Attorney General's Reference Pursuant to s. 37 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act No. 2 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 515Bourke v R

CASES CITED: Attorney General's Reference Pursuant to s. 37 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act No. 2 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 515Bourke v R [2010] NSWCCA 22DPP v Cooke [2007] NSWCA 2Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610R v AD [2008] NSWCCA 289R v Cahyadi [2007] NSWCCA 1R v Corbett [2008] NSWCCA 42R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115R v Elphick [2010] NSWCCA 112R v Fajka [2004] NSWCCA 166R v Hersi [2010] NSWCCA 57R v Jones (unrep., NSWCCA, 30.6.1994)R v Mitchell, R v Gallagher [2007] NSWCCA 296R v Nicholson [2010] NSWCCA 80R v Wallace [2007] NSWCCA 63

REPRESENTATION: Ms. R. Gee for the Director of Public Prosecutions Mr. A. Blackman of Counsel for and with Mr Schaeffer

JUDGMENT 1 On 30 August 2010 following plea negotiations the offender pleaded guilty to the following charges: That (he) on 24 December 2009 at Albury in the State of New South Wales did use unlawful violence towards Larry Haifa by conduct such that a person of reasonable firmness if present at the scene would have feared for their safety, contrary to section 93C(1) of the Crimes Act 1900, and further that; (he) on 24 December 2009 at Albury in the State of New South Wales did assault Larry Haifa, contrary to s. 61 of the Crimes Act, 1900.

2 Those offences constitute breaches of bonds imposed by me at this Court on1 June 2009. In respect of a charge of Common Assault a sentence of 9 months imprisonment was imposed and suspended upon the offender entering a bond to be of good behaviour pursuant to s. 12 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 and in respect of a charge of Larceny the offender was released on a Bond to be of Good Behaviour pursuant to s. 9 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The court will need to re sentence in respect of both of those Bonds.

3 In respect of the new offences to which the offender pleaded guilty on 30 August 2010 the representative of the Director of Public Prosecutions did not oppose the offender receiving a discount of 25% for the utilitarian value of the pleas. Mr. Blackman had previously submitted that that was the appropriate discount. Given the attitude of the prosecution I will allow the full discount of 25% for the utilitarian value of the pleas.

4 As is customary in the Local Court the matter proceeded by way of the tender of a set of Agreed Facts. I will recite those facts in full: Some time before 1.20am on 23 December 2009 the accused, Ian Schaeffer attended the ROI Bar in Dean Street, Albury.

About 1.15am on 24 December 2009 the victim Larry Haifa, attended the footpath in front of the ROI Bar in an attempt to gain entry into the premises with a number of other friends after having Christmas dinks at another local licensed premises.

Shortly thereafter a group of young males (the group) including Schaeffer were escorted form the ROI Bar by security staff. This group of males were on the footpath away from the entrance of the bar. The victim's friend, Ross Cook, approached the group and attempted to engage them in conversation. This group responded in a hostile fashion causing Cook to move away from them. At around this time, the victim moved over to the group and there was a hostile verbal exchange between them. Three security officers then approached the victim and physically moved him away from the group.

Cook then saw a man doubled over against a red car as he was being held in a headlock by a security guard. The security guard raised his knee several times hitting this man in the face. Two other security guards were present as this assault occurred. As this assault was occurring, Schaeffer and a number of members of the group joined in the assault on the victim. During this assault the man was punched and possibly kicked to the head. It was not until the man was able to raise his head between blows that Cook realised it was his friend, the victim, who was being assaulted. He then attempted to intervene but was physically prevented from doing so by one of the security guards.

When the security guard released his hold on the victim, he tried to move away from the attacking group but was pursued and repeatedly punched to the head (Affray). He appeared dazed. The victim was able to distance himself from his attackers and was standing on a median strip some distance from the entrance of the ROI Bar.

Up until this time Jesse Costin had been inside the ROI Bar. Once outside the ROI Bar Costin became involved in a fight. During this fight Costin exchanged blows with a number of unknown people.

