Application of HLD under s 121 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) [2025] NSWCATOD 156; (18 November 2025)

1. At the hearing of the application the Applicant tendered and relied upon the following evidence identified below:

(1) The application received 31 January 2025 - Exhibit A.

(2) Affidavit of the Applicant dated 4 April 2025 - Exhibit B.

(3) A reference of KH - Exhibit C.

(4) A document headed "Advice of Court Result" - Exhibit D.

(5) Affidavit of the Applicant dated 5 September 2025 - Exhibit E.

(6) The reference of CH - Exhibit F.

(7) The reference of KH - Exhibit G.

(8) The reference of the BG - Exhibit H.

(9) The reference of JC- Exhibit I.

1. There was no objection to any of the exhibits tendered by the Applicant and nor was the Applicant cross-examined.

1. The facts relevant to the Applicant's application are contained in his affidavits and the annexures. That evidence and the opinions of the Applicant's referees are summarised below or in the following paragraphs:

(1) The Applicant is an honours graduate of a university in NSW. He has been accepted into a combined law program at the same university. It is a requirement of that course that the Applicant complete a designated number of PLT placement hours in a law firm or legal practice, but he requires the Tribunal's approval due to a prior conviction (the details of which we will explain later).

(2) Prior to commencing university studies the Applicant served in the military.

(3) From 2017 to 2019 he was in a relationship with a female whose identity need not be disclosed for the purposes of this decision. His affidavit states that in late 2018 he was in hospital because of a fracture to his right hand and while awaiting surgery he and the female friend had a "verbal disagreement", and that in "a moment of poor judgment and emotional distress, I sent her a text message" threatening to expose her "along with a screenshot of a website that she had uploaded content to".

(4) The affidavit states that as a result of the text message he was charged and pleaded guilty to the offence of "Threaten to Disseminate an Intimate Image Without Consent (DV)".

(5) The Applicant and the female friend reconciled and she appeared as a witness at a hearing in the District Court in which the Applicant appealed against the severity of his sentence. That relationship ended in 2019.

(6) The affidavit states that the Applicant "deeply regrets my actions and I accept full responsibility for the offence. I recognise the seriousness of my conduct and acknowledge that there is no justification for sending such a message." The Applicant attributes certain stresses in his life as contributing to the momentary lapse of judgment. Those stresses were the military discharge, the stress of relocating interstate and the unhealthy nature of the relationship with the female friend, as well as his imminent surgery.

(7) The Applicant states in his affidavit that since the conviction he has demonstrated good character and a commitment to personal and professional development.

(8) From the advice of court result (Exhibit D) it is apparent that in May 2019 the Applicant was convicted and sentenced to a Community Correction Order for a period of 12 months including an order that he perform 120 hours community service work. In September the appeal against sentence was upheld and the Applicant was sentenced to a Community Corrections Order for a period of 12 months to commence in May 2019.

(9) The Applicant's second affidavit outlines steps taken by him which he describes as "a deliberate and sustained process of rehabilitation and personal development". He engaged a clinical psychologist and worked through personal and emotional issues that he says gave him a "much deeper understanding of the underlying factors that contributed to my offending". He also states that the course he undertook to achieve a Bachelor of Psychological Science gave him a "structured and evidenced-based framework for understanding mental health, interpersonal relationships, and the psychology of decision-making. It further reinforced my insight into my own past conduct."

1. We now turn to the references provided by the Applicant.
2. The first reference is from CH, Chief Operating Officer of a company providing professional services to a variety of businesses. CH states that the Applicant has been employed with the company since 2018 in a casual capacity. He describes the Applicant as demonstrating "the utmost professionalism, a strong work ethic, and exemplary character" as well as performing his duties diligently and reliably. The Applicant commenced as a Responsible Service of Alcohol (RSA) Marshal and was subsequently promoted to an RSA Supervisor. The Applicant was later appointed to managing one of the company's operations. CH describes the Applicant as a "trustworthy and effective leader" who can be relied upon to "maintain order and uphold the highest standards of conduct". CH is aware of the offence of which the Applicant was convicted and is of the opinion that the offence does not reflect the Applicant's "true nature or character". Further, he states that the Applicant has expressed "genuine remorse for the incident".
3. The next reference is from KH who is the Operations Manager at the same company. The reference describes the work the Applicant has undertaken and that KH has observed the Applicant across "a variety of demanding and high pressure environments" in which the Applicant has proven himself capable "of handling large teams, resolving conflicts and upholding compliance and safety standards." The Applicant is described as trusted and respected. KH also states that he is aware of the Applicant's conviction and is of the opinion that it does not reflect the true character of the Applicant.
4. The third reference is from BG who is a university graduate in architecture . She says that she has known the Applicant since 2023 and that since 2024 she and the Applicant have "been in a committed and loving de facto relationship". She is aware of the Applicant's 2018 conviction which she describes as a "singular and historic mistake that does not reflect who [HLD] is today". She states that in her relationship with the Applicant there has never been any aggression, control, abuse, intimidation or inappropriate behaviour of any kind.
5. The next reference is from JC who was a friend of the Applicant having known him for "many years". This friendship dates from school days. JC is aware of the Applicant's conviction and states that he has watched the Applicant "rebuild his life with perseverance, devoting himself to study in psychology and law, completing therapy".

