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[2025] NSWSC 650
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of NSW
2025-06-23
Dhanji J
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Medium Neutral Citation: Application by Bassam Hamzy pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) [2025] NSWSC 650
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 23 June 2025
Decision date: 23 June 2025
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Dhanji J
Decision: (1) The application that the whole of the applicant’s case be referred to the Court of Criminal Appeal to be dealt with as an appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) is refused.
Catchwords: CRIME – appeal and review – application to Supreme Court under Part 7 – Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) – conspiracy to murder – where co-conspirator found not guilty of conspiracy and acquitted – whether doubt or question as to applicant’s guilt – whether verdict unsustainable as a matter of law – principle of incontrovertibility of an acquittal – broader claim of inconsistency – impact of “fresh” evidence led at co-conspirator’s trial – responses of each accused to Crown case of conspiracy substantially different – conviction of applicant consistent with acquittal of co-conspirator – abundant evidence at applicant’s trial to support guilt – discretion under s 79(3) – application refused
Legislation Cited: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW), Pt 8, ss 78, 79
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 26
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 6
Cases Cited: Application by AZ for inquiry into conviction pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) [2020] NSWSC 1048
Application by Pavel Svanda under Part 7, s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review Act) 2001 (NSW) [2021] NSWSC 1061
Application of Peter James Holland under s.78 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 [2008] NSWSC 251
Dickson v R [2016] NSWCCA 105
Director of Public Prosecutions v Shannon [1975] AC 717
Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions of the Australian Capital Territory (2003) 214 CLR 318; [2003] HCA 28
Folbigg v R [2023] NSWCCA 325
Gibson, Scott — Application under Part 7 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 [2022] NSWSC 1577
Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; [1989] HCA 35
Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57
Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; [1998] HCA 7
R v Gilham (2007) 73 NSWLR 308; [2007] NSWCCA 323
R v Hamzy [2002] NSWSC 128
R v Hamzy [2004] NSWCCA 243
R v Hurrey (1987) 29 A Crim R 42
R v Jones (1985) 20 A Crim R 142
R v Mok (1987) 27 A Crim R 438
Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251; [1994] HCA 42
The Queen v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; [2002] HCA 55
The Queen v Darby (1982) 148 CLR 668; [1982] HCA 32
The Queen v LK; The Queen v RK (2010) 241 CLR 177; [2010] HCA 17
The Queen v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364; [1978] HCA 39
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Bassam Hamzy (Applicant)
Attorney General of New South Wales (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
Self-represented (Applicant)
J E Emmett SC with R A McEwen (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2024/00302316
Publication restriction: Nil
The applicant, Bassam Hamzy, pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) (CAR Act) has made an application for an inquiry into his conviction for conspiracy to murder contrary to s 26 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
On 24 July 2001, following a trial by jury conducted in June and July 2001, the applicant was convicted on each of five counts in an indictment charging him with the following:
“1. On 30th May 1998 at Paddington in the [S]tate of New South Wales, did murder Kris TOUMAZIS
- On the 30th May 1998 at Paddington in the [S]tate of New South Wales, did maliciously wound Nicholas LAMBOS with intent thereby to do grievous bodily harm to the said Nicholas LAMBOS
- On 30th May 1998 at Paddington in the [S]tate of New South Wales, did maliciously discharge loaded arms, namely a pistol with intent to do grievous bodily harm to Arthur Kazas
- On the 30th of May 1998 at Paddington in the [S]tate of New South Wales, did threaten to use an offensive weapon namely a firearm, with intent to prevent or hinder the lawful apprehension of himself
- Between the 18th August 2000 and 30th August 2000, at Sydney in the [S]tate of New South Wales, did conspire with Radwan Zraika to murder Khaled Hammoud”
This application relates only to count 5.
The first four offences occurred in Oxford Street, Paddington at around 3.00am on 30 May 1998. The applicant was arrested in relation to the first four offences on 30 January 1999 and refused bail. The fifth offence occurred while the applicant was in custody with respect to the other offences.
On 15 March 2002, Bell J sentenced the applicant as follows (R v Hamzy [2002] NSWSC 128):
Count 1: 21 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years and 9 months commencing 15 March 2002, taking into account three Form 1 offences.
Count 2: 5 years imprisonment commencing 15 March 2002.
Count 3: 3 years imprisonment commencing 15 March 2002.
Count 4: 3 years imprisonment commencing 15 March 2002.
Count 5: 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years commencing 15 December 2017.
The applicant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal (CCA) against his convictions and the sentences imposed on him. His appeal was dismissed: R v Hamz**y [2004] NSWCCA 243.
The applicant’s alleged co-conspirator with respect to count 5, Radwan Zraika, was tried separately on a single count charging that he conspired with the applicant to murder Khaled Hammoud. Following a trial by jury conducted in October 2001, Mr Zraika was found not guilty of the offence and subsequently acquitted and discharged on 22 October 2001.
The applicant submits that there is a doubt or question as to his guilt. He contends that the jury’s verdict in relation to count 5 is unsustainable as a matter of law because there could be no conspiracy between the applicant and Mr Zraika given Mr Zraika’s acquittal.
78 Applications to Supreme Court
(1) An application for an inquiry into a conviction or sentence may be made to the Supreme Court by the convicted person or by another person on behalf of the convicted person.
(2) The registrar of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court must cause a copy of any application made under this section to be given to the Minister.
79 Consideration of applications
(1) After considering an application under section 78 or on its own motion—
(a) the Supreme Court may direct that an inquiry be conducted by a judicial officer into the conviction or sentence, or
(b) the Supreme Court may refer the whole case to the Court of Criminal Appeal, to be dealt with as an appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912.
(2) Action under subsection (1) may only be taken if it appears that there is a doubt or question as to the convicted person’s guilt, as to any mitigating circumstances in the case or as to any part of the evidence in the case.
