s.789FC - Application for an order to stop bullying

Application for an FWC order to stop bullying; dismissal of application pursuant to s 587 of the Act

[1] On 17 December 2025 an application was filed in the Fair Work Commission by Ms Fiona Glumac pursuant to s 789FC of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) in which Ms Glumac seeks orders to stop bullying at work.

[2] The application is somewhat unusual. Ms Glumac describes herself in the application as a director and employee of The Herd Independent Learning Centre Pty Ltd (the Herd). The Herd is an "intergenerational learning centre where our early learning and care service shares a roof with a residential aged care home". The application names a former "customer" of the Herd and makes allegations against this person, including with respect to workplace bullying. She says it is this person who bullied her at work, and there is a risk it will continue.

[3] I consider it unnecessary for the purposes of this decision to name the former customer and will simply refer to them as "the former customer".

[4] The application names Mr Reece Druiven as Ms Glumac's representative, who is described as a lawyer. On 12 January 2026 the Herd filed a Form F73 employer/ principal response in the Commission. The relevant contact person listed is Ms Anna Glumac who is described as a "Director". The employer response also names Mr Druiven as the Herd's representative.

[5] Prior to and at a case management hearing I conducted in relation to this matter I queried as to whether, in circumstances where often a stop bullying application seeks orders be made against a worker's employer, Mr Druiven has a conflict acting for both the Applicant and the employer. This is ultimately a matter for Mr Druiven, but I have indicated that, should the matter proceed, it will be necessary for him to inform the Commission as to how he intends to manage this apparent conflict.

[6] On 13 January 2026 the former customer filed an application in chambers seeking that Ms Glumac's application be dismissed pursuant to s 587 of the Act based on various grounds (the dismissal application).

• [7] I have considered whether a person named in an application made for stop bullying orders has standing to apply pursuant to s 587 that the application be dismissed. Section 587(3) of the Act, which provides the Commission may dismiss an application on its own initiative or "on application", does not appear to limit who might make an application under its terms, such as a person named in an application for stop bullying orders (commonly referred to as "the named person"). There has been no objection raised to the application on this ground. I consider there is no impediment to such a person making an application pursuant to s 587 for an application concerning them to be dismissed. Plainly such a person has an interest in the proceedings, especially when the application is directly primarily against that person, and when orders made against them are sought[1]. If I am wrong about this, I consider it appropriate in the circumstances to deal with the proposition that Ms Glumac's application be dismissed pursuant to s 587 of the Act on my own initiative.

[8] After the application was allocated to my Chambers, I listed the matter for a case management hearing. I was later advised that the former customer did not intend to attend the hearing, and said they were "not comfortable being exposed to these people online or in person ... I am suffering PTSD due to their behaviour. So the conference can proceed without my presence".

[9] The parties were directed to file and serve submissions as to the dismissal application and any material they wished to rely on. Ms Glumac filed an Outline of Submissions and a bundle of documents. For some reason, despite being represented by a lawyer, Ms Glumac did not serve that material on the former customer, as had been directed. After this was rectified, the former customer indicated she had nothing further to add to the written submissions already before the Commission in relation to her dismissal application, but then did send several pieces of further correspondence, all of which I have had regard to. After considering the material filed by the parties, I indicated that I considered it appropriate to conduct a short hearing in relation to the dismissal application, particularly due to an apparent factual contest in some areas. However, both parties responded to this proposition advising they opposed the matter being the subject of a hearing and urged me to determine the dismissal application on the papers. In particular, Ms Glumac submitted, among other things, that the Commission is not being asked to conduct, nor needs to conduct, a full hearing or to make final findings as to contested allegations of fact going to the bullying allegations of the substantive application, that determining the objections on the papers accords with the principles in key authorities and avoids a "mini-trial" and preserves contested factual issues for determination at the appropriate stage, and noted that both parties have had the opportunity to file written submissions.

[10] In those circumstances I have decided to determine the dismissal application on the basis of the written materials filed by the parties. My reasons for that determination follow.

The principles governing the operation of s 587 of the Act.

[11] Section 587(1)(c) of the Act provides:

(1) Without limiting when the FWC may dismiss an application, the FWC may dismiss an application if:

(a) the application is not made in accordance with this Act; or

(b) the application is frivolous or vexatious; or

(c) the application has no reasonable prospects of success.

Note: For another power of the FWC to dismiss an application for a remedy for unfair dismissal made under Division 5 of Part 3‑2, see section 399A.

(2) Despite paragraphs (1)(b) and (c), the FWC must not dismiss an application under section 365, 536LU or 773, or an application under section 527F that does not consist solely of an application for a stop sexual harassment order, on the ground that the application:

• [12] The test for dismissal of an application pursuant to s 587(1)(c) of the Act is not whether the application will succeed, but whether it has no reasonable prospect of doing so[2]. A conclusion that an application has no reasonable prospect of success should only be reached with "extreme caution", and in cases, "for example, where an application is manifestly untenable or is groundless or is so lacking in merit or substance as to not be reasonably arguable" (albeit this is not an exhaustive description)[3]. The phrase "no reasonable prospect of success" should be given full expression and should not be limited by expressions such as "clearly", "manifestly", "obviously", "frivolous", "untenable", "groundless" or "faulty"[4]. The answer to the question as to whether an application has no reasonable prospect of success may differ depending on the time the question is asked[5]. In Alan Geoffrey Bond v Carbridge Pty Ltd T/A Carbridge (Carbridge) [6] Easton DP summarised some of the principles in relation to the s 587(1)(c) power. The Deputy President's decision is often referred to by the Commission in matters of this kind because it is a useful summary of these principles taking into account the relevant authorities. The Deputy President's summary is as follows (citations omitted)[7]:

"(a) section 587 allows the Commission to dismiss an application on the Commission's own initiative or on application by a party (per s.587(3))

(b) the purpose of s.587(1)(c) is to enable the Commission to deal with matters that should not be litigated because there is no reasonable prospect of an outcome other than the dismissal of the application;

(c) section 587 is a provision that is available to use at the early stages of a proceeding before a full hearing is conducted;

(d) it could not have been the intention of the Parliament in introducing s.587 to require the Commission to engage in lengthy and elaborate hearings on an interlocutory basis for the purpose of determining whether or not a proceeding has reasonable prospects of success;

(e) as a general proposition it is inappropriate that the resources of the Commission and the parties are unnecessarily diverted towards protracted proceedings if an application has no reasonable prospects of success;

(f) the 'no reasonable prospects of success' test in s.587(1)(c) sets a lower bar than the common law test for obtaining summary judgement. It is not necessary to establish that an application is hopeless or bound to fail (per General Steel principles) in order to establish that an application has no reasonable prospects of success;

(g) the exercise of power under s.587 should be used with caution, particularly if the matter involves complex questions of fact or law; and

(h) an application has reasonable prospects of success if there are live facts in issue that could affect the outcome of the proceedings."