1. The Applicant has provided lengthy and helpful submissions in support of his application. There is no need to set the submissions out in any detail. However, it is necessary to say that the submissions argued for the Tribunal to give approval without accompanying conditions. During the hearing we discussed with the Applicant and Ms Hristeff each of the conditions proposed by the Law Society. During the discussion we expressed our views as to the various conditions and both the Applicant and Ms Hristeff were given the opportunity to respond.

1. The Law Society has provided submissions for consideration by the Tribunal on the basis that the Law Society does not express a view as to whether the Tribunal should approve the application but rather to provide assistance to the Tribunal.
2. The Law Society's submissions refer to s 125 of the Uniform Law which provides that Part 3.9 of the Uniform Law has effect subject to any applicable jurisdiction or legislation relating to spent convictions. The effect of s 125 of the Uniform Law when considered with the Criminal Records Act 1991 (NSW) is that a person who might otherwise be obliged to make an application pursuant to s 121(2) of the Uniform Law, based on having been convicted of a serious offence, is not required to make such an application if the conviction is a spent conviction.
3. In this case the relevant serious offence occurred in 2018. The general principle contained in the Criminal Records Act is that some convictions may be "spent" after a period of 10 years. Therefore, the offence for which the Applicant has been convicted is not spent.
4. The Law Society's submissions suggest that the Tribunal consider whether the offence, which formed the basis of the conviction, the subject of this application, is a "serious offence" for the purposes of the Uniform Law. We have already referred to the definition of "serious offence" as contained in s 6 of the Uniform Law. We are satisfied that the offence is an indictable offence and therefore is a "serious offence" for the purposes of the Uniform Law.
5. The Law Society's submissions referred to a number of Tribunal decisions. We will refer to them to the extent relevant in the following paragraphs.
6. The first decision is that of McCowan v Council of the Law Society of NSW [2014] NSWCATOD 44. McCowan concerned a solicitor (Mr Brawn) whose practising certificate had been cancelled by the Law Society. He was later charged and convicted of fraudulent misappropriation of client money. Years later he sought approval to be a lay associate. The Tribunal stated that it must be satisfied that Mr Brawn is a fit and proper person to be a lay associate. After a detailed description of the evidence, the Tribunal stated that it was satisfied that the "necessary tests of fitness and propriety, character, inside [sic], remorse and rehabilitation have been satisfied by Mr Brawn" (at [82]). The Tribunal granted its approval but subject to stringent conditions.
7. The next case is McGirr & Anor v The Council of the Law Society of NSW [2014] NSWCATOD 154. This case concerned a young man, aged 18, who was convicted of larceny, having taken a shopping trolley from a shopping centre. The Tribunal stated that the "primary principle which the Tribunal must consider is the protection of the public" (at [56]) and further that the "integrity of the legal profession is also a relevant consideration" (at [58]). The Tribunal found that Mr McGirr had demonstrated insight and understanding of his wrongful action and how his behaviour had fallen below the standard expected. The Tribunal found that he was a fit and proper person to be employed as a lay associate. Approval was granted without the imposition of any condition.
8. The next case is Hill v The Council of the Law Society of NSW [2017] NSWCATOD 164. The applicant in that case was convicted of the charge of dangerous driving occasioning death. The offence was described as serious but was caused by "momentary inattention" and did not involve excessive speed, alcohol, other drugs or fatigue. The Tribunal approved the applicant, Mr Barnett as a lay associate without the imposition of conditions.
9. The next case is Fox v Law Society NSW [2018] NSWCATOD 164. This case involved an applicant who had pleaded guilty to the offence of hindering an investigation under s 315 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The Tribunal found that it was satisfied that the integrity of the legal profession would not be damaged by granting approval for the applicant to be employed as a lay associate. The Tribunal also found that there was no risk to the public by the granting of approval.
10. The next decision is that of the Application of Gale [2023] NSWCATOD 125. In that case the Applicant had pleaded guilty to being in possession of four firearms. The decision describes in detail the circumstances in which the applicant had become in possession of the four firearms. There was no suggestion that he had any criminal intent. The Tribunal found that it was comfortably satisfied that the employment of the applicant as lay associate would not impose a risk to the public and nor will the employment of the applicant impact adversely upon the integrity of the legal profession. Approval was granted without the imposition of conditions.
11. Lastly, we were referred to the Application of FXI under s 121 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) [2024] NSWCATOD 6. In that case the applicant had been convicted of various counts of using a carriage service for sexual activity with persons under the age of 16. The Tribunal granted approval under s 121 and the approval was accompanied by a number of conditions. Although the offences were described as "abhorrent and disgraceful" the Tribunal formed the conclusion, having considered all of the evidence including the opinions of medical experts, that the applicant was presently a fit and proper person to be a lay associate and approval was granted, subject to conditions.

