Applicants v Respondent

1. On 16 November 2023 Gorton J made restraining orders pursuant to ss 18 and 19 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (the 'POCA' or 'Act') in relation to the land at 45, 50-54 Grosvenor Street, Abbotsford ('45, 50-54 Grosvenor') and 30-36 Grosvenor Street, Abbotsford ('30-36 Grosvenor') (together, the 'Grosvenor Properties'). Southlink Grosvenor Pty Ltd ('Southlink') and Southlink Grosvenor No 2 Pty Ltd ('Southlink 2') (collectively, the 'Southlink Companies' or 'Southlink Applicants') are the registered proprietors of the Grosvenor Properties.
2. One of the investors in the Southlink Companies is Zhu Investments Pty Ltd ('Zhu Investments'), the sole director and shareholder of which is Jie Zhu, who is the brother of Jing Zhu. Jing Zhu, along with five others have been charged in connection with an alleged money laundering operation of significant scale, informally known as the Long River Money Laundering Operation ('Long River MLO').
3. The restraining orders were made upon the suspicion that the funds invested by Zhu Investments for the acquisition of the Grosvenor Properties by the Southlink Companies originated from the Long River MLO. The orders of Gorton J also restrained the shares held by Zhu Investments in the Southlink Companies.
4. In Southlink Grosvenor Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police [2025] VSC 556, I set out in detail the background to this proceeding. It is unnecessary to repeat that detail here, save to highlight aspects of that background relevant to the present application.
5. The Southlink Companies propose that the restraining orders which presently apply to the Grosvenor Properties be revoked, and in place of the Grosvenor Properties, different properties of equivalent value be restrained ('the substitution application'). The properties proposed to be substituted for the Grosvenor Properties ('the substitution properties') comprise 20 residential apartments, supplemented by approximately $700,000 in cash.
6. The substitution properties comprise the following:

(a) five residential units, being Units 602, 603, 615, 713 and 815 located at 7 Claremont Street South Yarra, Victoria, more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume 11830 at folios 795, 796, 808, 826 and 848 ('Claremont Street Units'); and

(b) fifteen residential units, being Units 105, 409, 410, 505, 514, 602, 603, 608, 707, 1004, 1103, 1203, 1206, 1208 and 1211 located at 77 Queens Road, Melbourne, Victoria, more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume 11906 at folios 454, 503, 504, 514, 523, 526, 527, 532, 545, 579, 589, 600, 603, 605 and 608 ('Queens Road Units').

1. The substitution properties are owned by the following entities:

(a) Claremont Street Units - Jack & Judy Real Estate Pty Ltd ('Jack & Judy'); and

(b) Queens Road Units - South Fuji Developments Pty Ltd ('South Fuji').