(3) The Supreme Court may refuse to consider or otherwise deal with an application. Without limiting the foregoing, the Supreme Court may refuse to consider or otherwise deal with an application if—
(a) it appears that the matter—
(i) has been fully dealt with in the proceedings giving rise to the conviction or sentence (or in any proceedings on appeal from the conviction or sentence), or
(ii) has previously been dealt with under this Part or under the previous review provisions, or
(iii) has been the subject of a right of appeal (or a right to apply for leave to appeal) by the convicted person but no such appeal or application has been made, or
(iv) has been the subject of appeal proceedings commenced by or on behalf of the convicted person (including proceedings on an application for leave to appeal) where the appeal or application has been withdrawn or the proceedings have been allowed to lapse, and
(b) the Supreme Court is not satisfied that there are special facts or special circumstances that justify the taking of further action.
(3A) The Supreme Court may defer consideration of an application under section 78 if—
(a) the time within which an appeal may be made against the conviction or sentence (including an application for leave to appeal) is yet to expire, or
(b) the conviction or sentence is the subject of appeal proceedings (including proceedings on an application for leave to appeal) that are yet to be finally determined, or
(c) the application fails to disclose sufficient information to enable the conviction or sentence to be properly considered.
(3B) This section does not authorise a direction to be given, or a referral to be made to the Court of Criminal Appeal, if the Supreme Court is satisfied that the grounds for the direction or referral arise only from—
(a) the fact that the convicted person was—
(i) questioned under section 24 of the Crime Commission Act 2012, or
(ii) required under section 24 or 29 of that Act to produce a document or thing, or
(b) either or both of the following—
(i) evidence obtained directly from that questioning or requirement,
(ii) any further information, evidence, document or thing obtained as a result of the questioning or the production of the document or thing.
(4) Proceedings under this section are not judicial proceedings. However, the Supreme Court may consider any written submissions made by the Crown with respect to an application.
(5) The registrar of the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court must report to the Minister as to any action taken by the Supreme Court under this section (including a refusal to consider or otherwise deal with an application).
The legislation is an acknowledgment that, despite the protections for accused persons provided by the process of criminal trials and appeals, there remains a place for review to “overcome injustices that sometimes arise in the course of the criminal justice system”: Application by Pavel Svanda under Part 7, s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review Act) 2001 (NSW) [2021] NSWSC 1061 at [5]; Application by AZ for inquiry into conviction pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) [2020] NSWSC 1048 at [10]; Eastman v Director of Public Prosecutions of the Australian Capital Territory (2003) 214 CLR 318; [2003] HCA 28 at [60], [64]-[75].
In Application of Peter James Holland under s.78 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 [2008] NSWSC 251, Johnson J reviewed the principles applicable to the consideration of applications under s 79 (at [6]-[9]):
“6 The test is whether it appears that there is a doubt or question as to guilt, as to any mitigating circumstances in the case or as to any part of the evidence in the case: s.79(2). With respect to repealed s.475 Crimes Act 1900 (which used similar words), it was said that this view may be formed where the material causes the person considering the matter unease or a sense of disquiet in allowing the conviction or sentence to stand: Varley v Attorney General (NSW) at 48; Application of Rendell (1987) 32 A Crim R 243 at 245. This formula has been applied since the repeal of s.475 and its replacement by the provisions now contained in s.79(2): Application of Pedrana (2000) 117 A Crim R 45 at 463 [28]; Application of Suey [2001] NSWSC 543 at [18].
7 Where it is contended that a doubt or question exists concerning part of the evidence in the case, it is appropriate to consider whether any doubt or question about that part of the evidence produces a doubt or question as to guilt: Application of Moore [2000] NSWSC 364; (2000) 112 A Crim R 331 at 332 [6]. The section is to apply to a part of the evidence which has some real material substance as effecting the conclusion of guilt: Application of Suey at [19].
8 There has to be available material which, as a matter of practical reality, gives rise to a relevant sense of unease or disquiet: Application of Esposito (Hunt J, 14 July 1988, unreported at page 2); Application of Visser (Newman J, 27 June 1994, BC9402667 at page 3); Application of Dunn [2005] NSWSC 857 at [9].
Some Other Features of the Jurisdiction
9 The procedure under s.78 is not intended to provide a convicted person with yet another avenue of appeal after the usual avenues have been exhausted: Application of Dunn at [9]; Application of Milat [2005] NSWSC 920; (2005) 157 A Crim R 565 at 574 [26]. Nor is it an opportunity, in a sense, to run the trial again on paper, with the ultimate submission that acquittal should result.”
“(i) In determining the application, the Court is exercising an administrative power;
(ii) The Court is not hearing an appeal against the applicant’s conviction;
(iii) The legislation is designed to overcome injustices that sometimes arise in the course of the administration of criminal justice;
(iv) The legislation has a beneficial purpose;
(v) The scope of the administrative function is determined by the relevant provisions set out in s 79(2) of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act; and
(vi) Action under s 79(1) (being either to direct that an inquiry be conducted, or for the whole case to be referred to the Court of Criminal Appeal), may only be taken if it appears that there is a doubt or question as to the convicted person’s guilt, as to any mitigating circumstances in the case, or as to any part of the evidence in the case: s 79(2).”
(a) The applicant’s submissions and supplementary submissions, both filed 16 August 2024. (b) A letter authored by the applicant and addressed to the Registrar of the Supreme Court dated 23 October 2024 opposing an extension of time requested by the respondent for the filing of its submissions.
