Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill

1. Within 7 days of the date of these Orders the De Facto Husband shall pay the sum of $600,000 $940,000 to the trust account of Coleman Greig Lawyers (Account Name: Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd Law Practice Trust Account, BSB: ..., Account Number: ...13) to be forthwith transferred into a controlled monies account held in the joint names of the parties.

1. That pending further Order and save only for the purpose of complying with these Orders, the De-Facto Husband shall be and is hereby restrained personally and in the capacity of director of J Pty Ltd from doing any and all of the following actions or otherwise requiring any other persons in respect of J Pty Ltd:

2.1 Transferring, selling, encumbering or further encumbering shares, or issuing further share capital;

2.2 Increasing his wage beyond $250,000.00;

2.3 Appointing any additional or alternate directors;

2.4 Providing financial remuneration to any staff member outside of their contracted salary without first giving the wife 28 days' prior written notice;

2.5 Writing off or forgiving any debtors owed to J Pty Ltd from 1 July 2024 to date other than for 'bad debts' certified to be such by the company accountant;

2.6 Issuing any dividends;

2.7 Preventing, delaying or otherwise hindering the prompt repayment of loans to J Pty Ltd, including the loans owing from Mr B being $54,500;

2.8 Altering, removing and/or destroying any documents that would be treated as business records including, but not limited to emails sent and received by the husband, invoices, accounting records (draft or final), contracts, agreements, licences, applications of any nature; and

2.9 Opening banking, credit or other accounts with any other banking institutions;

other than in the ordinary course of business and without first providing the De-Facto Wife with not less than twenty-eight (28) days' notice of such an intention to undertake any of the above actions.

1. That pending further Order, the De-Facto Husband shall within 7 days of the date of these orders re-establish or otherwise create a new account to permit and thereafter maintain the De-Facto Wife's viewing access to:

3.1 any and all accounting software/s utilised by J Pty Ltd including Xero;

3.2 J Pty Ltd banking with NAB;

3.3 Management software including but not limited to DocketBook and Verizon and any other platform used by J Pty Ltd to manage projects, equipment and services rendered; and

3.4 J Pty Ltd Corporate Drive (including projects and administration).

1. That in respect of the loan to be repaid from Mr B of $54,500.00, the De-Facto Husband in the capacity as director shall do all acts and things to cause the repayment/s to be made into the bank account as held by J Pty Ltd, being the NAB account #...63.

1. That within 7 days of the date of these Orders the De Facto Husband shall cause to be transferred a sum of $356,629.25 to National Australia Bank #...15 (in the name of N Pty Ltd).

6. That in respect of the following Trust entities:

6.1 L Pty Ltd ATF M Trust (ACN...); and

6.2 N Pty Ltd ATF Javad Family Trust (ACN...);

(hereinafter, "the Trusts")

the De-Facto Husband shall be hereby restrained personally and in the capacity of director of the corporate trustees from doing any and all of the following actions or otherwise requiring any other person in respect of the Trusts:

6.3 Transferring, selling, encumbering or further encumbering the Trusts;

6.4 Drawing any loans from the Trusts;

6.5 Appointing any additional or alternate directors, beneficiaries or trustees for each of the Trusts;

6.6 Exercising any power of appointment, including by altering or changing the Appointor for each of the Trusts;

6.7 Transferring any units held by the De Facto Husband in Javad Family Trust;

6.8 Causing or permitting any distributions, payments or allocations to be made;

6.9 Altering, removing and/or destroying any documents that would be treated as Trust records including, but not limited to emails sent and received by the husband, invoices, accounting records (draft or final), contracts, agreements, licences and/or applications of any nature; and

6.10 Opening banking, credit or other accounts with any other banking institutions;

other than without first providing the De-Facto Wife with not less than twenty-eight (28) days' notice of any intention to undertake any of the above actions.

7. That in respect of:

7.1 Any real property in the name of the trusts; and

7.2 any loans in the name of the Trusts;

the De Facto Husband shall cause to be paid sums sufficient to

7.3 Meet the mortgage repayments each month;

7.4 Make payment of all rates, utilities, accounting fees and associated taxation liabilities as and when they fall due; and/ or

7.5 Meet any maintenance costs.

1. The De Facto Husband is to copy the De Facto Wife into all email and other communication, and otherwise provide any and all documents, relating to the development and the works occurring or to be incurred to the Q Street Suburb R property and these Orders authorise the De Facto Wife to communicate with any nominated architect or builder about those works from time to time.

