Applicants v Respondent

1 On 7 July 2025 I heard two applications for compensation orders made pursuant to s 85B of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ('the Act') by Ms Georgia Head and Ms Alexandra Head (together, 'the applicants').[1] The applicants are the only two children of Ms Mandy Melzer-Head, who was murdered by Mr Trefor Kingdon ('the respondent') on 12 May 2020. The respondent was Ms Melzer-Head's partner at the time of her death.

2 A complete account of the respondent's offending is set out in the reasons for sentence of Lasry J.[2] For present purposes, I will only provide a brief summary.

3 The respondent and Ms Melzer-Head, who had briefly been in a relationship in high school, rekindled their relationship following a school reunion in 2018. As at May 2020, the pair were living at a property in Bendoc in East Gippsland.

4 On the night of 11 May 2020, the respondent, his friend John Osborne, and Ms Melzer-Head were socialising at the Bendoc property. Later in the night and into the early hours of 12 May 2020, after Mr Osborne had gone to bed, there was an argument between the respondent and Ms Melzer-Head and the relationship apparently ended.

5 The respondent subsequently stabbed Ms Melzer-Head with a kitchen knife 11 times to the chest and back. He alerted Mr Osborne to what he had done, who called triple zero and performed CPR compressions for over two hours. The respondent did not assist with resuscitation efforts but made no attempt to flee or conceal his involvement in the offending.

6 The respondent was charged with murder on 12 May 2020. On 31 August 2021, the respondent pleaded guilty to that charge before this Court. On 21 December 2021, he was sentenced by Lasry J to 23 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 16 years and three months.

7 Both applicants filed applications pursuant to s 85C of the Act on 1 December 2022. This matter has undergone lengthy case management in the intervening two and a half years.

8 On 4 April 2024, Freeman JR ordered the matter to be referred for judicial mediation. That mediation occurred in May 2024, and the Court was subsequently advised that the matter had settled. As is the usual process, the matter was brought back before the Court on 30 October 2024 for finalisation. On that date, the parties advised Freeman JR that the matter had resolved for an agreed sum with deeds of release signed by the parties, but complications had arisen in giving effect to the settlement. The matter was consequently listed for hearing before a judge of this Court.

9 Simply by way of context, a perusal of the material on the court file shows that the protracted nature of this matter arises in the following circumstances:

(a) After the respondent was charged, on 2 September 2020, the Director of Public Prosecutions ('DPP') obtained a restraining order under s 16 of the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) over a property in Binningup, Western Australia, ('the Binnningup property') of which the respondent was the sole proprietor;

(b) On 18 September 2020, the restraining order was varied to allow certain distributions to be made from the proceeds of sale of the Binningup property and for the balance of the sale proceeds to be paid to Asset Confiscation Operations and held on trust until further order;

(c) On 5 October 2020, the sale of the Binningup property was settled;

(d) Following the sale of the Binningup property, the ANZ bank apparently required the proceeds of the sale to be paid against the mortgage of a property in Byford, Western Australia ('the Byford property'), rather than into an asset pool for distribution to the applicants;

(e) On 2 December 2020, the DPP obtained a restraining order over the Byford property under s 16 of the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) and further orders were obtained allowing the respondent's wife to transfer her interest in that property to the respondent. The respondent's son, Rhys Kingdon,[3] is a tenant in common as to 19/20 shares in the property. The DPP contended that the respondent also has an equitable interest in the Byford property pursuant to s 10(b) of the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) (broadly speaking, it was property that was a gift from the respondent);

(f) At the time the Byford property was restrained, its land valuation was approximately $320,000, with a mortgage of around $236,000;

(g) The matter resolved at the mediation for an agreed sum and an agreement that the Byford property would be sold to allow satisfaction of the compensation amount. Rhys was present at the mediation as an interested party in relation to the Byford property. Deeds of release were signed;

(h) However, after the mediation, Rhys (through the respondent) advised that the sale of the Byford property had been delayed because of a dispute between Rhys and his former spouse, who was residing at the Byford property with their children and refusing to vacate the property to enable its sale, and because of family law proceedings on foot between Rhys and his former spouse; and

(i) The matter was subsequently brought back in February and March this year after further follow up with Rhys' lawyers. In short, his lawyers advised that they had not heard anything from Rhys' estranged wife regarding the sale of the Byford property, and it appears that she is not legally represented and still residing in the Byford property. In light of the delays and the lapse of the settlement deed the matter was listed for hearing.

10 Despite any compensation order the Court makes in this hearing, enforcement of those orders becomes a separate matter for the applicants to pursue.

11 For most of these proceedings, the respondent has not been legally represented and was unrepresented at the hearing of the applications.