1. None of the owners (or principals) of the substitution properties are suspects in the Long River MLO. On the face of it, the entities and their principals are unrelated to the underlying allegations of criminal activity. Each of the owners and their principals have given their express consent to their properties being restrained in substitution for the Grosvenor Properties. No explanation has been given by any of the owners as to their reasons for accepting that restraint.
2. If the proposed substitution were to be permitted, the Southlink Companies would be permitted to deal with the Grosvenor Properties, including by selling those properties, realising their value and distributing the returns. As originally framed, the substitution applications also sought release of the restraint upon Zhu Investments shareholding in the Southlink companies. At the hearing of this matter the application relating to Zhu Investments was abandoned.
3. As to value, both parties rely upon the evidence of sworn valuers. The Southlink Companies relied upon the sworn valuations prepared by Jones Lang LaSalle ('JLL') and Charter Keck Cramer ('CKC'), both of whom expressed the opinion was that the aggregate market value of the Grosvenor Properties exceeded the market value of the substitution properties by approximately $740,000. The Southlink Companies propose to make up the shortfall in cash to ensure that the undertakings are given in relation to property and assets of equivalent value to that of the properties presently restrained.
4. The Commissioner relied upon the evidence of Mr Kininmonth of Preston Rowe Paterson ('PRP'), who largely agreed with the assessments of market value given by JLL and CKC. The only difference between the valuers was that PRP expressed the view that the Grosvenor Properties, being commercial properties, were likely to increase in value at a greater rate over time than residential apartments such as the substitution properties.
5. The Southlink Companies were content not to cross-examine PRP's evidence, submitting that no expert was entitled to make predictions about the future. I do not accept that submission, or the characterisation of the evidence in that way. The opinion of Mr Kininmonth is not a prediction as to the future but rather an opinion which compares the inherent characteristics of land value, which is a subject that is within the expertise of a land valuer. The difference of opinion could be relevant to whether the proposed substitution properties are of equivalent. That being said, I proceed upon the basis that the assessment of current market value is agreed, that the value of the substitution properties and $740,000 in cash to make up the shortfall is in aggregate the same as the present value of the Grosvenor Properties. I nonetheless proceed on the basis that the substitution properties are likely to increase in value more slowly than the Grosvenor Properties, but that the effect of any difference has not been explored in a way which would permit a quantification of the difference. Insofar as there is a difference between the valuers, it is not one of significance in determining the outcome of this particular matter.
6. The Southlink Companies submit that the substitution properties are a fair exchange for the presently restrained properties.
7. The Commissioner says that there are a number of additional factors which must also be weighed in the balance, and that doing so should result in the rejection of the application. The Commissioner submits that a proper assessment of the proposed substitution is not confined to arithmetic equivalence of the market value of the properties, but must be informed by the context and purpose of the legislation.
8. It is common ground that a substitution application of this kind may be brought pursuant to s 44(2) of the POCA. Section 44(2) relevantly provides:

44 Giving security etc. to revoke etc. a restraining order

(1) ...

(2) A court may:

(a) revoke a restraining order that covers the property of a person who is not a suspect; or

(b) exclude specified property from such a restraining order;

(c) the person applies to the court to revoke the order or exclude the property; and

(d) the person gives written notice of the application to the responsible authority; and

(e) the person gives an undertaking concerning the person's property that is satisfactory to the court.

1. It is apparent that s 44(2) exists to confer a broad discretion on the Court to release from restraint the property of persons who are not suspected of any criminal activity. There is no express guidance as to the manner of its exercise or limits of the power conferred.
2. The heading of the provision suggests the range of undertakings which might be given are broad and include '[g]iving security etc'.
3. The discretion to accept a wide variety of undertakings is reinforced by the content of the explanatory memorandum, which in relation to s 44(2) states:

That undertaking is not required to involve a monetary amount, or be able to cover any possible liability imposed under the Act the only requirement is that it be satisfactory to the court.

1. While the form of undertaking which could be accepted is notionally broad, ultimately the success of an application depends upon it being 'satisfactory to the court'.
2. No express guidance is to be found in the provisions of s 44(2) as to the circumstances in which the power is to be exercised. The parties were agreed that there was little case law concerned with the exercise of power under s 44(2),[1] and such that there might be is of little assistance in the present case.
3. I accept that, as a matter of principle, each case falls to be decided on its own merits. It must be that the required state of satisfaction is to be informed by the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, having regard to the purpose of the provision, and the overarching purposes of the POCA.
4. No doubt the discretion exists to ameliorate, in appropriate circumstances and to the extent necessary or possible, hardship or inconvenience experienced by those whose property has been restrained but who are not suspected of criminal activity. This, however, is not the sole consideration, and the weight to be given to it must be tempered by the purposes of the POCA.
5. The principal objects of the POCA under s 5 include:

(a) to deprive persons of the proceeds of offences, the instruments of offences, and benefits derived from offences, against the laws of the Commonwealth ...; and

(b) to punish and deter persons from breaching laws of the Commonwealth ...; and

(c) to prevent the reinvestment of proceeds, instruments, benefits, literary proceeds and unexplained wealth amounts in further criminal activities; and

(da) to undermine the profitability of criminal enterprises; and

(e) to enable law enforcement authorities effectively to trace proceeds, instruments, benefits, literary proceeds and unexplained wealth amounts ...