EE Properties

9. That in respect of the following developments:

9.1 CC Street, City T, Country U. Investment sum 4,750,000 Country U currency (HH building);

9.2 Property 1, DD Street, City T, Country U (JJ building); and

9.3 Property 2, DD Street, City T, Country U (KK building).

(hereinafter, "the EE Properties")

9.4 The De-Facto Husband shall do all acts and things and sign all documents as necessary to:

9.4.1 Comply with any and all obligation, such as signing documents, giving authorities, and taking all necessary steps in order to not hinder, delay or prevent the EE Properties being developed;

9.4.2 Provide notice to the De Facto Wife no less than 7 days prior to any further payments being made along with any documents relevant to such payments; and

9.4.3 Keep the De-Facto Wife informed of and copied into any and all correspondence as between the De-Facto Husband and any party relating to the EE Properties.

9.5 That the De-Facto Husband shall be restrained from transferring, selling, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the EE Properties unless as agreed by the De-Facto Wife or without first providing the De-Facto Wife with not less than twenty-eight (28) days' notice of such an intention to undertake any of the above actions.

GG (City T) Properties

10. That in respect of the following developments:

10.1 Property 1, FF Street, Country U; and

10.2 Property 2, FF Street, Country U;

(hereinafter, "the GG Properties")

The parties shall do all acts and things and sign all documents as necessary to affect the development of the GG Properties as directed or required by the sales agent of the GG Properties and including making payment as and when such payments fall due pursuant to the Schedule to the Reservation Contracts signed on 21 February 2025 for each of the GG Properties, with payments being made by the De-Facto Husband at first instance and provide notice to the De Facto Wife prior to such payments being made along with providing any transaction listings or remittance immediately after payment.

1. The parties shall be and are hereby restrained from causing to prevent, delay, hinder or otherwise further encumber the development of the GG Properties.
2. That the parties shall do all acts and things to cause for the other party to be copied into and included in any and all correspondence as exchanged with respect to the GG Properties.

1. That in respect of the Loan owing to the De-Facto Husband from the Estate of the Late Mr C Javad which the wife asserts is not less than $623,997.39 and the husband asserts is in the amount of $547,000 the De-Facto Husband:

13.1 Shall be and is hereby restrained from doing any and all of the following actions:

13.1.1 Taking steps to hinder, delay or otherwise prevent the repayment of the Loan owing to the De-Facto Husband; and

13.1.2 Unless in amounts less than $1,000 in respect of any transaction, taking steps to increase the Loan owing to the De-Facto Husband, unless as agreed with the De-Facto Wife or without first providing the De-Facto Wife with not less than twenty-eight (28) days' notice of such an intention to undertake any of the above actions.

13.2 Shall do all acts and things and sign all documents as necessary so as to cause any and all repayments received in respect of the Loan to be paid into the trust account of Coleman Greig Lawyers (Account Name: Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd Law Practice Trust Account, BSB: ..., Account Number: ...13) to be forthwith transferred into a controlled monies account held in joint names of the parties.

1. That the De-Facto Husband be permitted possession of the construction vehicle 1 held in the name of K Group Pty Ltd (ACN ...) currently located on the Suburb Z Property such that:

14.1 The De-Facto Husband (or J Pty Ltd) continue to meet:

14.1.1 the loan repayments of the loan secured against construction vehicle 1;

14.1.2 the wages of the driver driving the construction vehicle 1; and

14.1.3 any maintenance and service costs and otherwise make any repairs as and when necessary;

14.2 The De-Facto Husband (or J Pty Ltd) shall continue to make the following payments to K Group Pty Ltd each month:

14.2.1 The outstanding payments owing to K Pty Ltd of $21,284.85; and

14.2.2 The monthly sum of $3,300.00 (inclusive of GST) relating to leasing of construction vehicle 1.

1. That within 14 days of the date of these Orders the De facto Husband provide to the De Facto Wife with invoices, documents or records underpinning the invoices and any email communication enclosing the invoices or payment requests for the following payments made by J Pty Ltd:

15.1 23.7.25 $13,388.01

15.2 28.7.25 $9,837.77

15.3 31.7.25 $32,314.66

15.4 1.8.25 $3,981.12

15.5 1.8.25 $4,018.63

15.6 1.8.25 $5,535.56

15.7 1.8.25 $39,793.13

15.8 1.8.25 $264,496.56

15.9 4.8.25 $21,694.86

15.10 11.8.25 $22,517.85

15.11 18.8.25 $66,532.36

15.12 18.8.25 $501,135.34

15.13 21.8.25 $3,149.08

15.14 21.8.25 $35,771.87

15.15 25.8.25 $21,316.30

15.16 27.8.25 $15,023.36

15.17 27.8.25 $16,095.75.