• [13] The Deputy President also said power is subject to the Commission acting judiciously and affording applicants procedural fairness, and[8]:

"(a) an applicant must be able to put his or her case to the decision-maker for consideration on all matters material to the making of the decision.

(b) where there are specific aspects of an applicant's application that the Commission considers may be important to the decision and may be open to doubt, the Commission must at least ask the applicant to expand upon those aspects of the application.

(c) when dealing with unrepresented parties it may be appropriate in certain circumstances for the Commission to direct the parties' attention to the relevant terms of the legislation and to invite submissions on the various statutory criteria

(d) the expression procedural fairness conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case."

"(a) the Commission must also be cautious in dismissing an application under s.587 based on the strengths or weaknesses of the originating document(s). It is regularly said that the Commission is not a court of pleading. Pleadings define the issues at trial, give notice to the other parties of the case they have to meet, affect the admissibility of evidence (meaning in their evidence parties cannot stray from their pleaded case) and so on. By contrast the Commission must exercise its powers in a manner that is "quick, informal and avoids unnecessary technicalities" (per s.577(1)(b)). Many applicants prepare their own originating documents without the assistance or advice of lawyers or other representatives. In this context originating documents, such as the Form F2 Application for Unfair Dismissal, must be considered with a keen eye (but not a blind eye) to the substance of the application rather than the form of the documentation; and

(b) section 587 should also be understood in conjunction with the cost provisions in s.611 and s.400A. These provisions read together indicate that Parliament intended to discourage the making of and the continuation of applications that are made vexatiously or without reasonable cause, or that have no reasonable prospect of success."

• [15] The power to dismiss proceedings is discretionary[10] and will often involve an exercise in balancing the prejudice to a party who is being caused to meet litigation that is without reasonable prospects of success, or is frivolous or vexatious or not made in accordance with the Act, against the right of a person to assert their legal rights[11]. In Carole Greenan v David Vilebnsky & Ors (Greenan)[12] a Full Bench of the Commission gave extensive consideration to some of the principles relevant to the question as to whether an application for stop bullying orders should be dismissed because the application has no reasonable prospect of success, echoing much of what had been said in decisions of the Commission previously, such as Carbridge. While the context of the circumstances being dealt with by the Full Bench were different than those before me - the case involved an application for dismissal arising from the end of the worker's employment - several of the observations of the Full Bench remain instructive, including the following:

(a) While the Commission has a wide discretion in terms of matters that may be included in a stop bullying order, the order must be directed at preventing identified bullying conduct from continuing.

(b) A decision to exercise discretion to dismiss an application for an order to stop bullying on the basis it has no reasonable prospect of success is based on the Commission finding that it has no jurisdiction to make an order to stop bullying at that time because there is no present risk that bullying will continue, and that those circumstances will not change in the foreseeable future.

(c) In deciding whether to dismiss an application for stop bullying orders pursuant to s 587(1)(c), issues relevant to the exercise of the discretion may include whether an order can have efficacy in a practical sense,

(d) A decision to dismiss the application under s. 587(1)(c), on the grounds that it has no reasonable prospects of success, is not based on any finding about the merits of the application. Rather, the decision is based on weighing the facts and circumstances existing at that time, including that the Commission cannot be satisfied that there is a risk that the applicant will continue to be bullied at work by the individual or group.

• [16] The former customer also claims Ms Glumac's application is frivolous and vexatious. The test in relation to s 587(2)(b), which deals with applications said to be frivolous or vexatious, is likely to be more stringent than in relation to s 587(2)(c), generally requiring the application to be "of such little merit or pursued for such ulterior purposes or motives as would amount to an abuse of process"[13]. The approach taken Barwick CJ in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner of Railways (NSW)[14], requiring "manifest fault", is likely to apply (where these principles are not as applicable to the questions posed by s 587(2)(c)).

[17] For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied Ms Glumac's application has no reasonable prospect of success, and I intend to dismiss her application on this basis. It is therefore unnecessary for me to determine whether the application is frivolous or vexatious and should be dismissed on that ground and my reasons below focus on the question of whether the application has a reasonable prospect of success.

[18] The principles used by the Commission when considering whether an application has a reasonable prospect of success necessitates consideration of several elements of the case Ms Glumac has brought, as is set out below.

The Commission's jurisdiction to make orders to stop bullying at work

• [19] A "worker" who reasonably believes that they have been bullied at work may apply to the Commission for an order to stop bullying[15]. A worker is bullied at work if, while they are at work, in a constitutionally covered business, an individual or a group of individuals repeatedly behaves unreasonably towards the worker, or a group of workers of which the worker is a member, and that behaviour creates a risk to health and safety[16]. However, the concept does not apply to "reasonable management action carried out in a reasonable manner"[17].
• [20] The Commission may make orders to stop bullying if it is satisfied that (a) the worker has been bullied at work by an individual or a group of individuals, and (b) there is a risk that the worker will continue to be bullied at work by the individual or group[18]. The application must also have been made "in accordance with s 789FC" of the Act, importing the requirement that the worker "reasonably believes" that they have been bullied at work[19]. The Commission may make any order it considers appropriate (other than an order requiring payment of a pecuniary amount) to prevent the worker from being bullied at work by the individual or group[20]. The Act provides:

(2) In considering the terms of an order, the FWC must take into account:

(a) if the FWC is aware of any final or interim outcomes arising out of an investigation into the matter that is being, or has been, undertaken by another person or body - those outcomes; and

(b) if the FWC is aware of any procedure available to the worker to resolve grievances or disputes - that procedure; and

(c) if the FWC is aware of any final or interim outcomes arising out of any procedure available to the worker to resolve grievances or disputes - those outcomes; and

• [21] A Full Bench of the Commission recently made the following observations about the Commission's stop bullying jurisdiction[21]:

"(a) Both limbs of s 789FF(1) must be met for the Commission to consider the exercise of the discretion to make an order to stop bullying. If the second limb of s 789FF(1)(b) (the existence of future risk of relevant bullying) is not and will not be met, then an application for an order to stop bullying cannot succeed.

(b) An order under s 789FF operates prospectively and is directed at preventing the applicant worker from being bullied at work. The Commission is specifically precluded from making an order requiring the payment of a pecuniary amount, hence it cannot make an order requiring a respondent to pay an amount of compensation to an applicant. The legislative scheme is not directed at punishing past bullying behaviour or compensating the victims of such behaviour. It is directed at stopping future bullying behaviour.