The Attorney General provided written submissions filed 25 March 2025, together with the affidavit of Catherine Moore sworn 25 March 2025, which exhibited Exhibit CM-1. There was some delay in the respondent being in a position to properly respond to the application due to the need to obtain the records which ultimately formed the exhibit to Ms Moore’s affidavit. That exhibit includes the entirety of the material relating to the applicant’s conviction and sentence appeal to the CCA. This contains, in addition to the transcript of the CCA hearing, the grounds, submissions and related appeal documents, along with the eight volumes provided to the CCA containing the trial materials. Those eight volumes include the transcript of the trial and a large number of exhibits. As is usual, not all exhibits were reproduced or otherwise provided on the appeal. The index sets out those exhibits which were not provided. There was some difficulty in obtaining volume 7 which contained the transcript of the addresses of counsel, the summing up, a judgment, the proceedings after conviction, including in relation to sentence, and the remarks on sentence. That material was subsequently sourced from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), with the exception of the judgment. The absence of that judgment, which determined an application to discharge the jury, is not of any consequence to this application.
The exhibit to Ms Moore’s affidavit also includes material in relation to Mr Zraika’s trial sourced from the District Court and the ODPP. The material in relation to Mr Zraika’s trial is incomplete. It includes, inter alia, the indictment, a list of exhibits and MFIs, the associate’s record of proceedings, records of jury communication, continuation sheets, the master result sheet and a partial trial transcript. The transcript does not continue past 17 October 2001, with the effect that the trial transcripts from 19 and 22 October are both unavailable. The transcript of the Crown case is complete, as is the evidence-in-chief of Mr Zraika, who gave evidence in his own defence. The cross-examination of Mr Zraika, however, commenced on 17 October and continued on 19 October. (It appears the court did not sit on 18 October.) As a result, the conclusion of the cross-examination of Mr Zraika is missing, as are the addresses and the summing up. The transcript of 17 October records an indication by Mr Zraika’s counsel that an Arabic interpreter was required on the next occasion, which suggests that at least one other witness may have been called. Whatever be the case, there is sufficient material available to understand Mr Zraika’s defence at his trial.
Following service of the respondent’s material, the applicant provided submissions in reply filed 8 April 2025 and supplementary submissions in reply filed 6 May 2025.
By letter to the Registrar dated 11 June 2025, the respondent sought leave to file further submissions in response to the applicant’s reply submissions. The application for leave and the attached submissions were referred to my chambers on 12 June 2025. At the time the application was received, a draft of these reasons had been completed and was in the process of being finalised. Having regard to the view I had formed with respect to the application, I considered that there was no prejudice to the respondent in refusing leave.
Bell J, in sentencing the applicant, made findings of fact with respect to the offences. The following is taken from those findings.
In the early hours of 30 May 1998, the applicant and a group of friends, including Nedhal Hammoud and Kader Chakaik, attended the Mr Goodbar nightclub in Oxford Street. At that time, Kris Toumazis, the deceased, also attended the Mr Goodbar nightclub with a group of friends, including Nick Lambos and Arthur Kazas. An incident occurred between Mr Kazas and Nedhal Hammoud at around 3:00am which led to a verbal confrontation between them on the footpath outside the nightclub. Mr Kazas, together with his companions, entered his vehicle, which was parked immediately outside the nightclub. Mr Chakaik then kicked the rear wheel arch of that vehicle. Upon exiting and observing the damage to the vehicle, Mr Kazas, Mr Lambos and the deceased gave chase to Mr Chakaik and Nedhal Hammoud, who ran across Oxford Street.
On observing his companions being chased, the applicant produced a handgun and commenced firing into Oxford Street in the general direction of those giving chase. A bullet hit Mr Lambos near the right sternal notch. This was the subject of count 2 in the indictment. A bullet hit Mr Kazas as he ran towards the applicant. This was the subject of count 3 in the indictment. A bullet hit the deceased and he fell on the ground near where the applicant was standing. The deceased aimed the gun downwards towards the body of the deceased and fired a second bullet, which hit the deceased. This was the subject of count 1 in the indictment.
After the applicant fired the second bullet towards the deceased, he began to run from the scene. Detective Senior Constable (DSC) Barwick observed this series of events from inside a police vehicle. He called out “stop police” to the applicant and his two companions. The applicant pointed his handgun towards DSC Barwick for a fraction of a second. DSC Barwick fired a round from his service revolver and all three men ran away. The applicant pointing the gun towards DSC Barwick was the subject of count 4 in the indictment.
In the aftermath of the commission of the above offences, the applicant and Mr Chakaik travelled to Paramatta and met with Nedhal Hammoud. The following day, the applicant and Nedhal Hammoud met with Nedhal’s brother, Khaled Hammoud. The applicant and Nedhal Hammoud travelled to Lebanon the next day with Khaled Hammoud’s assistance. In Lebanon, there was a falling out between the applicant and Nedhal Hammoud. During this time, the police investigation into the murder of the deceased had identified the applicant, Nedhal Hammoud, Mr Chakaik and Mohammed Ajaj as suspects. Against this background, Khaled Hammoud offered assistance to the police in an endeavour to help Nedhal Hammoud. Khaled Hammoud was, on his account, able to provide valuable evidence to the police including of an alleged admission made by the applicant. He also encouraged Nedhal Hammoud to surrender to the authorities and provide a (self-serving) account of the incident, which he ultimately did. Eventually, the applicant was arrested and returned to Australia, where he was remanded in custody. While in custody, the applicant, on the Crown case, conspired with Mr Zraika to engage a contract killer to murder Khaled Hammoud to prevent him from giving evidence against him. This was the subject of count 5 in the indictment.
“20 In August 2000, while in custody at the Silverwater Remand Centre, the [applicant] entered into an agreement with an associate, Radwan Zraika, to murder Khaled Hammoud. Khaled Hammoud made a statement to police on 28 October 1998. In that statement he gave an account that when his brother and the [applicant] came to his home on the afternoon of Saturday 30 May 1998 he had seen the [applicant] hand a gun to an unidentified man. He said that the [applicant] had confessed to being the gunman.
