Austin & Banks [2026] FedCFamC1F 73 (11 February 2026)

1. The father's application sought for his time with X to progress across four stages spanning 10-weeks which would ultimately result in X spending each Wednesday from 3:00 pm to 7:00 pm, and every second weekend from 3:00 pm Friday to 9:00 am Monday with the father. Further, the father sought that school holidays be shared equally between the parents and sought orders which provide time between the father and X during Christmas, on Father's Day, and on other significant people's birthdays.
2. Additionally, the father sought for the Expert to be discharged and for the appointment of a new Single Expert to prepare a report. Lastly, some ancillary orders were sought relating to restraints from discussing the proceedings with X and non-denigration.

1. The mother filed a Response to Application in a Proceeding on 27 January 2026 ("the mother's proposal"). The mother sought that the father's application be dismissed, the matter be listed for final hearing and for the Expert to prepare an Updated Family Report.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer filed an Outline of Case Document on 23 January 2026 ("Independent Children's Lawyer's case outline") which included the orders sought by him. He sought for X's time with the father to progress over a five-month period, resulting in X spending six-hours' with the father each Saturday. Additionally, the Independent Children's Lawyer sought for the parents to engage in a Court assisted alternative dispute resolution.

1. In support of his application, the father relied on the following material:

(1) Outline of Case Document filed 29 January 2026 ("the father's case outline");

(2) Amended Application in a Proceeding filed 28 January 2026 ("the father's proposal");

(3) His Affidavit filed 29 November 2025; and

(4) His Affidavit filed 28 January 2026 (save for paragraphs 37, 40 and 51- 52).

1. In support of her application, the mother relied on the following material:

(1) Outline of Case Document filed 27 January 2026;

(2) Response to Application in a Proceeding filed 21 January 2026;

(3) Her Affidavit filed 21 January 2026; and

(4) Documents tendered throughout the hearing which became Exhibits R1-R2.

1. In support of his application, the Independent Children's Lawyer relied on the following material:

(1) Outline of Case Document filed 23 January 2026;

(2) Child Impact Report prepared by Court Child Expert, Ms C dated 10 July 2024;

(3) Single Expert Report prepared by Dr K dated 4 February 2025 ("the Expert Report"); and

(4) Addendum to Single Expert Report prepared by Dr K dated 16 April 2025 ("the Addendum Expert Report").

1. The applicable law is found in Part VII of the Act. The Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) ("the Amendment Act") came into effect on 6 May 2024 and made substantive amendments to the previous Act which apply to these proceedings. In determining parenting matters under Part VII of the Act the Court must still regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration: s 60CA.
2. The objects of Part VII are set out at s 60B:

60B Objects of Part

The objects of this Part are:

(a) to ensure that the best interests of children are met, including by ensuring their safety; and

(b) to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child done at New York on 20 November 1989.

1. In regard to parental responsibility, the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility as created by the previous s 61DA of the Act has been abolished. Instead, s 61D(3) of the Act provides the Court with the ability to deal with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions in relation to children as follows:

61D Parenting orders and parental responsibility

...

(3) A parenting order that deals with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child (see subsection 64B(3)) may provide for joint or sole decision-making in relation to all or specified major long-term issues.

1. Section 61DAA of the Act provides the Court with an understanding of what joint decision-making about major long-term issues entails:

61DAA Effect of parenting order that provides for joint decision-making about major long-term issues

(1) If a parenting order provides for joint decision-making by persons in relation to all or specified major long-term issues in relation to a child, then, except to the extent the order otherwise specifies, the order is taken to require each of the persons:

(a) to consult each other person in relation to each such decision; and

(b) to make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision.

(2) To avoid doubt, this section does not require any other person to establish, before acting on a decision about the child communicated by one of those persons, that the decision has been made jointly.

