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[2026] QSC 23
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Queensland
2026-02-27
Davis J
Original judgment source is linked above.
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS - DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER - GENERALLY - where the respondent was a prisoner serving a sentence for a serious sexual offence - where the Attorney-General applied for orders under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 - where the Attorney-General submitted that the respondent was a serious danger to the community in the absence of an order under the Act - where the Attorney-General did not seek a continuing detention order - where the Attorney-General sought a supervision order - where the respondent resists the making of a supervision - where the Attorney-General sought an order that the supervision order be of a duration of five years - where the respondent submitted that he was not an unacceptable risk as he was undertaking treatment - whether a supervision order ought to be made - whether the duration of the supervision order ought to be five years
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DXP [2019] QSC 77, considered
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v GFC [2023] QSC 277, considered
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v KAH [2019] 3 Qd R 329; [2019] QSC 36, considered
Attorney-General (Qld) v Kanaveilomani [2015] 2 Qd R 509; [2013] QCA 404, considered
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Newman [2019] 2 Qd R 1; [2018] QSC 156, cited
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v PCO [2019] QSC 44, considered
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Phineasa [2013] 1 Qd R 305; [2012] QCA 184, cited
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Sutherland [2006] QSC 268, considered
R v Trott [2023] QCA 107, related
Tilbrook v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2012] QCA 279, cited
Van De Wetering v Attorney-General (Qld) [2024] QCA 222, cited
[1] The Attorney-General applies against Zachary William Trott for orders under s 13 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (DPSOA). Mr Trott resists the application.
[2] Section 3 of the DPSOA describes the objects of the legislation as follows:
(a) to provide for the continued detention in custody or supervised release of a particular class of prisoner to ensure adequate protection of the community; and
(b) to provide continuing control, care or treatment of a particular class of prisoner to facilitate their rehabilitation."
[3] Those objects are sought to be achieved by a scheme providing for the detention of certain prisoners beyond the expiry of their sentences, or alternatively by their release upon supervision.[1]
[4] Section 5 empowers the Attorney-General to apply for both an order under s 8 of the DPSOA and also an order under Division 3 of Part 2. Section 8 provides for a preliminary hearing where orders can be made for the psychiatric examination of a respondent. Division 3 of Part 2 provides for final orders. Applications may only be brought pursuant to s 5 against a "prisoner".
[5] The term "prisoner" is defined for the purposes of s 5, by s 5(6) which relevantly provides:
(a) means a prisoner detained in custody who is serving a period of imprisonment for a serious sexual offence, or is serving a period of imprisonment that includes a term of imprisonment for a serious sexual offence, whether the person was sentenced to the term or period of imprisonment before or after the commencement of this section..."
[6] Section 5(6) introduces the concept of "a serious sexual offence". That term is defined in Schedule 1 as follows:
"serious sexual offence means an offence of a sexual nature, whether committed in Queensland or outside Queensland -
(a) involving violence;[2] or
(b) against a child; or
(c) against a person, including a fictitious person represented to the prisoner as a real person, whom the prisoner believed to be a child under the age of 16 years."
[7] In Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Phineasa,[3] a respondent committed sexual offences which constituted sexual assault but involved no real force. The question arose as to what, within the meaning of the term "serious sexual offence", constituted a "violent" offence. Muir JA, with whom White JA and Philippides J (as her Honour then was) agreed, said:
"[38] As I trust emerges from earlier discussion, the "violence" referred to in the definition of serious sexual offence is force significantly greater in degree than mere physical contact or even, at least as a general proposition, acts such as pawing, grasping, groping or stroking. The language of sections 8 and 13, in particular, is inconsistent with the application of the Act to sexual offences other than of a very serious kind where offending against adults is concerned. Those sections are addressing conduct of such a nature, that the risk that a prisoner, assumed to be a member of a particular class, might engage in it and harm a member or members of the public if released from custody or if released without a supervision order, is regarded as unacceptable. Consequently, the "violence" contemplated by the Act (excluding for present purposes threats and intimidation) would normally involve the use of force against a person to facilitate the "rape" of that person within the meaning of s 349 of the Criminal Code or which caused (or in the case of predicted conduct would be likely to cause) that person significant physical injury or significant psychological harm.
[39] It is unnecessary for present purposes to explore the question whether and to what extent there may be "violence" for the purposes of the Act not involving intimidation, threats or the application of physical force to a person. Nor is it desirable or appropriate to attempt any greater degree of definition of the meaning of "violent". It will always be necessary to determine whether conduct involves "violence" by reference to the particular facts and circumstances of the case under consideration. However, rape, involving as it does the violation of the victim's body would normally, if not invariably, involve "violence".[4]
[8] By s 8 a preliminary hearing is conducted. Section 8 is in terms:
(1) If the court is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for believing the prisoner is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order, the court must set a date for the hearing of the application for a division 3 order.
(2) If the court is satisfied as required under subsection (1), it may make -
(a) an order that the prisoner undergo examinations by 2 psychiatrists named by the court who are to prepare independent reports; and
(b) if the court is satisfied the application may not be finally decided until after the prisoner's release day -
(i) an order that the prisoner's release from custody be supervised; or
(ii) an order that the prisoner be detained in custody for the period stated in the order."[5]
[9] The term "prisoner", as used in s 8, is defined differently to that as in s 5(6).[6] The distinction is not relevant here. It is not disputed that Mr Trott was, at the relevant times, a "prisoner" as defined both in ss 5 and 8. It is not in dispute that Mr Trott was convicted of a "serious sexual offence" for the purposes of both s 5 and s 8.[7]
[10] Section 8(1) introduces the notion of "serious danger to the community". That is a fundamental concept within the scheme of the DPSOA. The term is defined in s 13, which is a pivotal section within the scheme. It is the section which vests jurisdiction to make final orders.
(1) This section applies if, on the hearing of an application for a division 3 order, the court is satisfied the prisoner is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order (a serious danger to the community).
