Application by Mr Jacob Lye [2025] FWC 3410 | Case summary

[3] The matter has been the subject of significant delays, caused to a large extent by repeated requests made by Mr Lye for variations to Directions to allow additional time to prepare, file and serve material, and various procedural requests.
[4] On 22 October 2025, the Bureau made an application under cover of Form 1, pursuant to s 587 of the Act, seeking that Mr Lye's application for stop bullying orders be dismissed (the dismissal application). It also seeks an order prohibiting the publication of the names of the named persons.
[5] The dismissal application asserts that on 22 October 2025 Mr Lye's employment was terminated and thus the Commission has no power to make stop bullying orders under s 789FF of the Act because it cannot be satisfied in the circumstances there is a risk that Mr Lye will continue to be bullied at work by an individual or group[1].
[6] On 23 October 2025 I made directions for the dismissal application to be dealt with, by directing the Respondent to file and serve an Outline of Submissions and any evidentiary material upon which it relies on 31 October 2025 and Mr Lye to do so on 7 November 2025 (referred to in error as "Thursday"). I indicated that the matter would be listed for a hearing on 14 November 2025.
[7] On the same day, Mr Lye advised chambers that he was unable to comply with the directions "until appropriate reasonable adjustments are made ...". His email referred to adjustments as outlined in his "interlocutory application currently before the Commission". This appeared to be a reference to frequent requests Mr Lye has made for various orders to be made in relation to this matter, including for example, requests he made on 22 October 2025 for "preservation orders" in relation to records said to be in the possession of the Bureau that are relevant to Mr Lye's application, or his frequent requests for "reasonable adjustments" to be made, such as the Bureau being ordered to grant Mr Lye access to its systems so he can access his work email and other material.
[8] The Bureau filed an Outline of Submissions in relation to the dismissal application on 31 October 2025.
[9] On 5 November 2025, Mr Lye wrote to my chambers, referring to the direction that he file and serve submissions in relation to the dismissal application on 7 November 2025. He said that he had filed an appeal and stay application in relation to [2025] FWC 3061, a decision in which I explained that Mr Lye's earlier application that I disqualify myself from dealing with the matter was refused. He asked that the directions issued on 23 October 2025 in relation to the dismissal application be vacated or deferred until the appeal and stay application was determined.
[10] On 6 November 2025, Mr Lye was advised, in correspondence from my chambers, that I was not inclined to agree to vacate or suspend directions in relation to the dismissal application, noting that Mr Lye's appeal and stay application would be dealt with according to the Commission's usual process and in accordance with the Act. Mr Lye responded to that email recording his "strong objection". Later on 6 November 2025 Mr Lye also filed an application under cover of Form 1 seeking issues he sought to raise pursuant to ss 577 and 578 of the Act, and pursuant to the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 be dealt with as "preliminary matters" prior to the conduct of any hearing, mention or dismissal application.
[11] On 7 November 2025, I advised parties that the application Mr Lye had made on 6 November 2025 would be dealt with in due course, if necessary, but that the directions made for the conduct of the dismissal application stood and were expected to be complied with. Mr Lye sent several emails in response, repeatedly seeking that the application he filed on 6 November 2025 be dealt with urgently, and immediately listed for directions or mention.
[12] Mr Lye did not file and serve submissions in relation to the dismissal application by the return date, 4:00PM 7 November 2025
[13] On 10 November 2025, solicitors for the Bureau wrote to my chambers and asked that, as Mr Lye had not complied with directions, the dismissal application be dealt with on the papers.
[14] At 3:14PM on 10 November 2025 my chambers alerted Mr Lye to the fact that he had failed to comply with Directions and provided him with an extension of time to do so, provided his material was filed by 4:00PM the following day, 11 November 2025. Later, on 10 November 2025, Mr Lye sent a reply, complaining about the proposition that the matter be dealt with on the papers, and seeking that the Bureau's request in this regard be rejected. He also sought that he be provided access to appropriate office space for three to four days so that he could prepare materials. He again sought that his application filed on 6 November 2025 be listed urgently and the directions be vacated.
[15] On 11 November 2025, I advised parties that Mr Lye's request for office space could not be accommodated by the Commission. I provided him with another extension of time to file material in relation to the dismissal application - this time until 4:00PM 12 November 2025. I once again repeated that Mr Lye's request that his 6 November 2025 application be prioritised was refused, and the dismissal application would be dealt with first.