Business Valuation

16. That within 42 days the parties shall do all acts and things to value:

16.1 J Pty Ltd;

16.2 The Q Street Suburb R Property;

16.3 The V Street Suburb W Property;

16.4 The Y Street Suburb Z Property; and

(the properties at subparagraph 2-5 above collectively referred to as the "Real property" for the purpose of these Orders).

1. For the purposes of these Orders Mr D of G financial services Pty Ltd is appointed to value J Pty Ltd.
2. For the purposes of these Orders H property services Pty Ltd is appointed to value any real property in issue.
3. The De-Facto Husband shall meet the costs of the valuation and any disbursements at first instance with the De-Facto Wife's half share to be paid at final settlement.

1. That the De-Facto Husband pay the De-Facto Wife's costs of and incidental to this Application on an indemnity basis.

AND THE COURT NOTES THAT reasons will be delivered in due course.

1. The Orders made 19 September 2025 are varied pursuant to paragraph 10.13 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) to discharge Order 14.2.2.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Javad & Nitika has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. On 19 September 2025, the Court heard the parties' competing interlocutory applications. At the completion of submissions, the Court made interim orders and indicated that reasons would be delivered in due course. These are those reasons.
2. On 24 July 2025, the applicant de facto wife ("the applicant") commenced proceedings for financial adjustment pursuant to s 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). Contained within her application were a series of interlocutory orders by way of injunctions in relation to property of the respondent de facto husband ("the respondent") as well as seeking orders for the payment of valuations and costs. All of the orders were opposed with the respondent contended that there was no necessity for the Court to make any injunctive orders, the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case for relief, and she otherwise had the capacity to meet her share of the costs of any valuations.
3. In the event the Court determined that there was a basis for the making of injunctive orders, the parties, through their respective senior counsel, reached substantial, albeit not complete agreement, in the form of a document which became Exhibit 1.
4. The proceedings are very much in their infancy and arise out of a de facto relationship which the applicant's senior counsel conceded was a little over four years, albeit contending that a relevant consideration at the final hearing will be contributions made by her in the period prior to the commencement of the relationship. The respondent contends the relationship is of shorter duration. There are no children of the relationship.
5. Valuations have not been undertaken and the quantum of the pool of assets is disputed with the applicant contending a pool of approximately $17 million while the respondent contends a pool of approximately $8 million. The applicant's senior counsel asserts that a court would at a final hearing divide the pool equally, while the respondent contends that a court would not make any adjustive order. Whether either of these outcomes are ambitious is a matter for determination at a later time.
6. The respondent conducts a civil contracting business through an enterprise called J Pty Ltd ("J Pty Ltd") which is owned and controlled by him. The financial accounts for the business disclose, according to senior counsel for the applicant, an after-tax profit of $2.97 million and net equity of approximately $2.45 million.
7. The applicant is the owner of K Group Pty Ltd ("K Pty Ltd") which she contends owns a construction vehicle subject to a lease and conducted the payroll operations for J Pty Ltd. The respondent contends that J Pty Ltd is the owner of the construction vehicle and the party liable under a chattel mortgage.
8. In addition to various items of real estate in the name of the respondent and in the name of companies controlled by the respondent, there are properties in City T which are in the process of being constructed.
9. In the applicant's Case Outline, her senior counsel submits as follows:
   1. It is the wife's contention that she commenced full-time employment with [J Pty Ltd] in 2018 where she remained until April 2021 - at that time she obtained external employment but remained working in and for [J Pty Ltd] around the commitments of that employment until separation including facilitating the business by the establishment of [K Pty Ltd]. The evidence of Ms [E] does not deny acceptance of such propositions, including on an interim basis.
   2. The husband commenced her employment and involvement with [J Pty Ltd] at the husband's request and in circumstances where he sought such assistance because the business was 'struggling' and had 'little equity' - contentions which the husband denies. Over the course of the relationship, including as an incident of her role in [J Pty Ltd], the wife had access to and visibility over the accounting software of [J Pty Ltd] and the bank accounts (and credit card facilities) of [J Pty Ltd], the husband and related entities.
   3. The wife was not remunerated for her role, but rather the parties' living expenses and the costs of the acquisition, maintenance and servicing of related debt were met until separation from, ultimately, the earnings of [J Pty Ltd].