(2) A prisoner is a serious danger to the community as mentioned in subsection (1) if there is an unacceptable risk that the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence -
(a) if the prisoner is released from custody; or
(b) if the prisoner is released from custody without a supervision order being made.
(3) On hearing the application, the court may decide that it is satisfied as required under subsection (1) only if it is satisfied -
(a) by acceptable, cogent evidence; and
(b) to a high degree of probability;
that the evidence is of sufficient weight to justify the decision.
(4) In deciding whether a prisoner is a serious danger to the community as mentioned in subsection (1), the court must have regard to the following -
(aa) any report produced under section 8A;
(a) the reports prepared by the psychiatrists under section 11 and the extent to which the prisoner cooperated in the examinations by the psychiatrists;
(b) any other medical, psychiatric, psychological or other assessment relating to the prisoner;
(c) information indicating whether or not there is a propensity on the part of the prisoner to commit serious sexual offences in the future;
(d) whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour on the part of the prisoner;
(e) efforts by the prisoner to address the cause or causes of the prisoner's offending behaviour, including whether the prisoner participated in rehabilitation programs;
(f) whether or not the prisoner's participation in rehabilitation programs has had a positive effect on the prisoner;
(g) the prisoner's antecedents and criminal history;
(h) the risk that the prisoner will commit another serious sexual offence if released into the community;
(i) the need to protect members of the community from that risk;
(j) any other relevant matter.
(5) If the court is satisfied as required under subsection (1), the court may order -
(a) that the prisoner be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care or treatment (continuing detention order); or
(b) that the prisoner be released from custody subject to the requirements it considers appropriate that are stated in the order (supervision order).
(6) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (5)(a) or (b) -
(a) the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of the community; and
(b) the court must consider whether -
(i) adequate protection of the community can be reasonably and practicably managed by a supervision order; and
(ii) requirements under section 16 can be reasonably and practicably managed by corrective services officers.
(7) The Attorney-General has the onus of proving that a prisoner is a serious danger to the community as mentioned in subsection (1)."
[11] Orders which can be made under s 8 include orders that a prisoner undergo psychiatric examination. That occurred here. The evidence so obtained may then be relied upon by the Attorney-General for orders under s 13.[8]
[12] By s 13, an order can be made that a respondent be detained in custody beyond the expiry of the sentence they are serving (a continuing detention order or CDO).[9] Alternatively, an order can be made releasing a respondent from custody subject to the requirements of an order for their supervision (a supervision order).[10]
[13] Here, the Attorney-General does not press for a CDO. She accepts that having regard to all the circumstances and to the considerations prescribed by s 13(6), adequate protection of the community can be reasonably and practicably managed by a supervision order.[11] In my view that concession is properly made. There is no evidence supporting the making of a CDO.
[14] Therefore, the first question on the present application is whether a supervision order ought to be made against Mr Trott or whether the application ought to be dismissed.
[15] If a supervision order is made, then by force of s 13A the order must state the period for which the supervision order is to have effect. Section 13A provides as follows:
(1) If the court makes a supervision order, the order must state the period for which it is to have effect.
(2) In fixing the period, the court must not have regard to whether or not the prisoner may become the subject of -
(a) an application for a further supervision order; or
(b) a further supervision order.
(3) The period can not end before 5 years after the making of the order or the end of the prisoner's period of imprisonment, whichever is the later."
"[68] It follows then that setting a period of supervision under s 13A must involve an assessment now of the prisoner's current state but predicting when he will be an acceptable risk in the community without a supervision order.
[69] The Court cannot consider "whether or not the prisoner may become the subject of an application for a further supervision order or a supervision order" in the future. However, it does not follow that the consideration of the appropriate length of the order is undertaken without reference to the statutory scheme.
[70] Ms Holliday for the respondent submitted that s 13A(2) would be offended if the Court considered that the prisoner would only cease to be an unacceptable risk in the community after ten years on supervision but set the duration of the order at five years on the basis that the order could later be extended under s 19B. I accept her submission as a correct statement of the operation of the section in that situation. In that situation, the supervision order would not provide "adequate protection of the community". On those facts, "adequate protection of the community" would only be ensured by the making of a supervision order, and a later order extending the period of supervision
[71] However, when assessing, as at today, what supervision order is required to provide adequate protection of the community, the statutory context is not an irrelevant consideration. So, the evidence that I have accepted is that if the respondent complies with the supervision order for five years he will no longer pose an unacceptable risk. The legislation provides for an extension of the supervision order (in some cases upon breach) and that can be taken into account in determining whether on the evidence in this case a supervision order of five years provides adequate protection of the community.
[72] I have accepted the evidence that if the respondent satisfactorily completes supervision for a period of five years he will thereafter not pose an unacceptable risk. If he breaches the supervision order or does not perform and thereby enlivens the discretion under ss 19B or 22 then the supervision order can be extended. Of course, that would be a completely different determination made by the Court at that time. Against the statutory scheme, which includes ss 19B and 22, I am satisfied that a supervision order on the terms that I intend to order for a period of five years provides adequate protection of the community."
[17] In Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DXP,[14] Applegarth J followed KAH and stated:
"[29] If the Court is satisfied that adequate protection of the community can be afforded by a supervision order, then it is necessary to consider its terms and its duration. In considering the period of the order, the Court makes a current assessment of future risks and asks: when will the respondent reach a point at which he is an acceptable risk without a supervision order? The assessment of when a risk will be acceptable or unacceptable is for the Court, not the psychiatrists. However, the opinions of psychiatrists concerning risk and matters within their professional expertise assist the Court in determining the issue for its decision."
[18] Later, in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v GFC,[15] Applegarth observed:
"[115] In Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v KAH,[16] Davis J considered the proper construction of s 13A of the Act. In doing so he considered earlier authorities to the effect that in fixing the period of a supervision order the Court must predict the time in the future at which the respondent will be an acceptable risk without supervision. The correct legal consideration is "when will the respondent reach a point at which he/she is an acceptable risk without a supervision order?"[17] The issue is not whether the prisoner may become the subject of an application for a further supervision order in the future. Instead, the appropriate length of the order is undertaken by reference to the statutory scheme.
