(2) Save as provided by subrules (5) and (6) or by rule 5, an order appointing a person next friend or guardian ad litem of a person under disability is not necessary for the purpose of a proceeding to which this rule applies.

(3) If a person under disability is a represented person, a guardian or administrator authorised under the GAA Act Part 5 or 6 to act as next friend or guardian ad litem , as the case may be, of the represented person in the proceedings is the next friend or guardian ad litem , as the case may be.

1. Given the pre-existing appointment of a guardian ad litem, the applicable provision in rule 2(5) is par (a). It is therefore not necessary to exercise the power in par (b).
2. On this approach, it may only be necessary to regularise the proceedings by amendment to reflect that the respondent acts by the Public Advocate in its capacity as guardian ad litem. That would be in conformity with O 70 r 2(1)(b), O 70 r 2(5)(a) and O 70 r 3(3) RSC. I propose to make such an order.
3. In making this order, I recognise there may be an argument that, having regard to the terms of pt 7 of the CLMI Act and the operation of the provisions therein, the regime in O 70 RSC is thereby excluded. This point was not argued before me and so I will refrain from expressing any concluded views on the point. It is appropriate to note the following matters, however.
4. The relationship between the regimes would require an assessment of the special nature of proceedings under pt 7, in which a person having a 'mental impairment' will participate, and be bound, as a respondent to an application brought by the Attorney General. The nature of such proceedings is starkly different to the civil proceedings litigated in this Court in which questions of the appointment of next friends and guardians ad litem often arise for consideration.
5. The rationale which underlies the typical appointment of a guardian ad litem (or a next friend) is that the law considers the litigant is incapable of asserting or protecting their rights, or forming a judgment as to the necessity to bring or defend proceedings.[74] Such appointments are also typically required because, in civil proceedings, the Court requires there be a person on the record who can consent to settlements, and who is personally liable for costs.[75]
6. The relationship between the regimes also requires an analysis of the provisions found within the CLMI Act, which have specific application to proceedings under pt 7, and which may be said to operate to render the application of O 70 RSC to the proceedings as unnecessary. Specifically, there are provisions within the CLMI Act concerning the representation and protection of persons in proceedings under the legislation, which have a degree of similarity to the roles undertaken by a guardian ad litem.
7. For example, the Court or the Mental Impairment Review Tribunal may order that a 'supervised person' be provided with 'any support measure that is reasonably available',[76] and may appoint a 'communication partner' to undertake the functions specified in s 21(2) of the CLMI Act, namely to communicate and explain to the 'supervised person' any questions put to them, and to communicate and explain to the Court any information given by the 'supervised person'. Further, in proceedings under pt 7 of the legislation, close family members or carers of the 'supervised person' may be permitted to make submissions to the Court.[77]
8. In the circumstances, in conformity with O 70 RSC and as the respondent has an appointed guardian ad litem, I propose to make an order to amend the name of the respondent to reflect the role of the Public Advocate as his guardian ad litem in these proceedings.