12 Applications of this kind are governed by Subdivision 1 of Division 2 of Part 4 of the Act. Section 85B relevantly provides:

(1) If a court -

(a) finds a person guilty of an offence; or

(b) convicts a person of an offence -

it may, on the application of a person who has suffered any injury as a direct result of the offence, order the offender to pay compensation of such amount as the court thinks fit for any matter referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (2).

(2) A compensation order may be made up of amounts -

(a) for pain and suffering experienced by the victim as a direct result of the offence;

(b) for some or all of any expenses actually incurred, or reasonably likely to be incurred, by the victim for reasonable counselling services as a direct result of the offence;

(c) for some or all of any medical expenses actually and reasonably incurred, or reasonably likely to be incurred, by the victim as a direct result of the offence;

(d) for some or all of any other expenses actually and reasonably incurred, or reasonably likely to be incurred, by the victim as a direct result of the offence, not including any expense arising from loss of or damage to property.

13 'Injury' is defined within s 85A of the Act to mean:

(b) mental illness or disorder or an exacerbation of a mental illness or disorder, whether or not flowing from nervous shock; or

(c) pregnancy; or

(d) grief, distress or trauma or other significant adverse effect; or

(e) any combination or matters referred to in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) arising from an offence -

but does not include injury arising from loss of or damage to property

14 The offending need not be the sole cause of the injury, so long as it had a significant role in causing the injury. Nor does the reference in s 85B of the Act to the injury being the 'direct' result of the offence mean the injury must be 'immediate, proximate or obvious'.[4]

15 The quantum of any compensation (within the ambit of s 85B(2) of the Act) is entirely within the discretion of the Court, but relevant factors that should be taken into account in that assessment include:[5]

• the circumstances in which the death occurred;
• the effect on the applicant on hearing of the event causing loss;
• the closeness of the relationship between the applicant and the deceased;
• the age of the applicant; and
• the extent of grief and psychological suffering experienced as a result of the loss.

16 The assessment of quantum was discussed by T Forrest J in Moresco v Budimir:[6]

Orders for compensation are not limited to injuries that would be compensable at common law. The Act's definition of 'injury' is broad and includes grief and distress. An application for compensation for pain and suffering is not subject to the restrictions in Part VBA of the Wrongs Act 1958 as being a claim for 'recovery of damages' for non-economic loss. I will return to s 85B(2), and the issue of quantum, shortly.

The expression [is] 'direct result of', which means 'an injury that is judged as a matter of fact, according to common-sense and experience, to have been caused by the offence.'

. . .

Although the application is ancillary to the criminal proceeding, it is itself a civil proceeding, to which the civil standard of proof applies.

If there is an entitlement to compensation, the assessment of the quantum of that entitlement is undertaken by application of the common law principles of assessment of damages, subject to any necessary modification. The judge must intuitively synthesise all of the material circumstances of the case, including the seriousness of the offending, the relationship between the offence and the victim and the victim and the offender, the degree of injury suffered by the victim, the offender's financial circumstances and the effect of an order on the offender's prospects for rehabilitation.

17 In St Clair and Holmes v Jamieson,[7] Bell J summarised the 'fundamental reparatory principle' governing s 85B as follows:[8]

The purpose of the order is to compensate the victim, not to punish the offender. Therefore the court must not allow the proceeding to drift into a quasi-resentencing process in which an assessment is carried out by reference to the retributive rather than compensatory considerations.

. . .

Compensation for pain and suffering, which encompasses loss of enjoyment and amenities of life, is assessed according to well-accepted principles that are applied by judges and juries in common law damages cases on comparable materials every day. At common law, the general principles of damages, which applies equally to the pain and suffering component, requires an assessment of 'a sum which, so far as money can do, will put [the injured party] in the same position as he or she would have been in if [the wrong had not been committed]'. It is understood that it is 'impossible to assess damages [and therefore crimes compensation] for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life by any process of arithmetical calculation', but the amount must be 'fair and reasonable'. The assessment is to be objective, rational and evaluative. In the context of crimes compensation, what is required is an assessment of compensation for pain and suffering resulting from criminal conduct that has a particular impact upon the victim, which is typically experienced as a deeply personal level... Therefore, the focus is upon 'the actual impact' of the (criminal) acts of the offender upon the victim, about which it is proper for judges 'to draw inferences from human experience', not upon the compensability of the (tortious) acts of the offender at common law.

. . .

The court should avoid over-compensating the victim, but not by applying a set discount or following a formulaic approach, for each case must be decided on its own merits.