[116] The Court has to make a prediction, based on evidence, of what kind and duration of supervision order is required to provide adequate protection of the community. That may entail a working assumption about compliance with the supervision order. However, it involves many other considerations. In this matter it includes the matters addressed by the psychiatrists as to the respondent's entrenched personality disorder, his psychopathic traits and his intellectual deficits. This is not a case, unlike many, in which one might have a degree of confidence that, with appropriate engagement with counselling and support, employment, abstinence from drugs, and the development of a pro-social network of family and friends, an individual will mature, gain insight into their offending and vulnerabilities, develop coping strategies and behaviours that minimise risk, and not be an unacceptable risk after a period of five years of support and supervision."
[19] There is, in my view, no difference in substance between the articulation of the question by me in KAH and the articulation of the question by Applegarth J in DXP and GFC. The aim is to pick the point and time when the respondent will not pose an unacceptable risk when not subject to supervision.[18]
[20] The determination of the length of the supervision order does not pose the question "whether the prisoner may become the subject of an application for a further supervision order in the future".[19] The point being made in KAH was that the statutory scheme provides for the setting of an expiry date for the order and also provides for action to be taken upon a breach. That action includes the extension of the order. Therefore, when assessing the length of the order pursuant to ss 13 and 13A, that assessment should proceed on the basis that the order will be complied with; see Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v PCO.[20]
[21] In Van De Wetering v Attorney-General (Qld),[21] questions were raised as to the correctness of what I said in KAH about the relevance of the availability of breach proceedings if the supervision order was not complied with. The Court ultimately considered it unnecessary to resolve what it considered were differences in opinion between Applegarth J and me.[22]
[22] I, with respect, have difficulty in seeing any conflict between what I said in KAH and what Applegarth J said in GFC and DXP. In GFC, Applegarth J specifically adopted my articulation of the correct test and correctly, in my respectful view, stated that the issue is not whether a respondent may become subject to an application for a supervision order in the future. His Honour said, "the appropriate length of the order is undertaken by reference to the statutory scheme". That is, with respect, consistent to what was said in KAH.[23]
[23] In the absence of any statement by the Court of Appeal to the contrary, the approach which should be taken, in my view, to the assessment of the duration of a supervision order is to assume that the supervision order will be complied with. Upon that assumption the point must be determined at which time a respondent will cease to be an unacceptable risk to the community without a supervision order.
[24] Section 13A(3) of the DPSOA provides that the period of the supervision order cannot be less than five years. Therefore, where there is no evidence supporting the making of a supervision order for a period exceeding five years, the determination envisaged in KAH, DXP and GFC will not be performed. Once it is determined that a supervision order should be made and once it is determined that the supervision order will not exceed a period of five years, the only option is to impose a supervision order for a period of five years.
[25] Where it is alleged that a supervision order or interim supervision order has been breached, a warrant may be issued for the arrest of the released prisoner.[24] The prisoner is then detained, pending determination of the breach proceedings unless the prisoner discharges the obligation upon him under s 21(4):
"(4) The court may order the release of the released prisoner only if the prisoner satisfies the court, on the balance of probabilities, that his or her detention in custody pending the final decision is not justified because exceptional circumstances exist."
[26] By s 8(2)(b)(i), a respondent may be released on an interim supervision order, pending the final determination of the Attorney-General's application pursuant to s 13 (an interim supervision order).
[27] Mr Trott was born on 15 March 1996. He is presently 29 years of age.
[28] Mr Trott's criminal history began when he was 18. On 5 February 2015 he was convicted on his own plea of guilty in the Townsville Magistrates Court of one count of stalking between 3 June and 31 August 2014. He was placed on probation for 12 months and a restraining order was made. No conviction was recorded.
[29] On 12 April 2016 Mr Trott was again convicted in the Magistrates Court at Townsville on his own plea of guilty. Those offences had occurred during September, October and November 2015. There was one count of stalking, one count of using a carriage service to make a threat to kill and one count of using a carriage service to make a threat to cause serious harm. The offending breached the probation order which had been made on 5 February 2015.
[30] That offending involved a complainant with whom Mr Trott had a relationship for a short time in August and September 2015. The complainant terminated the relationship which then led to Mr Trott texting her incessantly, telephoning her, threatening to kill and otherwise harm her, and him appearing at various places where she was present.
[31] On 12 April 2016 the breach of probation was found proved and Mr Trott was fined $500. In relation to the charges of using a carriage service to threaten to kill, and using a carriage service to threaten to harm, sentences of six months and three months respectively were imposed and Mr Trott was released on recognisance of $3,000 to be of good behaviour for a total of 18 months. As to the charge of stalking, he was placed on probation for two years. Convictions were recorded in relation to all offences.
[32] On 2 December 2016, Mr Trott was again before the Magistrates Court at Townsville. On that occasion he was charged with wilful damage and committing public nuisance. He pleaded guilty, and was fined in relation to both offences.
[33] Mr Trott's next court appearance was on 24 July 2017. He was charged with one count of breach of a probation order, one count of breach of a restraining order and one count of using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence. One of the complainants here was the woman who had been the subject of the offences dealt with by the Magistrates Court in April 2016. He contacted her to apologise for what he had done but told her that he was wounded by self-inflicted gunshot wounds and was bleeding to death.
[34] The offending also concerned a second complainant who Mr Trott met through the application Tinder. When she indicated that she did not wish to pursue any contact with him, he pursued her with text messages threatening suicide and also threatening harm to her.
[35] Various orders were made, including the imposition of an effective head sentence of six months' imprisonment with parole release on 23 January 2018.
[36] On 31 August 2018, Mr Trott was convicted in the Townsville Magistrates Court of going armed so as to cause fear. He was fined.