(c) The Commission is given wide powers to make such preventative orders as it considers appropriate. The exercise of those powers must be informed by, but are not necessarily limited to, the workplace bullying found to have occurred. Orders must be directed towards the prevention of the applicant worker being bullied at work in the future by the individual or group of individuals concerned, be based upon appropriate findings, and have regard to the considerations established by s 789FF(2) of the Act.

(d) Section 789FF does not limit the persons against whom orders can be made. The Commission may at least make orders directed to the behaviour of individuals found to have engaged in workplace bullying as well as their respective employer(s)/principal(s).

(e) The assessment under s 789FF(1)(b)(ii) is based on a consideration as to whether there is a present risk that relevant bullying will continue at the time the application is being considered by the Commission and, if there is not, whether the Commission is satisfied that those circumstances will not change in the foreseeable future.

(f) The Commission must be satisfied that there is a real (and not simply conceptual or hypothetical) risk."

• [22] Part 6-4B of the Act is remedial or beneficial legislation and thus it should be construed in manner not to deprive workers of the protection it is intended to have[22]. However, both limbs of s 789FF(1) are plainly directed at bullying occurring "at work" - words of "limitation intended to confine the operation of the substantive provisions"[23]. Being "at work" is not limited to the confines of the physical workplace and a worker will be "at work" any time they perform work, regardless of their location or time of day[24] including, for example, engagement in some other activity which is authorised or permitted by their employer, or in the case of a contractor their principal (such as being on a meal break or accessing social media while performing work)[25]. However, conduct is not "at work" simply because it has a substantial connection to work[26].
• [23] The conduct said to be bullying at work must be "unreasonable". Unreasonable behaviour is that which a reasonable person, having regard to the circumstances may consider to be unreasonable[27] - conduct which lacks "an evident and intelligible justification"[28]. It is not necessary, to be "unreasonable", that the conduct is the best or preferable course of action[29].

[24] I have not heard evidence in this matter, having been urged by both parties to deal with it on the papers. In the circumstances, it is appropriate to provide only a brief summary of the apparent background to the application.

[25] The former customer's two children attended the Herd between 19 April 2025 and 26 November 2025. According to the application, Ms Anna Glumac spoke to the former customer on 10 September 2025 after becoming aware (or having the belief) that she had left her baby unattended in her car. The application says that following this, the former customer sent a series of emails to the Herd which were accusatory in tone and contained allegations of wrongdoing, legal threats and demands. The application says the emails increasingly copied in a wider audience, including messages visible to all Herd staff and complaints and letters copied to or directed to external bodies, such as the Department of Education, child protection authorities and Work Safe. The application says these "often" contained allegations of serious misconduct against Ms Glumac and her sister, Ms Anna Glumac.

[26] The application says that on 9 October 2025 "after a psychosocial risk assessment", "we issued occupational health and safety directions" restricting the former customer's attendance at the premises, while allowing her children to continue to attend via a third party, and requiring all communication be through its nominated mailbox. The application says following this, the former customer continued to send accusatory emails. The application says from late October 2025 the former customer's emails included repeated allegations of defamation and privacy breaches.

[27] The application was accompanied by a bundle of documents which have not been scrutinised by the evidentiary process. I have perused that bundle of documents. Some of the correspondence referred to in the application is contained within the bundle of documents. What is evident is that after the conversation on 10 September 2025 between the former customer and Ms Anna Gluman, relations between the parties deteriorated rapidly and both the former customer and the Herd, through Ms Anna and Ms Fiona Glumac, began making allegations and counter allegations against each other in relation to inappropriate conduct and behaviour. This escalation appears to begin with expressions of upset, which develop into allegations of bullying, which then increased to more formal threats made such as relating to, for example, the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004, or defamation.

[28] The application says that on 26 November 2025 the former customer withdrew her children from care with immediate effect, "alleging that the Herd had made a "vexatious" child protection report". A submission made by the former customer says that on 25 November 2025 the Herd made a child protection report concerning them. It said the report comprised approximately twenty allegations and only one of the allegations had ever been raised with the former customer prior to the report having been made. The submission made by the former customer says that on 8 December 2025 the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing confirmed that the report had been investigated, that the concerns were found not to be evidenced and that Child Protection would not continue to be involved.

[29] The application says that following the named person's withdrawal of her children from the centre, she continued to send further emails to "us" (presumably Ms Glumac and her sister) and their solicitors making allegations, she continued to "circulate correspondence copying external agencies and regulators" and that she made further demands and ultimatums, including threats to commence proceedings and to seek significant damages. This alleged conduct is examined in more detail below.

[30] The application says on 3 December 2025 the Herd revoked the former customer's license to attend the premises. The communication advising the former customer of this asks that future correspondence be directed to the Herd's solicitors (Mr Druiven). It says after this the former customer continued to send threatening or demanding communications.

[31] The application says Ms Glumac is "concerned" about "suspected online disparagement and anonymous complaints (mentioned further below).

[32] It also says that "multiple members of the public" have told Ms Glumac that the former customer has made concerning comments about her and her sister.

[33] The Form F73 Response filed by the Herd says it agrees with Ms Glumac's account of the conduct she says she has been subjected to set out in the application.

[34] In summary, the former customer says Ms Glumac's application should be dismissed on the basis of matters summarised as follows.

[35] The former customer submits that s 789FF(1)(a)(ii) of the Act requires that there be a risk the worker will continue to be bullied at work, and, even accepting Ms Glumac's allegations at their highest, this "jurisdictional threshold" cannot be met because the former customer is not and has never been a worker of the Herd, and their children ceased attending the service on 26 November 2025, and the application was filed after the relationship had ended, and there is no workplace interaction capable of repetition. It is submitted the conduct alleged consists predominantly of correspondence by a former customer, "complaints and communications made in a consumer context" and engagement with regulators and third parties.

[36] It is also submitted that regulatory complaints cannot constitute bullying at work and that characterising "regulatory reporting as bullying would improperly chill lawful conduct and undermine statutory oversight mechanisms". It is further submitted that "lawful legal correspondence is not bullying", including in relation to pre-litigation correspondence.

[37] It is also submitted that since 26 November 2025 the former customer has never entered, attempted to enter, sought access to or threatened to enter the Herd's premises, and there has been no conduct capable of giving rise to any future interaction "at work". It is said that the proposition the former customer might attend the premises is "objectively untenable" including because they suffer from PTSD which has been exacerbated by interactions with Ms Glumac and these proceedings.

[38] It is also submitted that no order of any utility or lawful effect can be made. It is asserted that the stop bullying jurisdiction is protective and prospective, or "preventative" and not a mechanism to restrain lawful complaints, regulatory engagement, legal action or "a tool to silence former customers or private citizens". It is submitted that in the circumstances, no order could regulate the former customer's conduct "at work", could prevent future bullying or operate consistently with Part 6-4B of the Act. It is submitted that the relief sought by the application is outside of the Commission's statutory powers, such as in respect to orders sought that the former customer be compelled to retain a solicitor, be restrained from online "disparagement" and be prohibited from entering the premises.