18 Given an order under s 85B of the Act is strictly compensatory in nature, it does not allow for an award of punitive or aggravated damages.[9] Similarly, in Brooks v Meade,[10] Weinberg JA held:[11]

Section 85B is plainly intended to facilitate a swift, and relatively low cost means of redress for the harm suffered by victims of crime. It avoids the need to force them to embark upon lengthy, and complex, civil litigation. At the same time, because the process entailed is summary in nature, it is appropriate to take a somewhat conservative view of the amounts that should be paid, given that detailed evidence in support of claims may not necessarily be available, and a broad brush approach may have to be adopted.

19 The Court may also take the financial circumstances of the offender, and the burden of payment, into account.[12] While an offender's means is a relevant consideration, it is not a 'controlling consideration' - put another way, the fact that the offender may have limited finances does not necessitate a reduction in the compensatory sum.[13] Similarly, a court is not precluded from making a compensation order because it is unable to ascertain the financial circumstances of the offender.[14]

20 Any compensation must be reduced by any amount awarded to the applicants under either the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic) or Victims of Crime (Financial Assistance Scheme) Act 2022 (Vic) ('victims of crime legislation').[15]

21 The Court received the following materials on the applications:

(i) Affidavits of Georgia Head affirmed 4 July 2023 and 2 July 2025;

(ii) Report of Dr David Weissman dated 13 April 2023; and

(iii) Report of Dr Sarah Crome dated 6 November 2023.

(iv) Affidavit of Alexandra Head affirmed 4 July 2023 and 2 July 2025;

(v) Report of Dr David Weissman dated 17 April 2023;

(vi) Letter of Dr Ruth McNair dated 24 May 2023; and

(vii) Report of Dr Sarah Crome dated 19 November 2023.

(viii) Statements of Trefor Kingdon dated 30 November 2023 and 13 May 2025.

22 Georgia is currently 37 years old. She was 32 years old when her mother was murdered.

23 Georgia was living in New York in May 2020. She recalls receiving a call from her father at about 5am local time, notifying her of her mother's death. She did not know any details about her mother's passing for a number of days, and travel back to Australia was fraught with bureaucracy and extended quarantine because of the pandemic. Her partner also could not be with her at her mother's memorial, or to assist her to clean out her mother's home. Each of these factors added to her distress.

24 She returned to New York because of the lockdowns in Melbourne and felt isolated and alone. She was not coping with her work and felt exhausted constantly.

25 Georgia still ruminates on her mother's death and the vagueness of detail in the immediate aftermath. Going to airports results in flashbacks. She experiences problems with concentration and memory, high anxiety, and guilt and regret for being overseas and losing precious time with her mother. She has lost motivation for her career and no longer works at full capacity.

26 She has stress-related neck and back pain and has difficulty sleeping. She is triggered by loud noises and things she sees on the news. She thinks about her mother constantly.

27 Her social circle has decreased, and her relationship with her partner (who is also her business partner) is strained.

28 In her affidavit dated 4 July 2023, Georgia deposed that the thought of starting her own family without her mother caused her immense distress. Georgia has since had a child. In her affidavit dated 2 July 2025, Georgia says that becoming a mother when she lost her own in such violent circumstances is a source of significant pain and distress. Many of the special moments of becoming a mother have been marred by her mother's death. Instead of feeling joy and excitement, her experiences have been marked with an overwhelming sense of absence and longing. She finds it very painful that her mother will not have the opportunity to be a grandparent, and recalls that Ms Melzer-Head was brilliant with children.

29 Georgia's feelings of anxiety were heightened during her pregnancy and she felt hyper-aware and protective, particularly in crowded spaces and by loud noises. Routine activities, such as catching public transport, have become stressful. Her anxiety has continued since having her child.

30 She says she has continued to attend therapy sessions and that the process of working through what it means to be a motherless mother is layered and ongoing.

31 Since her mother's death Georgia has gradually come to feel more comfortable in smaller, quieter spaces with people she is familiar with. She used to be an extroverted person who was energised by social connection.

32 Although she has worked hard to build a stable and loving life for her family, Georgia feels her mother's absence every day and her death affects every part of Georgia's life. She believes she will always be impacted by the horrible circumstances of her mother's death.

33 Dr Sarah Crome is Georgia's treating clinical psychologist. At the time of her report in November 2023, she had been treating Georgia since September 2020. Her assessment is that Georgia had diagnoses of prolonged grief disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder ('PTSD') with dissociative symptoms (principal).

34 Georgia was assessed by Dr David Weissman, consultant psychiatrist, in April 2023. He concluded that, at that time, she was suffering from:

• moderate chronic adjustment disorder with depressed (deeply sad) and anxious mood;
• mild to moderate chronic post-traumatic stress and anxiety syndrome; and
• moderate unresolved grief reaction and persistent bereavement process.