1. The Southlink Companies submit that the undertakings proposed to be given by them should be regarded as satisfactory because:

(a) the value of the substitution properties and cash covers the full value of the Grosvenor Properties;

(b) notwithstanding that the Southlink Companies do not own the substitution properties, by private treaty between the Southlink Companies and the owners of the substitution properties, the Southlink Companies have acquired rights and powers in connection with the substitution properties which permit it to offer them in exchange for the revocation of the restraining orders over the Grosvenor Properties; and

(c) as the restraining orders in respect of Zhu Investments' shares in the Southlink Companies are now no longer the subject of this application, those restraining orders will remain in place preventing the return of capital, and distribution of profit or earnings into the hands of the only entity so far connected to the alleged money laundering operation.

1. The Southlink Companies submit that this Court should not be concerned that the substitution properties are owned by corporate entities that are separate from the Southlink Companies, or that the directors and shareholders of those companies are not entirely the same as those involved in the Southlink Companies. The Southlink Companies submit that it is sufficient that the owners of the substitution properties have consented to the arrangements which facilitate the undertakings sought to be relied upon.
2. As a matter of principle, there is no rule preventing someone who is unrelated to any of the alleged criminal conduct from offering up their properties in the terms contemplated by the Southlink Applicants. However, whether such an arrangement is 'satisfactory' depends upon all of the circumstances.
3. In the present case, the underlying criminal activity which has led to the making of the restraining orders involves money laundering of a significant scale. On the available evidence, the connection between the Grosvenor Properties and the money laundering activity arises from the purchase of those properties with funds derived from persons directly implicated in the money laundering activities.
4. At the present time, evidence of connection between the illegal conduct and the Southlink Companies is limited to those funds used by Zhu Investments to purchase its shares in the Southlink Companies which in turn contributed to the purchase price of the Grosvenor Properties in an amount approximately 25% of the purchase price. Zhu Investments is a shareholder in the entities which own the legal interests in the Grosvenor Properties. The Southlink Companies do not propose that the effect of the undertakings will dilute or diminish the restraint which presently exists in respect of Zhu Investments, nor the monetary value of that shareholding. The Southlink Companies are content to free up the value of only those shareholders who are not presently implicated in any money laundering activities.
5. At the time of the hearing before me the Commissioner's examinations of relevant persons concerned with the Southlink Companies' acquisition of the Grosvenor Properties had not commenced, despite efforts to progress them. Accordingly, the Commissioner says that at present very little is known about the connections between the other investors in the Southlink Companies. Equally little is known about the owners of the proposed substitution properties.
6. The Commissioner submits that it is in the nature of money laundering operations of the scale of the Long River MLO that the reach of connections and influence extends widely and runs deep. The Commissioner's position is that too little is known now to be able to say with any confidence that there is no or low risk that the assets presently restrained will not find their way back into the hands of criminals if substitution is permitted as proposed. The Commissioner does not suggest that its further investigations and examinations will necessarily reveal further connections between other shareholders in the Southlink Companies and the money laundering operations, but the Commissioner simply cannot exclude that possibility at this stage given the present state of knowledge.
7. Given the present state of knowledge, I cannot ignore the possibility of further connections emerging from the examination and investigation process. I also accept that it follows that there exists a risk that some of the proceeds of the alleged money laundering could be returned to those involved in the alleged criminal enterprise by making the orders sought by the Southlink Companies.