…
23 The [applicant] arranged, through the services of a man named Pham, to meet a person known as Jack, whom he understood to be a contract killer. In the event, Jack was an undercover officer in the New South Wales Police Service. A lengthy meeting between the [applicant], Pham and Jack at the Silverwater Remand Centre was recorded by Jack. The [applicant] spoke in whispers during the course of the conversation and not all of what was said was picked up on the recording device. That which was recorded and is clearly audible is chilling. The [applicant] told Jack he did not care how he did it. He wanted Hammoud killed ‘ASAP’. The [applicant] undertook to arrange for Jack to be supplied with a gun to carry out the killing. In evidence Jack said that they discussed how he would establish that he had carried out the killing to the [applicant]’s satisfaction. It was agreed that he would remove a finger from the body and take it to the Silverwater Jail to show the [applicant]. The conversation on the recording at this juncture is somewhat indistinct however passages which are audible strongly support the accuracy of Jack’s recollection. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the [applicant] agreed Jack should bring him the finger of the deceased as a token of good faith.
24 Arrangements were made for Jack to meet the co-conspirator, Zraika. The latter drove with Jack to identify Khaled Hammoud’s work premises and family home. In due course the [applicant] and Zraika were charged with the conspiracy.”
“34 In a taped telephone conversation made from overseas on 29 November 1998, the [applicant]’s sister Mejida told him that his picture was in the paper. Exhibit 5 is a copy of the Daily Telegraph dated 28 August 1998. It contains a sketch of the suspected gunman. The [applicant] replied to his sister: ‘Yeah, because fuckin’ Ned*’*s brother [Khaled Hamm**oud] drew the picture.’
35 On 18 August 2000 an undercover police officer using the pseudonym of ‘Jack’ was introduced to the [applicant] at Silverwater Remand Centre by a person named ‘Phong Pham’. The conversation of the three men was recorded by means of a listening device fitted on ‘Jack’. There are gaps in the recording and additional evidence about the conversation was given by ‘Jack’.
36 ‘Jack’ gave evidence that during the conversation the [applicant] whispered: ‘I need someone dead ASAP… we will use the word ‘rob’ for ‘kill’ … it will all be given to you outside’. This conversation was not on the tape. The tape and its transcript ([Ex] DD and EE) nevertheless contain damning evidence including:
‘Jack: *So you don’t care how I do it, as long as he’*s dead …
What do you want done with the body*?* ….
Do you want the body found or…
[applicant]: Doesn’t matter.’
There is discussion about timing, payment and the location of the victim with the assistance of ‘Rodney’ (Radwan Zraika) (effectively identifying the intended victim as Khaled Hammoud).
37 Later intercepted telephone calls between the [applicant] and ‘Jack’ and between the [applicant] and Zraika provided overwhelming evidence of the [applicant]’s conduct in arranging with Zraika to have the victim killed.” (emphasis in original)
“JK: So, your friend Rodney, so he knows everything
[applicant]: No. He knows what he needs to know.
JK: Ok. That’s all.
[applicant]: That’s all. He does not have to know for what reason, how, what or where. He does not know everything. He needs to know what he needs to know.”
Later in the recording, the applicant said of Mr Zraika: “He’s not going to ask. He’s not going to want to know. He does what he’s told by me if I say jump. He says how high. That’s it.”
The applicant said that the “only part” Mr Zraika was to play was to show Jack the locations set out above, although at one point in his evidence-in-chief, the applicant did say that he intended to convey to Mr Zraika that Jack was not to be paid unless the robbery was successful.
When cross-examined, the applicant initially maintained that Mr Zraika’s role was limited such that he was not made aware of the (on the applicant’s evidence) plan to rob. However, as the applicant’s cross-examination developed, he gave evidence that while he did not initially do so, he did ultimately tell Mr Zraika of the plan to rob Khaled Hammoud. He said this occurred after Mr Zraika’s first visit to him (on 23 August 2000) but before Mr Zraika’s second visit to him (on 30 August 2000). He told the court:
“Later on when he started getting suss, he was asking me, ‘What’s going on?’ and then I said to him, ‘Listen, I’m going to get him [Jack] to rob him’.”
“In respect of the conspiracy charge … it really centres around that conversation of 18 August and, most importantly, whether or not it was in essence a robbery.”
It is not without significance that senior counsel for the applicant at trial did not attempt to refute the presence of an agreement between the applicant and Mr Zraika. The applicant’s approach to the trial was reflected in the summing up, in which Bell J described the applicant’s case as that the applicant “agrees that there was, if you like, a conspiracy to commit an unlawful act, but he says it was a conspiracy to rob Khaled Hammoud”.
The applicant also gave evidence of his relationship with Mr Zraika. He said that he had known Mr Zraika for “a long time” and that he had “complete trust” in Mr Zraika. In cross-examination, the applicant resiled from this somewhat, stating that he used to “see” Mr Zraika when they were “kids”, but that they had not “been the best of friends” since that time.
“Now, when [the applicant] was still trying to tell me all he wanted to do was rob but I knew by everything that ‘Jack’ started talking to me about and he wasn’t going to rob him, he was going to kill Khaled Hammoud, okay.”
“… the need for decisions of the courts, unless set aside or quashed, to be accepted as incontrovertibly correct. … That principle is not only fundamental, it is essential for the maintenance of public respect and confidence in the administration of justice”
See also Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57 at [53] per Gummow J, referred to by the applicant.
The “agreement” which formed the basis of the conspiracy to murder charge was, ostensibly, between the applicant, the undercover operative, Jack, and Mr Zraika. There was, however, no genuine agreement with Jack. He was an undercover operative and, as such, at no point intended to carry out the planned killing. The applicant correctly points out that Jack was not a party to any conspiracy: see, for example, The Queen v LK*; The Queen v RK* (2010) 241 CLR 177; [2010] HCA 17 at [1]. The respondent takes no issue with this. The only possible parties to any conspiracy were, therefore, the applicant and Mr Zraika. The applicant contends that if, as a result of his acquittal, Mr Zraika cannot be regarded as a party to the conspiracy, then, in turn, his own conviction cannot stand. The applicant is correct to submit that no matter his own intention, if Mr Zraika did not enter into the relevant agreement with him, that is an agreement to murder, then he was not party to a conspiratorial agreement with Mr Zraika and his conviction cannot stand.