1. Subject to any order to the contrary, s 61DAB clarifies that if a child is spending time with a person under a parenting order, the order is not taken to require that person to consult with a person who has parental responsibility about decisions that are made in relation to the child that are not major long-term issues.
2. Because s 60CA and s 60B refer to the best interests of the child, the Court must consider s 60CC which specifies how the Court determines what is in a child's best interests:

60CC How a court determines what is in a child's best interests

Determining child's best interests

(1) Subject to subsection (4), in determining what is in the child's best interests, the court must:

(a) consider the matters set out in subsection (2); and

(b) if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child - also consider the matters set out in subsection (3).

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), the court must consider the following matters:

(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:

(i) the child; and

(ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);

(b) any views expressed by the child;

(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;

(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;

(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;

(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.

(2A) In considering the matters set out in paragraph (2)(a), the court must include consideration of:

(a) any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the child); and

(b) any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.

(Emphasis in original)

1. It should further be noted that due to the repeal of the former s 65DAA of the Act, there is no longer the statutory requirement for the Court consider equal time or substantial and significant time. Cases that refer to this section will need to be carefully considered as to whether they still apply in limited ways, if at all.
2. The definition of family violence is found in s 4AB of the Act, reproduced below:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.

(2) Examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence include (but are not limited to):

(a) an assault; or

(b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour; or

(c) stalking; or

(d) repeated derogatory taunts; or

(e) intentionally damaging or destroying property; or

(f) intentionally causing death or injury to an animal; or

(g) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that he or she would otherwise have had; or

(h) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member, or his or her child, at a time when the family member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support; or

(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with his or her family, friends or culture; or

(j) unlawfully depriving the family member, or any member of the family member's family, of his or her liberty.

(3) For the purposes of this Act, a child is exposed to family violence if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence.

(4) Examples of situations that may constitute a child being exposed to family violence include (but are not limited to) the child:

(a) overhearing threats of death or personal injury by a member of the child's family towards another member of the child's family; or

(b) seeing or hearing an assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family; or

(c) comforting or providing assistance to a member of the child's family who has been assaulted by another member of the child's family; or

(d) cleaning up a site after a member of the child's family has intentionally damaged property of another member of the child's family; or

(e) being present when police or ambulance officers attend an incident involving the assault of a member of the child's family by another member of the child's family.

1. The new legislative focus is on promoting the safety of children and carers, whereas the former provisions focused on protection from harm. The legislature must have intended there to be a distinction between the former provisions, which focused on protection from harm, and the current provisions which focus on the promotion of safety, otherwise the amendments would lack utility (Melounis & Melounis (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 778). The amendments require a more nuanced, proactive and future-focused approach to considering the safety of children and those who care for them. This will be guided by historical risk assessment.
2. As stated by Campton J in Barnabas & Phineus [2025] FedCFamC1A 215 at [17]:

The construction of Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") after the 2024 amendments reinforces the consideration of the safety of children or another person as a focused starting point in those considerations to be weighed in determining a parenting regime that best promotes the best interests of the children (Pierce & Pierce (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 162 at [31]).

Emphasis added

1. Acknowledging this, the Court cautions against lapsing into simplistic binaries such as contending that promoting safety is always different from protection from harm. The reality is much more nuanced. Every case is different. Perhaps in many cases it will make no difference which approach is adopted, but in other cases the nuanced, proactive and future-focused difference is very important to the child and carer.
2. It should further be noted that due to the repeal of the former s 65DAA of the Act, there is no longer the statutory requirement for the Court consider equal time or substantial and significant time. Cases that refer to this section will need to be carefully considered as to whether they still apply in limited ways, if at all.

1. The Full Court's decision in Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 at [68] provides some guidance as to the procedure of interim parenting hearings:

...the procedure for making interim parenting orders will continue to be an abridged process where the scope of the enquiry is "significantly curtailed". Where the Court cannot make findings of fact it should not be drawn into issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. The Court also looks to the less contentious matters, such as the agreed facts and issues not in dispute and would have regard to the care arrangements prior to separation, the current circumstances of the parties and their children, and the parties' respective proposals for the future.