...

1. It is the wife's case that she was subject to ongoing and serious physical, emotional, financial and conduct-based family violence by the husband over the course of the relationship, which conduct resulted in physical injuries and persisting fear of the husband. The husband denies such allegations and raises some crossing allegations.

(Reference to annexures omitted)

1. Senior counsel for the applicant contends the respondent, in the period following separation, sought to diminish the pool and/or prejudice the applicant's ultimate entitlements. In that respect, he submits as follows:
   1. In the period both immediately prior to, and in the aftermath of separation, the husband has engaged in a course of conduct calculated to diminish or otherwise prejudice the wife's entitlements in the matrimonial asset pool. By way of example, the husband has:

16.1 following transfers from associated (including offset accounts), of some $2.75million to the [J Pty Ltd] business account #[...]63 the husband has then transferred funds to his personal account and then at least some $1.508million to accounts not known to the wife;

16.2 made significant payments to businesses operated by personal friends without an evidence basis and in amounts inconsistent with prior dealings - $403,969.50 to [O] Pty Ltd on 21 August 2025 (the day after being served with the wife's proceedings) and $245,300 to [P] Pty Ltd on the same day;

16.3 removed the wife's name from the Sale Purchase Agreements for the [GG] ([City T]) properties, notwithstanding that the Reservation Contracts had been executed by both parties and that the parties had contributed approximately 30% of each unit's purchase price; and

16.4 caused the sum of $1,080,000 to be loaned to his brother, [Mr F Javad], which the husband now asserts has been largely repaid and a small balance forgiven; the husband does not disclose and the wife is unaware as to where such funds are held or have been directed]; and

16.5 threatened to sell the property at [Q Street], [Suburb R] at a loss as to deprive the wife of any benefit despite its purchase during the relationship and the wife's contributions to same**;**

such conduct being consistent with the broader threats which the wife deposes to the husband having made as to his intention to defeat her entitlements in these proceedings.

(Reference to annexures omitted)

1. Senior counsel for the respondent puts in issue many of the applicant's contentions. In her Case Outline, she submits as follows:

The ADW contends that she was employed for a period by [J Pty Ltd]. The RDH denies that was the case. He concedes that from time to time he provided the ADW with a periodic payment, cash, additional money for clothes and jewellery. There were frequent occasions where the ADW also took money from the company business accounts without the knowledge or consent of the RDH. On 23 July 2025 the ADW withdrew from the RDH's personal account an amount of about $500,000 being funds that belonged to [J Pty Ltd]. Again, this was done without the permission or consent of the RDH. There is no mention of this particular transaction made in the ADW's material which was sworn and filed the day prior. Her actions are concerning having regard to the relief she seeks.

Whilst there are significant allegations of family violence made by the ADW, the RDH denies that family violence was ever a feature of the parties' relationship.

...

Contrary to the case of the ADW, the RDH denies that the ADW made either financial or non-financial contributions to any of the assets that are currently in his name on the Balance Sheet. He says that the ADW helped herself to significant funds that belonged to either him or his company during the course of the relationship that have not been accounted for. Further, the parties kept their finances separate and there was no co-mingling of their finances or assets during the course of the relationship.

The RDH seeks to continue to conduct his affairs as he had during the course of the relationship and before it. That is, that he would seek to increase and diversify his assets as opportunities have arisen. The injunctive relief sought by the ADW would prevent him from doing this and give the ADW an element of control in the business affairs of the RDH that was not consistent with any interest that she might have in the assets that she seeks to injunct nor consistent with how the parties conducted their financial affairs during the short time that they were together.

Given that the RDH contends that there ought to be no adjustment in the ADW's favour and, if the Court was against him on that, the relatively modest adjustment that might, at best, be made in her favour, the RDH contends that the injunctions are oppressive. He seeks that the Court not exercise its discretion to provide such injunctive relief.