35 Dr Weissman recommended Georgia continue sessions with Dr Crome on a monthly basis for at least 12 months (if not 24 months), and suggested she may benefit from antidepressant medication. He opined that her psychiatric prognosis was 'mildly uncertain and guarded' and that she would never fully recover from the death of her mother. He assessed her collective whole person psychiatric impairment to be in the order of 20%, although this was not fully reflective of her loss and sadness.

36 Alexandra is currently 35 years old. She was 30 years old when her mother was murdered.

37 Alexandra recalls her father calling her at about 7pm to inform her that her mother had been killed. The phone call from her father came moments after she had arrived at her partner's house to meet his sister for the first time. She said that it took several hours to contact Georgia because of the time difference, which was distressing.

38 Alexandra had not seen her mother for more than six months because of COVID lockdowns, but would speak to her by phone daily. She was planning to introduce her partner to her mother the next day. The fact that they never met has caused her significant anger and distress. Ms Melzer-Head was killed the day before Mother's Day and now every Mother's Day, and the week leading up to it, is re-traumatising for Alexandra.

39 Following Ms Melzer-Head's death, Alexandra did not work for a year. On her return to work, she struggled significantly, particularly on days that coincided with court hearings. She had to take on a less demanding job, and could only focus on her career again after the criminal process had concluded. She had a mental breakdown within the first six months of starting her current role. She is concerned about her ability to stay in her current job long term, and the impact on her career progression - she once desired to complete a PhD, but is now concerned that she will not be able to cope mentally.

40 In her affidavit dated 4 July 2023, Alexandra said she struggled with memory, focus and concentration. She experienced severe anxiety, and was extremely exhausted and overwhelmed. She lacked the 'zest for life' that she used to have.

41 In her affidavit dated 2 July 2025, she deposes to the continuation of these experiences. She continues to forget and misplace things. The issues with her memory and concentration affect both her personal and work life. Her severe anxiety is coupled with feelings of panic, dread and worry. Alexandra also deposes that she takes medication for her PTSD.

42 Her relationship with her partner has been strained. In her words, he has become her carer. They were denied a lot of the milestones that young couples celebrate together. She has no interest in intimacy or her appearance. Her symptoms continue to impact her relationship with her partner and she feels like she is a burden.

43 In her first affidavit Alexandra deposed to physical pain all over her body, and to having violent and graphic nightmares several times a week. In the affidavit dated 2 July 2025, Alexandra says that she now has nightmares nightly, which cause her to wake in a panic and that she struggles to settle herself for the remainder of the day when this happens.

44 She commenced anti-depressant medication in 2022 which, as at July 2023, only slightly alleviated her symptoms and had unpleasant side effects. Alexandra says in February 2025 she began to reduce her anti-depressant medication and in June 2025 she stopped taking it completely. However, she worries that her condition is deteriorating. She continues to take Valium for her ongoing anxiety and to help her sleep.

45 Ms Melzer-Head wanted to be a grandmother, and knowing that she was robbed of this breaks Alexandra's heart. She thought that she would have children of her own by this stage of her life, but now believes she would not be able to cope.

46 Alexandra does not believe she will ever fully recover from the loss of her mother and believes the circumstances surrounding Ms Melzer-Head's death will continue to impact her ability to live a full and happy life.

47 Alexandra's General Practitioner, Dr Ruth McNair, echoes much of the above. She opines that Alexandra's pre-existing anxiety was exacerbated by her mother's death, and, although she is likely to gradually recover from the acute trauma and grief, her anxiety will need ongoing treatment including through counselling and medication.

48 Dr Crome is also Alexandra's treating clinical psychologist. At the time of her report in November 2023, she had been treating Alexandra since August 2020. Her assessment is that Alexandra had diagnoses of PTSD with dissociative symptoms (principal) and major depressive disorder (moderate) with anxious distress.

49 Alexandra was also assessed by Dr Weissman in April 2023. He concluded that, at that time, she was suffering from:

• moderate chronic adjustment disorder with depressed (deeply sad) and anxious mood;
• moderate chronic post-traumatic stress and anxiety syndrome; and
• moderate unresolved grief reaction and persistent bereavement process.

50 Dr Weissman recommended Alexandra continue anti-depressant treatment and sessions with Dr Crome monthly for 12 months (if not 24 months). He opined that her psychiatric prognosis is 'somewhat uncertain and guarded' and that she would never fully recover from the death of her mother. He assessed her collective whole person psychiatric impairment to be in the order of 20 per cent, although this was not fully reflective of her loss and sadness.

51 Although not a formal affidavit, Mr Kingdon provided a statement signed 13 May 2025 indicating his financial position. He indicated his total assets were valued at $52,208.30, comprising of a five per cent interest in the Byford property, the contents of his bank account, the value of a broking business, and various amounts held in prison accounts.

