is simply obliged as a co-owner to join in the sale of the property so that the husband's interest in it can be realised. Such orders can be made under s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).

Did his Honour apply inconsistent treatment of third-party resources?

1. Under this ground, the husband complains that the financial arrangements between the wife and Mr J was treated differently to his financial arrangements with his children.
2. If the facts support a different treatment, so be it. That does not identify error.
3. This ground does not succeed.

Ground 4 - Did the primary judge err by making findings against the husband based on evidence covered by a direction under s 128 of the Evidence Act?

1. Under this ground, the husband complains that the primary judge relied upon evidence given by him, which was covered by a certificate under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). He relies on s 128(7) which states that:

(7) In any proceeding in an Australian court:

(a) evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate under this section has been given; and

(b) evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence;

cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence.

1. That provision can only be sensibly read as referring to any other proceeding, because otherwise the entire section would be entirely pointless.
2. This ground does not succeed.

Ground 5 - Was the husband denied procedural fairness?

The hearing was conducted in two 3-day periods, on 28 to 30 March 2022 and 10 to 13 March 2025

1. The husband submitted that the delay in the proceedings diluted the testing of the wife's inconsistencies and enabled her to change her solicitors and recast her case through several further amended applications.
2. That may be so, but presumably each application was heard on its merits and this of itself does not indicate any error.

The summary judgment application filed by husband on 6 February 2025 was not referred to in the final reasons and still remains open on the ComCourts portal

1. Obviously, this was an oversight. The application must have failed in any event because the primary judge made substantive property settlement orders.

The husband was denied opportunities to cross-examine

1. The husband submitted that he was denied meaningful opportunities to cross-examine and then provide three instances.
2. The first two matters refer to questions which were properly rejected by the primary judge.
3. At the conclusion of the evidence in the trial, the Court made the following notation:

The Court requested that the [wife] provide documents relating to the monies borrowed from Mr Magro and upon receipt of those documents they will be marked Exhibit "W".

(Orders dated 13 March 2025, Notation A)

1. The husband complains that he was thereby denied the opportunity to inspect, object to or cross-examine on those documents.
2. The husband was, however, given the opportunity to file and serve written submissions on or before 8 April 2025. He could have, but did not, raise any objection in that document. He also could have objected to that notation at the time it was made, but he did not.
3. The exhibit list shows that the documents were received and marked as an exhibit on 14 March 2025. In his written submissions filed 8 April 2025 at paragraph 35 and 36 the husband made submissions about those documents received in relation to Mr J. This rather suggests the husband was in a position to deal with the documents and no denial of procedural fairness is established.

The admission of the wife's affidavit as Exhibit B before cross-examination

1. In her examination in chief, the wife referred to an affidavit that she had sworn on 14 February 2022.She had previously identified it as an affidavit to be relied upon. It emerges from the transcript (although not very clearly) that the copy of the affidavit and annexures in the Court Book was not the complete copy. His Honour therefore received the complete copy of the affidavit and marked it as Exhibit B.
2. The complaint is that the premature admission of this exhibit denied the husband a fair and reasonable opportunity to test the evidence. I do not understand that because the cross-examination of the wife by the husband commenced after the tender of the affidavit. Indeed, the husband was given an adjournment so that he could read the complete copy of the affidavit prior to commencing his cross-examination.

Admission of the wife's final written submissions

1. The orders for written submissions provided that the submissions not exceed 10 pages, but the wife's were 34 pages in length. In fact, the submissions themselves were only 10 pages long, but they were accompanied by 24 pages of attachments.
2. The attachments to the submissions are varied, including copies of exhibits from the proceedings, transcripts from the proceedings, regulations as well as documents that appeared not to be in evidence, some of which were in Chinese characters.
3. The husband had the opportunity to respond to these documents and there is no suggestion by him that the primary judge improperly had regard to this. The husband's complaint is that the primary judge commented upon a photograph attached to the children's submissions. The photograph was of their deceased mother. As the primary judge said, that photograph was not relevant to the proceedings. That comment does not suggest his Honour materially took into account the additional material attached to the wife's written submissions.

The husband was denied procedural fairness on interim injunctions.

1. Finally, the husband complains of procedural unfairness as to interim injunctions made on 16 September 2020. In the final orders the primary judge continued the interim injunction but varied it so as to enable the husband to implement the payment of the sum ordered to be paid, but not otherwise.
2. His Honour said:
   1. ...In light of the husband's encumbering of the [Suburb B] property after the making of that injunctive order, there is sufficient evidence to ground its continuation, subject to that variation...
3. The complaint of the husband is that the operation of the 16 September 2020 order was not "straightforward for an elderly, self-represented non-native English speaker" (husband's Summary of Argument filed 25 November 2025 as amended at the hearing, paragraph 86). However, nonetheless an adverse finding was made against the husband for breaching it.
4. It can readily be understood that the operation of orders may be difficult for people in the husband's circumstances, but he did have more than enough time to understand and seek advice about it. In any event, the order is not overly complicated. Order 15 of the orders made on 16 September 2020 provided:

Upon the oral application of the [wife], pending further order or written agreement between the parties, and pending the [wife] putting on evidence about the proposed sale of [the Suburb B property], the [husband] is injuncted from disposing of, selling or further encumbering the said property.

1. I am not persuaded that any procedural unfairness is involved.

1. None of the grounds have been successful and it follows that the appeal will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and two (102) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Aldridge.