1. The applicant concedes, on the available evidence, that the statutory requirements for the making of an extended custody order under s 110(3) of the CLMI Act have not been satisfied. That is a concession which is consistent with the recommendation which was made by the Mental Impairment Review Tribunal in November 2024.
2. It is a concession which was well made, in my respectful view.
3. The concession does not, of course, obviate the need for the Court to consider the issue and form its own assessment as to whether an extended custody order should be made.
4. The analysis required under s 110(3) involves two distinct evaluative steps, as explained earlier. The first evaluation that is required is whether there is an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence in the future, in the absence of any measures that would provide adequate protection of the community against that risk, being an extended custody order in this case. Assessments of the possible serious offences which may be committed, and the nature and extent of the possible harm, are required.
5. The most significant aspects of the evidence which are relevant to the assessment just described are the respondent's antecedents, the circumstances of the alleged index offence which was dealt with in the District Court in March 2018, the most recent psychiatric assessments of the respondent, and the demonstrated conduct of the respondent whilst he has been living in the community over the past several years.
6. The respondent's antecedents include two 'serious offences', including the alleged index offence. The first of these occurred in 2007 and the alleged index offence took place in September 2016. In between these offences, the respondent committed a range of offences and spent time in custody, evincing a pattern of re-offending in a relatively short time upon his release. The alleged index offence discloses an intention on the respondent's part to commit a sexual offence and to use violence, in that case against an elderly and vulnerable woman. The alleged offence was serious, described by Glancy DCJ as 'frightening' for the victim, but may be described, as Massey DCJ later noted, at the low range of seriousness.
7. It may be observed there is one instance of sexual offending in the respondent's criminal history and at least two instances where the victims were vulnerable. Overall, the respondent's antecedents do not disclose any particular pattern of offending. I therefore accept the applicant's submission that there is no evidence of a propensity on the part of the respondent to engage in conduct that could constitute a serious offence in the future.[78]
8. It is apparent on the evidence that the respondent suffers from a moderate intellectual disability with a series of global deficits. His diagnoses include schizophrenia, alcohol use disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. The respondent will need to continue treatment for his schizophrenia indefinitely, and remains at risk of relapse in terms of the use of alcohol, which is a major determinant of his risk of future serious offending.
9. The respondent's propensity to commit serious offending in the future is underpinned by his intellectual disability, his antisocial personality disorder, alcohol use disorder, and schizophrenia, according to Dr Petch. That said, in his most recent report, on which he was cross‑examined, Dr Petch opined that there is at present a low level of risk of further serious offending by the respondent. I understood the assessment of Dr Petch to be that the respondent has progressed well, although slowly, with his rehabilitation in the community.
10. Dr Petch noted that the respondent is 'well and stable' and there have been no behavioural concerns or offending behaviour whilst he has been living in the community. The respondent has been fully compliant with the conditions of the orders to which he is subject, particularly in relation to abstinence from alcohol and drugs, despite being faced with opportunities to consume such substances.
11. Dr Petch did, however, caution that the effectiveness of the current management plan did not mean that it was no longer required. In his opinion, there were possible circumstances in which the respondent's risk could escalate.
12. I accept the assessment of Dr Petch in this regard, which was carefully reasoned and wholly consistent with the evidence of the respondent's reported behaviour in recent years.
13. I do not discount the risk that further offending by the respondent could involve the commission of offences in which there is serious harm to a person. I refer in particular to the assessment of Dr Griffiths in this regard, as well as Dr Petch. The commission of an 'acquisitive offence' was identified as an example by Dr Griffiths. Overall, on the evidence and given the antecedents of the respondent, that risk must be assessed as low.
14. On the available evidence, I am not prepared to find that there is an unacceptable risk the respondent would commit a serious offence in the future, in the absence of an extended custody order. The evidence points against any such conclusion. In this regard, I also remind myself of the statutory language employed in s 110(3) and, in particular for the Court to be satisfied by 'acceptable and cogent evidence' and 'to a high degree of probability' of the matters stated therein.
15. Had I found the risk to be 'unacceptable', the nature and extent of that risk would inform the evaluation or assessment as to whether an extended custody order is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the community.
16. It is apparent the respondent has complied with the conditions of the conditional release order and his leave of absence order since he began living in the community in November 2021. The respondent has a stable accommodation arrangement which is expected to continue into the foreseeable future.
17. The respondent also receives considerable support from services funded through his NDIS plan, which has recently been rolled forward for a further year. Through these services, the respondent receives assistance with daily routines, support for attending appointments, and attending events in the community. The respondent is also supported by a positive behaviour specialist, an occupational therapist, a specialist support coordinator, and a general practitioner.
18. In essence, the respondent has progressed well over the past several years. On the evidence, the respondent has been living in the community, in a stable environment with suitable accommodation, and adopting what evidently appears to be a pro-social approach to life, since around November 2021.
19. In the case of the respondent there are two matters which emerge from the objects and principles stated in the CLMI Act which are of particular cogency in the context of this Application, and which are not, on my assessment of the risks involved, outweighed in the present circumstances by the paramount consideration in s 8 of the legislation.
20. The first matter is that persons with mental impairment should be subject to the least possible restriction on their freedom consistent with the protection of the community. This principle is expressly identified in s 7(2)(a), and forms one of the objects of the legislation as described in s 7(1)(b). I must therefore recognise that an offender's entitlement to be at liberty is not lightly to be denied.
21. The second matter is the principle in s 7(2)(e) of the CLMI Act that persons with mental impairment in the justice system should not be subject to outcomes under the CLMI Act that 'restrict their freedom more severely than if they had been convicted' of the alleged offence.
22. In the present circumstances, the respondent was alleged to have committed a serious offence in September 2016, being the alleged index offence of aggravated indecent assault. There were additional alleged offences of aggravated home burglary and commit offence in dwelling, and threats to harm. The respondent was dealt with by the District Court in March 2018. Subsequently, a limiting term under the CLMI Act was set as 6 years, which expired on 27 September 2022, having been backdated to commence in September 2016.
23. The respondent has thus been the subject of orders restricting his liberty since around September 2016, which is almost 9 years. Over that period, the respondent was subject to a custody order under the Repealed Act for the period from March 2018 through to November 2021. He has been living in the community since that time, but subject to formal supervision arrangements under the Repealed Act and the CLMI Act over that period, all of which operate to restrict the respondent's freedom.
24. I consider that, had the respondent been sentenced in March 2018 for the alleged index offence, and the associated offences, he would very likely no longer be subject to any custodial or other disposition for those offences. These circumstances engage the principle in s 7(2) which I have mentioned, and to which I must have regard. I consider this is an important consideration in the present context, but I do not suggest it is a controlling or a decisive factor.
25. These matters do provide further support for the assessment I have made on the evidence that the requirements stated in s 110(3) of the CLMI Act are not presently satisfied, and certainly not to the high standard the legislation requires. Indeed, in my respectful view, the making of an extended custody order in respect of the respondent, at this stage of his life and given his progress to date, would be highly counterproductive to his health and to his further progress.
26. I will therefore dismiss the application for an extended custody order.