1. A possible concerning aspect of this application is that the conduct which gave rise to the conviction arose out of a personal relationship of trust and confidence between the Applicant and his then female partner. In that sense it represented a serious breach of implicit obligations of confidentiality arising from such a relationship.
2. However, in our opinion in the Applicant's favour are the following:

(1) There is evidence that the conduct occurred during a period of stress and that the Applicant has since achieved sufficient insight into his conduct to thereafter engage a clinical psychologist to better understand how to deal with stress.

(2) The evidence discloses that the Applicant has achieved insight into his conduct and is sincerely remorseful.

(3) The references are supportive and impressive. There is no evidence of any subsequent criminal conduct and indeed the evidence of his current partner supports the conclusion that what occurred is very unlikely to be repeated.

1. For the above reasons and the further matters described below, we are satisfied that the Applicant is a fit and proper person to be approved as a lay associate and that the integrity of the legal profession will not be adversely affected by this approval.
2. Turning to the specific matters to be addressed as required by s 121(3) of Uniform Law, the following are our conclusions:

(1) As to the nature and circumstances of the Applicant's conviction we are satisfied that the conviction arose out of a momentary lapse of judgment caused by a number of stressors then affecting the Applicant. We are further satisfied that the Applicant has taken steps to ensure that, in the event he is subjected to similar stresses in the future, he will not engage in similar or other illegal conduct ;

(2) The second consideration concerns the requirements and responsibilities of the arrangement which the Applicant is seeking approval to undertake. These arrangements involve working under supervision and the conditions we intend to impose will ensure that the supervision is undertaken by an appropriate practitioner and that the supervisor is aware of the Applicant's prior conviction and of these reasons.

(3) The third issue to be considered is the degree of connection between the conviction and the requirements and responsibilities of the arrangement. We have already commented upon what we consider to be a concerning feature of the conviction, namely the fact that the Applicant breached a relationship of trust and confidence. That kind of relationship is integral to the relationship between a lawyer and a client. However, given the circumstances already described, the Applicant's relative age (24 years at the time of the offence) and the period of time that has elapsed since the conviction, we repeat that we are satisfied that the Applicant is now a fit and proper person to be given the opportunity to progress to the next stage of his proposed entry into the legal profession.

1. Overall, we are satisfied to the standard described in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 that the Applicant is a fit and proper person to be approved as a lay associate and that the reputation and integrity of the legal profession will not be adversely affected by this approval.
2. Notwithstanding the confidence in the Applicant that we have expressed in the prior paragraphs, we think it appropriate to impose the conditions set out below. However, before setting out the conditions we wish to say something about confidentiality.

1. Under s 64 of the NCAT Act, the Tribunal has the power to restrict disclosures of the name of any person (whether or not a party to proceedings) if it is satisfied that it is desirable to do so. The Tribunal may make such an order of its own motion or on the application of a party.
2. The Applicant in these proceedings is self-represented and is relatively young. We are concerned that publication of our reasons may detrimentally affect the Applicant's future career as a lawyer or more generally.
3. Further, we have concerns that the publication of this decision might be said to operate inconsistently with the provisions of the Criminal Records Act, the broad terms of which will possibly have the result that the Applicants conviction will be spent in approximately three years' time. Section 125 of the Uniform Law states that the requirements of s 121 of the Uniform Law are subject to the provisions of the Criminal Records Act. This would appear to mean that in three years' time the Applicant may have no obligation to have regard to the provisions of s 121. In one sense, publication of this decision either on Caselaw or elsewhere by the parties would appear to operate to subvert the provisions of the Criminal Records Act assuming that the conviction applicable to the Applicant is capable of becoming spent.
4. Accordingly, we propose to make an order on an interim basis that this decision be published to the parties only and that the parties be prohibited from disclosing the name of the Applicant or any other person named in the decision pending further order. We propose to direct the parties to make submissions within 14 days as to whether they agree to or oppose a permanent order restricting the disclosure of the name of the Applicant or any person named in the decision. If, following receipt of the submissions, we remain of the view that an order under s 64(1)(a) of the NCAT Act should be made, we will publish another version of this decision with the names of the Applicant and other named persons redacted or otherwise anonymized. That version will be published on Caselaw in accordance with the Tribunal's usual practice and will be the version which the Applicant will be required to provide to a law practice as currently envisaged by order 2(d).
5. Accordingly, we have included order (4) below for the purposes of enabling the Applicant's position to be protected whilst we await submissions from the Applicant and the Law Society.
6. We make the following orders:

(1) Pursuant to s 121(2) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) the Applicant, HLD is approved to be a lay associate of a New South Wales legal practice on the conditions set out below in order 2.