52 Mr Kingdon indicated that the valuation of the broking business ($18,828.84) was on the basis that the trial commission is ongoing, but that there was in fact no legal obligation for it to continue. He also indicated that Rhys's estranged partner and their two children currently reside in the Byford property, which will likely become subject to a family law agreement which has stalled given the restraining order over the property.

53 In their joint written submissions dated 21 May 2025, the applicants direct attention to the reports of Dr Weissman and Dr Crome, to the various diagnoses contained in those reports, and to the affidavit material filed in this proceeding. They submit that the injuries suffered by them both are 'at the upper end of the scale'. They also note the gravity of the respondent's offending.

54 In the course of oral submissions, counsel for the applicants took the Court to those parts of the reasons for sentence where Lasry J accepted that the respondent's moral culpability was 'high', observed that general deterrence has an important role to play in the context of offending such as the respondent's, and concluded he was deserving of 'substantial punishment'.[16]

55 Counsel also took the Court through the affidavit evidence in relation to Alexandra highlighting, in particular, the distress Alexandra feels at the fact she was robbed of seeing her mother again after COVID lockdowns, the nightmares that she continues to suffer from, and her ongoing medical treatment.

56 In relation to Georgia, emphasis was placed on the distress caused by the fact she was in New York when her mother died and the difficulties she had travelling back to Australia during the pandemic. Attention was also drawn to the distress Georgia feels as a new mother who is grieving the loss of her own mother, and to her past and present medical treatment.

57 The applicants contend that the Court should make an 'unfettered' award in light of what they say is a high degree of suffering, with diagnosable psychiatric injuries. In respect to Alexandra they submit that it has been five years since the offending occurred and there is no evidence that her condition is going to improve.

58 In response from a question from the bench as to the appropriate range for an award of compensation, counsel submitted a figure of $250,000 due to the nature of the offence and the ongoing severity of the injuries suffered by the applicants. In making this submission, the applicants rely on the decision of Elliott J in Paulino v Paulino.[17] It was understood this was a submission that an award of $250,000 should be made to each of Alexandra and Georgia.

59 Counsel for the applicants accepted that the Act requires that any compensation orders that are made must be reduced by the amount of any victims of crime payments already paid out and submitted than any award of compensation in this matter 'be inclusive of the [Victims of Crime Assistance Tribunal] reduction'. It was submitted that Alexandra has been awarded $30,234.02 in victims of crime compensation and Georgia has been awarded $40,045.52.

60 Finally, the applicants made an oral application for pseudonym orders in respect of these reasons for decision on the basis that it will cause the them significant further distress to have their names on the public record and because of the personal nature of medical treatments they have received. The respondent did not object to this application.

61 The respondent did not file any written submissions.

62 It emerged during the hearing that the respondent had not received the further affidavits of the applicants dated 2 July 2025. Counsel for the applicants confirmed the affidavits had been sent to the correctional facility where he is currently detained. As a matter of procedural fairness the respondent was given the opportunity to seek further time to consider that material. The respondent declined that opportunity and chose not to make any oral submissions in respect of the applications.

63 The respondent did, however, seek clarification over whether this Court had the power to make orders for the disposal of the Byford property as his capacity to pay compensation centred on the sale of that property. I explained to the respondent that the present proceeding is concerned with the making of compensation orders under the Act and the enforcement of any such orders would unfortunately have to occur separately to this proceeding.

64 The applicants seek pseudonym orders which would restrict the publication of their names in these reasons.[18] The respondent does not object to the making of those orders.

65 Pseudonym orders are made under the Court's inherent jurisdiction.[19] The relevant principles applicable to the making of such orders were recently summarised as follows:[20]

In considering whether a person's identity should be protected, the court may take into account the individual considerations pertaining to the person seeking the order and balance those against the principle of open justice.

Self-evidently, a pseudonym order is far less intrusive upon open justice than a suppression order. Accordingly, in considering whether a pseudonym order should be made, the relatively lesser degree of derogation of open justice must be taken into account.

Generally speaking, cogent proof of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of a pseudonym order must exist before an order will be made. The burden of establishing a necessity will not be satisfied by a party's mere belief that an order is necessary.

66 One aspect of the principle of open justice is that what takes place in court is public and may be publicised.[21] In this regard, the Court of Appeal has observed that it 'has been said that proceedings must be 'exposed in their entirety to the cathartic glare of publicity', subject only to limited exceptions 'sparingly allowed''.[22]

67 The applicants contend that pseudonym orders should be made on the basis that it would cause them further distress to have their names and the details of their medical treatment on the public record.

