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[2020] QSC 305
respondent. Orders made 25 September 2020: (1) The respondent be released from custody and continue to be subject to the requirements of the supervision order of Applegarth J dated 17 October 2016; (2) The...
Sampton, subject to a DPSOA supervision order requiring abstinence from alcohol and drugs, admitted consuming alcohol in breach of condition 23. The Attorney-General commenced contravention proceedings under s 22 seeking detention, but after receiving psychiatric evidence that the breach did not elevate sexual offending risk and that the respondent remained manageable on community supervision, the applicant conceded the respondent satisfied the statutory onus in s 22(7). The court found the contravention proved, accepted the psychiatric opinion, and ordered Sampton released to continue subject to the existing supervision order.
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1,710 words · generated 02/09/2026
The respondent, Hosea Sam Sampton, was subject to a supervision order made under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (the DPSOA) by Applegarth J on 17 October 2016 (see paragraph [1] and footnote 1). Condition 23 of that supervision order required the respondent to "Abstain from the consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs for the duration of this order" (paragraph [8]). On 11 August 2020 QCS staff observed the respondent presenting as under the influence. Breath tests taken at 8:20pm and 8:40pm returned positive results of 0.216% and 0.244% BAC respectively; the respondent admitted drinking one and a half cups of rum about half an hour before the first test (paragraph [9]).
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
A contravention application was brought under s 22 of the DPSOA. The respondent admitted the contravention (paragraph [20]). He was arrested under a warrant and detained pending determination; a s 21(2)(a) order for detention until final determination was made on 13 August 2020 (paragraph [10]).
The Attorney-General sought orders under s 22, which include rescission of a supervision order and making a continuing detention order unless the released prisoner satisfies the court, on the balance of probabilities, that adequate protection of the community can nonetheless be ensured by the existing (as amended, if necessary) supervision order (paragraph [17]).
A psychiatrist, Dr Josephine Sundin, provided a report dated 4 September 2020. She diagnosed the respondent as having antisocial personality disorder and a significant substance use disorder, observed that his unmodified risk for sexual offending remained high and was escalated by intoxicants, but concluded that the current contravention had not elevated his risk and that he could be returned to the community under the existing supervision order with continued psychological treatment and consideration for pharmacotherapy (paragraph [15]).
Following that advice the applicant conceded the respondent had satisfied the s 22(7) onus and agreed release on the existing supervision order was appropriate (paragraphs [18]-[19]). On 25 September 2020 Davis J ordered that the respondent be released from custody and continue to be subject to the supervision order of 17 October 2016 and vacated the review set for 19 October 2020 (paragraph [3]).
The decision rested on the statutory mechanics of s 22 and the factual and expert evidence before the court.
Statute: s 22 operates so that where the court is satisfied a released prisoner has contravened or is likely to contravene a supervision order, the default is rescission and detention (s 22(1)-(2)), unless the released prisoner satisfies the court on the balance of probabilities that the adequate protection of the community can nevertheless be ensured by the existing order (s 22(7)). If the prisoner succeeds, the court must amend the existing order to include all requirements under s 16(1) if not already included, and may otherwise amend it to ensure adequate protection or for rehabilitation (paragraph [17]).
Evidence and concession: the respondent admitted the contravention (paragraph [20]) and the particulars (paragraph [9]) support the finding. The crucial question then became whether the respondent had discharged the onus in s 22(7) that community protection could be adequately ensured by the supervision order. The applicant conceded that the respondent had satisfied that onus (paragraph [18]). The court had before it Dr Sundin's psychiatric opinion that, although the respondent retained a high unmodified risk for sexual offending and intoxicants escalated that risk, the present contravention did not represent an elevation of risk and that he could be managed in the community under the supervision order (paragraph [15]). Davis J accepted that expert evidence and the applicant's concession, and concluded the adequate protection of the community could be ensured by the supervision order in its present terms (paragraph [21]). That conclusion directly triggers the s 22(7) pathway rather than the rescission/detention pathway.
Thus the combination of an admitted non-sexual contravention, rapid detection, lack of any intervening sexual offending, psychiatric opinion that risk had not elevated, and the Crown's concession produced the outcome that continued community supervision was appropriate.