8. I accept the Commissioner's submission that these risks must be brought to bear in the assessment of whether the proposed arrangements are a satisfactory basis upon which to make the orders sought. An important consideration, and one to which I attribute considerable weight is that the risks that I have identified materialise, the outcome would be inconsistent with the purpose of the POCA.
9. I would be inclined to give less weight to this consideration in circumstances where the risk might be diminished by an improved state of knowledge arising from further investigations or examinations having be undertaken. At present the process of bringing on those examinations has barely begun, and for that reason greater caution is required.
10. In this case, the risk is accentuated both because of the underlying nature and scale of the alleged criminal conduct, but also because there is no evidence which explains why it is that the parties proposing to put their properties up in substitution for the release of the Grosvenor Properties are prepared to do so. The absence of this information ought properly generate caution, particularly where the alleged criminal conduct involves, as I understand it, a labyrinthine web of interconnected corporate and personal relationships which are designed to obfuscate the path of money passing from criminal operations into legitimate circulation in a way which seeks to impede detection and confound investigation.
11. In the absence of any explanation for the motivation and/or willingness of those putting up their property in exchange for the release of the restrained property (and exposing themselves to the risk of losing their property), the underlying nature of the criminal activity gives rise to legitimate suspicions about their motivations, and the risk that those proffering their property may not be doing so willingly, or may in some other way be deployed as part of an elaborate plan, not readily apparent, to release the funds presently restrained.
12. Should I ignore the possibility that the proposal before me is no more than an elaborate ploy to secure the release of the restrained properties, to facilitate by some presently unknown means, the return of proceeds of crime to those responsible? The Southlink Companies submit that I should be cautious not to act without evidence. The statement requires some unpacking. When restraining orders are made, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied under s 18(f) of the POCA that 'the authorised officer who made the affidavit holds the suspicion or suspicions stated in the affidavit on reasonable grounds'.
13. The Southlink Companies enjoin me to act on the available evidence, and not to speculate as to the extent and nature of the risks which might arise if the orders they seek are made. It is the paucity of evidence presently available on all sides which leaves open so many possibilities inconsistent with the purposes of the POCA, and which as a consequence, render me unsatisfied with the undertakings.
14. The requirement that this Court be satisfied with any undertaking sufficient to justify an order under s 44(2) necessarily involves an assessment of risk in the context of what is presently known, and the gaps in that knowledge. The risk must be assessed having regard to the initial purpose of imposing the restraint, the state of the evidence as it now stands, and the overarching purposes of the POCA.
15. In all of the circumstances of this case I am not satisfied that the proposed undertakings are satisfactory. The current state of knowledge lacks sufficient maturity. The Commissioner has not completed their examinations. While the Southlink Companies are critical of the time this has taken, I must take account of the complexity of the underlying offending, the enormity of that operation and the investigative work involved in that task. I am not at present ready to conclude that the delays in completing the examinations are either unreasonable or entirely the fault of the Commissioner. Together with the absence of any explanation for the involvement of the owners of the substitution properties, and the potential for consequences which are inconsistent with the purposes of the POCA, caution should be the determinative consideration.
16. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