1. The circumstances in which this Court will grant an injunction are well settled. Section 114 of the Act provides the Court power to grant injunctions.
2. In Tsiang & Wu and Ors [2019] FamCAFC 128; (2019) FLC 93-911, the Full Court at [20] to [27] summarised the relevant law in relation to injunctions. To ground the applicant's relief, she needs to establish that there is a serious issue to be tried, alternatively expressed as a prima facie case for relief.
3. She must also establish that her claim for relief may be imperilled if the injunction is not granted. To that extent, the Court might be satisfied about risk of dissipation by an assessment of future possibilities of an event occurring, which may be established by the drawing of inferences.
4. The question of balance of convenience including prejudice to the respondent needs to be considered and the order made should be no more than is necessary. It is the party seeking the injunction who bears the onus of satisfying the Court that the circumstances justify the making of the order (Sieling and Sieling [1979] FamCA 23; (1979) FLC 90-627 at 78,262).
5. These are interlocutory proceedings. There has been no cross-examination of the parties. Many of the factual contentions are at issue. As a consequence, I am unable to make any findings beyond those that are the subject of agreement by the parties.

1. The applicant seeks an adjustment pursuant to s 90SM of the Act. The respondent puts in issue that there is a serious issue to be tried and contends that the applicant has not established a prima facie case for the making of the orders sought.
2. A prima facie case has, in one context, been described as a case with "a reasonable probability of that claim being successful in some measure" (Perkins and Perkins [1979] FamCA 4; (1979) FLC 90-600 at 78,054). In the context of an application for an interlocutory injunction, it was described by the High Court in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622 in the following terms:

... whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief ...

(Citations omitted)

1. It has alternatively been expressed in the context of injunctions as "a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo" (Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at 65). Even a "weak" case may ultimately be successful at trial.
2. I am satisfied the applicant has established a prima facie case. As the authorities to which I have referred indicate, she has to merely establish that there is a probability of a claim being successful in some measure. It does not have to necessarily amount to an exact satisfaction of the orders or outcome sought. I am satisfied that her contributions as set out in her affidavit and expanded upon in her counsel's, submissions are such that if the evidence as asserted by her is established then there is a probability that she will satisfy the making of an order pursuant to s 90SM of the Act.

1. The applicant has proffered an undertaking as to damages. In that respect, I note the observations of the Full Court in Blueseas Investments Pty Ltd v Mitchell and McGillivray [1999] FamCA 745; (1999) FLC 92-856. I am satisfied that the applicant's asset position and the undertaking given provides a measure of protection to the respondent. It was not suggested otherwise by senior counsel for the respondent.