The victim was standing on the median strip. Costin approached the victim and punched him to the face. As a direct result of this the victim was knocked out and fell to the ground. The victim's head hit the road surface where the witnesses heard a "crack". The victim did not move and blood started coming from his head.

As the victim lay unconscious on the ground, Schaeffer approached him and punched him to the head (Common Assault).

Police attended, examined and processed the scene and commenced the investigation.

Schaeffer was arrested on 13 January 2010 in Wodonga before being extradited to New South Wales. He was subsequently charged at Albury Police Station. Schaeffer participated in an electronically recorded interview without making any admissions.

The victim was taken to Albury Base Hospital by ambulance an later transferred to the Royal Melbourne Hospital in a critical condition.

The victim suffered extensive injuries. Those injuries were: a fractured left cheek bone, a midline occipital fracture extending into the left skull base, factures of the nasal bones, a fracture of left orbital floor, large laceration to the back of the head and acute intracerebral bleeds on both sides of the falx. There were also several focal intracerebral bleeds within the left and right lobes. He was put on life support and in a medically induced coma. He was transferred to the care of the Neurosurgeon and was later discharged from the Neurosurgery Unit for follow up by the Royal Talbot Brain Rehabilitation Hospital. He has since been at home but undergoing further treatment. He presently suffers ongoing neurological and physical symptoms for which he is undergoing continuing rehabilitation.

A significant brain injury, occipital fracture and the large laceration to the back of the victim's head were occasioned when the victim's head impacted with the road surface after he fell unconscious to the ground upon being struck by Costin. Schaeffer is not charged with occasioning any injury to the victim. The Crown cannot point to any injuries directly attributable to the actions of Schaeffer".

5 I emphasise that that last paragraph is a verbatim quote from the Agreed Facts presented by the prosecution. I am bound to sentence on the basis of the Agreed Facts.

6 The victim was riding his bicycle in Kiewa Street Albury after work. He sighted a vehicle doing "burn outs". The victim went to speak to the driver of the vehicle doing the "burn outs" as he knew that person. The offender and another unknown male walked up to the victim and pushed him off his bike causing him to move backwards and his bike to fall to the ground. The victim who was holding a mobile telephone outstretched his arms confused as to what was happening. The offender accused the victim of doing "burn outs" outside his sister's home. The offender punched the victim with a closed right fist connecting with the right side of the victim's jaw, a second punch landed on the victim's left ear. The offender then took the mobile phone. The offender got up and followed, pleading for his phone back, to which the offender said, "Here's your sim card motherfucker". The offender placed the phone in his right hand pocket and walked inside.

7 Before going to assess the criminality, it is appropriate to go to the matters of general principle relating to Affray. Essentially, although the offender is sentenced in the background of the events giving rise to the charge he or she is sentenced in respect of his or her role in the affray.