(2) The following conditions are attached to this approval:

(a) the approval has effect from the date it is granted to the date that is 12 months from the date that it is granted;

(b) the approval authorises the Applicant to be a lay associate of solicitors, barristers or both solicitors and barristers;

(c) whilst acting as a lay associate, the Applicant must be supervised by an Australian lawyer who holds a current practising certificate and if the supervising Australian lawyer is a solicitor, may be supervised by that solicitor only if that solicitor holds a current practising certificate which authorises the holder to supervise the work of others;

(d) in addition to his obligations under s 122(1) of the Uniform Law to inform the law practice of his convictions prior to becoming a lay associate, the Applicant must, prior to becoming a lay associate provide the principal of any law practice in which he works a copy of the Tribunal's written reasons for decision in these proceedings.

(3) The Applicant must provide proof of compliance with condition 2(d) above to:

(a) in the case of a lay associate's engagement with a solicitor, the Director, Legal Regulation of the Law Society of New South Wales; and

(b) in the case of a lay associate's engagement with a barrister, the Director Professional Conduct of the New South Wales Bar Association;

within seven days of becoming a lay associate of a New South Wales legal practice.

(4) Pursuant to s 64(1)(a) the Applicant and the Law Society are prohibited, pending further order, from disclosing the name of the Applicant and any other person named in this decision subject to the Applicant and the Law Society being able to make disclosure of this decision to their legal advisors.

(5) The Applicant and the Law Society are directed to file and serve submissions within 14 days concerning whether a permanent confidentiality order should be made as contemplated in these reasons.

1. On 29 October 2025 we published our decision in these proceedings to the parties only. The decision was not published on Caselaw in accordance with the usual practice of the Tribunal. The decision included order (5) (see above) directing the parties to file and serve submissions concerning whether a permanent confidentiality order should be made as contemplated in the above reasons. Submissions have been received from the Applicant in support of an order for confidentiality. The Law Society has lodged submissions that neither support nor oppose such an order, but rather set out principles for our consideration intended to guide us as to whether such an order should be made.
2. We have considered the Applicant's and the Law Society's submissions and are of the opinion that an ongoing order for confidentiality should be made. This does not involve amending order (4) (except as to continuing the order on a final basis) but as we intend to publish this decision on Caselaw (consistent with the usual practice of the Tribunal) it is necessary to make changes to the decision published to the parties by anonymising the name of the Applicant and the names of witnesses, and altering other personal details so as to avoid indirectly enabling identification of the Applicant.
3. The power of the Tribunal to impose a confidentiality order is contained in s 64 of the NCAT Act which provides as follows:

64 Tribunal may restrict disclosures concerning proceedings

(1) If the Tribunal is satisfied that it is desirable to do so by reason of the confidential nature of any evidence or matter or for any other reason, it may (of its own motion or on the application of a party) make any one or more of the following orders--

(a) an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of the name of any person (whether or not a party to proceedings in the Tribunal or a witness summoned by, or appearing before, the Tribunal),

(b) an order prohibiting or restricting the publication or broadcast of any report, including a sound recording or transcript, of proceedings in the Tribunal,

(c) an order prohibiting or restricting the publication of evidence given before the Tribunal, whether in public or in private, or of matters contained in documents lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence by the Tribunal,

(d) an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure to some or all of the parties to the proceedings of evidence given before the Tribunal, or of the contents of a document lodged with the Tribunal or received in evidence by the Tribunal, in relation to the proceedings.

(2) The Tribunal cannot make an order under this section that is inconsistent with section 65.

(3) The Tribunal may from time to time vary or revoke an order made under subsection (1).

(4) For the purposes of this section, a reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person.

1. The reasons for our decision to restrict disclosure of the name of the Applicant and witnesses and our conclusion that it is desirable to make such an order in these circumstances of this case were set out in the above decision. The Applicant's submissions supporting a confidentiality order are essentially the same reasons as we foreshadowed in our above decision.
2. The orders we have made require the Applicant to provide a copy of this decision to the principal of any law practice in which the Applicant works and thereafter to provide proof of compliance with that order to the Law Society or the Bar Association (as appropriate). In our view those requirements adequately protect the public in the sense that the Applicant's association with a law practice as a lay associate will occur with the principal of the relevant law practice being made aware of the Applicant's prior convictions.
3. Accordingly, Order (4) will be remade on a final basis and this version of our decision will be published on Caselaw.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.