1. An interim hearing proceeds on evidence that is yet to be tested. There is no cross-examination to establish the veracity of the evidence before the Court. Where facts are in dispute the Court cannot make conclusive findings about those matters. As the Full Court observed in Franklyn & Franklyn  [2019] FamCAFC 256 at [73]:

In interlocutory hearings, to the extent it is possible, judges are enjoined to make decisions about interim orders based on agreed facts, less contentious evidence, and inferences which fairly arise (citation omitted), but decisions must still be made despite contentious evidence. Judges are obliged to act on the strength of the evidence presented and, if it is relatively weak, are entitled to treat it so.

1. Nonetheless, any such findings made at an interim hearing "should be couched with great circumspection, no matter how firmly a judge's intuition may suggest that the finding will be borne out after a full testing of the evidence" (SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 at [88]).
2. As explained by the Full Court in Marvel & Marvel (No 2) [2010] FamCAFC 101; (2010) 43 Fam LR 348 at [120], it is important to recognise that interim orders are only a waypoint on the road to a final solution for the family unit.
3. As has been frequently emphasised interim parenting proceedings, and orders made as a consequence, are a necessary but temporary measure until all the evidence can be tested, evaluated and weighed at a final hearing by the making of final parenting orders. Decisions judicial officers have to make in interim proceedings are difficult and, often for very good reason, a conservative approach, or one which is likely to avoid harm to a child is adopted. This is often to the understandable distress of a party who may not achieve the outcome he or she desires or thinks to be in the best interests of their child or children.

1. There are many issues in this case but only three which need to be decided in the present context:

(1) Should X's time with the father be increased, and if so, how?

(2) Should this matter be listed for hearing now, or should that be postponed?

(3) Should anything be done now in relation to the Expert evidence?

1. Brief reasons will be provided below, which explain the answers to these questions which are as follows:

(1) Yes, broadly in accordance with the recommendations of the Independent Children's Lawyer.

(2) Yes, at the earliest date available to the Court which maximises the availability of the parents and their legal representatives.

(3) No.

1. One of the strongest impressions from the evidence before the Court is the present vulnerability of X arising from his diagnosis of Cancer, and his subsequent treatment that included surgery, chemotherapy, and advanced radiation treatment in the United Kingdom. X has experienced enormous disruption in his life, quite apart from his exposure to what presents as a highly acrimonious separation between the parents. It is in this context that the father proposes a substantial change to the existing parenting orders.
2. The most reliable, and indeed the only evidence about how X is presently coping with life, is found in the mother's affidavit at paragraphs 81-84. She describes his current routine at paragraphs 85-92, including evidence of the difficulties the mother is experiencing in seeking to achieve consistency whilst X is with the father. The Court's concern is that X is vulnerable. He is still receiving medical treatment. His prognosis seems encouraging, and perhaps he is even heading towards remission. Parenting X is challenging, nonetheless. It is understandable if the mother is protective. It is an appropriate attitude at this point in X's life. The Court is concerned about the potential impact on X, and on the mother's parenting of X, and of significant changes in his daily routine. Indeed, Dr D, the mother's General Practitioner, noted that the mother "has been struggling with adjustment disorder with anxiety since January 2025 more recently she has been depressed as well" (Exhibit R2). X's vulnerability, and the Court's concerns, are unlikely to be permanent.
3. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the father describes the time that he is having with X in positive terms. That does not make the evidence of the parents inconsistent especially given the different contexts of the time they spend with X.
4. X's time with the father is important for both of them. They once had a very good relationship. There was a pattern of regular time and communication, though the nature of this is disputed. There is clearly a foundation for a normal resumption of a "father and son" relationship, subject to other issues that have been raised by the mother, but which cannot be adjudicated on at this point. The Court does not, however, accept the father's submission that the past good relationship and the asserted quality, and a consistent parenting time arrangement would justify making the orders that he seeks. The father's case ignores the disruptive reality of X's diagnosis, treatment and recovery from Cancer. His proposal was premature and perhaps reflects both the father's understandable desire to renew a normal relationship with X, but a lack of understanding of the need to be nuanced and sensitive the difficult time in X's life.
5. The Court found it hard to understand why the mother resisted the proposal of the Independent Children's Lawyer which, in the Court's opinion, provides the nuance and sensitivity that is required at this time in X's life. In a carefully measured manner, X's time with the father is progressively increased, albeit not to overnight time. This proposal is in the best interests of X at this particular time in his life.