8 It is not the case that each participant is held jointly responsible for the entirety of the events covered by the affray: as much was made clear by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the decision of R v Fajka [2004] NSWCCA 166. Howie J. (Hulme & Simpson JJ agreeing) said at [27]-[29]: It seems to me, with respect, that too much was made throughout the sentencing hearing of the conduct of the brother rather than focusing, as his counsel sought to have the judge do, on the conduct of the applicant. The brother was charged with a number of offences, including, somewhat surprisingly, two counts of affray. The applicant did not become liable for all that his brother had done, either because of the nature of the charge of affray or because, in his Honour's words, ''he was quite prepared to identify himself with his brother''. If that phrase meant that he became involved in order to assist his brother or to take his brother's part in disputes with the hotel guests, then it might be accurate. But if it suggests that by participation in the brawl he adopted all that his brother did and in someway became criminally liable for it, that is not so. 28 Of course the applicant's conduct had to be considered in the context of the fact that his brother had become involved in a brawl with guests and staff at the hotel on what was in effect a family occasion, with children present. But that was the limited basis upon which the brother's conduct aggravated that of the applicant. Section 93(C)(2) does not mean, in my opinion, that the applicant was to be punished for all the conduct of both himself and his brother. Rather the section is concerned with ensuring that the conduct of the two of them is considered in determining whether that conduct ''is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety''. 29 In a case such as the present the applicant could only be punished for that part of his and his brother's conduct which gave rise to the offence of affray and not that conduct which also resulted in some other offence or offences being committed by the brother, for example an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. In particular where the brother was charged with two offences of affray and the applicant only one offence, the sentencing court had to be careful not to take into account that part of the brother's conduct that gave rise to the second offence with which the applicant was not charged. 9 Further, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered this issue in R v Stevens [2007] NSWCCA 152, a decision to which I was helpfully referred by the Crown in this matter. Price J (McClellan CJ at CL, Hidden J agreeing) said at [24]-[25]: Section 93C of the Crimes Act relevantly provided: "Affray (1) A person who uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and whose conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his or her personal safety is guilty of affray and liable to imprisonment for 5 years. (2) If 2 or more person use or threaten unlawful violence, it is the conduct of them taken together that must be considered for the purposes of subsection (1)." In determining an appropriate sentence for an offence of affray contrary to s 93C of the Crimes Act an offender's conduct is to be considered in the context of the conduct of a co-offender. The level of violence used and the scale of the affray are relevant. An offender, however, may only be sentenced for that part of his conduct and the conduct of the co-offender which gave rise to the offence of affray and not that conduct which resulted in some other offence being committed by him or by the co-offender: see R v Huynh [2000] NSWCCA 18, R v Eleter [2003] NSWCCA 130 and R v Fajka [2004] NSWCCA 166.

10 More recently, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered the issue of sentence for Affray in R v Elphick [2010] NSWCCA 112. At [43] Grove J. (Allsop P. Hislop J. agreeing) said: Of course, in dealing with affray the unlawful violence is to be distinguished from causative harm which is an element of the different offence to be dealt with pursuant to the s 166 certificate. A distinct element in the offence of affray is the capacity of the violence to engender fear in a bystander, there being no requirement of the actual presence of such a person (s 93C (4) Crimes Act ). It is germane to consider the level of the violence which I have described as extremely high but bear in mind that it is not an element of that offence that harm or harm of any particular scale or quality be caused to a victim. This distinction from the related offence on the s 166 Certificate is self evident.

11 The Affray on which I am passing sentence is essentially the offender being part of the group that pursued and then repeatedly punched the victim. As the authorities make clear, the gravamen of the charge of Affray is the instilling in the hypothetical person of reasonable firmness fear for their safety. The offender was part of a group that was obviously intent on violence. The victim was pursued and repeatedly punched. However, there was no planning, and to a large extent what occurred was spontaneous. I am of the opinion that the matter is at or about the half-way point on the scale of objective seriousness of matters that routinely come before the Local Court.

12 The Common Assault is in my opinion, very much towards the upper end of the range of seriousness. The victim was on the ground and was unconscious, and therefore in my opinion a vulnerable victim within the meaning of s 21A(2)(l) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

13 The maximum penalty for Affray if dealt with on Indictment is 10 years imprisonment. It is a matter to which the principles enunciated by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115 apply. In that case Grove J. in giving the leading judgment (Spigelman CJ and Kirby J. agreeing) in that decision said at [35]: The result of true construction of the statutory provisions in New South Wales is that, what has been prescribed is a jurisdictional maximum and not a maximum penalty for any offence triable within that jurisdiction. In other words, where the maximum applicable penalty is lower because the charge has been prosecuted within the limited summary jurisdiction of the Local Court, that court should impose a penalty reflecting the objective seriousness of the offence, tempered if appropriate by subjective circumstances, taking care only not to exceed the maximum jurisdictional limit. The implication of the argument of the appellant that, in lieu of prescribed maximum penalties exceeding two years imprisonment, a maximum of two years imprisonment for all offences triable summarily in the Local Court has been substituted must be rejected. As must also be rejected the corollary that a sentence of two years imprisonment should be reserved for a 'worst case'".