It is convenient to first consider the principle of incontrovertibility on which the applicant relies.
“The matter may be put another way: is there not a fundamental inconsistency in sustaining a conviction that A conspired with B when B has been declared to be innocent of conspiring with A? Despite the plausibility of the argument, we are unable to accept it. In our opinion, it proceeds upon a mistaken view of the true effect of an acquittal. We agree, with respect, with the observations of Lord Salmon in Shannon:
‘An accused is entitled to be acquitted unless the evidence satisfies the jury beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty. A verdict of not guilty may mean that the jury is certain that the accused is innocent, or it may mean that, although the evidence arouses considerable suspicion, it is insufficient to convince the jury of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The verdict of not guilty is consistent with the jury having taken either view. The only effect of an acquittal, in law, is that the accused can never again be brought before a criminal court and tried for the same offence. So far as the Crown is concerned, the accused is deemed, in law, to be innocent. His acquittal cannot, however, affect anyone but himself and indeed would not be admissible in evidence on behalf of or against anyone else. Anyone acquitted of a criminal conspiracy may still be sued in damages for the conspiracy of which he has been acquitted at his trial.’
It is true that greater conceptual difficulties attend the task of a jury determining the guilt of both A and B on a joint trial for conspiring together (and with no one else) than in the case of separate trials. A can only be convicted if the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on evidence admissible against him, inter alia, that A and B conspired together. In essaying their duty in the case of B, the same jury which was satisfied of A’s guilt in conspiring with B may on evidence admissible against B fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that B did conspire with A. The result is then that in the one trial the jury is saying at the same time that A is guilty of conspiring with B but B is not guilty of conspiring with A. In reality, of course, the apparent phenomenon is readily explained in terms of the obligation of the jury to consider separately the guilt of the two accused on the basis only of the evidence admissible against each.” (citations omitted)
“… the conviction of a conspirator whether tried together with or separately from an alleged co-conspirator may stand notwithstanding that the latter is or may be acquitted unless in all the circumstances of the case his conviction is inconsistent with the acquittal of the other person. In our opinion such a determination will focus upon the justice of the case rather than upon the technical obscurities that now confound the subject.”
Thus, on the basis of the above, while one person’s acquittal for a particular crime cannot be controverted in other proceedings against them, that acquittal does not necessarily extend to proceedings against their co-conspirator for that same crime. That is because, at least in part, a verdict of acquittal, in contrast to a conviction, requires no positive findings of fact: R v Gilham (2007) 73 NSWLR 308; [2007] NSWCCA 323 at [253] (per Hulme J), referring to The Queen v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364 at 370-1; [1978] HCA 39 (per Barwick CJ). See also Director of Public Prosecutions v Shannon [1975] AC 717 at 772 (per Salmon LJ), extracted above in The Queen v Darby.
McHugh J in Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493; [1998] HCA 7 (at [63]), after referring to The Queen v Darby, considered that the position adopted in that case was “plainly correct” because, to provide one example, “evidence which is admissible against one accused - for example, a confession - may not be admissible against the other accused”.
Based on the above, the applicant’s primary contention must be rejected. That is, that the principle of incontrovertibility operates as a complete answer to the applicant’s guilt with respect to the same conspiracy for which Mr Zraika was acquitted.
The question on the application is thus whether the applicant’s conviction is inconsistent with the acquittal of Mr Zraika, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the evidence led at the respective trials. The applicant addressed this issue in his reply submissions, in which he contended that on consideration of all the material across the two trials, a doubt or question arises as to his guilt.
Determining this issue involves “an analysis of the evidence as against alleged co-conspirators to determine whether the different verdicts are explicable by different evidence” such that the evidence is “capable of sustaining a conviction against one in the light of the other’s acquittal”: Mickelberg v T**he Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259 at 310; [1989] HCA 35 (per Toohey and Gaudron JJ). The approach to be taken to the evidence is a “practical, commonsense approach, without too much emphasis on what can be regarded at best as mere possibilities as to what the jury may have thought and how it arrived at the verdicts which it did”: R v Jones (1985) 20 A Crim R 142 at 150 (per Lee J). See also Mickelberg v T**he Queen at 310 (per Toohey and Gaudron JJ); R v Mok (1987) 27 A Crim R 438 at 442 (per Hunt J, McInerney and Allen JJ agreeing).
As observed above, while the acquittal of Mr Zraika is not technically inconsistent with the guilt of the applicant, it may nonetheless give rise to a doubt or question as to his guilt. An example of such a case is found in Jones, where two alleged conspirators were tried together and the Crown case against each of them was “substantially the same”. Street CJ (with whom Lee and Maxwell JJ agreed) regarded the verdicts as inconsistent such that the conviction should be quashed. See also R v Hurrey (1987) 29 A Crim R 42; cf Mok, Dickson v R [2016] NSWCCA 105 at [60]-[64].
The applicant, in broadening his argument to embrace what might be described as factual inconsistency, submits that the evidence as against him and as against Mr Zraika was “identical”, with the result that Mr Zraika’s acquittal was such as to give rise to a doubt as to his guilt.
The applicant’s submission that the evidence was identical requires scrutiny. While the Crown case may have been, in each trial, relevantly similar, each of the applicant and Mr Zraika gave evidence at their respective trials, as set out above. Given that Mr Zraika’s acquittal alone is not enough to establish a doubt as to the applicant’s guilt, and that there was a difference in the evidence at the two trials, a preliminary question arises with respect to the evidence on which the applicant would rely to establish a doubt as to Mr Zraika’s guilt, and therefore his own, were the matter referred to the CCA.
