Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Stanbrook [2013] QSC 29

[6] The meaning of "involving violence" in the definition of "serious sexual offence" in the Act was the subject of Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Phineasa [2012] QCA 184. The Attorney-General in that case had contended that any assault of one person by another which fell within the definition of s 245 of the Criminal Code 1899 involved violence. That approach was rejected by the Court of Appeal on the basis of construing the language of the Act in the circumstances in which the regime under the Act applied to persons "who have committed no crime for which they have not undergone just punishment" (at [31]). Muir JA (with whom the other members of the court agreed) at [36] agreed with Margaret Wilson J's conclusion in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Tilbrook [2012] QSC 128 at [42] that to constitute "violence" something more than mere physical contact was required, but also expressed the view "that 'violence', for present purposes, does not equate to the application of force, however limited, irrespective of the harm caused or likely to be caused to the person to whom it was applied." Muir JA expressed a preference for the definition of "violent" in The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (at [37] and [10]) and then stated:**

[8] The approach in Phineasa was applied in Tilbrook v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2012] QCA 279. Mr Tilbrook was serving a period of imprisonment for three sexual offences which had been found at first instance to be serious sexual offences for the purpose of the Act. On appeal Muir JA (with whom the other members of the court agreed) stated at [20]:**