68 On a personal level, the applicants' desire for privacy is entirely understandable. However, the principle of open justice is a fundamental aspect of the Victorian legal system[23] and I must be satisfied there is a cogent reason to displace it.

69 I accept that the publication of their names and medical information will regretfully cause the applicants distress and that the respondent does not object to the making of orders. Nevertheless, in the circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is cogent proof going to the necessity of pseudonym orders in this matter.

70 In reaching this conclusion, I have taken into account that the names of both applicants are already on the public record in connection to the relevant offending by virtue of Lasry J's reasons for sentence.

71 I also note that there is no general practice of granting pseudonym orders to persons applying for compensation under s 85B of the Act. The decision to make an application for compensation will inevitably involve the disclosure of some personal information by the applicant. In turn, many, if not most, applications include medical evidence of a nature like that adduced in this matter.

72 As such, I am not satisfied that the threshold for the making of pseudonym orders has been met and therefore refuse the application.

73 Section 85C(1)(a) of the Act requires that an application for a compensation order be made within 12 months after the offender 'is found guilty, or convicted, of the offence'. For the purposes of s 85C, Lasry J has held that, where the offender has pleaded guilty, time runs from the date of sentencing.[24]

74 The respondent pleaded guilty to the murder of Ms Melzer-Head and was sentenced on 21 December 2021. Both Alexandra and Georgia filed their applications for compensation on 1 December 2022.[25] In the absence of any submissions to the contrary, I am satisfied the applications were filed within time.

75 I am also satisfied that both Alexandra and Georgia have established a basis for the making of compensation orders in their favour - they are clearly persons who have suffered an injury as a direct result of the respondent's offending.[26] The evidence shows that Alexandra and Georgia both suffered, and continue to suffer, significant grief, distress and trauma as a direct result of their mother's murder. The medical evidence is that they each have been diagnosed, among other things, with PTSD and an adjustment disorder. These are injuries within the definition of that term in the Act.[27] In any event, I understand the respondent accepts that compensation orders should be made.

76 Having concluded that orders under s 85B of the Act will be made, what remains to be determined is the quantum of compensation awarded. Section 85B(2) provides that an order for compensation may be made up of amounts for, in summary form, each of:

(a) the pain and suffering experienced as a direct result of the offence;

(b) the costs of medical expenses or counselling services actually incurred or reasonably likely to be incurred as a direct result of the offence; and

(c) other expenses (other than those relating to loss or damage to property) actually or reasonably likely to be incurred as a direct result of the offence.

77 As I understand their submissions, the applicants only seek compensation for their pain and suffering[28] and not for their medical, counselling or other expenses. They submit that compensation should be awarded in the amount of $250,000 inclusive of victims of crime payments already made.

78 For reasons I explain below, although I am satisfied that both applicants are entitled to an award of compensation, I consider this figure is beyond the range which is reasonable in the circumstances.

79 As outlined above, in determining the amount to be awarded to Georgia and Alexandra I must 'intuitively synthesise' the evidence before me including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the respondent's offending, the relationship between the offence and the applicants, the relationship between the applicants and the respondent, the degree of injury suffered by the applicants, the respondent's financial circumstances, and the effect of compensation orders on the respondent's prospects for rehabilitation.[29]

80 As counsel for the applicants contended, Lasry J found that the respondent's offending was very serious in that it represented yet another example of a defenceless women dying violently at the hands of her partner after she expressed a desire to leave the relationship. His Honour found the respondent's moral culpability was high.[30] This is undoubtedly correct, the respondent's offending and the brutal death of their mother has had a profound impact on both applicants. As such, I take Lasry J's findings as to the objective seriousness of the respondent's offending into account.[31]

81 However, to the extent (if at all) that drawing attention to statements made by Lasry J that the respondent was deserving of 'substantial punishment' was intended as a submission that I should take the need to punish the respondent into account in determining quantum, I reject that submission. As Bell J stated in St Clair and Holmes v Jamieson, the purpose of a s 85B order is compensatory rather than punitive.[32]

82 There is no evidence before me regarding the relationship between the applicants and the respondent, other than their mother's relationship with him. As such, although I take this into account generally as part of my consideration of the evidence, I do not place any weight on this factor.

83 Turning to the evidence of the applicants' pain and suffering, I will deal with each applicant separately.

84 In her evidence Georgia described in detail the significant anguish she felt as a result of her mother's death and at the difficulties she faced returning to Australia because of the COVID restrictions in place at that time. She described the impact her mother's death had on her capacity to work and the strain it placed on her personal relationships generally. More recently, Georgia has become a mother and has felt significant distress and anxiety at navigating this period in her life without her own mother. Georgia says she continues to attend therapy to work through these matters and, although she has worked hard to build a loving and stable life for her family, she misses her mother and believes she will always be impacted by her death.