[39] It is submitted the continuation of the proceeding is oppressive and "disproportionate".

[40] Ms Glumac's submissions address five issues. First, Ms Glumac submits she is a "worker" in a constitutionally covered business, carrying out work for a person conducting a business or undertaking (being the Herd). It submits the Commission has treated Directors and managerial officeholders as "workers" in analogous circumstances.

[41] Secondly, Ms Glumac submits there is no requirement that a "Respondent" to an application pursuant to s 789FC of the Act be a worker, whether in the Applicant's same workplace or elsewhere and that a former customer plainly falls within the class of individuals whose conduct may be the subject of orders under s 789FF of the Act.

[42] Thirdly, Ms Glumac addressed in her submissions the issues associated with the requirement that bullying involves a risk to health and safety "while the worker is at work". It was submitted that the requirement imposes a temporal connection - the worker must be at work when the effects of the behaviour occur, but the alleged bully need not be at work, and "work" is not confined to a physical workplace and includes performing work at any place or time being engaged in activities authorised or permitted by the employer. She submitted that "posting abusive material online is 'behaviour'", that behaviour continues for as long as the material remains online, and that it is sufficient that the worker accesses the material while at work, even if the content was posted outside work hours and off site. Ms Glumac referenced the Commission's Stop Bullying Benchbook, noting that the Benchbook states "at work" covers work-related electronic communications and social media where their impact is felt while the worker is at work.

[43] A more expansive summary of the conduct alleged by Ms Glumac to have been engaged in by the former customer is set out below, but she submitted the conduct includes "repeated emails and legal threats directed to the Employer and the Applicant", and "receipt of repeated complaints and referrals to regulators concerning the Employer and the Applicant". She submits that she deals with this conduct in the course of her work as director and manager including

"(1) reading and responding to the Respondent's correspondence and threats

(2) considering, managing and responding to legal risk presented by the Respondent in her correspondence;

(3) managing regulatory investigations initiated by the Respondent's complaints; and

(4) managing reputational and OHS consequences of the online posts"

[44] It is submitted that the alleged behaviour is directly related to and directed at Ms Glumac in her capacity as a worker at the Herd and in performing her duties as a director, the behaviour impacts her at work, in the performance of her duties. It is submitted that the behaviour is not managed outside of her work duties, in a personal capacity.

[45] It is submitted that "at this interlocutory stage, it cannot be said that the "at work" element is not reasonably arguable".

[46] Fourthly, Ms Glumac addresses the requirement that there be a risk a person seeking orders to stop bullying will continue to be bullied at work. Ms Glumac noted that "risk" in this context requires a "real, not remote or purely theoretical, possibility of future bullying, but does not require proof that further bullying is inevitable or more probable than not".

[47] Ms Glumac concedes that there are cases where the "risk requirement" has not been satisfied because the worker has left employment and there is no realistic prospect of future interaction. However, Ms Glumac submits that in this matter, she continues to work for the Herd, and the former customer's conduct has continued after she ceased to be a customer and continues in the form of legal threats, regulatory complaints and online publications, and there is no evidence the "campaign" has ceased or is likely to cease absent intervention.

[48] The behaviour alleged by Ms Glumac to have been engaged in by the former customer since they removed their children from the centre, said to be "continuing" is described by her as follows, using the phrase "for example" (note: Ms Glumac refers to the former customer as "the Respondent"):

(a) The Respondent has sent extensive legal and regulatory demands to the Employer and Applicant. For ease, that correspondence is outlined in detail at Attachment 1

(b) Separately, the Respondent is alleged to have published (or caused to be published) hostile online material about the Applicant and the Employer, including in a public or semi-public Facebook group directed to parents on the Mornington Peninsula, in which childcare centres in the area are discussed (the "Mornington Peninsula Mums" group).

(c) In that group, posts made by an "anonymous member" included statements the effect that:

(i) the author had withdrawn their children from the Employer's service because the directors were "bullies";

(ii) the author had withdrawn their children due to "serious concerns" about the conduct of the directors and would not recommend the service; and

(iii) the service had made unsubstantiated child protection reports about the author's family, and the withdrawal occurred due to concerns about the directors' behaviour.

(d) The Applicant relies on those publications as further examples of the Respondent's alleged continuing conduct (and its reputational and psychosocial impact) which the Applicant is required to manage in the course of her work as director and manager, including while the Applicant is at work."

[49] Ms Glumac submits that as Director, she receives or is provided all of these communications and monitors social media posts and is responsible for managing the legal, reputational risks associated with the communications and conduct alleged to have been engaged in by the former customer.

[50] Ms Glumac submits the conduct poses health and safety risks at work, including psychosocial stress for her.

[51] Ms Glumac submits that while some of the former customer's communications are "clouded under a without prejudice label" it remains open to the Commission to consider them for the purposes of this matter, taking into account the Commission is not bound by the rules of evidence.

[52] Fifthly, Ms Glumac opposes the dismissal application, submitting that her application is "neither frivolous, vexatious or without reasonable prospects of success". She asserts that "no reasonable prospect of success" is a stringent test, that summary dismissal powers should be exercised cautiously and only where it is clear that there is no real prospect of success even if the facts alleged are proved. She again refers to the Commission's Stop Bullying Benchbook, which says that the power in s 587 of the Act should be used "sparingly in this jurisdiction because whether conduct is unreasonable, creates a risk to health and safety, and is likely to continue are questions that usually require evidence".

[53] Ms Glumac also submits the application concerns serious bullying and WHS issues which have already been the subject of an internal investigation that substantiated allegations of bullying and harassment and the conduct has continued and escalated despite the end of the customer relationship. She submits the Herd has made attempts to investigate and manage the conduct alleged of the former customer, referring to "the OHS measures and directions the Applicant's employer has already attempted to implement to control the conduct" and "the Applicant's employer's investigation into the Respondent's conduct which:

(a) was scoped to investigate allegations of bullying conduct by the Respondent;

(b) defined bullying consistent with the definition under s 789FD of the FW Act;

(c) found the allegations that the Respondent had engaged in bullying to be substantiated.

(3) the ongoing regulatory and reputational consequences of the Respondent's conduct:

[54] In this regard, it should be noted that there is not a great deal of material before me as to the "internal investigation" apparently conducted by the Herd into allegations made by Ms Glumac (or others) referred to "bullying" with respect to the former customer. It appears from these submissions however that some kind of internal "investigation" occurred.