The evidence on which the applicant would rely in the event that the matter was referred to the CCA would seem to be the evidence led at Mr Zraika’s trial, that evidence being sufficient to at least raise a doubt as to Mr Zraika’s entry into the conspiracy to murder in the mind of Mr Zraika’s jury.
If this application was to be referred to the CCA to be dealt with as an appeal, it is not self-evident that the evidence from Mr Zraika’s trial would be admissible on that appeal. Even if the applicant were able to overcome the hurdles with respect to the admission of fresh or new evidence on appeal, any such evidence would, nonetheless, need to be admissible. The evidence from Mr Zraika’s trial is, of course, hearsay. There is nothing to suggest that the same evidence would necessarily be available to the applicant on any appeal.
It may be that there is no objection to the evidence. Alternatively, if there is a doubt on the material before me, the matter could be referred for an inquiry. At any such inquiry, the rules of evidence would not apply. It would then be at least possible that, following the inquiry, the report resulting from the inquiry would become “evidence” for the purposes of s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW): see Folbigg v R [2023] NSWCCA 325 at [12]-[13], although the admission of the report may still require the absence of objection.
The answer is likely to be that the principles in relation to the undesirability of conflicting decisions would require the CCA to consider the record of both trials. I am content to proceed on this basis.
“… if the jury had the evidence of Mr Zraika, the fresh evidence of Jack and the transcript concessions they may have acquitted me.”
The applicant identifies the evidence given by Mr Zraika at his trial as fresh evidence which raises a doubt or question as to his, the applicant’s, guilt. I will not here make any distinction between “fresh” and “new” evidence.
The applicant submits that he did not have the benefit of Mr Zraika’s evidence at his trial, and that he could only testify as to matters that were within his knowledge. He contends that Mr Zraika’s evidence was consistent with his evidence that he did not tell Mr Zraika of any plan to kill Khaled Hammoud, and, additionally, that Mr Zraika’s evidence went further to “explain his mindset, actions and comments which I could not explain”.”
The applicant also identifies as fresh evidence the amendments to the transcripts of the listening device conversations, and the evidence given by Jack at Mr Zraika’s trial in relation to those transcripts. The applicant submits that at Mr Zraika’s trial, around ten months following his own, the Crown was still in the process of conceding amendments to the transcripts of the three listening device conversations with Jack. He says that the transcripts were amended on three occasions; before the applicant’s trial, before Mr Zraika’s trial, and again during Mr Zraika’s trial. The applicant also complains that at Mr Zraika’s trial, Mr Zraika’s counsel was provided with 23 pages of notes authored by Jack in relation to the listening device conversation which took place on 18 August. These notes were apparently not disclosed to the applicant at his trial.
As part of this submission, the applicant draws attention to “significant change” in the evidence given by Jack as between the applicant’s and Mr Zraika’s trials with respect to particular words in a recording. The applicant points to a disagreement in his trial that arose out of a passage in the listening device transcript from 18 August. Jack gave evidence that the applicant said the words “the man is going to disappear you know”, while counsel for the applicant submitted that the words should read “and when the money is split”. However, the applicant highlights the following passage from Mr Zraika’s trial, being the cross-examination of Jack by Mr Zraika’s counsel in relation to the transcript (which had since been amended, with those amendments underlined):
“Mr Brewer: … there’s an underlined passage from Hamzy at about .3; ‘I’ll just, if, who I wanted to send, I want, you know, I take their word for them. There’s rob and the money is going to be split, you know’?
Jack: Yes.
Mr Brewer: What did you understand by the expression ‘the money is going to be split, you know’?
Jack: That was just part of the code word that rob being used.”
It is convenient to deal first with the most significant difference in the evidence between the two trials. As has been set out above, each of the applicant and Mr Zraika gave evidence in their respective trials. It can be accepted that Mr Zraika’s evidence was that the applicant never told him that he (the applicant) planned to murder Khaled Hammoud. Further, Mr Zraika’s evidence was that when he became suspicious and pressed the applicant as to what was really going on, he was told it was intended to rob Khaled Hammoud. In that regard, it must be accepted that there was a degree of consistency in the accounts, and with respect to key matters. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the addition of Mr Zraika’s evidence to the applicant’s trial results in a doubt as to the applicant’s guilt. Each of the trials was different, with not only the absence of Mr Zraika’s evidence from the applicant’s trial, but also the presence of the applicant’s evidence (which was, in turn, absent from Mr Zraika’s trial).
As a result of that combination of present and absent evidence, it cannot be assumed that Mr Zraika’s evidence would have the same effect in the context of the applicant’s trial. The evidence the applicant gave in his trial had the capacity to affect the inferences that might have been drawn as to Mr Zraika’s state of mind. Relatedly, Mr Zraika’s evidence may not have been accepted (or, at least, raised a doubt as to his guilt) when considered in the context of the applicant’s evidence.
While the Crown cases against the applicant and Mr Zraika were essentially the same, and the Crown is obliged to prove its case, that is not to say that the evidence led by an accused cannot be taken into account in support of the Crown case. For example, a Crown case may be based on weak identification evidence. Any issue as to identification will, however, be resolved if the accused gives evidence admitting their presence at the scene in accordance with the identification evidence, but contesting liability on some other basis. A conviction which might have been unreasonable in the absence of the accused’s evidence may thus cease to be so when the accused’s evidence is taken into account.
An analogy may be drawn between the above example and the present case. As discussed above, while the applicant gave evidence that he initially told Mr Zraika only what he needed to know, he later told the court under cross-examination that he ultimately availed Mr Zraika of his plans, and, in particular, that he planned to rob Khaled Hammoud, not to kill him. The applicant’s counsel summarised the applicant’s case as him having entered a conspiracy to rob rather than to kill. The applicant’s case was put in similar terms by the trial judge in her summing up to the jury.