1. In their written submissions, the Southlink Companies also rely upon s 39 of the POCA as an independent power to grant the orders they seek.
2. Section 39 provides as follows:

(1) The court that made a restraining order ... may make any ancillary orders that the court considers appropriate and, without limiting the generality of this, the court may make any one or more of the following orders:

(a) an order varying the property covered by the restraining order;

(f) an order giving directions about the operation of the restraining order and ... a forfeiture order that covers the same property as the restraining order;

1. There is a good basis for concluding that s 39 is not an alternative or substitute for s 44(2). The release of the Grosvenor Properties (being sought by the Southlink Companies here) is specifically addressed by the various provisions dealing with exclusion. The power contained in s 39 is described as 'ancillary', facilitating the variation of restraining orders, not as an alternative to s 44 which exists specifically to facilitate substitution. In Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Kanjo the Court observed:

Section 39 was required to be construed having regard to the fact that the POCA expressly provides for constrained avenues by which a suspect may apply for the exclusion of property from a restraining order. As stated in Anthony Hordern:

When the Legislature explicitly gives a power by a particular provision which prescribes the mode in which it shall be exercised and the conditions and restrictions which must be observed, it excludes the operation of general expressions in the same instrument which might otherwise have been relied upon for the same power.

...

While the power in s 39 of the POCA may, in an appropriate case, extend to an order excluding property from restraint, the ancillary nature of the s 39 power requires close regard to be given to its hierarchy in the provisions of the POCA. Suffice it to say that the s 39 power, being ancillary to the power to make a restraining order, cannot be used to circumvent the limited and conditional avenues for exclusion expressly prescribed for in ss 24 and 29.[2]

1. There is good reason for treating this passage as a correct statement of principle.
2. In any event, even if s 39 were available as an alternative means of seeking the relief pressed by the Southlink Companies, it is apparent there ought be no material difference in the outcome because under s 39(1) the Court can only make orders that it 'considers appropriate'. The test framed in that way, and without any further textual guidance, would not give rise to a materially different analysis or process of reasoning than is required to achieve the necessary state of satisfaction which is the precondition to any order that might be made under s 44(2).
3. For the avoidance of doubt I would not reach any different conclusion if s 39 was said to apply and I were required to reach the conclusion that the proposal is considered 'appropriate'.

1. On 5 September 2025, I gave directions concerning the future conduct of the Southlink Companies applications for exclusion orders. At the case management hearing on 7 August 2025 the Southlink Companies sought to have their applications heard promptly. The Commissioner opposed that course. One of the central issues was whether the Southlink applications should or could be heard separately and before the other exclusion applications related to the Long River MLO. For the reasons which I gave in Southlink Grosvenor Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police [2025] VSC 556 it was premature to list the Southlink matters for hearing at that time.
2. The Southlink applications were listed for a further hearing before me, and I ordered the Commissioner file and serve any affidavit material before that directions hearing as to the progress made in its conduct of examinations, whether the exclusion applications should be further delayed, and the extent and reasons of any such delay.
3. The Commissioner filed the affidavits of Ms Sheehan dated 12 November and 18 November 2025, and Mr Piscicelli dated 12 November 2025. In the hearing before me on 19 November 2025, the Southlink Companies reprised their request for the prompt hearing of their exclusion applications.
4. I remain of the view that it is premature for this matter to be listed for hearing at this stage for the following reasons.
5. As at 30 October 2025, the Commissioner had not completed any examinations. The Southlink Companies submitted, as they did before me on 7 August 2025, that the Commissioner's delay was unacceptable and that they were entitled to a prompt hearing of their applications.
6. Section 32 of the POCA states:
   1. Application not to be heard unless responsible authority has had reasonable opportunity to conduct an examination

The court must not hear an application to exclude specified property from the restraining order if:

(a) the restraining order is in force; and

(b) the responsible authority has not been given a reasonable opportunity to conduct *examinations in relation to the application.

1. Section 180 of the POCA permits the Commissioner to seek examination orders, it does not compel the making of an application of such orders nor does it prescribe a time frame within which such an application must be made. Section 32 prevents a responsible authority being forced prematurely into a position on an application for exclusion orders where it has not yet had enough of an opportunity to properly explore the circumstances of the restrained property and the connections of people to that property. At the same time, it is also clear that s 32 operates to motivate the responsible authority to act with reasonable diligence and speed to conduct necessary examinations, because the consequence of inexplicable and unreasonable delay might result in a hearing on the application for exclusion even if that court is opposed by the responsible authority. Section 32 invites an objective inquiry as to the adequacy of the opportunity of the responsible authority to conduct examinations. That inquiry must be informed by the facts and circumstances of the matter. It is not necessary or desirable to articulate indicia of reasonableness. The circumstances delineating between a reasonable opportunity to conduct examinations and unreasonable delay, will be peculiar to the circumstances of the case at hand.
2. Apparent inaction over a period of time by a responsible authority may, in an appropriate case, be a factor which points strongly to the conclusion that the responsible authority has had a reasonable opportunity to conduct examinations such that a hearing should proceed, but in other cases where the delay in conducting examinations can be explained by other factors (such as the scale or complexity of the task of preparing for such examinations) then mere delay in the commencement of the examinations will not be sufficient.
3. It follows that whether the Commissioner has had a 'reasonable opportunity' to conduct examinations in the present case is a question of fact, to be judged by reference to all of the circumstances.
4. It is helpful to step through in detail the circumstances of the present case which militate against the conclusion that the Commissioner has had a reasonable opportunity to conduct the examinations.