Whether a community supervision order should be made?

1. The alternative relief sought by the applicant, and opposed by the respondent, was for the imposition of a community supervision order pursuant to s 110(4) of the CLMI Act. In order to make such an order, I would need to be persuaded by the applicant that, to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the respondent should remain under supervision 'due to' his 'rehabilitation, retraining or resocialisation requirements'.[79]
2. I must approach the analysis by reference to the terms of pt 5 of the legislation,[80] particularly the matters identified in s 47(1) of the CLMI Act, as well as the objects, principles and paramount consideration identified in s 7 and s 8 of the legislation. In the course of analysing the evidence, I have addressed the matters identified in s 47(1), including the need for protection and safety of the community, the nature and seriousness of the alleged index offence and the respondent's antecedents, the nature of the respondent's mental impairment, the relationship between his impairment and offending, and the adequacy of resources available to treat the respondent in the community. These are all matters to which I give weight in the analysis, particularly the last consideration bearing in mind the evidence that the respondent has access to stable accommodation which will continue and to NDIS supports an ongoing basis.
3. There is no further analogous assessment under s 114(2), unlike under s 110(3), of any 'unacceptable risk' the supervised person poses to the community, although the protection of the community naturally remains the paramount consideration under the legislation. Of course, the consideration by the Court as to whether a community supervision order under s 110(4) should be made occurs only following non-satisfaction of the matters in s 110(3), which requires that risk assessment.
4. The applicant submitted that a community supervision ought be made having regard to the respondent's 'rehabilitation, retraining or resocialisation requirements', and the risk the respondent would voluntarily cease his other sources of support.[81] That scenario might then lead to a resumption of alcohol use by the respondent, which may precipitate a general relapse on his part. Those 'other sources' of support, which sit outside the criminal justice regime, include the NDIS supports, the respondent's access to a general medical practitioner, and the assistance provided to him through the Public Advocate, among others.
5. Dr Petch considered that the respondent's risk to the community appears to be currently well managed as a result of his NDIS support and the containment provided by the custody order. However, if one of those pillars was removed, the risk would no longer be adequately managed, in his view. Dr Petch considered that a community supervision order was required. Dr Petch concluded that the respondent should remain under supervision due to his rehabilitation, retraining or resocialisation requirements, but recognised the balancing process required under the legislation.
6. I will first address the risk the respondent would cease his other forms of support. This was a risk expressly addressed by the medical practitioners including Dr Griffiths in her report and by Dr Petch in his report and in his evidence during the hearing, as just noted.
7. I must accept on the evidence that the respondent has, on several occasions, reported to his medical practitioners and others, a desire to cease or cancel his supports and to resume alcohol consumption. That desire has been expressed in different ways and with varying degrees of forcefulness. These statements are, it would appear, founded in the respondent's desire to be a 'free man'. The respondent highly values that freedom.
8. I did not assess this desire as being borne from any cultural factor specific to the respondent's Aboriginality.[82] Rather, it is driven more by a general philosophy on the respondent's part to have the right to make his own decisions and to have the freedom to choose his own path. The respondent craves a greater degree of autonomy, in order to govern his own life.
9. The challenge presented by the respondent's desire in this regard is the lack of insight on his part as to the consequences of a withdrawal from his supports. The scenario identified by Dr Petch was one in which the Court declined to make a community supervision order, on the assumption the respondent is well supported otherwise, but he then proceeds to withdraw from those supports and that assistance. I accept this would be a problematic scenario if it occurred. Dr Petch identified the risks involved as significant. I certainly cannot exclude the risk this scenario would develop, and may produce serious consequences for the respondent and for the community. I must take these matters into account.
10. Against this, I recognise the respondent has been subject to a supervision regime for almost four years, in respect of which there has been compliance on his part and no evidence of behavioural difficulties. The assessments undertaken by Dr Vidovich are to the effect that the respondent has been very accepting of his NDIS supports and the respondent has been well managed by his general practitioner and the NDIS support teams.
11. The respondent, in his counsel's submission, highlighted that, whilst he was in custody, he was gradually transitioned to accommodation in the community until being ultimately placed on a conditional release order on 1 November 2021.
12. The respondent drew the Court's attention to the evidence, which I accept, which demonstrates the respondent is subject to a medication regime which is overseen by a general practitioner, noting the respondent is not currently engaged with a mental health services. The respondent has previously undertaken substance abuse counselling, which was in 2023, with which he engaged well and in respect of which his treatment is considered complete.
13. The respondent noted that he had not been referred to any further programs by his supervising officer.
14. Further, the respondent has an NDIS plan and funding approval which provides for support staff to assist the respondent with his daily activities, accessing the community, support co-ordination and a positive behaviour therapist. As I have noted, all of these services are independent of any involvement by the officers from the Adult Community Corrections division.
15. The respondent recognised that Dr Griffiths had identified a longer period by which the respondent would be held under supervision, but submitted that this was effectively a preventative restriction rather than a resocialisation need. There is some force in that characterisation.
16. The respondent also emphasised, through his counsel, the objects and principles to which I have earlier made mention. In particular, that persons with mental impairment should be subject to the least possible restriction on their freedom consistent with the protection of the community, and that persons with mental impairment in the justice system should not be subject to outcomes under the CLMI Act that 'restrict their freedom more severely than if they had been convicted' of the alleged offence. These matters inform the assessment required under s 114(2) of the CLMI Act (through s 110(4)). The respondent's counsel noted that the respondent had already spent a substantial period of time in custody and then in the community under supervision. The respondent also referred to the report of Dr Alex van Hattem dated 9 June 2021 which highlighted that the ongoing supervision by the then Board could in fact be a source of stress for the respondent.
17. I accept these are matters I must take into account in the assessment and, in the present circumstances, they weigh against the making of a community supervision order, or further subjecting the respondent to any orders under the CLMI Act regime.