The applicant’s submission that his evidence at trial was that he did not tell Mr Zraika of his plans cannot be accepted in full. As I have said, he gave evidence that he told Mr Zraika of a plan to rob Khaled Hammoud. While the applicant is correct in his contention that him telling Mr Zraika of his plan to rob Khaled Hammoud did not, of itself, make Mr Zraika a party to any conspiracy, it is necessary to have regard to the other evidence available at the applicant’s trial. Mr Zraika was not only made aware of the (purported) plan, he was engaged to facilitate it. This involved participation in the purported plan, and provides an ample basis on which to infer a conspiratorial agreement, assuming there was in fact a meeting of minds between the applicant and Mr Zraika with respect to at least a robbery. As noted above, the address of the applicant’s counsel and the summing up of the trial judge both proceed on the basis that there was such a meeting of minds.
In addition to the absence of Mr Zraika’s evidence, the applicant also points to changes in the Crown case in the form of the agreed content of some of the listening device recordings, and in the evidence of Jack, together with matters which were not disclosed to him.
Among the matters not disclosed to the applicant was that Pham was a police informant. The failure of the prosecution to make proper disclosure is a serious breach. In the context of this application, however, it is not clear how knowledge of this fact would have assisted the applicant.
There were a number of changes in the evidence of Jack as to the content of the recordings. It is not enough to simply point to the fact that changes were made to give rise to a doubt or question as to guilt. The applicant points to a passage in the recording of 18 August 2000 of the meeting at Silverwater gaol between the applicant, Jack and Phong. At the applicant’s trial, Jack testified that the applicant said the words “He been robbed and that the man is going to disappear you know”. There was a dispute as to the underlined words which the applicant contended were “and when the money is split”. The dispute appears to have arisen in the context of a CD being produced, although the summing up records her Honour telling the jury the parties were agreed that the difference in quality was marginal. With respect to the particular dispute, clearly the latter version is less inculpatory for the applicant’s case at his trial. In the present context, however, the applicant’s complaint is not as to what he engaged Jack to do, but rather the absence of agreement with Mr Zraika. The complaint as to these words, spoken in the absence of Mr Zraika, has no bearing on the doubt the applicant now seeks to establish. Other complaints as to the evidence of the recording of the meeting of 18 August, including the non-disclosure of notes by Jack, fall away on the same basis. That is particularly so in the context of the absence of the notes being used by the applicant’s counsel for forensic advantage in the cross-examination of Jack.
Ultimately, there was abundant evidence at the applicant’s trial to support his guilt. The verdict of the jury and the subsequent dismissal of the applicant’s appeal by the CCA are consistent with this conclusion. I am not of the view that any “question or doubt” arises as to the applicant’s conviction, either based on the evidence in the applicant’s trial or based on that evidence in conjunction with the evidence in Mr Zraika’s trial and the fact of his acquittal.
The court is invested with a discretion to refuse to consider or otherwise deal with an application: s 79(3) CAR Act. While a number of bases on which the court might refuse to consider an application are set out in s 79(3), those bases guide, but do not otherwise demarcate the limits of the discretion. While the present case is not suggested by the respondent to fit within any of the specific circumstances set out in s 79(3) of the CAR Act, there are powerful reasons why the application might, nonetheless, be dealt with pursuant to s 79(3).
The applicant, following his conviction, brought an appeal to the CCA. That appeal was heard in 2004. Mr Zraika had, by that time, been acquitted. It was therefore open to the applicant to raise the arguments the subject of this application before the CCA. However, he did not do so. A complete record of Mr Zraika’s trial was more likely to have been available at that time. The failure to raise this issue in the CCA appeal and the very significant delay since that time are powerful factors in favour of the court declining to deal with the application.
Also, at least potentially relevant to the discretion, is the nature of the argument itself. The applicant’s argument proceeds on the basis that there is necessarily a doubt with respect to the existence of the requisite agreement between him and Mr Zraika, which, for the reasons above, I do not accept. But even if there was such a doubt, the applicant accepts that the result is that he, absent any relevant agreement, sought to have Jack murder Khaled Hammoud. In accepting this, the applicant is explicit in accepting that this would amount to an offence of solicit to murder pursuant to s 26 of the Crimes Act. This raises a serious question as to whether, if the applicant were to be acquitted of the conspiracy offence, he could be prosecuted for an offence of solicit to murder.
Any such prosecution would arise out of substantially the same facts. In these circumstances, it may be open to the applicant to argue that the further prosecution, on those same facts, is an abuse of process: The Queen v Carroll (2002) 213 CLR 635; [2002] HCA 55. In The Queen v Carroll, the respondent to the Crown’s appeal had been acquitted at trial after giving evidence in his own defence, of murder. He later confessed to the murder. He was charged with perjury with respect to the evidence given at his first trial based on the confession. Proof of the perjury was dependant on proof that he was guilty of murder. Thus, the prosecution for perjury raised the same ultimate issue as had been raised in the first trial and sought to controvert the result. In the present case, unlike the facts in The Queen v Carroll, any conviction in relation to soliciting to murder would not be inconsistent with the applicant’s acquittal on the offence of conspiracy to murder. The Queen v Carroll is, as a result, distinguishable.
I make the following orders:
The application that the whole of the applicant’s case be referred to the Court of Criminal Appeal to be dealt with as an appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) is refused.
**********
(2003) 214 CLR 318
(1989) 167 CLR 259
(1998) 194 CLR 610
(1998) 192 CLR 493
(2007) 73 NSWLR 308
(1994) 181 CLR 251
(2002) 213 CLR 635
(1982) 148 CLR 668
(2010) 241 CLR 177
(1978) 140 CLR 364
By letter to the Registrar dated 12 June 2025, the applicant sought leave to file further submissions in response to the respondent’s submissions. Given my decision to refuse the respondent’s request for leave, leave was also refused to the applicant.