[37] The convictions which brought Mr Trott within the provisions of the DPSOA occurred in the Townsville District Court on 18 March 2021. On that occasion he was convicted of three counts of stalking, one count of rape and one count of making a recording in breach of privacy contrary to s 227A of the Criminal Code.
[38] This offending involved three complainants. Mr Trott met the first complainant through the social media platform Facebook. After a short time the relationship ended. He stalked her through telephone calls, voicemail messages, text messages and fake social media accounts through which he contacted both her and her friends. He posted disparaging comments about her.
[39] The second complainant also met Mr Trott through Facebook. There was only one meeting after which she said she did not wish to continue any contact. Over a 21 day period, Mr Trott telephoned her, sent text messages to her and used fake social media accounts to contact her and her brother. On one occasion he convinced her brother to let him into her house and he was present when she arrived home.
[40] The third complainant was a 20 year old woman. For about a month he telephoned and texted her and went to her house uninvited. On 22 May 2019 the complainant had been drinking with friends and saw Mr Trott. She spoke to him and Mr Trott followed her when she left to go home. Without invitation, he got into the backseat of her car and asked her to drive him home. They arrived at Mr Trott's residence but she was heavily intoxicated and feeling ill. He assisted her to shower and then she fell asleep. While she was asleep Mr Trott took photographs of her naked breasts and her vagina. That is the basis of the charge against s 227A of the Code. When she woke up he made advances to her which were rejected. He pulled her underwear down and inserted his fingers into her vagina. That occurred without her consent and that constituted the count of rape. She left his home.
[41] Mr Trott then stalked that complainant by calling and texting her, going to her workplace to speak to her manager and contacting one of her friends. He told her friend that he was going to stab and kill the complainant. A jury found him guilty of rape and he was sentenced to various terms of imprisonment resulting in a head sentence of five years with a period of 656 days declared as presentence custody.
[42] The 2021 conviction for rape was unsuccessfully appealed.[25]
[43] Mr Trott was not granted parole. His fulltime release date was 31 May 2024.
[44] On 20 February 2024, the Attorney-General filed an application pursuant to s 5 of the DPSOA. In support of that application, Dr Kenneth Arthur was retained to prepare a risk assessment report.
[45] On 19 March 2024, Hindman J heard the preliminary application pursuant to s 8 of the DPSOA. Tendered into evidence was Dr Arthur's report. Her Honour was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing Mr Trott to be a serious danger to the community in the absence of an order under the DPSOA and orders were made pursuant to s 8(2). Those orders included the appointment of Doctors Michael Beech and Scott Harden to prepare reports.
[46] On 30 May 2024, I made an interim supervision order pursuant to s 8(2)(b)(i) and Mr Trott was released pursuant to the terms of that order. That order was extended by order of the Court a number of times.
[47] In April 2025, on various occasions, Mr Trott sent SMS messages on a mobile phone which was not the one he was authorised to possess and use. On other occasions in April 2025 he accessed the social media application, Snapchat, and posted messages on his Snapchat account while not being authorised to do so. On 10 June 2025 a breath specimen provided by Mr Trott was tested and showed a blood alcohol concentration of .044%. By all this conduct, Mr Trott breached the interim supervision order made on 30 May 2024.
[48] On 19 May 2025, I heard the application for orders under s 13 of the DPSOA and judgment was reserved.
[49] On 17 June 2025, Mr Trott was brought before the Court upon execution of a warrant issued pursuant to s 20 of the DPSOA. Justice Callaghan remanded him in custody pursuant to s 21(2)(a).
[50] On 23 June 2025, the matter was mentioned before me and initial submissions were made as to the impact the breach of the interim supervision order may have to the principal application.
[51] The matter was mentioned again before me on 4 August 2025. It was ordered that the principal application and the contravention hearing be determined together and leave was given to reopen the principal application. An order was made pursuant to s 21(4) of the DPSOA, again releasing Mr Trott from custody subject to an interim supervision order.
[52] On 1 September 2025 Mr Trott pleaded guilty to three counts of contravention of the supervision order which is an offence against s 43AA of the DPSOA. He was fined.
[53] On 26 November 2025 final submissions on the principal application and the breach application were heard.
The evidence of the psychiatrists and other experts
[54] There were effectively three stages to the application. The first was the application for orders under s 8 of the DPSOA. The only expert evidence was that of Dr Arthur.
[55] The second stage was the hearing for the orders pursuant to s 13. By that stage, Dr Beech and Dr Harden had examined Mr Trott and prepared reports pursuant to the order of Hindman J. Psychologists who had been treating Mr Trott, namely Dr Luke Hatzipetrou and Mr Bruce Hamilton, also provided evidence.
[56] The witnesses other than the psychiatrists and psychologists who gave evidence were:
(a) Ms Bianca Fuller, the manager of the High Risk Offenders Management Unit of Queensland Corrective Services. Ms Fuller deposed to being involved in the overall supervision of offenders, including Mr Trott;
(b) Ms Emma Wildermoth, the acting manager of High Risk Offenders Management Unit of Queensland Corrective Services which supervised Mr Trott;
(c) Mr Ryan Robinson, the acting manager of High Risk Offenders Management Unit of Queensland Corrective Services which supervised Mr Trott;
(d) Ms Elana Carr, the acting manager of Specialised Clinical Services, Queensland Corrective Services, and registered psychologist who prepared a "forensic risk assessment" of Mr Trott; and
(e) Ms Catherine Hogarth, Acting Manager, Offender Intervention Unit, Specialist Operations, who deposed to the sexual offending treatment programmes that would be available to Mr Trott both in custody and the community.
[57] As already observed, once the breach proceedings were commenced, the hearing was reopened and further reports were received from Dr Arthur, Dr Beech and Dr Harden. Further psychological evidence was also received from Mr Hamilton and an additional psychologist, Ms Shay Addison. The other witnesses who provided evidence at this third stage were, again, Ms Fuller, who deposed to having been the person who applied for Mr Trott's arrest warrant following the alleged breaches, Ms Wildermoth, and Ms Nicola Todhunter, a team leader within the Police Information Centre.