Before this decision the statutory framework for contravention proceedings under the DPSOA was, and remains, governed by s 22. This judgment applies s 22 in the ordinary way: the statute imposes a default consequence of rescission and detention unless the released prisoner satisfies a statutory onus that community protection remains achievable by supervision (paragraph [17]). The decision does not alter the statutory law; it applies it to the facts of this case.
Practically, the judgment reiterates two points of statutory operation:
The decision therefore confirms the expected approach: where contraventions are non-sexual, detected and investigated promptly, and psychiatric assessment indicates no escalation of sexual offending risk, the court may permit continued community supervision rather than order detention.
Plain English: The supervision order forbids any alcohol or illicit drug use.
Plain English: On 11 August 2020 the respondent tested very high for alcohol and admitted drinking shortly before testing, which breached the abstinence condition.
Plain English: The law sets a default consequence of rescinding the supervision order and detaining the person after contravention, but allows the prisoner to avoid detention if they can persuade the court that the supervision order (possibly with amendments) still protects the public adequately.
Plain English: The expert said the respondent remains a high-risk offender, and alcohol makes him more risky, but on the present facts the breach did not make him more likely to commit sexual offences now; with supervision and treatment he can be safely managed in the community.
Plain English: The judge accepted the psychiatrist's report and decided that despite the breach, the supervision order as it stands is good enough to protect the public, so detention was not necessary.
This decision is directly engaged when:
When those elements are present, s 22 permits the court, and this judgment illustrates the court's approach, to conclude that the prisoner has discharged the onus in s 22(7) and that the supervision order can continue to protect the community.
The judgment itself cites earlier steps in the same proceedings (Applegarth J’s 17 October 2016 supervision order and Davis J’s earlier ruling [2020] QSC 40) (paragraphs [1], [5], footnotes). The present reasons apply s 22 in a straightforward way and depend heavily on the Crown's concession and accepted psychiatric evidence. The published reasons do not report subsequent appellate treatment or later decisions applying this judgment. From the text alone it is not possible to identify any subsequent treatment by later courts beyond the internal procedural history recorded at paragraphs [5]-[6]. Any analysis of later judicial treatment or persuasive value must therefore be based on other authorities and cannot be drawn from this judgment alone.
Grounded strictly in the text, questions that remain open or invite further legal or evidentiary exploration include:
The judgment provides helpful examples of the factual and evidentiary profile that will support a prisoner in discharging s 22(7) onus, but it leaves open the contours of proof and the precise weight to be afforded differing types of evidence in other factual matrices.
This analysis is information only, not legal advice. I can make mistakes. Before you rely on this analysis or use any draft or take any step suggested here, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check it.
"1. The respondent be released from custody and continue to be subject to the requirements of the supervision order of Applegarth J dated 17 October 2016.
"23. Abstain from the consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs for the duration of this order."
"On 11 August 2020, QCS staff were called to [a] Men's Group as information had been received that Mr SAMPTON was presenting as under the influence of an intoxicating substance. As per condition 24,[7] at 8:20pm Mr SAMPTON was directed to provide a sample of breath for testing which returned a positive result to alcohol at the level of 0.216% BAC. At 8:40pm, Mr SAMPTON provided another sample of breath for testing which returned a positive result to alcohol at the level of 0.244% BAC. Mr SAMPTON made admissions to drinking one and a half cups of rum a half hour prior to undertaking the first breath test. Mr SAMPTON's positive breath tests are direct contravention of condition 23.
Mr SAMPTON has demonstrated mixed compliance since his re-release on 06 March 2020. This is the first time SAMPTON's use of alcohol has been seen whilst he has been subject to the Supervision Order. Noting SAMPTON's offending history, that being whilst intoxicated with alcohol he has committed two rapes against known and stranger females, alcohol use is considered to elevate his risk to a level that is not able to be managed in the community."[8]
"In my opinion, Mr Sampton's diagnoses remain the same. In addition to his Anti-Social Personality Disorder, he clearly has a quite significant Substance Use Disorder, having abused both cannabis and alcohol during his most recent period of time in the community.
In my opinion, his unmodified risk for sexual offending is high.
His risk is escalated by the presence of intoxicants; particularly alcohol but also in the presence of cannabis.
His greatest risk for sexual violence is to an intimate partner, but if intoxicated there would be a significant risk of sexual violence to an adult female stranger.
The material from both the IOMS and Dr Walkley suggest that Mr Sampton continues to have reduced insight into the nature and risks associated with his sexual offending. He continues to minimise the seriousness of his sexual offending and his degree of drug dependence.
Consistent with his personality, he takes limited responsibility for the direction of his life and achievement of goals. He continues to externalise blame and appears to be only mildly perturbed by the likely consequences of his continued pattern of contravention.
His comments that he might seek to have the length of his supervision order reduced is a clear sign of reduced insight in the face of these repeated contraventions.
It is clear that both QCS staff and Dr Walkley have made considerable efforts to support Mr Sampton within the community. He has been attending regular sessions with a psychologist.
He has been referred to a drug rehabilitation program. He has been supported by [an] Indigenous Men's Group. He has been referred to an employment service. He has been assisted to find suitable independent accommodation.
It would appear from this recent period of time in the community that the concerns I expressed in my January 2020 report have occurred in that Mr Sampton has quite easily accessed cannabis whilst in the Townsville community.
His claim that he drank the alcohol because of distress at distance from his family seems a trite and manufactured excuse. I think it more likely that Mr Sampton drank the alcohol simple because he chose to do so.
It is possible given his repeated reversions to use of intoxicating substances that he does struggle with chronic cravings; for which reason I would recommend that he be considered for the Subutex program to limit the impact of his cravings and his pattern of recurrently seeking to access illicit substances and alcohol to modify his mood state.
In my opinion, Mr Sampton's risk to the community has not elevated during this period of time.
His behaviour in the community is entirely consistent with his primary psychiatric diagnosis.
I would again make the recommendation that consideration be given to placing him in a different precinct to Townsville. If Brisbane is unacceptable to him then Rockhampton may be worthy of consideration although as I understand it, there is no High-Risk Offender Management Unit in the Rockhampton area which may preclude that city.
I think it is likely that Mr Sampton will continue to contravene by way of use of cannabis and alcohol until he decides for himself that the behaviour is not worth the inevitable sanctions which follow.
I respectfully recommend that Mr Sampton can be returned to the community under the existing supervision order.
I recommend that he continue to see a clinical/forensic psychologist within the community to address his well-documented risk factors and that he be considered for the Subutex programme."[9]
(1) The following subsections apply if the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the released prisoner is likely to contravene, is contravening, or has contravened, a requirement of the supervision order or interim supervision order (each the existing order).
(2) Unless the released prisoner satisfies the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention or likely contravention of the existing order, be ensured by the existing order as amended under subsection (7), the court must -
(a) if the existing order is a supervision order, rescind it and make a continuing detention order; or
(b) if the existing order is an interim supervision order, rescind it and make an order that the released prisoner be detained in custody for the period stated in the order. ...
(7) If the released prisoner satisfies the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention or likely contravention of the existing order, be ensured by a supervision order or interim supervision order, the court -
(a) must amend the existing order to include all of the requirements under section 16(1) if the order does not already include all of those requirements; and
(b) may otherwise amend the existing order in a way the court considers appropriate -
(i) to ensure adequate protection of the community; or
(ii) for the prisoner's rehabilitation or care or treatment.
(8) The existing order may not be amended under subsection (7)(b) so as to remove any requirements mentioned in section 16(1)."
(a) The contravention does not involve the commission of an offence of a sexual nature.
(b) While the supervision order has now been the subject of three contravention proceedings, none of the breaches have involved the commission of a sexual offence.
(c) This contravention and the earlier contraventions have been easily and quickly detected.
(d) The psychiatric opinion is that the current contravention does not represent an elevation of risk of committing a sexual offence.
(e) The psychiatric opinion is to the effect that the respondent can be managed on supervision.
[1] Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Sampton, unreported, Applegarth J, 17 October 2016.
[3] Order of Mullins J (as her Honour then was).
[4] Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Sampton [2020] QSC 40.
[5] Unreported, Applegarth J, 17 October 2016.
[7] Condition 23 required abstinence and condition 24 required submission to testing.
[8] Application filed 13 August 2020, CFI 78.
[9] Report of Dr Sundin, 4 September 2020, pages 7-8.
[10] The contravention is admitted by the respondent.
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland
Sampton [2020] QSC 305
Orders made 25 September 2020: (1) The respondent be released from custody and continue to be subject to the requirements of the supervision order of Applegarth J dated 17 October 2016; (2) The review of the application on 19 October 2020 be vacated (paragraph [3]).