[16] On 12 November 2025, Mr Lye filed submissions in relation to the dismissal application. I issued a Notice of Listing for the matter to be the subject of a hearing on 14 November 2025. Later, on 12 November 2025, Mr Lye advised chambers that he would be present at the hearing "under duress". The Bureau also confirmed its appearances for the hearing.
[17] During the morning of 13 November 2025 Mr Lye appeared before DP Coleman in relation to his application that the decision in [2025] FWC 3061 be stayed. The application was refused[2]. Later, on 13 November 2025, Mr Lye contacted my chambers and advised that he was experiencing a significant deterioration in his mental health arising from the ongoing proceedings and was not fit to safely participate in a hearing. He said he would provide a medical certificate later that day and asked that the hearing listed for 14 November 2025 be vacated or adjourned.
[18] I asked the Bureau as to its views on this request, which could be provided before or after Mr Lye's medical certificate was furnished.
[19] Later, on 13 November 2025, Mr Lye contacted my chambers with further medical information. The Bureau was not copied into this correspondence. Mr Lye requested that the information not be placed on the public case file, not be provided to the Bureau, and be used solely for the purpose of determining his adjournment/vacation request. I am referring to this as "medical information" so as not to disclose its contents, in circumstances where Mr Lye asks that it not be provided to the Bureau.
[20] I asked Mr Lye to provide a copy of the information to the Bureau so its response to his request for and adjournment of the hearing could be informed by that information. Mr Lye then asked that I grant a confidentiality order in relation to the information, and that he was not prepared to provide it to the Bureau. This correspondence was also sent to my chambers without the Bureau being copied in. In it, he claimed that the Bureau had previously mishandled and misused his medical and personal information and had previously disputed medical evidence without any expertise.
[21] At 3:48PM I advised Mr Lye that in so far as he asked for a confidentiality order to be made on an ex parte basis, I was not prepared to do so, and that if he was not prepared to inform the Bureau as to his request for a confidentiality order, so it could be heard on the request, his application would be denied.
[22] At 4:32PM on 13 November 2025 Mr Lye sent a copy of his confidentiality order application to the Bureau.
[23] At 4:56PM solicitors for the Bureau said that it had not received Mr Lye's medical evidence and objected to the hearing being adjourned on the basis that it would cause the Bureau substantial prejudice.
[24] By the time Mr Lye eventually sent a copy of his application for a confidentiality order to the Bureau, allowing for its eventual response to the proposition that the hearing be adjourned, I was concerned that the prejudice to the parties not knowing whether the hearing was to take place the following day had accumulated to the point that it was unacceptable. I considered it was necessary that I determine the request and advise the parties and I did so, advising the parties at 5:18PM that I was not prepared to grant Mr Lye's request that the hearing be adjourned or vacated.
[25] I am not required to issue written reasons for a decision such as this one[3] but have determined it appropriate provide short written reasons as to why I have decided Mr Lye's request for the hearing to be adjourned or vacated is refused. These reasons follow a short email I sent to the parties earlier this afternoon advising them that Mr Lye's request for the hearing to be adjourned or vacated was refused, that the hearing would proceed, also altering parties to the effect of s 600 of the Act which provides that the Commission may determine a matter before it in the absence of a person who has been required to attend before it. I also indicated in that email that while Mr Lye had previously indicated a preference that matters be heard in person, I was prepared to make such accommodations as may be of assistance to him in relation to the hearing, for example that he be allowed to appear via video, and be provided with additional breaks. I also reminded parties that the hearing was simply to allow the parties to provide such oral submissions as they may wish to make, to supplement written submissions already filed and served and that it would not be necessary for the parties to make substantive submissions during a hearing not expected to run for more than 90 minutes.
[26] My reasons for the decision are as follows.