Summary of the material filed by Ms Glumac in response to the dismissal application - said to indicate that bullying is continuing

[55] Ms Glumac's submissions were accompanied by a bundle of documents she referred to as the "Outline of Relevant Conduct" which she appears to submit shows there is a risk that she will continue to be bullied at work. Taking into account her submissions, extracted above, as to the conduct said to ground the contention that she faces a risk that the bullying at work will continue, it is this conduct which must be examined to determine that question.

• [56] The first document is an email dated 27 November 2025 sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven[30]. It states, in summary, that she planned to lodge legal proceedings against the solicitor's client "for defamation".
• [57] The second document is an email dated 3 December 2025 sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven [31]. It also copies in several Herd "admin" mailboxes, two offices of a Victorian Government Department, and the Quality Assessment and Regulation Authority. The letter demands that the solicitor's "clients" immediately cease and desist from making or publishing further defamatory statements, retract previous statements, provide written confirmation of the legal basis for the restrictions placed on the former customer's presence near the service, arrange a supervised opportunity for the former customer's children to say goodbye to their educators and peers and to preserve all relevant material for legal proceedings. The letter asserts that the solicitor's "clients" have published multiple defamatory allegations concerning the former customer's conduct and character.
• [58] The third document is an email dated 4 December 2025 sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven[32]. It refers to the former customer having "initiated steps to commence defamation proceedings" and offers to settle those proceedings on terms.
• [59] The fourth document is an email dated 6 December 2025 sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven[33]. It seeks a response to previous correspondence.
• [60] The fifth document is an email dated 10 December 2025 sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven[34]. It asserts that "Child Protection" has closed its assessment in relation to the notification made by Mr Driuven's clients and says that should child protection confirm the notification was malicious, such a finding would be relied upon in current or future proceedings.
• [61] The sixth document is an email dated 10 December 2025 sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven forwarding a copy of correspondence she sent to a person within the Victorian Department of Families, Fairness and Housing[35]. It asks the Department that if a determination was made that the complaint made against the former customer was malicious, that it be recorded in the closure letter. It said that the former customer was obtaining legal advice regarding potential legal remedies.
• [62] The seventh document is an email dated 10 December 2025 sent by the former customer to "the Herd Admin", addressed to "Anna and Fiona"[36]. It asks what checks are made in relation to staff and residents who have access to the children who attended the Herd and whether "grandfriends who have children sit on their laps" are vetted.
• [63] The eighth document is an email dated 11 December 2025 sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven attaching a copy of the letter from "child protection" said to have closed the notification made against the former customer by Mr Druiven's "clients"[37].
• [64] The ninth document is an email dated 18 December 2025 sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven[38]. It again indicates legal proceedings will be commenced.
• [65] The tenth document is an email sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven dated 18 December 2025[39]. It responds to correspondence sent by Mr Druiven to the former customer advising that his clients deny liability for the allegations of defamation.
• [66] The eleventh document is an email sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven dated 6 January 2026 regarding the stop bullying application filed by Ms Glumac in the Commission[40].
• [67] The twelfth document is an email dated 6 January 2026 sent by the former customer's husband to two Herd email inboxes ("info" and "admin") seeking that the Herd, its directors, staff and representatives immediately cease all direct and indirect contact with the former customer[41]. It expressed "deep disappointment" in Ms Glumac's conduct, asserting it lacked "professional judgment" and rejected assertions made in her application for stop bullying orders.
• [68] The thirteenth document is an email dated 12 January 2026 from the former customer to Mr Druiven[42]. It was said to serve "as formal notice that your client is to immediately cease all contact with or about myself and with any member of my family".
• [69] The fourteenth document appears to be a screen shot of a social media post concerning a forum called "Mornington Peninsula Mums"[43]. A post made by "anonymous member 509" in respect to a post apparently dated 2 August 2024 says "the Herd isn't all it is crack up for people the [sic] believe. I've recently pulled my children out of their over concerns regarding the Directors behaviour".
• [70] The fifteenth document is another screen shot concerning the Mornington Peninsula Mums forum[44]. An "anonymous member 636" says that the "Herd have no review systems set up - very interesting. Our family was reported to child protection which was not substantiated and rocked out [sic] family".
• [71] The sixteenth document is a similar screen shot concerning the Mornington Peninsula Mums forum in which "anonymous member 509" says "I do not recommend - I had false allegations made by the Herd about neglect of our children"[45].
• [72] The seventeenth document is another similar screenshot, in which "anonymous member 269" says in relation to a post concerning the Herd, "Do not recommend. I've pulled my children out of there. The Directors are bullies if parents raise concerns."[46].
• [73] The eighteenth document is another similar screenshot in which "anonymous member 670 says "I withdrew my children from the Herd due to serious concerns about the Directors conduct. Would not recommend."[47].
• [74] The nineteenth document is a similar screenshot in which "anonymous member 269" says "I do not recommend. Our family had an unsubstantiated child protection made about our family that had a significant impact on our family."[48].

[75] My summary of the correspondence above omits to some degree the challenging nature of some of the correspondence - some of the correspondence is somewhat threatening (largely in the context of legal demands) and often uses highly indignant language.

• [76] Based on the material before me at this stage of the proceeding, while Ms Glumac is described as a "Director" of the Herd, it seems to be the case she performs work at the workplace. She claims therefore to be a "worker" within the meaning of s 789FC of the Act, which provides that for the purposes of that part of the Act, a "worker" has the same meaning as in the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act) but does not include a member of the Defence Force. The WHS Act defines "worker" broadly, encompassing persons carrying work in any capacity for a person conducting a business or undertaking, beyond simply a person in employment. The "essential question" as to whether a person is a "worker" for the purposes of s 789FC of the Act is whether they are a person who carries work in any capacity for the employer[49]. The strong suggestion in the material before me is that Ms Glumac does indeed do this: attends the work premises; engages with staff and customers; performs various managerial duties and perhaps much more. I am mindful, in the context of the particular circumstances before me, of Easton DP's comments in Liu v Owners Corporation of SP75626[50], when considering an application brought by a "business owner": that it "is clear that the policy or purpose of the stop-bullying jurisdiction is not to protect business owners from unreasonable commercial conduct towards their business"[51]. I respectfully agree with this view. It is not clear to me whether Ms Glumac is a "business owner" but she is a "Director", and the former customer describes in her submissions the circumstances of this matter as involving "complaints and communications made in a consumer context". However, taking a cautious approach, it appears to me, based on the material before the Commission at this time, that Ms Glumac is likely a "worker" for the purposes of this Part of the Act.

Can an application for Stop Bullying Orders be directed against conduct said to have been engaged in by a person who is not another worker?

• [77] The individual or group subjecting a worker to conduct that is bullying, and against whom orders to stop bullying may be directed, need not necessarily be other workers employed by the business or undertaking, or other workers at all, and may be, for example customers of the business in which the worker works[52].

