Au v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs | Case summary | Zoe

[12]

(1) Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to enter and/or remain in Australia. Being able to come to or remain in Australia is a privilege Australia confers on noncitizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding, will respect important institutions, such as Australia's law enforcement framework, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.

(2) The safety of the Australian Community is the highest priority of the Australian Government.

(3) Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or to forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia.

(4) The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they engaged in conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, that raises serious character concerns. This expectation of the Australian community applies regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.

(5) Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by visa applicants or those holding a limited stay visa, or by other non-citizens who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time.

(6) With respect to decisions to refuse, cancel, and revoke cancellation of a visa, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.

(7) Decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case. In some circumstances, the nature of the non-citizens' conduct, or harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation.

(8) The inherent nature of certain conduct such as family violence is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation, even if the information available at the time of consideration suggests that the non-citizen does not pose a measurable risk of causing physical harm the Australian community.

[25]

(i) Applicant - Statutory Declaration, dated 22 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 114-124), Witness Statement, dated 20 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 371-375), and unsigned Supplementary Witness Statement, dated 16 June 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 928-935);

(ii) Ms S Siew, Applicant's wife - Statutory Declaration, dated 22 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 138-147), Witness Statement, dated 21 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 376-385), and Witness Statement, dated 16 June 2025 (Exhibit 1 at p 936);

(iii) Ms A Siew, Ms P Siew's sister/the Applicant's sister-in-law - Statutory Declaration, dated 25 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 194-196), and Witness Statement, dated 23 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 386-389);

(iv) Mr D Siew, Ms P Siew's brother/the Applicant's brother-in-law - Statutory Declaration, dated 23 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 190-192), and Witness Statement, dated 18 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 390-393);

(v) Mr D Lee, the Applicant's friend from Kingdomcity Church - Statutory Declaration, dated 21 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 181- 183), and Witness Statement, dated 21 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 394-398);

(vi) Ms C Yee, the Applicant's friend from Kingdomcity Church - Statutory Declaration, dated 22 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 201-202), and Witness Statement, dated 22 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 403-406);

(vii) Mr S Tan, the Applicant' friend from Zion Praise Harvest church and Ms C Yee's husband - Statutory Declaration, dated 22 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 185-187), and Witness Statement, dated 20 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 399-402);

(viii) Mr L Koh, the Applicant's friend from Kingdomcity Church - Statutory Declaration, dated 25 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 198-199), and Witness Statement, dated 16 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 407-409);

(ix) Mr A Oh, the Applicant's friend from Zion Praise Harvest Church and business partner in Sycamore Wealth Pty Ltd - Statutory Declaration, dated 11 March 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 210-212);

(x) Mrs L Theeart, Senior Chaplain and Child Safety Officer of Rehoboth Christian College, the school the Applicant's children attend - letter in support, dated 5 March 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 208-209) and Witness Statement, dated 19 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 410-413);

(xi) Mr D Geijsman, Principal of Rehoboth Christian College, the school the Applicant's children attend - letter in support, dated 18 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 204-205);

(xii) Mr J Kirtisingham, Lead Pastor, Perth of Kingdomcity Australia Ltd, the church the Applicant, Ms S Siew and their children attend - letter in support of the Applicant, dated 19 November 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 206-207);

(xiii) Mr S Ng, Applicant's treating Clinical Psychologist - letter, dated 8 February 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 219-220), report (regarding Ms S Siew), dated 21 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 434-437), report (regarding the Applicant's children), dated 21 May 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 438-441) and report (regarding the Applicant), dated 3 June 2025 (Exhibit 1 at pp 588-595); and

(xiv) Mr O Robinson, Applicant's accredited mental health social worker - report, dated 7 February 2024 (Exhibit 1 at pp 216-218)

[174]

Further, in the Applicant's SFIC, the Applicant submits that it is 'extremely unlikely' that, upon release into the community, the Applicant would be 'put in a position' where he would have access to significant company funds so as to be 'at risk of re-offending': Exhibit 1 at p 354 at [52].
In the Applicant's SIR (Exhibit 1 at p 481), the Applicant submits, in relation to the likelihood of the Applicant engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, that:
1. The applicant's crimes were 'stealing as a servant.' The applicant's accounting career is over. The fact of the applicant's convictions are public. He has lost his accreditation as a CPA. He is enmeshed in his church community, many of whom are aware of his convictions. He has been publicly shamed. He can never be a director of a company, nor even drive a taxi. Even if the applicant were to attempt to effectuate a similar fraud, the applicant will almost certainly never occupy a position in which anything similar could be effectuated.
2. Likelihood. The improbability produced by the external impediments are multiplied by the applicant's internal considerations. The applicant had no criminal history of any kind prior to these crimes. The applicant has been very publicly shamed in the eyes of his wife, his parents, his friend and peers, his tight-knit church community. It drove him to the threshold of suicide, with a particular methodology in mind. Ng instructed [Ms S Siew] on emergency procedures. He suffers major depression, registering 'extremely severe' on empirical testing. He will eventually have to explain what he did to his children.
  1. The applicant says he is deeply remorseful. The suicide attempt speaks for itself in this respect. But those who know the applicant also provide their observations: [Ms S Siew] - who would know - believes him to be fully remorseful, describing his 'torment of guilt and remorse.'[footnote omitted] A church member who has known Mark for half a decade likewise observes that she has 'seen [Mark] truly saddened ... so tormented mentally, ashamed and cried remorsefully at church and at my house.'
  2. Ng provided a psychological report in February 2024 recording Mark's statement that it is 'right and appropriate for him to be punished and that there [was] no justification'. Ng records Mark's statement that he wanted to 'make things right' and his regret and shame for abusing his employer's trust. Ng's professional opinion was that Mark's mental health issues contributed to the offending in this way:

[176]

In Ng's most recent assessment, he says that 'Mark continued to articulate a strong sense of responsibility for his past behaviour and demonstrates a commitment to rehabilitation.' Ng goes on to say 'Mark presents a low risk of reoffending. This assessment is supported by his demonstrated commitment to rehabilitation, his active steps toward reintegration, and his desire to build a stable future with his family.'
Not to be discounted is the fact of repayment itself. Mark did not avoid that responsibility. He did not in fact have sufficient resources to repay all of the money, so he borrowed around $2M from his father. Mark's parents - in their 70s - abandoned their plans for retirement to do so. Mark's mother is a diabetic, who nevertheless now continues to work as nurse.
This is not the sort of thing that someone without genuine remorse does. Someone externalising 'would have simply let the cards fall as they may,' pointing to the availability to Taylor Marine of deductions and/or insurance (or the justification that they should have been insured). In fact, recalling that Taylor Marine identified a misappropriation of around $70,000 while the family were in Malaysia visiting [Ms S Siew]'s parents, someone utterly without remorse may well have never returned to Australia - enriched to the tune of $4M.
As it happens, there is a body of scientific literature on recidivism for financial crimes and guilt or shame. An American study concludes that propensity to experience guilt soon after incarceration negatively predicts criminal recidivism after release.[footnote omitted] That study distinguishes between 'guilt' and 'shame,' pointing out that 'guilt' is the better indicator. But that seems to be because 'shame' is associated with external blaming. There is not a trace of Mark blaming any external factor. Mark's mental health social worker was emphatic that Mark did not blame any other person, and thought Mark's remorse was genuine - while acknowledging some prisoner's attempts at gilding the lily.
Rehabilitation. It is awkward to speak of 'rehabilitation' of an opportunistic crime(s) where there is no other criminal history, committed in the context of mental health issues. Nevertheless, the applicant has engaged with church counselling [footnote omitted] and psychological counselling. In prison, he has completed a range of faith-based programs.
More significant here is the church community. The applicant has disclosed his convictions to many elders in his church community, of which he remains firmly a part. It is the church community, on the premise Mark is not involuntarily returned to Singapore, to which Mark would return. One does need to be a theologian to recognise that 'redemption' is an important narrative in Christianity.

[191]

As submitted by the Respondent (Exhibit 1 at pp 264-265), Mr Ng's opinion is contrary to the Applicant's conduct over a prolonged period, including him having only ceased the conduct once he was caught. As further submitted by the Respondent, the fact that Mr Ng's February 2024 Letter does not refer to several adverse aspects of the Applicant's offending indicates that a truthful disclosure of the Applicant's offending was not provided by the Applicant to Mr Ng, in their ten sessions, such that any evidence of recidivism is afforded less weight by the Tribunal.
A real concern to the Tribunal is that in his oral evidence, at the hearing, the Applicant said that, whilst employed at Taylor Marine (bearing in mind that he referred to his employer in his oral evidence as a 'family company' that 'treated him well' and 'welcomed' him into their family), he was 'always looking for a better position' and that he thought he should have 'been paid more by the company' but, because he had young children, he did not seek alternative employment and, as such, he felt that his children were 'holding him back'. Therefore, he stole from his employer to provide for his family and, specifically, his children financially. The Applicant told the Tribunal that his mindset, at the time of his offending, was that even if he could not be there for his family emotionally, and even if they 'hate' him, he could at least provide for them financially. He said that, in the future, he wanted both of his children to have a place to live, mortgage free, and that he did not want his children to go through 'the same thing as him.' In the Tribunal's view, there is nothing about this evidence, that demonstrates remorse or insight, by the Applicant, into his offending.
Further, as contended by the Respondent (Exhibit 1 at p 265), the findings of Mr Ng, in Mr Ng's February 2024 Letter, must be viewed in light of the purpose for which the letter was drafted, namely 'to provide information and my clinical opinion about Mr Chow's mental health in relation to two charges of stealing as a servant'.
In a more recent letter, dated 3 June 2025, Mr Ng states the following in relation to the Applicant's risk of reoffending:

[198]