[27] First, I consider, there is undoubtedly prejudice to the Bureau if the hearing is vacated or adjourned at this late stage. The prejudice is compounded by the inordinate delay that has afflicted this proceeding, largely caused by Mr Lye's repeated requests for additional time to comply with Directions (most of which have been granted) and his procedural requests. In addition to the general prejudice to both parties caused by unnecessary delay[4] the Bureau is in this matter now required to take steps to prepare for an appeal hearing in relation to an aspect of the proceedings. It also seeks that its non-publication order be dealt with, and until it is, the named persons may continue to be identified in the proceedings, in circumstances where otherwise this may cease to occur by way of order of the Commission if the matter is determined in its favour.
[28] Secondly, I consider that both Mr Lye and the Bureau have already been afforded procedural fairness in relation to the dismissal application, and the substantive proceeding. In relation to the dismissal application, both parties have filed and served submissions in relation to it, and Mr Lye was provided two unsolicited extensions of time for him to do so. Thus, the Commission is already appraised of the basis upon which the Bureau says the application should be dismissed, and why Mr Lye opposes that course. I had listed the matter for hearing to provide both parties an opportunity to supplement those submissions if they wished to do so, largely out of an abundance of prudence. This is not to say that based on the written submissions, I do not already have a reasonably comprehensive understanding of the parties' respective positions.
[29] Thirdly, in the Directions I issued in relation to the dismissal application, I alerted parties to decisions of the Commission such as that of Gostencnik DP in Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank; Bianca Haines[5]. Decision such as this suggest that the circumstances in which an Applicant might resist the dismissal of an application made pursuant to s 789FC of the Act for orders to stop bullying where their employment has been terminated may be extremely confined.
[30] In these circumstances, a compelling reason is required to justify adjourning a hearing at a very late stage, in circumstances where it is likely to be relatively brief and largely supplementary.
[31] Fourthly, Mr Lye has chosen not to reveal to the Bureau the medical information he has provided me with which he says warrants the adjournment of the hearing. This deprives it of procedural fairness in responding to his request, which is particularly relevant in circumstances where its interests are affected by it, in the manner I have described.
[32] Fifthly, I do not consider Mr Lye's basis to have chosen not to disclose this information to the Bureau, thus depriving them of the procedural fairness I have described above, has merit. Mr Lye has already provided medical information to the Bureau in the course of this proceeding. I am aware of no basis for his allegation that it has been misused. I see no reason why this further information could not have been provided.
[33] Sixthly, while I will not therefore disclose the details of Mr Lye's medical information in circumstances where he himself has chosen not to disclose it to the Bureau, I will observe that it is very brief. A short piece of medical information suggesting a proceeding should not proceed will not always be accepted as the basis upon which to vacate a hearing[6].
[34] Lastly, Mr Lye's conduct over the last 24 hours does not accord with the proposition he lacks capacity to participate in the litigation. Mr Lye appeared before the Commission in a stay application heard by DP Coleman earlier today before he made his request for the adjournment of the hearing tomorrow. I also observe Mr Lye appears to have had capacity to engage in various correspondence with the Commission during the course of this afternoon, after his request was made.
[35] Taking this into account, and with the little medical information that has been provided, I am not convinced that Mr Lye's capacity is so limited that he cannot attend the hearing tomorrow to provide brief supplement to his submissions in relation to the dismissal application. If he wishes, accommodation could be made to assist him to appear. While he has previously expressed a preference for proceedings to occur in person, the hearing could be conducted by video. As has previously been the case, additional breaks can be provided to Mr Lye. The hearing will not involve the giving of evidence - it simply requires brief submissions from parties to supplement those they have made in writing (if they wish to provide them).
[36] As I am not so convinced, I consider that the prejudice to the Bureau in vacating the hearing at this late stage outweighs a more cautious approach that might otherwise be taken to adjourn the hearing; and in my view, it is not appropriate to do so. My view in this regard is informed by the inordinate delays in this proceeding that have occurred already. In the circumstances, taking into account the nature of the dismissal application, further delay is inappropriate, and the hearing is to proceed tomorrow as listed.

[4] See Sophia (Marttea) Baker v Bodhicorp Pty Ltd ATF The Gadens Service Trust Nos 2 T/A Gadens Lawyers Brisbane [2024] FWC 924 [24]

Application by Mr Jacob Lye [2025] FWC 3410 (13 November 2025)

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Judgment (15 paragraphs)

Application by Mr Jacob Lye [2025] FWC 3410 (13 November 2025)

Legislation Cited (2)