85 The reports of Dr Crome and Dr Weissman also provide insight into the extent of Georgia's pain and suffering. In particular, in his report from April 2023, Dr Weissman's opinion was that Georgia's future prognosis was 'mildly uncertain and guarded' but that she would never fully recover from her mother's death. I note I do not have the benefit of any more recent medical assessments.

86 I am satisfied that Georgia has experienced significant pain and suffering as a direct result of the respondent's offending. The timing of her mother's death during the COVID pandemic, while Georgia was residing overseas, exacerbated the immense distress she experienced. I also accept that Georgia will continue to be affected by her mother's death for the rest of her life, particularly as she experiences motherhood without her own mother. This weighs heavily in my consideration of the evidence.

87 Similarly, Alexandra's evidence was that she experienced significant pain and suffering as a direct result of her mother's murder. This impacted every facet of her life, including her professional progression and her relationship with her partner. It is clear from the evidence that Alexandra continues to be greatly impacted by her mother's death. She frequently suffers from nightmares which affect her ability to function during the day and that, although she has stopped taking anti-depressant medication, she worries her condition is deteriorating. She continues to take medication for PTSD and anxiety, and to attend therapy sessions.

88 As counsel submitted at the hearing, it is over five years since her mother died and there is no evidence that Alexandra's condition will necessarily improve. This is consistent with the medical reports available to me, particularly the opinion of Dr Weissman that Alexandra's future prognosis was 'somewhat uncertain and guarded' and that she would never fully recover from the death of her mother.

89 I accept Alexandra's evidence of her pain and suffering. I place weight on the fact I consider it is likely that Alexandra, and her health, will continue to be significantly impacted by her mother's death in the long term.

90 Section 85H(1) of the Act provides that if a court decides to make a compensation order it may consider the respondent's financial circumstances (and the nature of the burden that paying the compensation will impose on the respondent) in determining the amount and manner of compensation to be awarded. However, a court is not prevented from making a compensation order if it is unable to determine the respondent's financial circumstances.[33]

91 The only material before me concerning the respondent's financial circumstances are two documents filed by the respondent in December 2023 and May 2025 purporting to be statements of the respondent's financial position. As I noted earlier, these statements, while signed by the respondent and a witness, were not filed in the form of a formal affidavit. This is explicable when it is recalled that the respondent has been self-represented at various points in this proceeding.

92 However, the financial statements provide a limited basis to make any findings in relation to the respondent's financial circumstances. In very broad terms, the more recent statement estimates the respondent's total assets, as of 13 May 2025, to be $52,208.30 comprising of a five per cent interest in the net profits of the Byford property, money in various bank and prison accounts, and the value of a broking business. A note to the statement explains there is a family law agreement in place between the respondent and his ex-wife in relation to the mortgage over the Byford property, and there is likely to be a family law agreement in the future between the respondent's son, who also has an interest in the property, and his ex-partner who currently resides there with their children. There is currently a restraining order over the property.

93 Notwithstanding this material, I consider there is insufficient evidence to enable me to make any findings with respect to the respondent's financial circumstances. At its highest, I consider that the respondent has some limited assets, likely the most significant of which is a possible interest in the Byford property. However, this is not an appropriate forum to make any findings in relation to the respondent's interest in the Byford property, or that of his family members. Nor is it necessary.[34]

94 Further, while the respondent's ability to pay any amount of compensation awarded is relevant it is not a 'controlling consideration' in my determination of quantum.[35] I consider this is particularly the case where the respondent does not contest the making of the orders and has chosen not to make any submissions in relation to quantum.

95 That said, I accept Lasry J's observations in respect of the respondent's prospects of rehabilitation - being that the prosecution accepted he had good prospects of rehabilitation - and that the respondent will be an elderly man by the time he is eligible for parole.[36] This will self-evidently affect his capacity to obtain paid employment upon release and, in those circumstances, the respondent would benefit from any assets already available to him. I consider therefore that the burden of paying compensation will be onerous for the respondent and, in turn, this could affect his prospects of rehabilitation. However, while I take this into account, I do not place any determinative weight on this factor.

96 Finally, I have also considered other cases involving applications for compensation under the Act made by family members of deceased persons.[37] Although there is no 'yardstick by which the extent of personal grief or distress can be measured, and no method of conversion of a human emotion or psychological reaction to an amount of money exists',[38] and while each application must turn on its own merits, I consider this is an appropriate course of action to take.

97 These cases demonstrate that the applicants seek an amount of compensation that is demonstrably higher than what has been awarded in most comparable matters concerning other adult children applicants. I do not say this to minimise the unfathomable loss suffered by Georgia and Alexandra through the death of their mother or their considerable pain and suffering. I simply do so to contextualise the range of compensation which has been awarded in the past.

