1. The task is one of statutory interpretation and involves ascertaining the meaning of the word "requirement" in s 55A(3). The issue is whether Ms Arnesto had been required to state her name and address. The task should begin with the "ordinary and grammatical sense of the statutory words having regard to their context and the legislative purpose": Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 per French CJ at [4]. The context includes the Act as a whole and the existing state of the law before the enactment of the legislation. The consequences of competing interpretations are also to be considered in ascertaining whether the construction being considered gives effect to the purpose of the legislation (Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas), s 8B)
2. Section 55A of the Police Offences Act provides:

1. In ascertaining the meaning of "requirement", it is relevant to have regard to the fact that the section being construed is a penal provision.
2. The frequently quoted statement of principle that applies to the construction of penal statutes is that of Gibbs J (as he then was) in Beckwith v The Queen [1976] HCA 55; (1976) 135 CLR 569 at 576:

1. In Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment [2005] HCA 58; (2005) 224 CLR 193, the plurality judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated at [45] that "in choosing between a relatively broad and relatively narrow construction of legislation it is desirable to take into account its penal nature ... An appreciation of the heavy hand that may be brought down by the criminal law suggests the need for caution in accepting any loose, albeit 'practical' construction ...". Here, a failure to comply with a requirement may result in arrest, s 55A(4), prosecution and a maximum penalty of 10 penalty units (presently, a maximum of $1,540).
2. On its own, the penal nature of the provision is not a significant factor. In choosing between two competing interpretations of the word "requirement", both of which are reasonably open, this factor weighs in favour of the interpretation which is more informative and in favour of Ms Arnesto, rather than the interpretation in favour of the prosecution.

1. The common law is part of the context to be taken into account in construing s 55A. In the absence of s 55A(1) a person would be under no obligation to provide their name and address to police. The person would have a right to remain silent. Subsection (1), allowing a requirement to be made, subs (3), creating an offence provision and subs (4), giving a power to arrest without warrant for that offence, all intrude upon an individual's right that he or she would otherwise have to remain silent.
2. In Petty v The Queen [1991] HCA 34; (1991) 173 CLR 95, Mason, Toohey and McHugh JJ stated at 99:

1. In Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission [1983] HCA 9; (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 340, the common law privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was described by Mason ACJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ as "too fundamental a bulwark of liberty to be categorised simply as a rule of evidence ..."; see also Murphy J at 346.
2. It is interesting to note the common law in relation to executing a lawful arrest. In ordinary circumstances, an arresting police officer is under a duty to inform the suspect of the nature of the charge_: Christie v Leachinksy_. Viscount Simon spoke at 587-588 of the "elementary proposition that in this country a person is, prima facie, entitled to his freedom and is only required to submit to restraints on his freedom if he knows in substance the reason why it is claimed that this restraint should be imposed". The requirement that a person should be so informed does not mean that technical or precise language need be used.
3. Without drawing on the common law with respect to arrest to interpret the meaning of the wording of the section here, it is mentioned as part of the context for s 55A.

1. There is a principle of statutory construction which must be applied to the construction of any statute which affects common law rights. A statute will only be interpreted to have abrogated a fundamental right by the use of clear words to that effect: Coco v The Queen at 437; displacement requiring words of "irresistible clearness": Bropho v Western Australia [1990] HCA 24; (1990) 171 CLR 1 at 18; see also Police v Conway [2006] SASC 186; (2006) 95 SASR 83 at [35]. As acknowledged on behalf of Ms Arnesto, plainly the section encroaches upon the right to silence and does so in express terms. The question in this case is one of degree and the extent or impact of the provision in its operation. This principle of construction applies in determining this question; the principle favours the least infringement of the common law right: RJE v The Secretary to the Department of Justice [2008] VSCA 265; (2008) 21 VR 526 per Maxwell P and Weinberg JA at [37], Williams v The Queen [1986] HCA 88; (1986) 161 CLR 278 per Mason and Brennan JJ at 292.
2. In Arachchi v Orlowski [2003] VSC 161, Nettle J at [26] referred to "the principle of statutory construction which requires that great care be exercised in the construction of any statute which affects the liberty of the subject. The statute must not be extended beyond the area of operation for which Parliament has clearly provided. Therefore, a construction of a statute which interferes with the legal rights of the subject to a lesser extent and produces the less hardship is to be preferred to another."
3. Nettle J referred to some of the authorities in support of that principle, noting at [27] that the "principle is of course so well entrenched that the recitation of authority is hardly necessary", but that it is worth recalling the reason for its existence, referring to the judgment of French J (as he then was) in Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank Ltd (1988) 20 FCR 403 at 433:

(1994) 179 CLR 427

(2009) 239 CLR 27

(1976) 135 CLR 569

(2005) 224 CLR 193

(1991) 173 CLR 95

(1983) 152 CLR 328

(1990) 171 CLR 1

(2006) 95 SASR 83

(2008) 21 VR 526

(1986) 161 CLR 278

(1988) 20 FCR 403