[2026] NSWSC 1237
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-09-17
Cavanagh J
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Aslan v Pucci (No 8) [2026] NSWSC 1237
Hearing dates: 17 September 2026
Date of orders: 17 September 2026
Decision date: 17 September 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Cavanagh J
Decision: The seventh defendant’s application is dismissed.
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE — application of seventh defendant for dismissal of proceedings against her pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) — where argument advanced by seventh defendant for dismissal of the proceedings is substantially the same as will be advanced at trial — whether plaintiff’s case has no real prospects of success or is otherwise an abuse of process — no issue of principle
Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 13.4
Cases Cited: Aslan v Pucci [2025] NSWSC 881
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Dina Aslan (Plaintiff)
Narghiza Ergashova (Seventh Defendant)
Representation: Plaintiff (Self-represented) Seventh Defendant (Self-represented)
File Number(s): 2025/186499
HIS HONOUR: This is an application brought by the seventh defendant, Narghiza Ergashova, for the dismissal of the proceedings pursued against her by the plaintiff. This will be the eighth judgment I have delivered in this long-running case involving alleged conspiracy by the defendants to defraud the plaintiff of the sum of approximately $400,000 in December 2020.
It is not necessary that I set out the background to the matter in any detail, as I have already done so in earlier judgments. It is only necessary to say that the plaintiff alleges that in approximately November 2020, she lent to the first defendant, Enrico Pucci, the sum of approximately $400,000 on the basis that Mr Pucci needed the money to pay the mortgage on the matrimonial home which he had allegedly purchased for the plaintiff and him to live in when they were married. Having handed over that money to Mr Pucci, Mr Pucci terminated their relationship and sent photos essentially boasting of having all her money.
The plaintiff originally commenced proceedings in the District Court and indeed obtained a judgment against Mr Pucci, which was unsatisfied. Mr Pucci is or was a bankrupt.
The plaintiff then commenced these proceedings, naming 16 defendants. Over the course of the past 18 months or so, there have been various applications by defendants to strike out or dismiss the proceedings against them.
This application is brought by the seventh defendant, who has represented herself during the proceedings. She represents herself again today, as does the plaintiff. There is no appearance by anyone else today, as I excused them from attendance.
Having said that, the second defendant, Rosario Pucci, did appear at one stage suggesting that his brother, the first defendant, Enrico Pucci, opposed the seventh defendant’s application and wanted to let the Court know that he would be assisting the plaintiff with evidence against the seventh defendant. I indicated to the second defendant that he had no right to be heard on this application. Indeed, he still instructs solicitors, although there may be some issue about their further attendance.
It may be viewed as a surprising turn of events that the first defendant now wants to assist the plaintiff. Be that as it may, none of that is relevant to the outcome of this application.
The seventh defendant relies on the five affidavits, being affidavits dated 2 April 2026, 23 April 2026, 24 June 2026, 4 August 2026 and 1 September 2026.
In response, the plaintiff relies on her affidavit of 16 August 2026, as well as her earlier affidavit of 11 June 2025.
Consistent with a lot of the documentation in this case, parts of the affidavits relied on by the parties are not relevant to the issue I am required to determine. The level and degree of hostility between the plaintiff and the seventh defendant cannot be underestimated, as is apparent from the conduct of this application. The plaintiff blames the seventh defendant for what happened to her. The seventh defendant expresses outrage and hostility towards the plaintiff for the fact that she has been dragged into these proceedings.
As I have commented in earlier matters, the conduct of the defendants generally towards the plaintiff since the commencement of the proceedings, including the 40 reports to the police about her, is a demonstration of the degree of hostility of the defendants towards the plaintiff for her continued pursuit in this action. Be that as it may, the plaintiff continues to pursue these proceedings on the basis of a cause of action in the tort of conspiracy.
As indicated to the seventh defendant, it is necessary for her to establish on her strikeout or dismissal application pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), that the plaintiff has no arguable case against her or that she cannot possibly succeed. As is well-known, the Court will not lightly dismiss proceedings at this interlocutory stage unless satisfied that the case has no real prospects of success or is otherwise an abuse of process: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69.
In circumstances in which both the plaintiff and the seventh defendant represent themselves and have done so throughout the conduct of this litigation, they were both allowed some latitude in terms of making the submissions they wished to make about the seventh defendant's application.
The seventh defendant maintains that she was herself a victim of the first defendant. She points to his recent conviction for offences involving coercive control against her. She points to the fact that he is now in prison based on offences committed against her. Of course I accept that. She also submits that she did nothing to induce the plaintiff into the romantic relationship with the first defendant and did nothing to induce her or suggest to her that she should be providing the money to the first defendant. She portrays herself as a victim of the first defendant's conduct.