This comment by Mr Robinson suggests that the Applicant was not exactly forthcoming in his sessions with Mr Robinson, about the details and true nature of his offending.
The Tribunal affords minimal to moderate weight to the letters of Mr Ng and Mr Robinson, noting neither expert is a qualified forensic psychologist and there is nothing to indicate they used any risk assessment and/or criminogenic screening tools directed towards the Applicant's offending, namely stealing or fraudulent conduct.
The extent to which the Applicant relies on the repayment of the sum stolen in support of the proposition he is not an 'unacceptable risk' is, as contended by the Minister, misconceived: Exhibit 1 at p 265. An assessment of the Applicant's future 'risk', and the nature of the harm he may cause if he reoffends, should not be predicated on the 'possibility' the Applicant will be minded to (and capable of) ameliorating the offending by repaying any stolen funds: Ng and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2020] AATA 4962 at [66].
As contended by the Respondent (Exhibit 1 at p 265), while the Sentencing Judge accepted the Applicant was 'remorseful' (see [158] below), the submissions lodged on his behalf to the Tribunal betray a concerning minimisation and downplaying of his offending. More specially, it was submitted by the Applicant's representative that the harm by the Applicant to his employer was 'minimal so that it went largely unnoticed,' 'negligible' and the 'only evidence of harm...was the prospect of greater profit by the company': Exhibit 1 at p 352.
As submitted by the Respondent (Exhibit 1 at p 265), the mere fact that the Applicant's employer, Taylor Marine, survived the theft, and the Applicant repaid the sum stolen does not support these contentions, which fail to account for, amongst other things, the hurt occasioned to his employer through his breach of trust, and the considerable time and effort associated with investigating and uncovering his conduct.
Further, as submitted by the Respondent (Exhibit 1 at p 266) , there is no evidence of what financial stress purportedly prompted the Applicant to commit his crime of 'Stealing as a Servant' and, absent any compelling evidence from the Applicant about the extent of financial stress to commit such brazen offending over a lengthy period (of which there is none), the Tribunal considers that there remains an unacceptable risk, to the 'Australian community' (including Australian companies) of the Applicant reoffending. In any event, the alleged financial stress remains and is elevated in circumstances where the Applicant has no offer of employment on his release. He will likely experience challenges obtaining any gainful employment given his criminal history (let alone at the level and salary he previously received as a CFO of Taylor Marine), and his spouse is, on his evidence, 'barely scraping by' to support herself and their children: Exhibit 1 at p 372.
Furthermore, the Applicant continues to owe and intends to repay a sum of $2 million to his father, who he claims told him 'the loan has to be repaid...this was the last of their support and [he] should not expect any more help': Exhibit 1 at p 372.
As submitted by the Respondent, there is limited evidence that the Applicant has engaged in treatment or rehabilitation to address the underlying factors that culminated in his offending. As stated above, his sessions with Mr Robinson were for, among other things, the management of mental health symptoms and were not for the purpose of identifying a 'cause' for his offending: Exhibit 1 at p 217. Further, as stated above, according to Mr Ng, the Applicant's offending began as a means of alleviating financial concerns: Exhibit 1 at p 219. However, there is nothing before the Tribunal to indicate the Applicant has undergone treatment regarding the underlying cause of his offending. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest his engagement in various religious-based courses whilst in prison have, in any way, addressed his offending behaviour. Therefore, as submitted by the Respondent (Exhibit 1 at p 266), in the absence of a proper and detailed forensic report analysing the causal factors behind the Applicant's offending, the Tribunal cannot be confident these have been appropriately identified and addressed by him to reduce his 'risk' of reoffending.
Although the Applicant urges the Tribunal to consider the Applicant's risk has been tested, given his 'trusted position' as a groundsman and conduct in prison (Exhibit 1 at p 354), as contended by the Respondent (Exhibit 1 at pp 266-267), of some concern to the Tribunal is the Applicant's involvement in an incident on 3 August 2024 in which it was reported that:

[200]

The Applicant received 7 days loss of telephone privileges as punishment for this. Eight days after the telephone call, on 11 August 2024, the Applicant was found to be in possession of items not lawfully issued to him and was regressed to standard level of supervision: Exhibit 1 at p 337. Although these incidents are obviously not of the same scale as the Applicant's fraudulent offending ('Stealing as a Servant'), they nevertheless demonstrate his 'risk' for future conduct pursuing financial gain: Exhibit 1 at p 267.
As submitted by the Respondent (Exhibit 1 at p 267), limited weight should be placed on the Applicant's character references from his wife and other close family members, his and his wife's church community, and his children's school community because they did not prevent him from committing crimes in the past and there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the same support would be any more effective in the future: LQZW and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 93 at [93].
There is no doubt, in the Tribunal's mind, that the Applicant's offending was opportunistic, and arose from his easy access to company funds. However, at the very heart of the Applicant's offending was dishonesty and a breach of trust. Central to (or, at least, a significant part) of the Applicant's case (as set out above) is that there are external constraints on his future employment such that, regardless of what an internal process of change he has gone through, externally he cannot return to work that would somehow see him in a position to effectuate a fraud. In closing, the Applicant's representative referred to the possibility of the Applicant reoffending as being an 'improbable theoretical possibility.'
In the Tribunal's view, that submission is entirely without merit. The principal driver of the Applicant's offending was psychological relief from 'financial stress' (i.e. to make himself feel better) and a desire to provide financially for his family's future (i.e. to put them in a financial position where they will 'want for nothing' in the future). These factors remain and, in the Tribunal's view, have been exacerbated by Applicant's convictions and incarceration, with the Applicant owing $2,200,000 to his parents (upon obtaining a job following release from prison) and Ms S Siew now being the sole income earner. Moreover, these factors will remain prevalent for a considerable period upon his return into the community, especially in circumstances where it is highly unlikely he will be able to resume work as an accountant in the reasonably foreseeable future, if ever, and will undoubtedly have to engage in far less gainful employment as a result. Realistically, any income he can earn in the future, if released, is highly diminished and, as such, the stressor factors will remain and will, in fact, be exacerbated.
The Applicant's evidence is that his intention is, in the future, to not work in a field that exposes him with ready access to funds or the opportunity to conceive of, and implement a scheme to acquire funds, via the nature of his employment. That is, in his oral evidence at hearing, the Applicant said that his future intention is to pursue employment away from roles involving money (such as construction or plumbing) due to the 'temptation,' thereby removing the risk of reoffending. The Tribunal accepts that. However, the difficulty with that is there are a multitude of roles in businesses, small or large, that involve access to money. A person does not necessarily need to be in a finance related role within an organisation to access its funds and effectuate fraud.
In any event, the reality is, and the Applicant confirmed in his evidence, that he does not have any employment 'lined up' upon his release. That is, he does not have any job prospects currently. Despite the Applicant's intentions of seeking employment away from roles involved with money, there is nothing preventing him from working in a role involving money and which makes best use of his background and qualifications, which are finance focused.
As set out above, the Applicant has submitted (in the Applicant's SFIC and the Applicant's SIR) that because of his deep and genuine remorse for his offending, he poses little risk to the Australian community of further offending. In the Sentencing Remarks, the Sentencing Judge found (Exhibit 1 at p 61) that the Applicant was "remorseful" about his offending, noting that he pleaded guilty to the two charges for stealing, as follows:

[202]

Even though the Applicant is 'remorseful' about his offending, and pleaded guilty to the two charges for stealing, the situation remains that the full extent of the Applicant's offending only came to light because Taylor Marine, his employer, conducted a thorough examination of its accounts and had to spend considerable time and effort unravelling the Applicant's offending conduct before finally informing the police. When interviewed by the police following his arrest, the Applicant gave 'no comment' responses regarding his alleged stealing offences: Exhibit 1 at p 279. Further, the Applicant did not accept full responsibility for his stealing, by disclosing it to his employer, when first confronted by his employer about his use of the company credit card for personal expenses, despite, on his own evidence (in cross-examination) having opportunities to disclose his stealing to his employer sooner.
On the evidence before the Tribunal, the Applicant did not repay the more than $3,700,000 money he stole from Taylor Marine for altruistic reasons. It was the result of legal proceedings in which the Applicant was sued for recovery of the stolen sum, plus costs. That is, the Applicant repaid the stolen sum (plus costs) in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Deed he entered because of the commencement of legal proceedings, in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, for recovery of the sum stolen. Put simply, and to use the words used by the Applicant himself in cross-examination, the Applicant had "no choice" but to sign the Settlement Deed and repay his employer the stolen money. That hardly speaks to a unique and compelling degree of remorse, as advanced by the Applicant. Further, this course of action allowed the Applicant to keep his family home and allowed his wife and children to remain living in the family home, affording them much the same lifestyle as they had prior to the Applicant's offending, conviction, and incarceration.
Further, on the evidence before the Tribunal, discussed above, the Tribunal considers that the Applicant currently lacks a sufficient level of understanding and insight into his offending for him not to represent an unacceptable 'risk' of reoffending. It is clear to the Tribunal, that the Applicant has, through his sessions with Mr Robinson and Mr Ong and his time undertaking courses, among other things, commenced a journey insight and understanding into his offending. However, this journey of insight and understanding is not sufficiently advanced to a level which allows the Tribunal to conclude that the Applicant has a thorough understanding of the causes underlying his offending and its impact on the Australian community. The starkest example of this is that, in cross-examination, the Applicant rejected the proposition that his offending was done for 'personal financial gain.' Rather, the Applicant maintained, under cross-examination, that his stealing was done for the benefit or gain of his family only and not himself. That is directly contrary to the Sentencing Judge's findings and, in the Tribunal's view, simply untrue. This evidence of the Applicant concerns the Tribunal in that it demonstrates that the Applicant has not yet grappled with the ways in which he benefited from his offending and the ways in which he stood to gain, and gained, from his offending.
For the above reasons, the Tribunal considers that the Applicant's 'risk' of reoffending remains 'unacceptable' to the Australian community.

[219]

Much was made by the Applicant's representative, both in his written submissions (Exhibit 1 at pp 487-489) and his oral submissions at the hearing, about whether the Applicant's wife and children (all Australian citizens) would legally have the right, under Singaporean law (or, in particular, the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Singapore Constitution)), to reside in Singapore should they choose to relocate to Singapore if the Applicant (a Singaporean citizen) is removed from Australia
It is not a matter for the Tribunal to opine on whether the Applicant's wife and children (all Australian citizens) are legally able, under Singaporean law (or the Singapore Constitution), to reside in Singapore. This is matter for the Applicant and his wife to resolve (i.e. seek independent legal advice on) should the Applicant's wife and children decide to relocate to Singapore. On the evidence before the Tribunal, neither the Applicant nor his wife have made any proper enquiries about the legalities of the Applicant's wife and children relocating to Singapore. Their knowledge of the alleged difficulties associated with Australian citizens living in Singapore appears to be based, in the main, on discussions they have had with Singaporean friends, living in Australia, and from information they have been given by the Applicant's representative (who is not qualified to practice law in Singapore). As stated above, based on the evidence before the Tribunal, the Applicant's wife is yet to decide whether she and her children will relocate to Singapore. As such, this entire issue is hypothetical. However, the Tribunal acknowledges that a decision by the Applicant's wife to relocate herself and her children to Singapore, to be with the Applicant if he is removed from Australia, will undoubtedly be very difficult, on many levels, and not without its challenges, especially given the Applicant's wife's strong and enduring ties to Australia (including her siblings, the church community and the school community) and the fact that her children were born, and have only ever lived, in Australia.
The Tribunal acknowledges that a decision by the Tribunal not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's Visa will have an adverse impact on the Applicant's wife and children, who are his immediate family members in Australia (and all Australian citizens), irrespective of whether they decide to stay in Australia or relocate to Singapore to join the Applicant: paragraph 8.3(1) of Direction 110. Either decision will not be without its struggles. Further, a decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's Visa is not in the best interests of his two minor children: paragraph 8.4 of Direction 110.

[235]

In relation to paragraph 8.4(4)(a) of Direction 110 (as set out above), as submitted by the Respondent (Exhibit 1 at p 270), the entire nature of the Applicant's relationship with his children (both before and since his incarceration) has, in the Tribunal's view, been marked by a significant 'absence', physically and emotionally. More than that, the Applicant was, from the moment his children were conceived and then born, in every sense of the word, absent and a disconnected father from his children. The Applicant, on his own evidence at hearing, never wanted children and told his wife, Ms S Siew this, before they married. The Applicant describes his life as becoming 'a bit of a mess' after his first child (daughter, Miss E) was born in July 2017: Exhibit 1 at p 117. The Applicant describes not being 'ready for kids at the time and this strained' his relationship with Ms S Siew: Exhibit 1 at p 118. The Applicant describes his feeling of 'disappointment' when he subsequently found out his son, Master E, was 'conceived.' The Applicant states that Master E was 'not planned,' they were already 'financially struggling,' and another baby would put even 'more financial burden' on them: Exhibit 1 at p118. The Applicant states that 'things' got worse during COVID because he was 'forced to be at home more with the babies constantly crying' and 'he had no desire to be at home': Exhibit 1 at p 119.
On the evidence before the Tribunal, it was only after his resignation from Taylor Marine, divulging the full extent of offending to his wife and him no longer working full-time, that he became actively engaged in his children's daily lives and routines. It is during this period that, according to the Applicant, his relationship with his children 'completely changed' and he realised that he really 'loves' his children: Exhibit 1 at p 121. The Applicants wife, Ms S Siew, confirmed this, in her oral evidence, at the hearing.
The difficulty the Tribunal has with this evidence is that, in cross-examination, the Applicant said that, well before his offending was revealed to his employer in January 2023, he would 'deliberately' arrive home at a time when he knew his children were 'going to sleep'. That speaks to a glaring lack of connection and emotional bond that the Applicant had with his two children, acknowledging that he was involved in their lives in other ways (such as providing for them financially and doing school runs). Based on the Applicant's and Ms S Siew's evidence, prior to his resignation from Taylor Marine, the Applicant was a workaholic who prioritised work, and, indeed, preferred work, to spending time with his family and Ms S Siew had primary responsibility for the children's care. The Applicant's relationship with his children was not close and they were not emotionally supported by him.
Given that the Applicant has never prioritised his relationships with his children over work in the past, the Tribunal has real concerns about the extent to which the Applicant is likely to play a positive parental role in the future: paragraph 8.4(4)(b) of Direction 110. The Applicant describes his time with his children, since his incarceration, as follows (Exhibit 1 at p 374):
1. Since my incarceration, [Ms S Siew] and the children visit every two weeks and spend about an hour and a half with me.
2. I look forward to these visits - they go by so fast (the fasted one and a half hours I have experienced) - and I treasure every moment.

[240]

In relation to his nieces and nephews, the Applicant states (Exhibit 1 at p 375):
1. I also have a close relation ship with my niece, [Miss M]. She misses me a lot. We talk on the phone, but we decided it was not appropriate for her to visit me in prison.
2. My nephew [Master I] is too young to fully understand what's going on, but I had a strong bond with him before I went to prison.
Mr D Siew (the Applicant's brother-in-law and Master I and Miss I's father) expressed a hope that the applicant can 're-establish his relationship with [Master I]' on his release and the applicant would not have a chance to get to know Miss I, noting they have not previously met: Exhibit 1 at p 391. The Applicant's relationship with his nieces and nephew is non-parental: paragraph 8.4(4)(a) and (e) of Direction 110. While accepting Miss M, in particular, may be disappointed or upset if the Applicant were to be removed from Australia, there is nothing to suggest the impact on her would go beyond that. The Tribunal places less weight on the effect the Applicant's removal may have on his relationships with his nieces and nephews as they are non-parental: paragraph 8.4(4)(a) of Direction 110.
In the event the Applicant is removed, and his wife and children choose to remain in Australia, there is no reason why he could not maintain a relationship with them via telephone or video calls, acknowledging that is far from an ideal situation: paragraph 8.4(4)(d) of Direction 110.
It is quite clear from the evidence before the Tribunal, that both prior to and during the Applicant's incarceration, Ms S Siew has played the primary parental care-giver role in relation to Miss E and Master E. According to Mrs Theaart (Senior Chaplain at Miss E and Master E's school), is that their mother 'is very invested in her children's well-being and wants the best for both of them. She is doing an incredible job without [the Applicant] around, but I can see that she is also struggling - she is tired and visibly stressed': Exhibit 1 at p 413. This suggests the children are well-cared for by their mother and there is nothing to suggest that, if the Applicant is removed to Singapore (and Ms S Siew and the children choose to remain in Australia), this will not continue, especially given the strong degree of support available to the Applicant's wife (and children) in Australia from family members, the school community, the church community and family members from overseas who spend periods of time staying with them and performing parental type roles in caring for the children: paragraph 8.4(3)(e) of Direction 110.
For the above reasons, the Tribunal considers that the fourth 'primary consideration' (Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision), in paragraph 8.4 of Direction 110, weighs in favour of revocation.
However, this fourth 'primary consideration' (Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision), in paragraph 8.4 of Direction 110, should not, in the Tribunal's view, outweigh the other 'primary considerations' which weigh heavily against revocation, namely the first 'primary consideration' (Protection of the Australian community), in paragraph 8.1 of Direction 110, and the fifth 'primary consideration' (Expectation of the Australian community), in paragraph 8.5 of Direction 110.

[257]

In closing submissions, the Applicant's representative made a submission, to the effect, that the Tribunal's decision whether to revoke the mandatory revocation of the Applicant's Visa would have 'legal consequences' for the Applicant on his ability to access to 'home leave', while he is still in prison and his eligibility for parole and that these are 'legal consequences' which require consideration under paragraph 9.1 of Direction 110.
The Tribunal is not limited to the considerations it can take into account, as set out in Direction 110. The Tribunal is required to consider or read, identify, understand and evaluate representations and it is open for the Tribunal to give representations 'weight,' even if they do not arise under one of the 'considerations' in Direction 110: Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 275 CLR 582 at [21] and [36].
The Applicant's 'Earliest Release Date,' on parole, is 14 February 2017, and the Applicant is eligible to 'apply' for 'Home Leave' on 15 November 2025, with a 'Date Eligible to Commence' of 15 February 2026: Exhibit 2 at p 3. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the Applicant is eligible to 'apply' for 'parole' or 'home leave,' on a particular date, that he will be granted 'parole' or 'home leave'.
In Western Australia, when imposing a sentence, the Judge determines if, and when, the convicted person is 'eligible' for parole in accordance with s 89 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) (SA). However, it is the Prisoner's Review Board of Western Australia (Board) who determines if the prisoner is 'suitable' for 'parole' (i.e. 'parole' being the release of a prisoner after they have completed part of their prison sentence) in accordance with the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA) (SAA). The Board must consider the release conditions in s 5A of the SAA. If a prisoner is serving six months or more and the court made a parole eligibility order at the time of sentence, as is the case here, the prisoner will be assessed by the prison for parole on the basis of the 'Parole Review Checklist and Community Corrections parole report' (and the report is to be provided to the Board at least eight weeks before the prisoners earliest eligibility date), the prisoner's parole plan, treatment reports, letters of support and any other relevant documents, including submissions to the Board. The Board must give the prisoner written notice of any decision on their parole application as soon as possible after the decision is made: s 107B of the SAA.
It is clear from the above that the Board's decision whether to grant parole is not a 'direct and immediate consequence' of the Tribunal's decision on whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of a non-citizen's visa requiring the Tribunal's consideration under paragraph 9.1 of Direction 110. Whether parole is granted to a non-citizen, when they become eligible to 'apply' for parole (in accordance with any orders of the sentencing judge under the SA) is a decision for the Board having considered the release conditions in s 5A of the SAA. Eligibility to apply for parole comes about as a result of the sentencing judge applying s 89 of the SA in sentencing and the grant of parole depends upon the Board making a decision whether to grant parole under the SAA, being satisfied that the release conditions in s 5A of the SAA are met in any particular case. While the end result of parole being granted may differ as a result of the Applicant's Visa cancellation not being revoked, being that a non-citizen parolee would likely be removed from Australia, the decision to grant parole itself is a separate statutory regime that relies upon separate considerations. Not only that, but it is also so far into the future, it is purely a matter of speculation, making it impossible for the Tribunal to attribute any 'weight' to it. Accordingly, the Tribunal affords this matter no weight.
The Commissioner's Operating Policy and Procedure, 'COPP 14.2 Home Leave,' produced by the Government of Western Australia Department of Justice Corrective Services (COPP 14.2), sets out, among other things, the eligibility of prisoners to apply to the prison and the Community Corrections Officer for 'home leave'. Paragraph 3.2.1 of COPP 14.2 states:

[260]

Since, as stated above, the legal consequence of the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's Visa by a delegate of the Minister is that he became an 'unlawful citizen': ss 13- 15 of the Migration Act. Because of that status, the Applicant is required to be detained under s 189(1) of the Migration Act until he is either removed from Australia, under s 198 of the Migration Act, or he is granted a visa (including having his Visa restored to him under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act). Section 198(2B) of the Migration Act provides for removal where there has been a mandatory cancellation and subsequent decision made not to revoke the cancellation. Accordingly, if the Tribunal decides not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's Visa, he is 'liable for removal' from Australia for the purpose of paragraphs 3.2.1 of COPP 14.2 and, it follows, no longer eligible to apply for 'home leave' on 15 November 2025. In the Tribunal's view, this is a direct and immediate 'legal consequence' of the Tribunal's decision, for the purpose of paragraph 9.1 of Direction 110. However, overall, the Tribunal finds that this carries limited weight in favour of revocation, and it is not outweighed by the first 'primary consideration' (Protection of the Australian community), in paragraph 8.1 of Direction 110.
Another direct and immediate 'legal consequence' of a decision by the Tribunal not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of his Visa is his removal from Australia and separation from his wife, two children, his wife's family and their church friends and community. The Tribunal finds that this carries limited weight in favour of revocation and it is not outweighed by the first 'primary consideration' (Protection of the Australian community), in paragraph 8.1 of Direction 110. As stated above, there is the possibility for the Applicant's wife and two children to relocate from Australia to Singapore if the Applicant is removed to Singapore.
For the above reasons, the Tribunal considers that, overall, this first 'other consideration' (Legal consequences of the decision), in paragraph 9.1 of Direction 110, carries limited weight in favour of revocation.

[273]

The Applicant is no stranger to Singapore. Given that the Applicant lived in Singapore until the age of 20 years old, and has returned to Singapore on multiple occasions since settling in Australia, including as recently as January 2023 (Exhibit 1 at p 221), it is reasonable to infer he has ongoing ties and social connections remaining in Singapore.
The Applicant has family in Singapore, comprising his parents and sister. The Applicant states that he did not get much emotional support from his parents (who were always working), or from his sister, growing up in Singapore: Exhibit 1 at p 115. The Applicant states that his relationship with his parents has 'always been tense': Exhibit 1 at p 372. The Applicant describes his 'remaining connection with his parents 'is solely the obligation to repay' what he owes them and that if he returned to Singapore he would have 'no support network to restart' his life and that he does not believe 'reconciliation' with his parents is likely: Exhibit 1 at p 374. The Applicant says that he does not get along well with his sister, (Exhibit 1 at p 115) and that his contact with her is limited and that she shares their parents' views: Exhibit 1 at p 374. She believes that, because of her parents' 'loan' to the Applicant, her 'inheritance' has gone.
For the following reasons, the Tribunal is objectively unable to categorically accept the Applicant's evidence that he will not receive support, from his parents, if he returns to Singapore.
First, the Applicant's parents have gone to some considerable effort to loan him a substantial sum of money (i.e. $2,200,000) to repay the money he stole from Taylor Marine, notwithstanding the significant impacts it has had on them. That is, the Applicant's parents had to come out of retirement and return to work because of the loan of their lifetime savings to the Applicant: Exhibit 1 at p 913. Furthermore, in their oral evidence, the Applicant and Ms S Siew both said that the repayment of what the Applicant owes his parents (currently approximately $2,000,000: Exhibit 1 at p 372) is a 'flexible arrangement' whereby the Applicant can begin repaying his parents once he is out of prison and earning an income (which may not happen for many years). In other words, in such circumstances, it must be said that the Applicant's parents remain, at the very least, financially supportive of the Applicant.
Second, on 2 March 2024, the Applicant's father wrote to the Perth District Court in support of the Applicant (Father's Letter): Exhibit 1 at p 912. The Father's Letter states:

[277]

Third, the Applicant's mother and father make 'video calls' to the Applicant's wife occasionally to see and speak to their grandchildren: Exhibit 1 at p 383. Further, the Applicant's mother helps his wife and children by coming to Australia and staying at their house for one or two weeks: Exhibit 1 at p 381. These actions, by the Applicant's parents, demonstrate an 'indirect' support for him, but it is 'support' nonetheless.
The Applicant has close enduring friendships with Christian Singaporean citizens (Exhibit 1 at p 371), namely, Mr K Lwi (the Applicant's best man at his wedding to Ms S Siew), Mr C Wong (the Applicant's groomsman at his wedding) and Mr E Wong. Mr K Lwi and Mr C Wong visited the Applicant in prison in March 2025 and Mr E Wong visited him in prison in May 2025: Exhibit 1 at p 371. In his oral evidence at the hearing, the Applicant stated that these three Singapore based Christian friends have 'stood by' him since being told about his convictions. In the Tribunal's view, there is nothing to suggest that the Applicant will not have their continuing friendship and emotional support if he returns to Singapore.
The Applicant converted to Christianity from Buddhism, in Singapore, around the age of 14, because many of his friends were Christian, and began attending the Bartley Christian Church in Singapore. The Applicant stated that as a teenager he was 'more reliant on friends and the church community for emotional support' than his family: Exhibit 1 at p 115. Indeed, it was at the Bartley Christian Church that he met Mr K Lwi, Mr C Wong, and Mr E Wong. In the Tribunal's view, there is nothing to prevent the Applicant, if he returns to Singapore, from establishing a relationship with a church, and a church community, in the same way he did at the age of 14 (as a minor) and forming close connections because of interacting with that church.
In his oral evidence at hearing, the Applicant told the Tribunal that he has several aunts, uncles and cousins living in Singapore, although he is not close to them. Most of his aunts and uncles in Singapore are old (in their 70s and 80s) and he has limited contact with them since moving to Australia. He said he has not even met many of his cousins in Singapore and the ones he has met, he has had limited contact with since arriving in Australia. The Applicant thinks he will be rejected by his extended family if he returns to Singapore. Notwithstanding this, in the Tribunals' view, it is a matter of conjecture that the Applicant will not have, or be able to establish, relationships with his extended family in Singapore if he returns there.

[279]

The Applicant's evidence is that, upon his release from prison, he does not intend to perform 'office or accounting work' (anything to do with 'finances') and that it would be 'better' for him to start 'afresh in a different field', such as bricklaying, plumbing or rail construction: Exhibit 1 at p 373 and oral evidence at hearing.
In the Tribunal's view, it is difficult to see what the material differences would be in his employment situation and prospects in Australia and in Singapore, upon his release from prison. The Tribunal is not required to undertake a comparative exercise in this regard, but that does not mean that a comparative exercise cannot occur in terms of comparing his circumstances in both countries. On his own evidence, the Applicant will be seeking employment in a field he has not worked in before. There is no reason that he would be unable to pursue the same type of work in Singapore that he could in Australia. The Applicant will be relying on the same tertiary qualifications to obtain employment in Singapore as he would in Australia. The Applicant points to his criminal history as a barrier to obtaining employment in Singapore. However, he faces the same difficulties in Australia: Exhibit 1 at p 373.
In any event, it is a matter of speculation that his criminal offending will immediately be apparent to any future Singaporean employer (for example, because it will be a matter of public record), making it impossible for him to obtain employment in Singapore. There is no objective evidence to support this. The Applicant relies on the opinions of laypersons (friends) who are dual Singaporean Australian citizens to support the submission that shame and ostracism is faced by Singaporean nationals, like him, who have criminal history. The idea that the Applicant will be completely and utterly shunned by Singaporean employers (making it impossible to secure employment), if he returns to Singapore is simply not borne out on the evidence. Particularly in circumstances where, on the Applicant's own evidence, he has received ongoing encouragement and support of a practical and emotional nature from Singaporean nationals, some of whom reside in Australia and others of whom reside in Singapore, despite them knowing of his criminal offending.

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

Respondent/Defendant:

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

Legislation Cited (5)

Administration Act 2003

Review Tribunal Act 2024

Tax Assessment Act 1997

Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001

Interpretation Act 1901

Cases Cited (33)

Chow and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2025] ARTA 1048 (2 July 2025)

Au v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 125

Bartlett and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2017] AATA 1561

BNY23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 608

CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138

FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185

LQZW and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 93

Minister for Immigration Multicultural Affairs v Ali [2000] FCA 1385; (2000) 106 FCR 313

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Peralta Montes [2025] FCA 667

Mizen v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCAFC 84

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; (2014) 220 FCR 1

Ng and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2020] AATA 4962

PNLB and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2018] AATA 162

Re Harrison and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 47; (2009) 106 ALD 666

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286 at [140]

Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 46; (2023) 296 FCR 582

Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 673; (2014) 225 FCR 424

Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 177; (2016) 246 FCR 146

The decision on this review application was made on 2 July 2025 and provided to the parties with a note that written reasons would be provided within a reasonable time: Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151; (2019) 271 FCR 326 at [41] and [48].

(2014) 220 FCR 1

(2022) 275 CLR 582

(2008) 235 CLR 286

(2023) 296 FCR 582

(2014) 225 FCR 424

(2016) 246 FCR 146

(2019) 271 FCR 326

(2024) 98 ALJR 610

(2000) 106 FCR 313

(2021) 274 CLR 398

(2024) 94 ALJR 594

(2015) 256 CLR 203

(2018) 262 CLR 333

(2020) 275 CLR 582

Au v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (298 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (5)

Cases Cited (33)

Chow and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2025] ARTA 1048 (2 July 2025)