14 I also note that the Court of Criminal Appeal (a bench of five) followed and affirmed this matter of general principle in Attorney General's Reference Pursuant to s. 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 No. 2 of 2002 (Guideline Judgment in Assault Police Matters) [2002] NSWCCA 515 at [27]. 15 The maximum penalty for a Common Assault dealt with in the Local Court is 12 months imprisonment. Matters of General Principle

16 This is yet another example of violence in the central business district of Albury in or about licensed premises. In my opinion there are very real issues of general deterrence. The conduct of the offender apart from being violent and dangerous is also conduct to which the decent and respectable citizens of this city should not have to witness, and further do not have to tolerate. Hulme J. said in the decision of R v Corbett [2008] NSWCCA 42 at [10]: From time to time particular offences have become more common, either throughout the state or in particular towns or parts of it. It is an accepted practice for criminal courts to respond to such increases in offending of a particular type by increasing sentences for such offences and this without any change to the legislative proscription of the conduct or any increase in the penalty prescribed. 17 Further, on the issue of general deterrence involving matters of violence, Howie J (Giles JA, Fullerton J agreeing) in R v Mitchell, R v Gallagher [2007] NSWCCA 296 at [29]: With respect to her Honour, when an offence is as objectively serious as this particular offence was, there is a limited scope to ameliorate the penalty by promoting the rehabilitation of the offenders, especially in the case of Mitchell who was on a bond for an offence of violence committed in retaliation against the victim for some assumed wrong. I fail to understand why her Honour thought that general deterrence was of less significance in the circumstances of this case just because the respondents were young men. Violence on the streets especially by young men in company and under the influence of alcohol or drugs is all too common and needs to be addressed by sentences that carry a very significant degree of general deterrence.

18 On the issue of safety of the streets, and the need for general deterrence Howie J in R v Hersi [2010] NSWCCA 57 at [44] said: I believe this offence was significantly more serious than the normal offence to which the Henry guideline applied. Pedestrians on public streets are entitled to protection from groups of young men and general deterrence was a very significant element of determining the appropriate sentence… 19 Of course, the offences being dealt with by the Court of Criminal Appeal in those matters involved more serious violence than that on which I am passing sentence. However, the matters of general principle relating to the need for deterrent sentences in offences involving violence on the streets should be plain to all.

20 The offender was subject to a suspended sentence Bond to be of Good Behaviour for a matter of violence at the time he committed the offences on 24 December 2009. I note that the Common Assault for which he received that suspended sentence was also a serious example of a Common Assault. The commission of further offences is a matter of Aggravation - see Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 s 21A(2)(j), and various authorities including R v Jones (unrep., NSWCCA, 30.6.1994); R v Wallace [2007] NSWCCA 63 at [15] and R v AD [2008] NSWCCA 289. I note that the Court of Criminal Appeal in that last decision affirmed the much earlier decision in Jones.

21 The most recent matters recorded against the offender are the matters for which he was on conditional liberty at the time of the commission of the offences on 24 December 2009. However, he has a significant history in Victoria. In July 2009 he was dealt with by the Wodonga Magistrates Court for Burglary and Theft for which he was sentenced to Detention in a Youth Training Centre. He also has matters in the children's Court for Recklessly Causing Injury, traffic and dishonesty offences. The offender was born on 26 June 1990 and accordingly, was 19 years of age at the time of the commission of the offences. In all of the circumstances I am of the opinion that the offender is not entitled to any particular leniency because of his record. I merely observe that if the offender continues to commit offences of violence he will soon have his record used as an aggravating feature in any sentencing exercise.

22 I am assisted by the Pre-Sentence Report prepared by the Probation and Parole Service. That report refers to the criminal history of the offender. He is the eldest of three children and was apparently raised in a supportive environment. The offender's father was imprisoned in respect of a charge of murder when the offender was 13 years of age, and according to the report "things began to go downhill for him" after that. He was suspended several times from school because of fighting. He apparently has supportive relationship with all family members.

23 The offender was not able to complete his Year 10 Certificate, because of the suspensions, but has been employed in various labouring positions. The author of the report indicates that the offender has a strong work ethic noting that he has employment available to him upon his eventual release.