1. The Southlink exclusion applications were first made on 28 March 2024 (about 5 months after the initial restraining order). The applications were made returnable for hearing on 15 May 2024. They joined a vast number of other exclusion applications made by others in the context of the broader Long River MLO investigations. The Southlink exclusion applications (like the others) were adjourned until 27 November 2024, when the Southlink Applicants, along with a small number of other applicants for exclusion orders in the Long River MLO proceeding, informed the Court of their wish to bring on a hearing of their discrete applications, even if the remaining applicants for exclusion in the Long River MLO were content to have their matters adjourned. The Commissioner foreshadowed that they opposed this course. The Commissioner's position was that all applications for exclusion arising from the Long River MLO should be heard and determined together. The Southlink Applicants, along with the others, obtained orders for a directions hearing on 26 February 2025 to consider whether the Southlink and other applications seeking a prompt hearing should be heard separately from the remaining exclusion applications arising from the Long River MLO.
2. On 28 February 2025, following the directions hearing, McCann JR made orders listing the Southlink Applicant's exclusion applications (along with other applications) for a case management hearing on 1 May 2025 to consider whether they should be permitted to proceed ahead of the remaining applications.
3. On 12 March 2025, the Southlink Applicants filed submissions in support of a prompt and separate hearing of their exclusion applications. The submissions abandoned the similar requests of the other parties, leaving only the Southlink Applicants to agitate for an expedited hearing on their exclusion applications.
4. In substance, the Southlink applications as originally framed were largely similar to the great number of other applications for exclusion (totalling more than a hundred) in the Long River MLO proceedings. In their 12 March 2025 submissions the Southlink Applicants explicitly framed their applications on the basis that, for the limited purpose of those applications, they accepted that funds used by Zhu Investments were tainted by the Long River MLO and the underlying criminal conduct which produced those funds. According to the Southlink Companies, this concession limited the nature of the inquiry and the scope of the examinations because, on their case the only question was whether or not the director of the Southlink Companies knew or ought reasonably to have known that the funds from Zhu Investments were tainted. According to the Southlink Applicants, this meant that:

(a) the Southlink exclusion applications could be hived off from consideration of the other exclusion applications arising in the context of the broader Long River MLO; and

(b) the Commissioner had no reason not to progress the examinations and investigations, nor was there any good reason for delay which might prevent a prompt hearing.

1. Southlink complained that the Commissioner had been slow to investigate the exclusion applications in general, and that the Commissioner should be set a tight time frame to conduct the examinations necessary to respond to the narrowed way in which the case was now framed.
2. In the context of s 32, it is difficult to count the period between March 2024 and November 2024 as a proper basis for complaint by the Southlink Companies about delay or inaction on the part of the Commissioner. During that period the Commissioner was under no obligation to conduct examinations in relation to the Southlink applications in particular. More than 100 applications for exclusion had been made in relation to the Long River MLO and all had been adjourned. Clearly enough, there was no basis upon which the Southlink examinations could or should be prioritised over other work.
3. Even after November 2024, the Southlink applications for exclusion broadly called into question whether the funds were the proceeds of crime at all. The Commissioner's foreshadowed objection to a prompt and separate hearing in relation to the Southlink applications in those circumstances had considerable force. At least on the face of it, a hearing on that broad basis would have required the exploration of factual matters which were necessarily relevant to other applications for exclusion which stood adjourned.

1. Since 12 March 2025, when the Southlink Applicants' position became clear, the Commissioner has taken steps to organise examinations.