1. I accept the submissions at paragraphs 23 and 26 of the Case Outline for the applicant as to the impact of the respondent's conduct imperilling her relief. I am satisfied, in light of the establishment of a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunctions but not entirely in the manner sought by the applicant. The orders as made take into account, as set out in the reasons below, the potential for prejudice to the respondent and are no wider or intrusive than is necessary.
2. Exhibit 1 recorded the competing positions of the applicant and respondent in the event that the Court determined that injunctions should be made. Addressing those parts where the parties were at issue, I find as follows.
3. By paragraph 1 the applicant sought a payment to a controlled monies account of $940,000 which the respondent had received from his brother and by paragraph 5 the payment to an account of $356,629.50 being funds that the applicant asserted had been removed by the respondent from an offset account. The applicant relied upon various submissions referrable to the movement of various funds in support of the order. Her senior counsel invited the court to draw a conclusion that the applicant's case was imperilled by the volume of money that has passed through the accounts of J Pty Ltd and otherwise dealt with by the respondent. The evidence is such as to give rise to the possibility that her claim for final relief may be imperilled (Tsiang at [25]). While I am not satisfied that there is a sum of money in accounts sufficient to enable the respondent to comply with paragraphs 1 and 5, I am satisfied on the basis of the submission of senior counsel for the respondent that there are sufficient funds available to the respondent including those in in the J Pty Ltd account to make a payment of $600,000 into a controlled monies account. It was not submitted that the respondent required the whole of the funds in the J Pty Ltd account to meet the needs of the company. I am satisfied that the balance of convenience supported the making of an order requiring the respondent to deposit $600,000 into a controlled monies account.
4. The respondent opposed paragraph 2.4 which sought to restrict him providing financial remuneration to any staff member outside of their contracted salary. Balancing the competing conveniences, I am satisfied that an order in the terms of paragraph 2.4 carrying with it the caveat that such payment could not be made without first giving the applicant 28 days' prior written notice does not pose a prejudice to the respondent.
5. The respondent opposed an order in the terms of paragraph 2.8 and paragraph 6.9 which restrained him removing or destroying any emails sent and received by him. His senior counsel submitted that it would prevent him from deleting any spam emails or reducing the size of his inbox. I am not satisfied that those asserted concerns are so onerous as to amount to a prejudice to the respondent such as to override the protections to the applicant that would flow from the making of the order as sought. Parties should not be deleting or destroying documents in the course of litigation.
6. The respondent opposed the applicant having viewing access to various accounts and software management systems. I am satisfied the applicant's evidence demonstrated that she did have that viewing access, but the viewing access was not as extensive as she now seeks to contend by the form of her order. I am satisfied that there is no prejudice to the respondent by permitting the applicant viewing access to the accounting software utilised by J Pty Ltd, including Xero, or to the J Pty Ltd banking facilities with NAB. It amounts to no more than providing disclosure as the Act and Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules (Cth) 2021 ("the Rules") require. I am not satisfied the applicant requires access to the management software including projects and administrations.
7. The applicant sought an order in the terms of paragraph 8, that she be included in all communications in relation to any development works conducted at the property at Q Street, Suburb R. I am satisfied that she should be included in such communications consistent with the obligation of disclosure. No case is advanced that she requires an order authorising her to communicate with the architect or builder nor was any evidence advanced sufficient to persuade me that an injunction in those terms is appropriate or necessary.
8. The applicant sought orders to be included in any correspondence in the terms of paragraph 9.4.3 and paragraph 12 in relation to the properties in City T. I am satisfied that an order to that effect is consistent with the respondent's obligation of disclosure and as such imposes no greater burden on him that the Act and the Rules provide. I further note, the respondent's senior counsel conceded that the properties are unlikely to be completed by the time the litigation concludes. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is any prejudice occasioned to the respondent.
9. The applicant sought an order in the terms of paragraph 13.2 for the payment into an account of any funds to be received by the respondent from his father's estate. In circumstances where his senior counsel submitted that it was unlikely that any payment would be received, then I am not satisfied that there is any prejudice to be occasioned by the making of an order, and the balance of convenience supports its making.
10. The applicant sought orders in the terms of paragraph 14 in relation to a construction vehicle and various payments to K Pty Ltd. The applicant contends K Pty Ltd has a liability to meet the lease payments for the construction vehicle. The respondent contends that the construction vehicle is not owned by K Pty Ltd but by J Pty Ltd and as best I understand his case, J Pty Ltd meets the liability. I cannot resolve what should not be an issue. In the event that it is as asserted by the respondent, then there is no prejudice to him by imposing upon him an order to make the payments he otherwise would make. I cannot resolve the dispute on the facts as to who bears the liability. The payments on the construction vehicle are to be made by the husband. It is not however intended that he would make the payment pursuant to Order 14.1.1 in addition to the payment pursuant to 14.2.2. The intent behind the orders is for the payment to be made not to unjustly enrich K Pty Ltd. To that end the orders are amended pursuant to Rule 10.13 to discharge order 14.2.2. The applicant otherwise seeks a payment of $21,284.85 to K Pty Ltd. I am satisfied that it is proper that such an order be made where it does not impose a significant prejudice or financial burden on the respondent in the context of the overall pool of assets controlled by him, where on the evidence the moneys appear to relate to expenses incurred by K Pty Ltd on behalf of J Pty Ltd and is a matter that can be taken into account at the conclusion of the proceedings.

PAYMENT OF VALUATIONS AND COSTS OF THE APPLICATION

1. The applicant sought an order that the respondent meet all of the costs of the valuations in the first instance. I am not satisfied that there should be a departure from the Rules that provides that the parties meet the costs of valuations equally. According to the Balance Sheet attached to her senior counsel's Case Outline, the applicant has approximately $325,000 in bank accounts. She has more than sufficient funds to meet her half share.
2. The applicant sought an order for the respondent to pay her costs of the application on an indemnity basis. The authorities make plain that an order for indemnity costs is not one that is lightly made, and there should be circumstances of an exceptional kind that warrant orders for costs on an indemnity basis (Kohan and Kohan [1992] FamCA 116; (1993) FLC 92-340). There is no warrant for an order on an indemnity basis.

1. These are interlocutory injunctions made at an early stage of the proceedings. Should the necessity arise for the review of these injunctions, either by increasing or restricting their scope, then that can be the matter of a subsequent application albeit potentially at a parties' peril as to costs. At this stage, the orders I have made provide the measure of protection necessary balanced against any asserted prejudice and are no wider than is necessary.

I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Schonell.