[58] Mr Trott, through his counsel, tendered four handwritten letters, styled as "affidavits", which were made exhibits in the proceedings.
[59] Dr Arthur diagnosed Mr Trott with a mixed Cluster B personality disorder with prominent borderline, narcissistic and antisocial features, and potential underlying autism spectrum disorder. He opined that the risk of sexual recidivism by Mr Trott was high, as was the risk of him engaging in further stalking behaviours, which would, in turn, increase the risk of engaging in further sexual offending. Dr Arthur opined that a supervision order would reduce the risk of sexual recidivism to at least moderate.
[60] As to the duration of the supervision order, Dr Arthur stated: "[Mr] Trott's Psychopathic Personality is likely to be a responsivity factor for both treatment and supervision. As such, he may require a supervision order longer than 5 years to adequately manage his risk of sexual recidivism".
[61] All three psychiatrists provided reports, and oral evidence in the course of the second stage of the proceeding.
[62] In further reports, Dr Arthur reiterated his initial diagnoses of Mr Trott, and opined that observation of Mr Trott's time in the community following his release on the interim supervision order had highlighted a limited capacity to engage in treatment.
[63] In oral evidence, Dr Arthur opined that Mr Trott would require a minimum of two to three years of engagement in further psychological therapy treatment. He reiterated that he believed Mr Trott would require a supervision order for between five and ten years.
[64] In cross examination, Dr Arthur accepted that the lack of an extensive history of sexual offending by Mr Trott increased the potential margin for error in the assessment and prognosis of risk. He further accepted that the lack of history might allow for another doctor to assess Mr Trott's risk as lower. However, he noted that his own assessment was based on several factors, including "the severity of Mr Trott's personality dysfunction... and his past history of persistent, you know, criminal behaviour despite sanctions".[26]
[65] Dr Beech diagnosed Mr Trott with a severe mixed Cluster B personality disorder and noted prominent psychopathic, narcissistic, borderline, and antisocial traits. Dr Beech also initially diagnosed Mr Trott with autism spectrum disorder, but later indicated that he was less inclined to accept such a diagnosis as the relevant behaviours were more likely to be a manifestation of the personality disorder. Dr Beech also diagnosed Mr Trott with an alcohol use disorder.[27]
[66] Dr Beech assessed Mr Trott's risk as "moderate, probably high or moderately high", with the risk likely being "moderately high". When asked at which point Mr Trott would no longer require supervision, Dr Beech opined that five years would be an appropriate timeframe.[28]
[67] In cross-examination, Dr Beech also accepted the proposition that a single sexual offence increased the difficulty of accurately assessing Mr Trott's risk, stating: "It's a difficult assessment, I agree. Um, it's difficult, mainly, in my opinion, because there's been one sentencing date, um, but when you then...assess him with the instrument such as a static, he comes up as high, and I think it...doesn't make sense to me that it's high, given there's one sentencing date".[29]
[68] Dr Harden diagnosed Mr Trott with a severe personality disorder with psychopathic, antisocial, narcissistic, borderline and paranoid features. Dr Harden said that Mr Trott possibly had a secondary to early attachment disorder, but was not convinced that Mr Trott suffered from autism spectrum disorder.
[69] With respect to risk, Dr Harden accepted that the greatest risk factor is Mr Trott's personality disorder, and assessed the risk of Mr Trott's recidivism as "moderate to high" in the absence of a supervision order. Dr Harden could not offer an opinion on a suitable length of time for a supervision order, but proffered that it would be entirely dependent on the engagement with treatment and the response to treatment. It seemed that he accepted that if treatment works, it should be effective by the end of a five year period.[30]
[70] All three psychiatrists opined that alcohol use would increase the risk of recidivism, and should be avoided by Mr Trott. Each psychiatrist accepted that there was a nexus between the stalking behaviours and the manifestation of sexual offending, noting that any future sexual offending would likely occur following a return to stalking. Each accepted that a supervision order would materially decrease Mr Trott's risk of recidivism.
[71] Mr Trott was referred to Dr Hatzipetrou for treatment following his release from custody in May 2024. Following 14 sessions with Mr Trott between June and October 2024, Dr Hatzipetrou produced a report[31] which described Mr Trott as having been "largely cooperative" in the course of his psychological treatment.
[72] Dr Hatzipetrou said that Mr Trott denied having problems with respect to the sexual offending or stalking behaviour. Therefore, treatment goals with respect to those behaviours were unable to be defined clearly. Rather, treatment focused on assisting Mr Trott with perceived antagonism and his adjustment to the terms of the interim supervision order.
[73] Mr Trott was also observed to have denied the psychiatric diagnoses of autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and the severe mixed personality disorder.
[74] In a section of his report entitled "Barriers to Treatment", Dr Hatzipetrou noted that the clinical risk factors identified in the psychiatrists' reports presented as barriers to positive treatment outcomes. He also stated that Mr Trott's blanket denial of the offending and the blaming of others for perceived injustices presented as barriers to future positive treatment outcomes.
[75] At the time of the report's creation, Mr Trott had commenced components of a sexual offending program. Dr Hatzipetrou opined that as being "a positive step" with respect to Mr Trott's ongoing treatment. Overall progress was described as "fairly positive". However, further observation and measures were required to be implemented before a full clinical assessment protocol of Mr Trott could be implemented.
[76] On 10 February 2025, Mr Trott's treatment was transferred to Mr Hamilton to continue psychological treatment. Mr Hamilton provided evidence by way of affidavits which exhibited four session summaries.
[77] Mr Hamilton's session summaries noted Mr Trott's consistent ongoing hostility and resistance to supervision and management processes. Ostensibly, after four sessions, there had been no establishment of treatment goals, or progress toward establishing them. Mr Hamilton noted that treatment, by this stage, focused on "monitoring and seeking to contain Mr Trott's behaviour / stabilisation".[32]
[78] Following the alleged breaches by Mr Trott, further addendum reports were provided by each of the psychiatrists.