24 Of concern in the report is the note that the offender agreed "with some of the police facts" and that he denies assaulting the victim when he was on the ground. This quite frankly flies in the face of the Agreed Facts, and is yet another example of an offender attempting to minimise his offending. However, despite this, the report notes that the offender is "genuinely remorseful" for his actions.

25 The offender suffered an accident at the age of 18 that resulted in a fractured eye socket that has required a number of surgical interventions. He is suitable for supervision, and in particular counselling relating to anger management and alcohol abuse.

26 The report indicates that the offender is not suitable for Community Service. I am of the opinion however, that such a disposition would be manifestly inadequate.

27 The court is indebted to Mr. Blackman who said and did everything he possibly could for the offender in the very comprehensive submissions in mitigation. A letter from the Victoria Department of Human Services was tendered that indicates that no action will be taken in respect of the matters from July 2009 in Wodonga. Letters from the offender, a friend Rachael Golia, and the offender's mother were handed up to the court in the course of the plea. The offender expresses remorse, and also laments the absence of his father. He maintains that he has learnt from the experience that finds him in custody. I accept that the letter is a genuine expression of remorse and an intention not to re-offend upon release. The letter from Ms. Golia expresses an opinion that the offender is "honest and responsible". Regrettably, the criminal history does not bear that out, but I note the observations. The offender's mother also refers to the offender's father and maintains that the offender found the situation hard to handle. I need no persuasion on that issue. The offender's mother also maintains that her son has learnt from this ordeal, and has made decisions not to re-offend. I accept those as genuine and sincere intentions. Apart from anything else, the offender has good family support that will stand him in good stead in his continuing rehabilitation when he is eventually released.

28 There is also a reference from Mr. Petar Gvozdenovic of "Pugsy's Plasterers Pty Limited" who has employed the offender in the past. The reference speaks well of the offender, and indicates that he would have no hesitation in re-employing the offender on his release. This is also something that is very positive in favour of the offender and this too will contribute to his rehabilitation.

29 Mr. Blackman appropriately emphasised the contents of those letters and references in the course of his plea. He went on to submit that the offender had consumed a considerable amount of liquor in the hours before the offending, he having attended the Star Hotel and Paddy's Bar before moving on to the ROI Bar. I merely observe that intoxication is generally not a mitigating factor - see Bourke v R [2010] NSWCCA 22 at [26] and [28].

30 Mr. Blackman referred to the facts and emphasised, appropriately, that none of the injuries sustained by Haifa can be attributed to the actions of this offender. Mr. Blackman submitted that there were no weapons used and the conduct was very much spontaneous with no planning. I accept these submissions.

31 The offender was 19 years of age at the time of the offending, and is therefore still a young man with his life ahead of him. He was born in Melbourne, and his parents separated when he was 12. I have already referred to the issue of the offender's father being imprisoned for murder when the offender was only 13. It was emphasised that the offender will require further medical and surgical intervention for the injury to his eye.

32 It was put on behalf of the offender, and I accept that there are good prospects of rehabilitation, although given the history of the offender I am more guarded on the prospects of him not re-offending. He will need to ensure that he accepts the guidance and counselling offered to ensure that he does not again come into conflict with the criminal law for offences of violence. It was submitted, and I accept that the offer of employment is a significant matter so far as rehabilitation is concerned.

33 Mr. Blackman submitted that the criminality so far as the Affray charge was concerned was below the half-way point of objective seriousness. I have already found that it is at or about the half-way point.

34 No submission was put that I not revoke the Bonds imposed on 1 June 2009. Indeed, it is my opinion that no reasonable submissions could have been so made. I was also urged to find Special Circumstances within the meaning of that expression in s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. This is the offender's first time in custody, he is a young man, and he will need extensive ongoing supervision and support upon release. I am very much of the opinion that there are Special Circumstances. The partial cumulation of sentences is another reason why I should also find Special Circumstances. I note that because of the issue of cumulation, and the need to preserve the integrity of the finding of Special Circumstances, the ratio of the Non-Parole Period to total sentence is less in this case that what I would other otherwise impose.

35 Although it is not submitted that I not revoke the bonds imposed on 1 June 2009 it is important that I note the decision of the Court of Appeal in DPP v Cooke [2007] NSWCA 2. Howie J (Sully & Price JJ agreeing) said at [23]: "There is nothing more likely to bring suspended sentences into disrepute than the failure of courts to act where there has been a clear breach of the conditions of the bond by which the offender avoided being sent to prison. Notwithstanding what has been stated about the reality of the punishment involved in a suspended sentence, if offenders do not treat the obligations imposed upon them by the bond seriously and if courts are not rigorous in revoking the bond upon breach in the usual case, both offenders and the public in general will treat them as being nothing more than a legal fiction designed to allow an offender to escape the punishment that he or she rightly deserved". 36 I am of course, obliged to give proper regard to sections 3A and 5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. I am of the opinion that no other sentence other that a full time custodial sentence is appropriate in the matters on which I have to pass sentence. I am also obliged to apply the decision of the High Court of Australia in Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 and pass an appropriate sentence on each offence and then consider the issues of cumulation, concurrence or partial concurrence and totality.

37 Clearly, on the authority of R v Nicholson [2010] NSWCCA 80 the sentence previously suspended but enlivened by the breach of the offences on 24 December 2009 will need to be imposed before I then turn to those new offences.

38 The principle relating to sentencing for multiple offending was explained in Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1 as follows: 27 …there is no general rule that determines whether sentences ought to be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The issue is determined by the application of the principle of totality of criminality: can the sentence for one offence comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence? If it can, the sentences ought to be concurrent otherwise there is a risk that the combined sentences will exceed that which is warranted to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. If not, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will fail to reflect the total criminality of the two offences. This is no regardless of whether the two offences represent two discrete acts of criminality or can be regarded as part of a single episode of criminality. Of course it is more likely that, where the offences are discrete and independent criminal acts, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend the criminality of the other. Similarly, where they are part of a single episode of criminality with common factors, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will reflect the criminality of both.

39 In the matters on which I have to pass sentence I am of the opinion that I can impose wholly concurrent sentences in respect of the offending for which a suspended sentence was imposed and a bond given on 1 June 2009. However, it is my opinion that the sentences for the Affray should be partially cumulative, as should the sentence for the Common Assault. The Common Assault was committed after the Affray was over, although the period of time was quite short. That common assault was nothing other than gratuitous thuggery, which in my opinion richly deserves some meaningful punishment beyond that imposed for the Affray.

40 I again emphasise that I am passing sentence on the basis that this offender caused none of the injuries sustained by Larry Haifa. In all of the circumstances I am of the opinion that the starting point for the sentence of Affray is in the vicinity of 20 months from which must be deducted the 25% discount for the plea, leaves a total sentence of 15 months. I am of the opinion that the starting point for the Common Assault is in the vicinity of 9 months imprisonment, which again, must be reduced by 25% for the plea, leaving, with some arithmetical rounding down, a sentence of 6 months, which I will impose as a Fixed Term.

41 The offender has been in custody solely referable to these matters since his arrest on 13 January 2010, and accordingly any sentence should commence on that date.

42 My formal orders are: Breach Matters: In respect of the sentence imposed and wholly suspended for the charge of Common Assault the Bond pursuant to section 12 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 is revoked. You are sentenced to a non-parole period of 5 months commencing on 13 January 2010 and expiring on 12 June 2010, with a balance of term of 4 months commencing on 13 June 2010 and expiring on 12 September 2010. In respect of the charge of Larceny I revoke the Bond to be of Good Behaviour imposed on 1 June 2009 and you are sentenced to a Fixed Term of Imprisonment of 2 months from 13 January 2010 and expiring on 12 March 2010. Offences of 24 December 2009:

In respect of the Charge of Common Assault you are sentenced to a Fixed Term of Imprisonment of 6 months commencing on 13 April 2010 and expiring on 13 October 2010.

In respect of the charge of Affray you are sentenced to a Non-parole Period of 8 months from 13 June 2010 and expiring on 12 February 2011. I specify a balance of term of 7 months to commence on 13 February 2011, which will expire on 12 September 2011. Gordon Lerve Magistrate Albury Local Court 22 Nov 2010

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