1. The mother sought for the matter to be set down for final hearing (mother's proposal, Order 1), and this was supported by the Independent Children's Lawyer. The father did not support the matter being set down for final hearing at this stage. The Court foreshadowed that the next available date for final hearing was the week commencing 17 August 2026. It was submitted by the father that setting the matter down for final hearing would be premature and cause the evidence to be condensed from now until the hearing, and that the father would like to cement a routine with X prior to any hearing.
2. The Court is of the view that it is within X's best interests to have finality of the parents' litigation and to be able to establish an ongoing consistent routine. The Independent Children's Lawyer indicated that he is available on the week foreshadowed by the Court. Regrettably, the Court is unable to accommodate counsel availability in this matter due to the limited dates remaining in the 2026 judicial calendar, coupled with the urgency in bringing this matter to an end for X.
3. The father may rest assured that this Court has frequently heard cases similar to this one where the time that he spends with X will remain limited by the time of the final hearing. This fact has never, and will not in this case, act as a fetter on the Court's capacity to make orders that are in the best interests of X based on the totality of the evidence. The current time arrangement is not some arbitrary anchor which binds the Court in terms of a prospective time order after a final hearing. It is the evidence lead in the current proceeding that will determine the outcome of the current case before the Court.
4. The matter shall be set down for five-days commencing 17 August 2026, and trial directions to facilitate this have been made.

1. The father sought orders that the Expert be discharged (father's proposal, Order 29), on the basis that the Addendum Expert Report is "rife with conclusions and findings of fact which give rise to an apprehension of bias, and otherwise strays into a judicial function which will prejudice his position at final Hearing" (father's case outline, paragraph 2.18(a)). The father's submissions referred the Court to authorities which contemplate the test to be implemented in considering the discharge of a Single Expert in parenting matters, however the foundation of his argument fails where he was unable to identify any jurisdiction the Court has to discharge the Expert.
2. Even if parties do not raise issue of the Court's jurisdiction, it is competent and proper for the Court to do so of its own motion, as was held in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Nedlands Pty Ltd (in liq) [2000] FCA 599; (2000) 99 FCR 554. Whilst "jurisdiction" as a plain English word is generic, it ought to be understood in a curial context as meaning authority to adjudicate (ASIC v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559 at [2]).
3. Part 7.1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules") govern how Experts ought to conduct themselves and how the Court ought to treat material produced by Experts. Relevantly, r 7.18 sets out an Expert's duty to the Court:

R 7.18 Expert witness's duty to the court

1. An expert witness has a duty to assist the court with matters that are within the expert witness's knowledge and capability.

2. The expert witness's duty to the court prevails over the obligation of the expert witness to the person instructing, or paying the fees and expenses of, the expert witness.

3. The expert witness has the following duties:

   a) to give an objective and unbiased opinion that is also independent and impartial on matters that are within the expert witness's knowledge and capability;

   b) to conduct the expert witness's functions in a timely way;

   c) to avoid acting on an instruction or request to withhold or avoid agreement when attending a conference of experts;

   d) to consider all material facts, including those that may detract from the expert witness's opinion;

   e) to tell the court:

   1. if a particular question or issue falls outside the expert witness's expertise; and

   2. if the expert witness believes that the report prepared by the expert witness is based on incomplete research or inaccurate or incomplete information, or is incomplete or may be inaccurate, for any reason;

   f) to produce a written report that complies with rules 7.21 and 7.22.

   1. The expert witness's duty to the court arises when the expert witness:

      a) receives instructions under rule 7.13; or

      b) is informed by a party that the expert witness may be called to give evidence in a proceeding.