(a) On 10 April 2025, an application for an examination order was filed by the Commissioner for William Lo who was separately represented.

(b) Subsequently, applications for examination orders were filed by the Commissioner for the other examinees who were jointly represented on:

(i) 15 April 2025 for Jie Zhu, Yuan Tao and Sam Cimino;

(ii) 8 May 2025 for Keqi Zhang, Yenan Yin, Jing Ye, Zhen Li and Wenqian Ding;

1. Examination orders were made by McCann JR for the Southlink Examinees (with the exception of Yenan Yin who could not be served) on 13 June 2025. On 6 August 2025, the Court made orders by consent for the examination of William Lo.
2. I understand that from 29 April 2025, the Commissioner began communicating with the Federal Administrative Review Tribunal ('ART') to arrange for examination hearings. The Commissioner was subsequently told that the process for obtaining examination dates from the ART had changed and that the ART would assign members to conduct the examinations once provided with proposed dates from the parties.
3. On 19 May 2025, the Commissioner advised the Southlink Examinees of the new ART process and requested dates from the Southlink Examinees. These were provided on 27 May 2025. On 3 June 2025 the Commissioner provided a list of available dates as agreed between the parties to the ART for examinations to be completed between 25 July 2025 and 20 August 2025. On 11 June 2025 the ART confirmed the dates and allocated members to those examinations on 12 June 2025. By an error in the registry of the ART, the members allocated to the examinations were based in the Sydney registry rather than the Melbourne registry. The error was communicated by the Commissioner to the representatives of the Southlink Examinees on 11 July 2025. New dates in the Melbourne Registry were required.
4. The Southlink applications for a prompt hearing came on for hearing before me on 7 August 2025. By that stage, the narrower basis upon which the applications for exclusion had been made had only been known for five months, but in the time since, the Commissioner had begun taking steps to commence their examinations.
5. On 6 August 2025, the Commissioner informed the representatives for the Southlink Examinees that they were arranging to have an examination notice issued for Sam Cimino on 18 August 2025. On 13 August 2025, the representatives for the Southlink Examinees informed the Commissioner that 18 August was no longer a suitable date for the examination of Sam Cimino.
6. New dates for examinations to be conducted by the Melbourne registry of the ART were sought on 28 August 2025 for Sam Cimino and Yuan Tao. Examination notices were requested by the Commissioner from the ART on 12 September 2025. An examination notice for Sam Cimino was then issued on 30 September 2025. An examination notice for Yuan Tao, which was delayed owing to a compounding error contained in various documents, meant that the examination notice was not issued by the ART until 15 October 2025 and subsequently served on the representatives of the Southlink Examinees on 16 October 2025.
7. On 2 October 2025 the ART was contacted regarding the availability of examination dates for Keqi Zhang, Jie Zhu and Wenqian Ding. The ART responded with available dates on 3 October 2025. Draft examination notices were sent by the Commissioner to the ART on 14 October 2025, with the ART confirming the dates later that day. On 16 October 2025, examination notices for Wenqian Ding and Jie Zhu were issued and were served on the representatives of the Southlink Examinees the same day. On 21 October 2025, a further examination notice for Keqi Zhang was issued and served on the representatives of the Southlink Examinees the same day. Similarly an examination notice for William Lo was issued on 29 September 2025 following discussions on suitable dates between the Commissioner and William Lo's representatives.