98 As such, doing the best I can to balance all of the competing factors and to instinctively synthesise the material I have had regard to, I consider that compensation should be awarded to Georgia in the sum of $100,000 and to Alexandra in the sum of $120,000. In reaching this conclusion, I have taken into account the inherent risk of 'overshooting' in determining the sum of compensation to be awarded. In compensating Georgia and Alexandra I am required to be mindful not to do an injustice to the respondent.[39]

99 Section 85I of the Act requires that I reduce the amount of compensation by any amounts already awarded under victim of crimes legislation. It was submitted that Georgia has been awarded $40,045.52 and Alexandra has been awarded $30,234.02.

100 As such, adjusting for these amounts, pursuant to s 85B of the Act I order compensation for Georgia in the sum of $59,954.28 and for Alexandra in the sum of $89,765.98.

101 The Act requires that each party bear their own costs of the proceeding, unless the court determines otherwise.[40]

102 As the parties did not address me on the matter of costs, I consider there is no basis to displace the general rule. The parties are to bear their own costs.

[1] For convenience, when referring to either applicant individually I will refer to them by their first names only.

[2] DPP v Kingdon [2021] VSC 858. His Honour's findings also constitute evidence before the Court in the present applications - s 85G(1)(c) of the Act.

[3] To avoid confusion, when referring to the respondent's son I will refer to him by his first name.

[4] See: Pawley & Anor v Willis [2022] VSC 85, [20] (Lasry J); Cheng v Zhuang [2016] VSC 24, [22] (Kaye JA) (citations omitted).

[5] DPP v Energy Brix Australia Corp Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 116; (2006) 14 VR 345, [50] (Neave JA).

[6] [2015] VSC 51, [21]-[22], [24]-[25] (citations omitted).

[7] [2019] VSC 57.

[8] Ibid, [22] (citations omitted, emphasis in original).

[9] RK v Mirik [2009] VSC 14; (2009) 21 VR 623, [150] (Bell J).

[10] [2017] VSC 172.

[13] RK v Mirik [2009] VSC 14; (2009) 21 VR 623, [135]-[138].

[16] See: DPP v Kingdon [2021] VSC 858, [55]-[56] and [59]-[61].

[17] [2020] VSC 642.

[18] Section 85J(1) of the Act requires the Court to provide written reasons for granting or refusing an application for a compensation order.

[19] MSB (a Pseudonym) v Chief Commissioner of Police [2018] VSCA 345; (2018) 57 VR 360, [48] (McLeish JA, Maxwell P and Almond AJA agreeing).

[20] DPP v Murray [2025] VSC 275, [41]-[43] (Elliott J) (citations omitted).

[21] Secretary, Dept of Justice and Regulation v Zhong (No 2) [2017] VSCA 19, [4] citing ABC v D1 & Ors [2007] VSC 480, [65] (J Forrest J).

[22] WEQ (A Pseudonym) v Medical Board of Australia [2021] VSCA 34; (2021) 69 VR 1, [60] citing David Syme & Co Ltd v General Motors-Holden's Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294, 300.

[23] See eg: Open Courts Act 2013 (Vic), s 1(aa).

[24] Pawley & Anor v Willis [2022] VSC 85, [10]-[12].

[25] Amended applications correcting the name of the deceased were filed by the applicants on 28 February 2023.

[27] The Act, s 85A(1) (definition of 'injury' paras (b) and (d)).

[29] Moresco v Budimir [2015] VSC 51, [25] (T Forrest J).

[30] DPP v Kingdon [2021] VSC 858, [55]-[58].

[32] [2019] VSC 57, [22]. See also: Paulino v Paulino [2020] VSC 642, [91] (Elliott J).

[34] The Act, s 85H(2). See also the discussion in: Crespo v Kelson [2021] VSC 264, [54]-[74] (Tinney J); St Clair and Holmes v Jamieson [2019] VSC 57, [38]-[39] (Bell J).

[35] RK v Mirik and Mirik [2009] VSC 14; (2009) 21 VR 623, [135] (Bell J).

[36] DPP v Kingdon [2021] VSC 858, [50] and [62].

[37] E.g. see: St Clair and Holmes v Jamieson [2019] VSC 57, [1]-[2], ftn to [40] and [41]; Paulino v Paulino [2020] VSC 642, [87] and [102]; Crespo v Kelson [2021] VSC 264, [1], [81] and [85]; and Pawley & Anor v Willis [2022] VSC 85, [52].

[38] DPP v Energy Brix Australia Corporation Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 116; (2006) 14 VR 345, [36].

[39] C.f. Paulino v Paulino [2020] VSC 642, [85] (Elliott J).