[78] Having said this, if the person who engaged in conduct said to be "bullying" is not a person who works with the worker, this will inevitably impact on the question as to whether the conduct can be said to be bullying, at work.

Does Ms Glumac have a reasonable belief she has been bullied at work?

• [79] The worker's belief that they have bullied at work must be supported by some rational basis and not be irrational or absurd[53]. As I will expand upon, Ms Glumac's case that she has been bullied at work is, on the basis of the material before, me, more compelling in respect of conduct she says occurred before the former customer ceased her relationship with the Herd, than as regards to conduct said to have occurred afterwards. On the basis of the conduct said to have occurred before the former customer ceased her relationship with the Herd, I am not satisfied it is manifestly untenable that Ms Glumac has a reasonable belief she has been bullied at work.

[80] The Commission will have no jurisdiction in this matter to grant Ms Glumac the relief she seeks if she was not bullied at work - the first "limb" of s 789FF(1)(b) of the Act.

[81] In dealing with the dismissal application, it is not necessary for me to determine the question as to whether Ms Glumac was bullied at work to finality - rather I must consider whether the contention is so lacking in merit or substance as to not be reasonably arguable in accordance with the principles set out above. The bulk of the material filed by Ms Glumac in response to the dismissal application is largely focused on conduct engaged in by the former customer after her formal connection with the workplace ended on 26 November 2025. Some material is before me as to the exchanges said to have occurred between Ms Glumac and the former customer before 26 November 2025 (contained within the bundle of documents attached to the application). I suspect this provides only part of the picture.

[82] In the application, Ms Glumac complains in particular about correspondence sent to a central administrative email address she and her sister (and co-Director) monitored. This correspondence was said by Ms Glumac to be "increasingly hostile and personal" and contained various allegations and legal threats. It is however described as being directed to "us" which I take to be a reference to Ms Glumac and her sister together, and "increasingly copied in a wider audience" involving other staff.

[83] It therefore appears that the question as to whether Ms Glumac was bullied at work revolves around whether emails which are hostile and personal, and contain challenging allegations and legal threats, and are directed to a worker (at least in part), and which are read by the worker in the course of them performing work (such as monitoring an email inbox) can constitute repeated unreasonable behaviour creating a risk to health and safety.

[84] It is conceivable that if a worker is required, as part of their duties, to manage an email inbox to which messages are being sent that are personally challenging, distressing or stressful, and are read by the worker at work, such conduct could amount to "bullying". Even the performance of these duties away from the workplace (for example, at home), or outside of work hours could, depending on the context, fall within the definition of bullying set out in the Act.

[85] I also consider there is no question that a repeated exposure to hostile and personal communication can create a risk to health and safety.

[86] Out of an abundance of caution, I also consider it appropriate to assume that in her substantive case, Ms Glumac is also likely to rely on direct interactions which she may assert occurred between her and the former customer, such as phone calls or face-to-face contact. I assume she may also say such conduct constituted bullying or coloured other conduct (such as the emails) causing it to rise to the level of bullying. Little is before me in this regard however, in circumstances where I must exercise extreme caution, I will take this into account.

[87] If all that Ms Glumac was required to do to activate the jurisdiction of the Commission in this matter was establish she has been bullied at work, I would not consider it appropriate to exercise my discretion at this stage, to dismiss her application for want of a reasonable prospect of success. I do not consider I have the full evidentiary picture and with reference to the conduct I have identified above, it not manifestly untenable that Ms Glumac, who I consider is a worker, might establish she was subjected to conduct at work by the former customer which was repeated and unreasonable and created a risk to her health and safety. I will stress that I do not consider I can find this to be the case at this stage - rather that I consider the case may be reasonably arguable.

Whether there is a risk Ms Glumac will continue to be bullied at work by the individual or group.

[88] However, it is also necessary for Ms Glumac to show there is a risk that she will continue to be bullied at work by the former customer to activate the jurisdiction of the Commission in this application. This is in circumstances where the former customer ceased her formal relationship the Herd on 26 November 2025.

[89] Above I have summarised the conduct apparently relied upon by Ms Glumac to demonstrate that there is a risk she will continue to be bullied at work by the former customer. As can be seen from the summary:

(a) Ten of the pieces of correspondence relied upon are sent by the former customer to Ms Glumac's solicitor, not to Ms Glumac herself.

(b) One of the pieces of correspondence is addressed to Ms Glumac's solicitor but also "copied" to the Herd admin inbox, which as I have mentioned, is said to be monitored by Ms Glumac and her sister (this correspondence was also sent to several regulatory authorities).

(c) One of the pieces of correspondence is sent to the Herd admin box, addressed to "Anna and Fiona" (Ms Glumac and her sister). This email was sent by the former customer on 10 December 2025.

(d) A further piece of correspondence is sent to Ms Glumac (and her sister) but not by the former customer - by her husband. This email was sent on 6 January 2026.

(e) The remainder of the material relied upon are six social media posts made by an anonymous person.

[90] The major tranche of conduct relied upon by Ms Glumac as to why there is a risk she will continue to be bullied at work by the former customer are some ten emails sent by the former customer to Mr Druiven, her lawyer. It may be that Ms Glumac's solicitor considers it necessary for her to read the letters he has received from the former customer, and thus she is exposed to them. She may therefore have read them, even though they were not sent to her, and this may be stressful for her, both because of their existence and their content.

[91] However, several problems arise if such conduct can be said to be bullying. First, a significant question exists as to whether reading such correspondence can be said to involve the worker being "at work". On one view, an owner or Director or other senior person within an enterprise might, as part of their duties, be required to be the liaison with an external solicitor (as Ms Glumac says she is), and in doing so be required to read and act upon such material, and thus be said to be "at work" when they do. On another view, depending on the circumstances, engaging with such material might be more properly to be said to be engaging with the litigation, not "the work" performed by the business or undertaking. For example, some of the correspondence complained of was sent by the former customer to Ms Glumac's solicitor in answer to the application made for orders to stop bullying. It is unlikely that correspondence sent to the opposing lawyer on the record, by a recipient to litigation in response to the litigation itself, can ordinarily be said to be conduct in the course of "work".

[92] Secondly, a significant question arises as to whether such conduct can be said to be "unreasonable". A person is entitled to assert their legal rights. In doing so they will often describe the basis upon which they assert their rights - which may involve setting out the allegations or accusations they rely upon. Many legal communications will involve allegations that are challenging to receive and may cause the recipient to take offence or umbrage.