1. At the time of Ms Sheehan's affidavit of 18 November 2025, the Southlink Examinees were scheduled for examination before the ART, between 26 November and 17 December 2025.
2. Against the backdrop of attempting to arrange examinations, it is apparent that some procedural and interlocutory matters have arisen. Between 6 August 2025 and 25 September 2025, correspondence between the Commissioner and the Southlink Examinees' representatives records that the Commissioner raised concerns about the common representation of the Southlink Examinees.
3. On 13 November 2025 the Commissioner filed a detailed written submission on the issue of common representation of the Southlink Examinees, the afternoon before the examination of Sam Cimino, the accountant for the entities associated with the shareholder of the Southlink Companies and other corporate entities of which Yuan Tao is a director. The Commissioner applied to restrain the representatives of the Southlink Examinees from acting for Sam Cimino. Consequently, the examination of Sam Cimino scheduled for 14 November 2025 was adjourned, and the authorised examiner reserved their decision on the Commissioner's objection to a date to be fixed. This matter was briefly ventilated before me on 19 November 2025.
4. At the time of the hearing before me, efforts had been made to organise the examinations of other key persons, but the task had not been completed.
5. Mr Piscicelli deposed in his affidavit dated 12 November 2025 that the information to be obtained in the investigations and the documents subsequently produced will likely require further investigation, analysis and comparison with material already obtained. I accept that this is obviously the case.

1. In my reasons on 5 September 2025 I was not prepared to accept on the evidence before me at that time that the Southlink applications should be adjourned indefinitely or could only be heard concurrently with all other applications for exclusion made in the context of the Long River MLO.[3] Accordingly, I rejected the thrust of the Commissioner's primary position.
2. As to whether or not the Commissioner had been given a reasonable opportunity to conduct examinations I declined to express a view. I said that:

I am struck by the fact that Southlink's application for exclusion orders was made some time ago, but I note that the refinement and narrowing of its position is relatively recent. I am mindful that examinations are presently underway, and that this may yield more information and greater clarity as to how the future conduct of this matter in this Court should be managed. It may well be that it is not possible for the Commissioner to advance a comprehensive response to the Southlink exclusion applications until all of the work which it says must be done is completed, but the evidence to date does not establish that the Commissioner has addressed itself directly to the narrower case advanced by the Southlink entities in a meaningful way.[4]

1. The progress which I had anticipated might have been made on the examinations has not occurred. The impediments to progressing the examinations have not been the fault of the Commissioner. Some progress has been made. The Commissioner has made reasonable efforts to bring on the examinations. While there have been delays, those delays are explicable by reference to a number of factors. Some delays are explicable by the listing errors in the ART beyond the control of all parties. Delay is also as a result of the normal exigencies of trying to accommodate the convenience of legal representatives on both sides already engaged in complex litigation.
2. In this case, delay has also arisen from the need to resolve important points of principle concerning the legal representation of the examinees, some of whom are central to a proper investigation. The Southlink Companies say that the Commissioner should have raised the question of common representation sooner than the night before the commencement of the examination of Mr Cimino. This may have been desirable but I am in no position to attribute blame on the material before me. Even taking Southlink's complaint about this matter at its highest, the delay occasioned by the adjournment would not lead me to the conclusion that the Commissioner should be taken to have squandered their reasonable opportunity to have conducted examinations. Given the overall complexity of the underlying activities which lie at the centre of the investigations and examinations, and the relatively short time which has elapsed since the refinement of the Southlink applications, I do not consider that the Commissioner has yet had a reasonable opportunity to conduct examinations.
3. Accordingly, I would not grant the Southlink Companies' application to list the exclusion applications for hearing at this time. The Southlink Companies will have liberty to apply for the matter to be brought on for hearing again once either the examinations are completed, or failing that, on evidence that a reasonable opportunity to conduct the examinations has been given to the Commissioner. Otherwise, the matter will be listed for further mention before McCann JR. It would be premature and inefficient at this stage to list the matter before a judge of this Court, given the current status of the examinations.

1. Before making final orders dismissing the applications for substitution and adjourning the exclusion applications to a date to be fixed, I will invite the parties to make submissions as to costs.

[1] See Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Pharmacy Depot Hurstville Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] NSWSC 643 and the subsequent appeal in Youssef v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police [2019] NSWCA 272.

[2] [2019] QCA 143; (2019) 1 QR 568, 590 [48], 591 [52] (Philippides JA, Gotterson JA agreeing) (citations omitted).

[3] Southlink Grosvenor Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police [2025] VSC 556, [80].