Indeed, that does seem to be so, as is highlighted by the plaintiff. After she was allegedly defrauded by the first defendant, the seventh defendant contacted her in 2021 providing her with information about the first defendant. She asserted that she had been defrauded of $100,000 by the first defendant. However, as is evidenced by the plaintiff, it seems that once the seventh defendant was repaid the $100,000, allegedly from the money defrauded from the plaintiff, she became uncooperative with the plaintiff and allegedly took active steps against her and continues to do so.
Both parties took me to text messages allegedly sent by the seventh defendant to the plaintiff in September 2020, being two months before the alleged fraud on the plaintiff. The seventh defendant took me to the text messages to explain that in fact she never sent the text messages (which the plaintiff says establishes some conspiracy against her between the first defendant and the seventh defendant) and that she herself has been the subject of a fraud. She says that they were sent by someone else on her behalf and that she never owned an iPhone.
The plaintiff relies on these text messages as being evidence of the seventh defendant’s role in the conspiracy. The plaintiff also relies on statements made after the event and other evidence after the event but, as I suggested to the plaintiff, post-event conduct may not be relied upon to establish that she was induced into the relationship by any conduct on the part of the seventh defendant.
It is only necessary to say that the tone and content of these text messages are very much to the effect that, despite the plaintiff suspecting in September 2020 that the seventh defendant was still in a relationship with the first defendant and having some concern about it at the time, the author of the text messages wanted her to know that that was not so. By that I mean the content of the text messages really suggest that the seventh defendant had not been in a romantic relationship since April and that she was struggling with the idea that she would no longer be in a romantic relationship with him, having regard to her love for him and that she should not worry about small things such as finding the seventh defendant’s bathrobe in his bedroom, as she says:
“Please stop the childish games. You will not find anyone better than Enrico.”
In other words, the effect of the message is to say to the plaintiff: you should take the opportunity with the first defendant because you will not find any better than him.
The plaintiff says she relies on those text messages as evidence of the seventh defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy. The seventh defendant says she did not send them, she was not aware of them and someone else sent them on her behalf. The seventh defendant submits there is no other evidence of her involvement in the conspiracy.
Surprisingly, it turns out that the seventh defendant has published a book called: “Curly Clix Convictions, Based on True Events, The Rise and Rise of Enrico Pucci; Drama, Betrayal and Redemption”.
In this book, which the seventh defendant relied on for the purpose of this application, she describes the Pucci brothers as being “part of a syndicate involved in the romantic and financial exploitation of women”. She lists the seven women who she says have been exploited by the Pucci family.
She includes herself, identifying a $100,000 debt; and the plaintiff, identifying a $500,000 debt. However, later in the book, she devotes some pages to the plaintiff’s involvement with the first defendant, the effect of which is to suggest that you would not believe a word the plaintiff is saying and that, in effect, the problem the plaintiff finds herself in is all her own fault. This is surprising because the earlier part of the book seems to portray the Puccis as being involved in some sort of overall conspiracy, but when it comes to the plaintiff, a number of things are said in the book to suggest that she was the one who was not in some way defrauded by the Pucci family.
As I said, this book was relied upon by the seventh defendant in support of her application. When I asked the seventh defendant about the content of the book and, in particular, the pages relating to the plaintiff, she said she accepted it was all wrong and she was going to write a new book correcting it.
Frankly, it is difficult to know where the truth lies in this litany of untruths.
My task is to determine the seventh defendant’s application. She faces a high bar. I must be satisfied that there is no arguable case against her. It is not necessary that I say anything further about the tort of conspiracy, as it is dealt with in my first judgment: see Aslan v Pucci [2025] NSWSC 881.
In my view, the problem with the seventh defendant’s application is that she is asking the Court to make a factual determination of the question of whether she sent the text messages in September 2020. She says that there is no evidence against her is that she did not send the text messages. It is not my task on this application to determine the facts. The plaintiff says she did send them. The seventh defendant says she did not send them. That is plainly a matter for the trial.
In my view, the text messages contain information which might (I use the word “might” deliberately) provide a basis for the allegation that the seventh defendant was involved in the conspiracy with the members of the Pucci family to defraud the plaintiff. Of course, if the seventh defendant did not send them, then the plaintiff’s case would rather fall away. However, it is not my task to determine that issue today. That is a matter for the trial.
I am satisfied in all those circumstances that the plaintiff has presented evidence which establishes an arguable case in conspiracy against the seventh defendant. In those circumstances, the application is dismissed.
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Aslan
Pucci (No 8)