[93] It is not entirely inconceivable such conduct could be said to be unreasonable, but it seems to me a high bar must be met before correspondence in which a person asserts their legal rights, by way of demand or threat, can constitute unreasonable behaviour creating a risk to health and safety in the context of Part 6-4B of the Act. The bar must be even higher when the assertions are not made directly to the worker but transmitted through their lawyer. If there are circumstances where it could be said a worker is "bullied at work" by legal threats made to their solicitor, it is more likely to be when the person directing the threats retains a formal connection with the workplace (such as a co-worker). Even then, in part because the conduct is indirect, those circumstances will be unusual. In any event, this is not that case here - the conduct I am presently examining did not emanate from a person with any ongoing connection to Ms Glumac's workplace.

[94] I do not consider there is any reasonable prospect that the correspondence sent by the former customer to Ms Glumac's solicitor could allow the Commission to be satisfied there is a risk she will continue to be bullied at work. I consider the contention that such conduct can constitute bullying at work to be manifestly untenable. I do not consider that in these circumstances such correspondence, sent to the solicitor (not to Ms Glumac) could, if there is a risk it is to continue, constitute bullying. In so far as Ms Glumac intends to rely on this conduct to ground her contention that there is a risk she will continue to be bullied at work, I do not consider such a case has a reasonable prospect of success.

The correspondence copied to the Herd admin inbox

[95] The email sent on 3 December 2025 by the former customer was addressed to Mr Druiven, Ms Glumac's solicitor, but then also copied to the Herd inbox and several regulatory authorities. It has been said by Ms Glumac that she and her sister monitor that email inbox and it may therefore be that when the email was sent on 3 December 2025, Ms Glumac read it.

[96] The email is cast in reasonably formal terms: it says it "constitutes a formal Letter of Demand" asking that Mr Druiven's clients "cease and desist" making further defamatory statements about the former customer and her family, and retract such statements, and takes issue with restrictions apparently placed on the former customer's presence near the service, and allow for a supervised opportunity for their children to say goodbye to their educators and peers. The email goes on to set out the basis of threats made in relation to defamation, "misrepresentation of legal authority" and "retaliatory conduct".

[97] I do not consider there is a reasonable prospect that this conduct, on its own, could allow the Commission to be satisfied that there is a risk Ms Glumac will continue to be bullied at work. The correspondence is similar to that discussed above - correspondence of a largely legal (albeit threatening) nature directed to Ms Glumac's solicitors. Its significance in relation to Ms Glumac's application for stop bullying orders may by slightly more pronounced, because it was copied to the Herd inbox (as opposed to being sent exclusively to Ms Druiven, as most of the other correspondence was), but I note some nine weeks has passed since any such correspondence was sent by the former customer to the Herd inbox.

[98] If anything, this correspondence serves to remind that this is one of only two occasions, on the material before me, where the former customer is said to have had direct contact with Ms Glumac (where "direct" is perhaps overstating things) since they discontinued their formal association with the Herd. Even if it could be said such conduct could amount to "bullying at work" (which I doubt) it seems to me it is not reasonably foreseeable that such conduct - copying the Herd email inbox into correspondence with Mr Druiven - is likely to continue, it having not happened now for over two months.

The correspondence sent by the former customer to the Herd email box addressed to "Anna and Fiona"

[99] The email sent by the former customer to the Herd Admin email inbox, addressed "Hi Anna and Fiona" is the only correspondence before me said to have occurred after the former customer ceased her relationship with the Herd, which is addressed to Ms Glumac herself (and, in this case, her sister). The correspondence asks, perhaps with an element sarcasm, what "checks are made on the staff and residents who have access to the children who attended the Herd", and whether they have a working with children's check.

[100] For this conduct to be found to constitute bullying, I consider much would need to be made by Ms Glumac as to the surrounding circumstances. On its own, the email is somewhat innocuous. It is only in the context of the broader circumstances that it is tenable it could be said to be unreasonable conduct causing a risk to health and safety.

[101] Presumably, in the context of the disputation with the former customer, this email was annoying, frustrating and perhaps even distressing to receive, perhaps seeming at the time as if the accusatory contact will never end. It is also unsolicited contact, in the sense that it was sent by a person who at that time had no formal relationship with the service. It is to some extent harassing behaviour. Within this context it is perhaps not untenable the conduct could amount to bullying.

[102] However, the proposition that this conduct indicates a risk that Ms Glumac will continue to be subjected to bullying is a much more remote one. In particular, the conduct occurred on 10 December 2025 and since then there is no evidence before me of any contact by the former customer directly with Ms Glumac. I do not consider it reasonably foreseeable there will be any such contact in the future. On the basis of this single piece of direct contact between the former customer and Ms Glumac, I do not consider there to be a reasonable prospect she can establish successfully there is a risk she will continue to be subjected to bullying at work.

The correspondence sent by the former customer's husband

[103] If it could be said that the correspondence sent by the former customer's husband on 6 January 2026, in which he asks that the Herd cease all direct and indirect contact with the former customer, is bullying at work, it is not bullying by the individual against whom the application is directed. The correspondence might be said to contextualise other conduct engaged in by the former customer herself, but it is not itself the basis of a case with reasonable prospects of success.

[104] The final tranche of material Ms Glumac relies upon to contend that there is a risk she will continue to be bullied at work are several social media posts apparently made on a "public or semi-public" Facebook Group called "Mornington Peninsula Mums". There is no information before me as to when the posts were made and the posts are made by several anonymous profiles.

[105] Ms Glumac's application is based on the proposition that the former customer is the "individual" who has bullied her at work, and in respect of whom there is a risk she will continue to be bullied at work. It is therefore necessary for her to establish that it is this individual who is the perpetrator of the conduct complained of.

[106] It is appropriate to note at the outset that some of the social media posts contain comments which are obviously reminiscent of the dispute which has arisen between the former customer and the Herd, which are no doubt the basis upon which Ms Glumac thinks that it was the former customer who made the posts. References to "false allegations and "unsubstantiated child protection" make it likely the former customer has something to do with the posts.

• [107] The posts also mention "the Directors" of which Ms Glumac is one and are in that sense personal. There is little doubt that the use of social media to make personal or distressing comments can amount to bullying behaviour[54].

[108] The evidence has not been tested in this matter. In her submissions, Ms Glumac does not deny making the posts but takes issue with the Commission making "findings based in suspicion" and the reliance on "anonymous conduct".

[109] After having received the submissions of the parties in relation to the dismissal application, I indicated my preference was to conduct a short hearing because there appeared to be contested questions of fact relevant to the dismissal application. The authorship of the Facebook posts was one such controversy. Ms Glumac, against whose interests the dismissal application is directed, made firm submissions against this proposition, urging the Commission to determine the dismissal application on the basis of the material before it ("on the papers"). The former customer agreed, and I have adopted that course of action.