   2. An expert witness who changes an opinion after the preparation of a report must give written notice to that effect:

   a) if the expert witness is appointed by a party--to the instructing party; or

   b) if the expert witness is appointed by the court--to the Registry Manager and each party.

   1. A notice under subrule (5) is taken to be part of the expert's report 18 sets out:

1. Rule 7.23 states the consequences of non-compliance with the above duties:

R 7.23 Consequences of non-compliance

1. If an expert witness does not comply with these Rules, the court may do any of the following:

1. order the expert witness to attend court;
2. refuse to allow the expert's report or any answers to questions to be relied on;
3. allow the report to be relied on but take the non-compliance into account when considering the weight to be given to the expert witness's evidence;
4. take the non-compliance into account when making orders for:
   1. an extension or abridgment of a time limit; or
   2. a stay of the proceeding; or
   3. interest payable on a sum ordered to be paid; or
   4. costs.

1. Indeed, r 7.23 of the Rules is the only section which speaks to how the Court may deal with Experts in default of their obligations. Part 7.1 of the Rules do not provide any express head of power for this Court to discharge an Expert. The Rules allows for an Expert Report to not be relied upon; r 7.23(b), for the Court to allow the Expert Report into evidence but diminish the weight attributable to it; r 7.23(c), or to even entirely stay the proceedings; r 7.23(d)(ii). Despite this, oddly, there is no power to discharge a Single Expert.
2. The consequence of this lack of jurisdiction was addressed by Wilson J in Toma & Doyle [2022] FedCFamC1F 215 at [28]:

The Rules do not provide for the discharge of a single expert. In my view, the inherent power of this Court, possessed as it is of a statutory jurisdiction, does not extend to the making of an order for the discharge of a single expert. The limited inherent power that a justice of this Court possesses is confined, for the most part, to controlling the Court's own process and to preventing an abuse of its process. The single expert regime prescribed in Part 7.1 of the Rules is a creature of subordinate legislation, that is to say, rules of court. Those rules are to be read and construed in the manner prescribed by the High Court in Project Blue Sky, Brooks, Taylor v Public Service Board (NSW), Southwest Water Authority v Rumble's, Cooper Brooks (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation, Toronto Suburban Railway Co v Toronto Corporation, Minister for Lands (NSW) v Jeremias, K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd, The Commonwealth v Baume, Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, R v Berchet and Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue. Nowhere in Part 7.1 does an express power exist to discharge a single expert, despite the very detailed provisions of that Part on all matters relating to single experts. Despite the intricacies of those provisions, none confer on me power to make the orders the wife seeks for the discharge of the single expert. None of the authorities on which the wife relied speak about any such power. The nearest the authorities come to the proposition the wife advances is the statement that the power to make such an order is assumed to exist. That is not borne out by the authorities there cited. No such power may be assumed to exist. As the High Court held in Re KL Tractors Ltd, the absence of authority on some point is frequently explained by the fact that a general consensus exists to the effect that the point is not maintainable.

1. In addressing a similar matter, albeit in an appellate context, Austin J opined in Falydn & Badenoch [2022] FedCFamC1A 170 ("Falydn"):
   1. ... The ruling did not determine any legal right which one party could exert against the other. Neither party had the "right" to the appointment of a single expert, but once accepted a single expert should be appointed, neither had the "right" to the appointment of their preferred candidate nor the "right" to veto the other's choice or the expert eventually selected. The decision was merely one about how the litigation would best be conducted to facilitate adjudication of the parties' rights under Pt VII of the Act. The decision is not a "judgment" from which an appeal lies.
   2. While the father may be dissatisfied with the psychiatrist selected by the primary judge for the role of single expert, he is not without redress. For example, if dissatisfied with the content of the single expert report subsequently furnished, he may confer with or pose questions to the single expert in advance of trial (Div 7.1.6 of the Rules). He could also seek the appointment of an adversarial expert, if certain conditions are met (r 7.08 of the Rules). At trial, he may test the validity of the single expert's opinion evidence via cross examination.
   3. It remains possible the father will eventually be satisfied with the opinion evidence given by the single expert, but assuming he is not, he may successfully persuade the primary judge that such evidence should be given little or no weight. Any evidence ultimately given by the single expert is not binding upon the primary judge.
2. This issue has also recently resurfaced at an appellate level with Strum J determining similarly in Nicolescu & Umar [2026] FedCFamC1A at [29]:

The applicant's submissions also refer to Bass & Bass [2008] FamCAFC 67; (2008) FLC 93-366. However, that too is of no assistance to her. That case similarly involved an application for leave to appeal the dismissal of an application to discharge a single expert witness, who had prepared a report for use in parenting proceedings, and for permission to adduce further evidence from another expert witness. For reasons which are not apparent, in that case, the issue of the competence of the proposed appeal was not raised or considered by the Full Court. It should have been, and the fact that it was not does not advance the applicant's case.

1. The discharge of a Single Expert is not one in which the Court can call upon any inherent or implied power. Any delay in the hearing from the failure to discharge a Single Expert, ipso facto, is not a relevant consideration as a discharge is not a parenting order; and thus, does not attract the attention of s 60CA of the Act.
2. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia is a Court bound in jurisdiction alone to matters vested by statutory and secondary statutory instruments. Section 44 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) does not assist here, as the Court's power to make "orders of such kinds as the Court considers appropriate" is inherently only bound to matters in which the Court has "jurisdiction". The Court does not, by paucity of the Rules, have authority to adjudicate this dispute. This Court does not accept any contrary expression of this principle by Behrens J in Bacci & Bacci [2025] FedCFamC1F 341 at [31].
3. The father's concerns about the perhaps strident language used by the Expert is understandable. Nonetheless, it is only the testing of that evidence, in the context of the totality of the evidence presented before the Court, that will enable the Court to decide whether to accept or reject, and if the former; what weight to place, on the Expert's conclusions. Thus, even if the Court considered that it had jurisdiction, it is unlikely that it would have made the order proposed by the father.

1. The father further submitted that the discharge of the Expert would be consistent with Nagel & Clay [2019] FamCA 406 ("Nagel & Clay") per Harper J at [7], as it would "address not only the Father's lost confidence with the report writer but also the significantly changed circumstances since the Addendum Family Report of 16 April 2025" (father's case outline, paragraph 2.18(b) (Emphasis added)).
2. There are notable differences between the present proceedings and Nagel & Clay. Firstly, the report in Nagel & Clay was some three years old and therefore a comprehensive "updating" report would have had to be completed, not a traditional "updating" report. In the present case, X attended on the Expert on 24 September 2024, and the Family Report was dated 4 February 2025, and a subsequent Addendum Family Report dated 16 April 2025 was produced without the need for further interviews. The rationale of Harper J at [8] of Nagel & Clay stated, "in light of the age of Dr E's existing report, it can make little difference whether interviews are undertaken by Dr E or a fresh, suitably qualified expert". This rationale is not applicable within the present case.
3. There is benefit to be gained by the parents, and X from returning to the Expert as she is appraised of the matter and this limits the number of professionals within the system that X is exposed to. Indeed, one of the submissions from the Independent Children's Lawyer against the discharge of the Expert was the impact that a new professional may have on X. There is further practical benefit from returning to the Expert, as it is more likely that an Updating Expert Report, rather than an initial Expert Report, could be completed prior to the final hearing commencing on 17 August 2026.
4. Although perhaps only persuasive under the new Rules, this Court views that there is much wisdom in the approach of the Full Court in Bass & Bass [2008] FamCAFC 67; (2008) FLC 93-366 at [50] who stated:

... the assertion of bias, be it apprehended or actual, on the part of the single expert, will best be able to be established through cross-examination of the single expert at the trial of the parenting proceedings.

1. For this reason, alongside those expressed above, the Court has declined to discharge the Expert for want of jurisdiction and shall order that an Updating Family Report be prepared ahead of the final hearing. Any disputes as to bias ought to be raised in the more appropriate forum of cross-examination at a contested final hearing.

I certify that the preceding sixty-four (64) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli.