Asmar bht Chaghoury v Paplaw Pty Ltd t/as Papantoniou Blake Lawyers

The plaintiff is over 70 years of age. She is under a legal incapacity because she suffers from dementia, cognitive impairment and language limitations. The tutor is her son, Mr Adrian Chaghoury. He is also her financial manager, but subject to supervision by the NSW Trustee and Guardian.

The application for approval is supported by a confidential affidavit of Mr Kyle McCabe dated 14 September 2026. Mr McCabe is the plaintiff’s solicitor.

The proceedings were commenced with the filing of a statement of claim on 24 November 2025. An amended statement of claim was filed on 20 February 2026.

The statement of claim alleges that the defendant acted for the plaintiff from about May 2020 in relation to the sale of a property in Toongabbie in New South Wales. The property was effectively owned, as to half, by the plaintiff and as to the other half by the plaintiff as trustee of her late father’s estate.

The property was sold in July 2020 and settled on 2 October 2020. After deduction of amounts of money on the settlement in respect of mortgages, caveats and other creditors, the whole of the proceeds of sale were depleted. Accordingly, the plaintiff and her father’s estate received no surplus funds from the sale.

The plaintiff alleges, as expressed in the written submissions, that the defendant breached its duty to her “by failing to properly ascertain her capacity, failing to provide interpreter assistance where required, failing to ensure the plaintiff understood the consequences of the transaction, and failing to protect the plaintiff from undue influence/exploitation or to refuse to act/stop the transaction.” It is alleged that but for these failings the plaintiff would not have proceeded with the sale, and therefore not have suffered a consequential loss.

The defendant has denied that it breached its duty of care and has also alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and that a third person is a concurrent wrongdoer. The defendant not only disputes liability and quantum but also disputes the plaintiff’s categorisation as being a person under a legal incapacity.

Clearly, if the matter proceeds to hearing, there are many factual and legal disputes which will permeate the proceedings. There are also competing arguments as to the quantum of the claim should the plaintiff succeed. If the plaintiff does not succeed, there will probably be costs orders made against her.

The proposed settlement is in the form of a Deed of Release and Settlement. Under the Deed the proceedings are to be dismissed on agreed terms and there are to be mutual releases, and also an express denial of liability on the part of the defendant.

Pursuant to the deed the plaintiff is to receive a sum of money. There is an agreed cap on her legal costs. The cap will ensure that the plaintiff receives no less than half of the agreed sum of money.

The settlement is for a not insubstantial amount of money but also reflects a compromise on the possible damages the plaintiff might receive if she was entirely successful. In my view a compromise in this case is called for because of the many areas of dispute which flow through almost every aspect of the plaintiff’s claim, including, as I have already noted, whether she is in fact a person under a legal incapacity.

I think it is in the best interests of the plaintiff that the settlement be approved. I will do so.

I make the following orders:

The proceedings against the defendant are dismissed.

For the purposes of s 91 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) the dismissal is on terms which prevent the plaintiff’s from bringing fresh proceedings of claiming the same relief in fresh proceedings against the defendant.

No order is made of the costs of the approval process.

The Court notes a Deed of settlement has been signed by the parties.