18. The second significant aspect of the respondent's submissions was the focus on the existence (or asserted non-existence) of the respondent's 'rehabilitation, retraining or resocialisation requirements'.
19. The respondent submitted that no other rehabilitation, retraining or resocialisation requirements had been identified.
20. The composite phrase, 'rehabilitation, retraining or resocialisation requirements', which is used in s 114(2), is used elsewhere in the legislation.[83] The phrase is not defined, nor are the constituent words. The text should be given its ordinary and natural meaning, subject to context and purpose. Further, the absence of any prescriptive definitions of these terms emphasises that these concepts are likely to be fact sensitive.
21. In the context of the CLMI Act, and without being exhaustive, the term 'rehabilitation' generally refers to the restoration of a person to their former health or to a life free of drugs and alcohol. A rehabilitation requirement would include a recommended step or plan which is necessary or appropriate to return the person 'to a good, healthy, or normal life or condition after they have been in prison, been very ill, etc.'.[84]
22. The term 'retraining' refers generally to the process of training someone again, and captures a broad range of vocational training and programmes, although it is possible the term also extends beyond training solely for employment purposes. A retraining requirement would include a recommended step or plan to prepare a person for future vocational endeavours.
23. The term 'resocialisation' refers generally to a process of educating someone for their resumption of normal social activities in the community and, again, it captures a broad range of matters directed to this purpose. A resocialisation requirement would include a recommended step or plan to educate a person 'to behave around others in a way that is considered suitable or normal, for example after difficult experiences that have affected their behaviour'.[85]
24. As to this last term, the ordinary meaning of the term is largely consistent with the language used in respect of the defined term 're-socialisation programme' in the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA).[86] Within that legislation, the defined term extends to the equipping of a prisoner for 're-entry into the general community', and addresses matters such as 'drug and alcohol use', 'mental and physical health', 'attitudes and social control', 'institutionalisation and life skills', 'housing', 'financial support and debt', and 'family and community networks'.
25. The use of the term 'requirements' in the provision, and elsewhere in the legislation where the composite concept is used, would at least refer to specific and identified steps or plans which the person is required to undertake or which have been appropriately recommended. I accept that the term is not confined to such matters, and its reach may be broader.
26. It should at least be possible, however, for the applicant to identify a causal link between the 'requirement' and the protection of the community through supervision by a representative of the Adult Community Corrections division.
27. As the respondent submitted, correctly in my view, s 114(2) of the CLMI Act directs attention to a causal connection between the need for supervision of a person, the protection of the community, and the person's 'rehabilitation, retraining or resocialisation requirements'.[87] Certainly, the provision requires an identification of these 'rehabilitation, retraining or resocialisation requirements' as an integer in the analysis. It is in this respect, at least, that the respondent emphasises the applicant has failed to demonstrate a case for the exercise of the power to make a community supervision order.
28. In a general sense, the fact the respondent is subject to a regime under the CLMI Act, which the applicant proposes be replaced by a community supervision order, has already provided a broad process of resocialisation for the respondent. This process, which has been directed to preparing the respondent for the resumption of his normal social activities in the community, to the extent that is possible, is consistent with the objects and principles which underpin the legislation. The process has been underway, in respect of the respondent, for some years.
29. I therefore accept that, to subject the respondent to a continuing regime under the CLMI Act, through a community supervision order, would in part be supported by a resocialisation requirement within the meaning of s 114(2). That is, there exists a broad requirement that the supervision of the respondent through the Adult Community Corrections division is needed to prepare the respondent for unsupervised re-entry into the community.
30. Against this, I recognise that the ongoing interface between the respondent and the criminal justice system could in fact adversely impact his resocialisation, which is aimed at him living appropriately in the community. I also recognise that, subject to a proper assessment of the risks, the respondent receives considerable support outside the auspices of the Adult Community Corrections personnel. This includes from the NDIS support team, representatives from the Public Advocate who act as administrator and guardian, and the respondent's medical practitioners.
31. I have not mentioned in detail, as yet, the evidence of Mr Van Der Steen, but it is uncontentious that, through the Office of the Public Advocate, he provides a supportive advocacy role for the respondent and a liaison service with the NDIS support representatives.[88] The evidence was to the effect that he would be able to advocate for changes to the supports required for the respondent on a fairly quick basis, including by directly liaising with the specific 'justice liaison' personnel which functions within the structure of the NDIA.[89]
32. On balance, then, I do not consider there to be a strong causal link between the supervision of the respondent and protection of the community, and the resocialisation requirements which were identified in the evidence.
33. I accept that continued supervision of the respondent under the CLMI Act, through monitoring by and engagement with the Adult Community Corrections division, would assist the respondent's resocialisation process in a general sense.
34. However, that resocialisation has been underway for some years now, and will be assisted going forward by the continued involvement of NDIS support personnel and others. The absence of a community supervision order will not bring the resocialisation process to a conclusion.
35. The foregoing renders the assessment of the risk of the respondent ceasing those other supports quite important in the present context. I have addressed this above in these reasons. I recognise the risk of that scenario developing, but I assess that risk as sufficiently low, on balance, that I do not consider it drives an outcome which requires the respondent to remain within the criminal justice system. The respondent has made statements about wishing to be unconstrained, but the evidence also demonstrates a strong history of voluntary compliance with a range of matters, together with positive and prosocial behaviour on the part of the respondent when faced with instances which might otherwise have caused a relapse. It is appropriate in my view to give significant weight to this evidence.
36. I therefore do not consider the applicant has satisfied the onus of demonstrating that a community supervision order should be made in respect of the respondent. I will therefore dismiss the application for alternative relief under s 110(4) of the CLMI Act.

1. In the course of the second reading of the Criminal Law (Mental Impairment) Bill 2022 (WA) in December 2022, the then Attorney General referred to the critical need for people with mental impairment who are found to have committed offences to be appropriately managed in the justice system.[90]
2. The then Attorney General also observed that the 'intersection of mental impairment and the criminal justice system is complex and difficult', and a 'careful balancing of protecting the community and protecting a vulnerable cohort of people is required'.[91]
3. The present Application provides an example in which the balance weighs in favour of returning the respondent to treatment by the mental health system, and outside the criminal justice process.
4. The respondent has been subject to custody orders and other supervision regimes under the Repealed Act and the CLMI Act for many years now. He has progressed well through this process and maintained a steady and positive trajectory of safe re-integration into the community. There are many supports available to him which will continue into the foreseeable future, and which the respondent must continue to accept. In the event the risk scenario identified by Dr Petch were to emerge, I reasonably anticipate that the medical and allied health practitioners involved will follow the appropriate reporting protocols.
5. Given my assessment of the risks involved, including in particular the low risk of harm to the community, I will dismiss the application for an extended custody order in respect of the respondent, which was brought pursuant to s 105 and s 110(1) of the CLMI Act. Further, I will dismiss the alternative application for a community supervision order, which was made pursuant to s 110(4) of the CLMI Act.
6. I will also order that the name of the respondent in this proceeding be amended pursuant to O 70 r 2 RSC and O 21 r 5 RSC, with effect from 21 July 2025, to indicate the respondent acts through the Public Advocate as his guardian ad litem.
7. Finally, I will order that the custody order in place in relation to the respondent be discharged pursuant to s 265(6)(a) of the CLMI Act. I invited submissions from both counsel this morning as to whether the effect of these orders should be delayed beyond today, to allow for any practical arrangements which were required to be put into effect. Neither counsel sought any delay to the operative effect of the orders and, accordingly, the orders will take effect from today.
8. I have incorporated into these reasons at Attachment B a copy of the formal orders made by the Court.

Proposed Conditions of the Community Supervision Order**

Pursuant to section 110(4) and section 110(5) of the Criminal Law (Mental Impairment) Act 2023 (WA) (CLMI Act), the Court, having found that, to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the Respondent should remain under supervision due to their rehabilitation, retraining or resocialisation requirements, makes a community supervision order in relation to the Respondent, for a period of [x] months from [insert date]:

STANDARD CONDITIONS REQUIRED BY SECTION 54 OF THE CLMI ACT

1. Be under the supervision of a Supervising Officer, which includes complying with the lawful directions of the officer;
2. Report to a Community Corrections Officer (CCO) at Midland Adult Community Corrections, Unit 1, 3-7 The Crescent, Midland, Western Australia, 6056, on the next working day after the day on which the order is made;
3. Be under the supervision of the CCO;
4. Comply with the lawful directions of the CCO until a Supervising Officer is designated for you;

1. Reside at [address suppressed] and spend each night there. You can only stay at a different address if the different address is approved in advance by a Supervising Officer;
2. Not leave the State of Western Australia without the permission of a Supervising Officer;
3. Not obtain a passport or attend an international departure point without prior approval from a Supervising Officer;

1. Unless you have the prior approval of your Supervising Officer, have no contact with the victim of your offending on 27 September 2016. Contact in this condition means speaking to the victim in person or by phone, making any gestures towards the victim, messaging the victim using electronic devices, or asking someone else to speak to or send a message to the victim;
2. Unless contact with the victim is permitted by the previous condition, if you see any victim, you must immediately leave where you are, without speaking to them or gesturing to them, and you must look away from the victim at all times;
3. Report any direct or indirect contact with the victims of your offending to the Supervising Officer on the next working day you report to them. Contact in this condition means speaking to the victim in person or by phone, making any gestures towards the victim, messaging the victim using electronic devices, or asking someone else to speak to or send a message to the victim;

1. Attend for, and submit to, urinalysis or other testing for alcohol or prohibited drugs as directed by the Supervising Officer, including going with them to an appropriate place for such testing to take place;
2. Not purchase, possess or consume alcohol or illicit drugs;

1. Attend all appointments, consult, and engage with any medical practitioner, psychiatrist, counsellor, psychologist, mentor, support service and/or support person, as directed by a Supervising Officer;
2. Take any medication, as directed by a Supervising Officer in consultation with a medical practitioner, medication practitioner, or psychiatrist, and comply with all testing to monitor your compliance with that treatment, as directed by a Supervising Officer.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Folio 1 (being the Application dated 25 November 2024).

[2] As there is no supervision order presently in place, the alternative relief was not for an 'extended' community supervision order under div 6 pt 7, but rather for a community supervision order under div 4 pt 5.

[4] CLMI Act, s 101. See also O 4 r 2A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC); and Practice Direction 9.20.

[5] Orders made on 28 January 2025 (Folio 7).

[6] See the affidavit of Ms Katherine Elizabeth Gething affirmed on 25 November 2024 and the two volumes of documents described as the Book of Materials (BOM), identified as Ex A (volume 1) and Ex B (volume 2),

[9] Applicant's submissions dated 17 July 2025 (AS); respondent's written submissions dated 21 January 2025 (RS).

[12] The legislation was repealed with effect from 1 September 2024 and replaced with the CLMI Act.

[17] When the CLMI Act commenced operation, the Mental Impairment Review Tribunal replaced the former Mentally Impaired Accused Review Board.

[18] Which authorises the Attorney General to request that a review be undertaken.

[19] Which requires the Tribunal to undertake a review of existing custody orders as soon as practicable after the commencement of the CLMI Act.

[20] Which requires the Tribunal to review custody orders and consider the need for extended custody orders to be made. Pursuant to s 103(4), if the Tribunal considers it necessary, it must recommend that the Attorney General apply for an extended custody order.

[24] RS [38] - [65] and [66] - [79].

[32] The following principles are drawn from the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Webb v Tang [2023] WASCA 119 (Buss P & Vaughan JA) and Prichard v M 6-8 Legal Pty Ltd [2024] WASCA 4 (Mitchell JA, Hall JA & Solomon J), and the authorities collected therein.

[33] CLMI Act, s 9(3); HRSO Act, s 4. It includes any community and is not limited to the community of Western Australia or Australia.

[34] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [2022] HCA 30; (2022) 277 CLR 1 (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward J) (Garlett).

[35] See, in this Court, the recent decisions of The State of Western Australia v Hansen [No 2] [2025] WASC 4 [30] and [50] (Fiannaca J), The State of Western Australia v Paraha [2025] WASC 20 [10] - [11] (Lemonis J), and The State of Western Australia v Williams [No 2] [2024] WASC 215 (Williams [No 2]) [39] - [41] (Lemonis J).

[36] Garlett [73] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ).

[37] Garlett [84] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ).

[38] Garlett [73] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Steward JJ).

[39] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; (2008) 38 WAR 307 [28] (Steytler P and Buss JA); Western Australia v West [No 6] [2019] WASC 427 [24]; and Western Australia v ZSJ [2020] WASC 330 [47].

[49] I refer to, but need not repeat here, the overview of the NDIS regime which I set out in The State of Western Australia v White [No 7] [2023] WASC 432.

[51] ts 54; Exhibit A, pages 379 - 382 and 434 - 453.

[52] ts 54; Exhibit A, pages 280 - 297, 315 - 316, 386 - 409.

[55] ts 46; Exhibit C (Participant's Plan with end date of 10 July 2026).

[63] BOM vol 1, 339. The report of Dr Griffiths is at BOM vol 1, 307 - 314.

[73] Gething M, Joseph R and Tomasi B, Civil Procedure : Western Australia (vol 1), [70.2.2] and the authorities cited therein.

[74] Gething M, Joseph R and Tomasi B, Civil Procedure : Western Australia (vol 1), [70.2.1].

[75] Gething M, Joseph R and Tomasi B, Civil Procedure : Western Australia (vol 1), [70.10.1].

[76] CLMI Act, s 20(3). The term 'support measure' is defined in s 9(1) to extend to any measure that may facilitate participation of a 'supervised person' in the proceedings, including to have a person near to them who is approved by the Court to provide them with support.

[77] CLMI Act, s 22(2). That said, there are other provisions in the CLMI Act which apply to proceedings under pt 3, but do not apply to pt 7, which also provide a layer of support for accused persons. See s 36 (notification of the Chief Mental Health Advocate) and s 38 (appointment and role of legal practitioners) of the CLMI Act.

[82] In general terms, I did not understand the opinions of the medical practitioners to indicate that any particular treatment of, or approach to, the respondent was required from a cultural perspective. Accordingly, the principle identified in s 7(2)(d) of the CLMI Act did not have specific application in the current circumstances.

[83] CLMI Act, s 86, s 104, s 106 and s 120.

[86] Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA), s 4 and s 115.

[90] Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 December 2022, 6294.

[91] Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 December 2022, 6294.