[79] Dr Beech noted that the breach had not altered his earlier opinions, other than his earlier opinion that supervision allowed Mr Trott to abstain from substance use, and that Mr Trott is able to comply with supervision order conditions. Dr Beech maintained that risk can be managed with a supervision order, but noted that the risk of harassing complainants may be difficult to manage as Mr Trott only needs access to a smartphone to harass them.
[80] Dr Arthur also reiterated his earlier opinions. He said that he saw no evidence that Mr Trott had progressed in therapy or meaningfully cooperated with supervising staff.
[81] Dr Harden also did not alter his previous opinions. He said, "this instance of misuse does not substantially alter his risk profile in my opinion except during the period in which he is acutely intoxicated". He reiterated his view that any supervision order should have a "no alcohol" condition.
[82] Mr Hamilton provided a further affidavit annexing a progress report with respect to Mr Trott's treatment. Mr Hamilton opined that on the basis of his brief treatment period with Mr Trott, he found it very unlikely that Mr Trott would shift from his blanket denial of the offending and perceptions of persecution.
[83] Mr Hamilton said that the most realistic method of treatment would be to allow Mr Trott to retain his denial stance but target the "dynamic risk markers prominent at the time of offending". He noted Mr Trott's willingness to explore aspects of a treatment course as "positive" and as a first step for any individual with a complex presentation. Notwithstanding that, Mr Hamilton expressed a view that ongoing supervision would present challenges to Queensland Corrective Services.
[84] Ms Addison engaged with Mr Trott for 11 sessions between August and November 2025. She provided an affidavit with an annexed report. Ms Addison is the only psychologist to have engaged in treatment with Mr Trott following the alleged breaches of the interim supervision order.
[85] Ms Addison observed Mr Trott's hostility toward supervision management, and recorded that he continued to offer a complete denial of the offending; instead expressing a view that he had been unfairly convicted and was the subject of malicious and persecutory behaviours on behalf of police and Corrections. Mr Trott also denies the diagnoses and assessments of risk completed by the psychiatrists.
[86] Ms Addison said that Mr Trott was responsive throughout their sessions. She opined that Mr Trott's presentation was consistent with autism spectrum disorder. She further opined that Mr Trott's personality formulation arises from what is described as "complex trauma", and that the behaviours demonstrated by Mr Trott are adapted to complex unmet needs, as opposed to a fixed pathology. The upshot of these impressions were that Ms Addison opines that Mr Trott is capable of treatment.
[87] Based on her observations, Ms Addison was able to formulate and prescribe a three-stage treatment plan with specific goals, and provided recommendations for Queensland Corrective Services regarding Mr Trott's supervision.
[88] Overall, Ms Addison opined that Mr Trott had shown "encouraging shifts" in their sessions. She noted that treatment would likely require a "lengthy trajectory, likely 2-3 years". She noted that there had been no indication of problematic sexual interests or dynamic sexual risk factors in their sessions.
[89] Prior to the final hearing on 26 November 2025, the psychiatrists delivered supplementary reports in light of the reports provided by Mr Hamilton and Ms Addison.
[90] Dr Beech did not alter his views and diagnoses. He agreed with Ms Addison's view that there is no indication of sexual deviance per se. Dr Beech believes that treatment would not continue without a supervision order. He reiterated his view that a supervision order should be for five years.
[91] Dr Arthur acknowledged a "subtle but significant positive shift in Mr Trott's attitude towards treatment". He acknowledged there is some indication of engagement with treatment. Notwithstanding that, Dr Arthur opined that the unmodified risk of serious sexual offending remains moderate to high in the absence of a supervision order. He concluded that a five year supervision order would be appropriate.
[92] Dr Harden described the new material as a "more sophisticated formulation of Mr Trott and a realistic intervention plan". However, Dr Harden's assessment of risk remained at moderate to high. He recommended that a supervision order should be imposed for five years.
[93] Ms Carr, the acting manager of Specialised Clinical Services, Queensland Corrective Services as at 28 January 2025, provided a "forensic risk assessment" in relation to Mr Trott. The report assessed the risk of sexual violence as moderate in the medium to long term, with a low risk of imminence. The report also assessed his risk of stalking the complainants as moderate and considered the risk of stalking related violence against those complainants to be moderate to high.
[94] Ms Catherine Hogarth, who was the acting manager of the Offender Intervention Unit as at 20 May 2024 deposed to the sexual offending treatment programmes available to Mr Trott both in custody and the community.
[95] As earlier explained, various people involved with the High Risk Offender Management Unit provided affidavits throughout the proceeding. Mr Robinson, acting manager of the Unit at 17 May 2024, deposed to concerns Queensland Corrective Services held with respect to the supervision of Mr Trott, particularly with respect to the monitoring of electronic device usage, and the inability of Corrective Officers to conduct comprehensive technology searches. In his affidavits he also noted the services that QCS could provide with respect to finding accommodation, treatment courses, and substance testing.
[96] Ms Wildermoth, the acting manager of the High Risk Offender Management Unit at various times, swore four affidavits in the proceeding. These affidavits largely contained information regarding accommodation and treatment options for Mr Trott in the event that he was released on a supervision order.
[97] Ms Wildermoth, seemingly on her own volition, offered insights into Mr Trott's response to supervision. While noting Mr Trott's behaviours, such as his fixation on proving his innocence, accessing the internet, and contacting the QPS, Ms Wildermoth offered an opinion on what she said are the barriers to case management and psychological treatment, and said that Mr Trott's behaviour has prevented him from engaging meaningfully in any treatment. Ms Wildermoth's most recent affidavit adopts and repeats those observations, while deposing that she was informed that Mr Trott has continued those behaviours, though it is not said by who, or the context in which those observations have been drawn.
[98] Ms Fuller, who is the Manager - Operations, South East Queensland at the High Risk Offender Management Unit, also swore several affidavits in the proceeding. The first deposes to Mr Trott's behaviour while on the interim supervision order, and recounts behaviours, including what she describes as "vexatious phone calls" to QPS, the apparent memorisation of the complainants' phone numbers, and "offence paralleling behaviours". It is clear that, in effect, Ms Fuller is saying that Mr Trott is unsuitable for supervision, or that QCS do not believe they can effectively supervise him in the event a supervision order is made.
[99] In a later affidavit, Ms Fuller deposes to what she describes as "behaviour consistent with poor mental health" exhibited by Mr Trott. Once again, the basis upon which Ms Fuller offers her opinions on the state of Mr Trott's mind is unclear, but the upshot seems to be that she does not believe that he is suitable for supervision.
[100] Following Mr Trott's alleged breach, Ms Fuller's affidavit provided an overview of the alleged breaches, and documents relevant to them. She also deposed to having been the person who raised the initial complaint, and sought a warrant against Mr Trott.
[101] Following Mr Trott's conviction for the breach, Ms Todhunter, a team leader with the Police Information Centre, swore an affidavit which annexed documents relevant to those proceedings, as well as Mr Trott's Queensland criminal history.
[102] Mr Trott did not swear formal affidavits and did not give oral evidence at the hearings, but, as explained earlier, provided several letters, referred to as "affidavits", tendered as exhibits through his counsel.
[103] The first letter, entitled "ZWT1", commences with a claim by Mr Trott that he is aware of material evidence which "calls into question" some matters relating to his convictions, and his assertion that the evidence has been provided to QPS. Mr Trott discusses treatment he receives for what he says is post traumatic stress disorder stemming from a workplace accident that occurred in 2018. He said that since being prescribed medication to manage his PTSD he has seen "major differences" in his life. He also referred to receiving phone counselling from an organisation called "Misa", and developing skills from those counselling sessions. He described the support he has received from two people, the parents of a school friend, who he refers to as his non-biological father and mother.
[104] Mr Trott goes on to describe his efforts to clear his name, and the difficulties he has encountered in attempting to provide his evidence to QPS. He recounts an incident in which QPS returned his evidence to the Wacol precinct at which Mr Trott resides. Mr Trott apparently contacted QPS, and made reference to suicide in his distressed state, which led to QPS officers being called out. Further references to QPS investigations appear to show that many of his complaints have been closed.
[105] Mr Trott also describes his inability to undertake university studies, or receive his manual drivers license. He makes multiple references to being unable to be approved to use a smart phone. He also recounts disagreements with a person referred to as "McCubbin", who appears to be a case manager.
[106] He also refers to his refusal to participate in sexual offending courses, and explains that his refusal to participate stems from his view that participation would constitute an admission of guilt. He goes on to say that he will never admit to "any action [he] is accused of apparently committing...".
[107] In his letter, being exhibit 2 in the hearing, Mr Trott describes grievances he has with the Queensland State Government. He accuses QCS of "stonewalling" him from obtaining justice. He then describes himself as the victim of multiple sexual assaults, and names one of the complainants as the perpetrator.
[108] Mr Trott goes on to explain his "lack of empathy and refusal to undertake sexual offending programs" as being a refusal to admit guilt or apologise to his alleged abuser. He states that to do so would be "like the Jews apologising to Hitler".
[109] Multiple references are made to setting the record straight, which I infer is a reference to proving his own innocence. He goes on to state his intention to return to mining work, and obtain a helicopter license.
[110] Mr Trott's third letter, which is exhibit 6 and was tendered in October 2025, commences by explaining that further information had come to light since the initial hearing in May 2025. Mr Trott then recounts the positive experiences he has had engaging with his psychologist, Ms Addison. He claims to has developed coping mechanisms to assists with emotional regulation, and have developed insight into the perspectives of others. Notwithstanding those assertions, Mr Trott still refers to the "misjustice" that he has purportedly sustained.
[111] Mr Trott states that consultations with the Forrest Lake Chiropractic Centre had revealed that Mr Trott's spine, hips, back, and shoulder were misaligned, inflamed, and generally injured. No report was tendered in support of this. Mr Trott then goes on to state that he intends to undergo treatment for those issues. Mr Trott states that his sleep and mental health has improved since identifying the issues. He states that those health issues led to the stalking offences, due to the aggression he experienced from the physical pain he claims to have suffered from.
[112] Mr Trott then states that the complainant in the rape conviction deliberately and opportunistically targeted him, knowing that he was suffering from those injuries.
[113] He expressed a desire to undertake mining work, and engage in aviation studies.
[114] Mr Trott again makes complaint about the failure of QPS to collect or receive documents from him in relation to his offences, though he states that it is probably the fault of QCS. Mr Trott concludes the letter with his view that he should not be a subject of the DPSOA regime "due to things that I needed being kept out of my reach that made major differences to my mental and physical health in many aspects".
[115] Mr Trott's final letter, which is exhibit 7 and which was tendered on 26 November 2025, once again expresses a need to provide the court with further information. Mr Trott expresses a wish to not be seen as "pointing fingers" but to "state things as they are". He makes reference to "honourable individuals" whom he idolises, including American Pilot Sully Sullenberger, as being his inspiration for doing so.
[116] Mr Trott then recounts his grievances with his treatment at the Wacol Precinct and supervising staff. He says that QCS have provided inaccurate information which is being used by the assessing psychiatrists to write what he says are inaccurate reports.
[117] In support of his claims, Mr Trott refers to individual incidents in which he was not provided with transport, had his PlayStation taken from him, and the storage of statements apparently made by Mr Trott to be provided to QPS. He also states that he has been refused transport to talk to QPS officers about his complaints, due to "the number of requests".
[118] Mr Trott claims that the QPS's refusal to investigate his claims has arisen from the offences having occurred in Townsville, and therefore being a logistical and jurisdictional issue.
[119] He then goes on to state that the behaviour the subject of his alleged breach, namely accessing Snapchat, was done at the request of a QPS officer who had requested that he obtain information in relation to his Townsville offending from the App. He claims that QPS have since refused to investigate those allegations.
[120] Mr Trott again describes himself as a victim of domestic violence, and names one of the complainants as having abused him. He later claims to have been the victim of sexual assaults, attempted rape and other offences by another complainant.
[121] Mr Trott again, in great length, outlines his disputes with QCS caseworkers whom he says are hindering his attempts to have his claims investigated by the police. One such incident allegedly involved an assessment with a QCS officer who, Mr Trott claims, attempted to elicit a sexual or emotional response from Mr Trott during their conversation. He also outlines claims that QCS deliberately refused to allow him to continue his university studies in order to distress him further and to elicit a negative reaction. He does, however, praise his most recent caseworker, who he says has assisted him significantly with health appointments.
[122] Mr Trott again complains of what he alleges are deliberate delays in approving his possession of a smartphone. He claims the phone is necessary for a variety of his needs, including his health, proposed study, and legal matters.
[123] Mr Trott tendered a letter from Dr Rang Rattehalli, a psychiatrist who observed Mr Trott over two sessions in November and December 2024. Dr Rattehalli's letter notes that Mr Trott presented as suffering from symptoms of PTSD and a high level of stress. Dr Rattehalli noted that he had changed the medication prescribed to Mr Trott to assist with those symptoms.
[124] The two people referred to by Mr Trott as his non-biological parents[33] both provided statements in support of Mr Trott. The crux of their statements are to outline the support that will be provided to Mr Trott upon a supervision order being granted. It seems that the couple are willing to allow Mr Trott to reside at their property in Wamuran. The non-biological father also states that Mr Trott would have the opportunity to work for the couple in their communications company operating in central Australia.
[126] Therefore, jurisdiction to make an order in this case under s 13 of the DPSOA arises only if the State has proved by acceptable cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability that there is an unacceptable risk that Mr Trott will commit an offence of a sexual nature involving violence if released without a supervision order.
[127] As already observed, three psychiatrists provided reports and gave evidence in the case. There was no challenge to the expertise or experience of any of the psychiatrists. Their respective views align substantially with each other. The psychiatrists' evidence ought be accepted.
[128] The notion of "unacceptable risk" was described by McMurdo J (as his Honour then was) in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Sutherland:[34]
"...the assessment of what level of risk is unacceptable, or alternatively put, what order is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the community, is not a matter for psychiatric opinion. It is a matter for judicial determination, requiring a value judgement as to what risk should be accepted against the serious alternative of the deprivation of a person's liberty."[35]
[129] While there are some differences between the psychiatrists as to their diagnoses of Mr Trott, all diagnosed him with a personality disorder with serious features.
[130] Dr Arthur opined that the risk of relevant offending as "high". Dr Beech opined the risk as "moderately high" and Dr Harden as "moderate to high".
[131] Limited progress on treatment was achieved by Dr Hatzipetrou and Mr Hamilton. Ms Addison has made better progress with Mr Trott and that is encouraging.
[132] Mr Trott denies the offending. Whether or not Mr Trott did, in fact, commit the offences for which he was convicted is not an issue for determination on this application. It is the conviction and sentence which activates the jurisdiction under the DPSOA. What is relevant now is risk of reoffending in a sexually violent way.
[133] Treatment generally involves an offender admitting guilt and then developing insight into the offending behaviour. The treatment of Mr Trott has been difficult, as given Mr Trott's denials, the usual path for treatment is not available. To combat this, Ms Addison, who has gained Mr Trott's trust, has developed a special three-stage program to address his issues.
[134] Mr Trott's central submission is that a supervision order is not necessary for the protection of the community. He submits that any risk is met by the ongoing treatment he is receiving from Ms Addison.
[135] That submission should be rejected. As Dr Beech observed, there must be doubts that Mr Trott will continue treatment if he is not subject to a supervision order. Mr Trott terminated treatment with both Dr Hatzipetrou and Mr Hamilton. He believes that his current circumstances are not as a result of his own actions but a result of false allegations made against him. He has not undertaken any sexual offender treatment programs, and unwilling to do so as he denies the offending. The treatment he considers is beneficial is the treatment from Ms Addison. She considers the proper treatment is likely to take two to three years.
[136] I accept the evidence of the three psychiatrists and find:
[137] The question under s 13A of the DPSOA is to be determined by identifying the point in time in the future where the risk to the public would be acceptable, notwithstanding the absence of a supervision order. As already observed, Ms Addison considers that her treatment will be completed in two to three years. Dr Beech opined that the supervision order should be in place for five years, as did Dr Harden. Dr Arthur, early in the proceedings, opined that Mr Trot "...may require a supervision order longer than five years". He later thought a five year supervision term would be appropriate.
[138] As already observed, under s 13A, the minimum period for which a supervision order can be set is five years. Having regard to all the evidence there is no satisfactory basis to conclude that it need be longer. Therefore, it is appropriate to make a supervision order in terms annexed to these reasons for a period of five years from the date of this judgment.
[139] I find the breaches of the interim supervision order proved. As I have found that Mr Trott should remain in the community subject to a supervision order, I take no further action on the breaches of the interim supervision order.
[1] Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offences) Act 2003, Part 2, especially Division 3.
[2] The limb of the definition which is relevant here.
[4] Followed in Tilbrook v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2012] QCA 279.
[6] Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Newman [2019] 2 Qd R 1; [2018] QSC 156.
[7] The convictions included a conviction for rape. See paragraphs [37]-[43] of these reasons.
[11] Sections 13(6)(b)(i) and 13(6)(b)(ii).
[13] [2015] 2 Qd R 509; [2013] QCA 404 at [118] - [120] cited in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v KAH [2019] 3 Qd R 329; [2019] QSC 36 at [67].
[19] Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v GFC [2023] QSC 277 at [115].
[20] [2019] QSC 44 at [77].
[23] At [71] and [72] and PCO at [75].
[25] R v Trott [2023] QCA 107.
[32] Affidavit of Bruce Hamilton, affirmed 1 May 2025, exhibit "BH-3".
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland
Trott [2026] QSC 23