On 16 June 2025, the Court notified the parties by email that the respondent’s application for leave to file the further submissions was refused. The Court subsequently did the same with respect to the applicant’s application for leave. I have not had regard to the submissions in respect of which leave has been refused. I would only add that it is preferable when leave is sought in circumstances such as those here, that the submissions not be attached so that there can be no suggestion that such submissions have been taken into account.
This decision has been made on the papers. In making my decision, I have considered all of the materials (properly) before me as set out above.
The facts of count 5 were found by Bell J to be as follows:
The jury in the applicant’s trial had the benefit of seeing the applicant cross-examined. This was significant, particularly with respect to the applicant’s explanations of his conversations with Jack to which Mr Zraika was not a party. Clearly, the jury rejected those explanations. That is, the jury accepted that, in speaking with Jack, the applicant was engaging him to murder Khaled Hammoud. Once the jury accepted that as a fact, the applicant’s own evidence that he ultimately let Mr Zraika in on his plans inevitably led to the conclusion that the applicant told Mr Zraika of his intention to kill. This no doubt led to the applicant’s conviction at his trial.
Put another way, it cannot be assumed that Mr Zraika’s evidence would have the same impact if considered in the context of the applicant’s evidence. Each of the applicant and Mr Zraika gave evidence as to their relationship with the other. In the course of his evidence, the applicant said that he had known Mr Zraika for “a long time” and, significantly, said that he had “complete trust” in Mr Zraika. This was consistent with the applicant’s evidence that he had brought Mr Zraika into a criminal conspiracy, albeit to rob not to kill.
By contrast, Mr Zraika sought to distance himself from the applicant. He described the applicant as someone to whom he would say hello as they knew each other from their local area. He explained his visit to the applicant in jail as, in essence, tagging along at the invitation of a group of friends who were going to visit the applicant.
Mr Zraika’s account of his relationship with the applicant was inconsistent with the applicant’s evidence that he trusted Mr Zraika, and given this, cannot be unquestioningly accepted. The applicant’s version of their relationship is, on the unchallenged evidence in his trial, far more likely to be the accurate version. It is therefore at least open to proceed on the basis that, as admitted by the applicant, there was a relationship of trust between himself and Mr Zraika. On the applicant’s evidence, that trust manifested in a criminal conspiracy between them, with the only substantive question remaining being whether the agreement was to murder Khaled Hammoud, or simply to rob him. That was the issue which was determined adversely to the applicant at his trial.
Further, Mr Zraika’s evidence at his trial was, as discussed above, that he had a suspicion the applicant intended to cause harm to Khaled Hammoud, which later firmed into a belief, followed by a realisation that he in fact intended to kill him. Mr Zraika gave evidence that, on realising that the applicant had lied to him about his plans, he simply “played along” in order to gain further information about what was to occur and to frustrate any plans to harm Khaled Hammoud. In other words, he was not a party to any conspiracy. If this is accepted as possibly true, it raises a doubt as to the applicant’s guilt.
Critical to Mr Zraika’s evidence that there was no agreement between himself and the applicant was his evidence with respect to the nature of the relationship between them. That evidence, was, to a significant extent, the foundation on which his case was built. The (on the Crown case false) admission by the applicant to Mr Zraika that it was intended to rob Khaled Hammoud, when placed under pressure by Mr Zraika, is more believable in the context of a relationship which was not particularly close. This is also the case with respect to Mr Zraika’s evidence that he simply played along. By contrast, in the context of the applicant’s account of the relationship, that being one of absolute trust, the possibility that Mr Zraika was simply playing along is much diminished. On the applicant’s case, having brought Mr Zraika into his plans, once it was established that the applicant’s plan was to murder (a matter which is not presently in dispute), it followed that the applicant brought Mr Zraika into a plan to murder.
To place the above in perspective, to prove the agreement between the applicant and Mr Zraika, the Crown relied heavily on a call between them on 30 August. That call, while referring to a robbery, must be seen in the context of the evidence of the applicant’s dealings with Jack, which the applicant does not now dispute, engaging him to kill Khaled Hammoud. The recording suggests a closeness and level of trust between the two men. That reading of the call is supported, in the case against the applicant, by his own evidence. The inference that the subject of the discussion was a plan to kill (that is, that it accurately reflected the applicant’s plans with Jack), is thus more easily drawn against the applicant in the context of the evidence in his case, than as against Mr Zraika in his case.
Having regard to the above, I am of the view that the conviction of the applicant can be reconciled with the acquittal of Mr Zraika. The evidence available to the respective juries was different in material respects such that no inconsistency has been established.
I note that Part 8 of the CAR Act contains provisions modifying the common law to allow for the re-trial of persons in factual circumstances similar to those that pertained in The Queen v Carroll. There is nothing in those provisions, however, that would cover the present case.
If a prosecution for solicit to murder were not barred, it would be conducted many years after the event. It is not known whether, as a result of the passage of time, such a prosecution would be viable. There would potentially be a serious unfairness to the Crown in ordering an acquittal as a result of the passage of time since the relevant events occurred.
The potential difficulties for the Crown in prosecuting an offence of solicit to murder raises an obvious concern with respect to the desirability that serious crime be prosecuted and, if established, punished. I have not, however, had the benefit of submissions on the question of whether any such prosecution would be an abuse of process, bearing in mind that that prosecution would be based on precisely the same facts. In these circumstances, I would not take this matter into account in considering the court’s discretion.
Ultimately, while there is a powerful case to be made against dealing with the application, given the view I have formed as to its substantive merits, it is unnecessary to reach a concluded view with respect to this question.