[110] Thus, on the material before me, I cannot find, on any evidentiary standard, that the social media posts - whenever they were made - could be reasonably argued to have been sent by the person Ms Glumac said bullied her, or that these anonymous posts could evidence a risk of further bullying by that individual. The posts are anonymous. The Commission would need to make an assumption, by interpreting their content, as to their authorship. Such an assumption could lead the Commission to error - it is possible they were posted by someone else (for example, someone otherwise familiar with the circumstances). I consider that in these circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect these anonymous posts could allow the Commission to be satisfied there is a risk Ms Glumac will continue to be bullied at work.

[111] While I have considered in detail the conduct Ms Glumac said indicated there is a risk she will continue to be bullied by the former customer, I have also, for completeness, considered the surrounding circumstances. In note there is no evidence before me of any attempt made by the former customer to physically attend the Herd workplace, since at least 26 November 2025, or have any proximity to it, and I note further it is said the Herd revoked the former customer's "license" to do so in early December 2025. Save for the two pieces of correspondence I have mentioned, there is also no evidence of any attempt made by the former customer to have any direct contact with Ms Glumac since she ceased her relationship with the Herd.

[112] For the reasons set out above, I do not consider Ms Glumac's application for stop bullying orders has a reasonable prospect of success because I consider it is manifestly untenable Ms Glumac can establish there is a risk she will continue to be subjected to bullying at work by a former customer of the Herd that ceased their relationship with the service two and a half months ago.

[113] I consider it appropriate to exercise my discretion to dismiss Ms Glumac's application pursuant to s 587(1)(c) of the Act. There is obvious prejudice to the former customer if the application is allowed to proceed, and it is said that this prejudice is significant. I consider this prejudice at least outweighs the prejudice to Ms Glumac in not being permitted to pursue her application for stop bullying orders from the Commission in circumstances where there is no bullying actually occurring and where, on the evidence, it is not reasonably foreseeable it may occur in the future. I consider Ms Glumac has been afforded procedural fairness in relation to the former customer's application: she has seen the basis of the application and filed submissions and other material in response. She was offered, but refused the opportunity to address the Commission further on the matter at a hearing.

[114] It is appropriate to make one further comment. The application says that if necessary, draft orders can be provided by the Ms Glumac's solicitor, but sets out the orders sought as follows:

"I therefore want the Commission to make orders restricting [the former customer] from continuing to engage in unreasonable conduct directed at me, my sister, and our employees and visitors, in connection with my work at The Herd. [The former customer's] legal threats have been repeated and unreasonable. Demands are made, some with only short deadlines to respond (e.g. 24 hours) and under pretence that she "will" commence proceedings, one specifying "tomorrow", but they never eventuate. It would be reasonable to order that her correspondence be conducted through a solicitor engaged by and acting for [the former customer], who will be bound by professional obligations. I also want the Commission to order that [the former customer] not disparage me, my sister, the business or its employees online. There is evidence of a pattern of disparaging comments online made by an anonymous individual who I suspect to be [the former customer]. I also want the Commission to order that [the former customer] be prevented from attending the premises, given she's no longer a customer of the business. My concern is escalation leading to physical altercation, whether against myself or my colleagues, if she attended. This has become a significant stressor for me personally given my experience of domestic violence."

[115] The former customer takes issue with several of the Orders sought, arguing they are beyond the power of the Commission.

• [116] The Commission's power to make orders to stop bullying at work are broad, but they are to be directed at "maintaining a working relationship" between the parties by "removing future risk of bullying"[55]. It is appropriate to consider whether an order can have "efficacy in practical sense"[56]. In considering the terms of an order the Commission must take into account several matters, including any procedure available to the worker to resolve grievances or disputes the Commission is aware of, or any matter the Commission considers relevant[57].

[117] I consider there is considerable doubt as to whether it would be appropriate or permissible for the Commission to make orders against a person who has no connection with a workplace, such as to restrain their conduct to the extent apparently sought by Ms Glumac in this matter. Some of the relief sought by Ms Glumac could clearly, if has merit, be the subject of other forms of action in which she might achieve the outcomes she apparently seeks. Even if some of the relief sought by Ms Glumac could be granted, the efficacy of orders made by the Commission in these circumstances must be in serious question. It is not necessary for me to determine those questions, but my concerns about the nature of the relief sought fortify my view that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to dismiss the application.

• [118] Ms Glumac's application is dismissed, and an Order[58] will issue to that effect with this decision.

[1] See for example Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 49; 194 CLR 247

[2] Elanor Australia Pty Ltd [2024] FWCFB 245 [29]

[3] Carole Greenan v David Vilensky and Others [2025] FWCFB 61 [53] citing Shaw v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2014] FWC 3408 [8] (Shaw)

[6] [2024] FWC 1302

[10] Carole Greenan v David Vilensky & Others [2025] FWCFB 61 [37], [68]

[11] See for example the principles discussed in Hoser v Hartcher [1999] NSWSC 527 cited in Matthew Priestly and Mika Tyson v Blackfisch Films Pty Ltd [2025] FWCFB 40 [33]

[12] [2025] FWCFB 61 [68] - [75]

[13] Brent Gorman v Australia Post [2010] FWAFB 9413 [10] - [12]

[14] [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 [129]

[15] Fair Work Act 2009 s 789FC

[16] Fair Work Act 2009 s 789FD(1)

[17] Fair Work Act 2009 s 789FD(2)

[18] Fair Work Act 2009 s 789FF(1)(a) and (b)

[19] Mac v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] FWC 774 [76]

[20] Fair Work Act 2009 s 789FF(1)

[21] Osure v National Disability Insurance Agency [2025] FWCFB 168 [37]

[22] Bowker v DP World Melbourne Ltd (T/A DP World); Maritime Union of Australia, The Victoria Branch [2014] FWCFB 9227 [24] - [25] (Bowker)

[26] Ibid [46] - [47]; See also Mac v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] FWC 774 [84]

[27] Re SB [2014] FWC 2104 [43] cited with approval in Mac v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] FWC 774 [88]

[28] Mac v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] FWC 774 [90]

[30] Applicant's Outline of Submissions Response to Jurisdictional Objections, 27 January 2026, Attachment 2

[49] Application by Trevor Yawiriki Adamson [2017] FWC 1976 [57]

[50] [2024] FWC 501

[52] Bowker v DP World Melbourne Ltd (T/A DP World); Maritime Union of Australia, The Victoria Branch [2014] FWCFB 9227 [31]

[53] Mac v Bank of Queensland Ltd [2015] FWC 774 [79]

[54] Bowker v DP World Melbourne Ltd (T/A DP World); Maritime Union of Australia, The Victoria Branch [2014] FWCFB 9227 [54]

[57] Fair Work Act 2009 s 789FF(2)

[58] PR796187

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