Applicant v Respondents

Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72; Gulfmeand Pty Ltd v Smarelli [2022] VSC 119.

1. On 7 October 2025 I delivered judgment in three separate matters brought by Ms Mazi. In delivering judgment I foreshadowed the general form of the orders I intended to make, but invited the parties to address me on costs and the final form of orders in writing. Each of the parties filed and served written submissions. My orders contemplated that each party would deliver submissions on the same day and that I would consider whether a further hearing on the question of costs was required.
2. As matters transpired, Ms Mazi sought leave to file her submissions a day later. As it turns out, Ms Mazi received the submissions of the other parties before filing her submissions, and took the opportunity to respond to those submissions. In light of that, it has been unnecessary to provide Ms Mazi with a further opportunity to address the submissions made by the Respondents.
3. All parties indicated that the final orders, including the costs orders, could be made on the papers. There was no debate of any significance concerning the dispositive orders in each proceeding. This is my ruling in relation to costs in respect of each matter. Orders will be made in each proceeding accordingly. I will deal with each matter in turn.

S ECI 2024 05284 (The Contempt Application and the Bygrave appeal)

1. It is convenient to deal with the liability to pay costs in each matter, and then to deal with the quantum.

Mazi v Kao (No.1) (Contempt Ruling) [2025] VSC 575

1. Ms Mazi brought a summons alleging contempt. The reasons for judgment make clear why the summons will be dismissed. While the Court has a wide discretion in relation to costs, the usual approach is that a successful litigant is entitled to recover their costs.
2. Ms Mazi contends that the each party should bear their own costs of this aspect of the proceeding. Citing the Court's broad discretion as to costs, and relying upon Oshlack v Richmond River Council,[1] she says that a departure from the usual rule is justified given the novel and public interest nature of the questions raised in this matter, she say raised in 'good faith'.
3. In my view, the summons did not raise a novel point, nor can it be described as one brought in the public interest. The application brought on by summons was grounded in Ms Mazi's misguided belief that Ms Hou (the Fourth Respondent) had conducted herself inappropriately in the conduct of other proceedings, conduct which Ms Mazi sought to attribute vicariously to Ms Hou's employer (Third Respondent) and its real estate clients (Ms Mazi's landlords - the First and Second Respondents).
4. From the outset, and for the reasons set out in my judgment, Ms Mazi's charges of contempt confronted significant difficulties. Rather than raising a novel point, the application traversed well-trodden jurisprudence, the effect of which rendered her application meritless. There was no public interest in the points sought to be raised. The Fourth Respondent did not commit contempt. There was no evidence supporting the contention that the First and Second Defendant were responsible for Ms Hou's conduct. The application was a waste of time.
5. In their written submissions, the Third and Fourth Respondents drew my attention to correspondence from Ms Hou's solicitor inviting Ms Mazi to withdraw her application as early as 7 March 2025, before the substantive hearings commenced. When the hearings commenced, and owing to the fact that orders made by the Judicial Registrar had not been complied with, I concluded (with the consent of the parties) to proceed to hear the contempt summons first. Given that Ms Mazi appeared self-represented, I decided that the most efficient course was to invite the responding parties to put their case on the summons first, and before Ms Mazi (the moving party), to enable Ms Mazi to hear the full argument against her before she was required to address the Court in support of the summons. Again, parties agreed to this approach and the hearing of the summons proceeded in that way. At the conclusion of the Respondents' submissions, I adjourned the hearing to enable Ms Mazi time to consider her position. In adjourning the proceeding I gave a preliminary indication that her contempt allegations confronted significant hurdles. Following that first day of the hearing and before the matter returned for Ms Mazi's submissions on the point, the solicitors for Ms Hou again offered to forego any claim for their legal costs incurred to date if Ms Mazi withdrew her charges of contempt. She nonetheless pressed on when the hearing resumed.
6. All of the Respondents each seek their costs on the standard or ordinary basis. In my view their applications show restraint, given the conduct of the case by Ms Mazi. At the very least they are each entitled to an order for their costs on the standard basis.
7. I address the question of quantum below.

Mazi v Kao (No.2) (Notice of Rent Increase) [2025] VSC 630

1. In the substantive proceeding challenging the notice to increase rent, Ms Mazi also contends that each party should bear their own costs. I cannot agree. While it is true that in the result, an extension of time to bring the appeal, and leave to appeal were granted - the appeal itself was dismissed. The grant of an extension, and leave, should not be taken to disguise the fact that the applications were misconceived from the outset.
2. As the judgment records, Ms Mazi was informed on a number of occasions that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to entertain her application for declarations as formulated. Accepting that the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic) is not without its complexities, the result on the substantive appeal before me does no more than confirm established principle in relation to the powers of the Tribunal.
3. It is true that the judgment in this matter does clarify the operation of some aspects of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, but it does so by applying established principle to a discrete part of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic) that was only brought into question by the persistence of Ms Mazi in taking what was ultimately a bad point. Nothing about Ms Mazi's case tends to the conclusion that the litigation was in the public interest, or should be regarded as being of such a character that would deny the Respondents their costs in defending the proceeding in this case.
4. Ms Mazi also submits that no costs should be awarded in relation to her application to commence proceedings out of time as, in this respect she was ultimately successful. I reject that submission. The costs of that application were reserved, and fall to be dealt with as costs in the proceedings. Ms Mazi also submits that, in the assessment of whether costs should be awarded, she is entitled to bring to account what she says was the late service of materials, and delays caused by the Respondents. She says that these matters should weigh heavily against fixing costs. As I have decided not to fix costs for the reasons that follow, this complaint falls away.
5. In my view, costs should follow the event as they would in the ordinary course.

1. In these proceedings all four respondents seek orders fixing costs at specified amounts.
2. The First and Second Respondents rely on the decision in Gulfmeand Pty Ltd v Smarelli[2] in which Attiwill J observed that the then operating equivalent of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2025 empower the Court to order that costs be fixed, rather than taxed, to avoid the expense, delay and aggravation involved in the taxation of costs. His Honour referred to factors which might weigh in favour of such an award, including that the costs claimed were in respect of a small number of items and in a broadly reasonable amount.
3. This is a case where I might have been tempted to consider making an order fixing the costs to avoid the aggravation associated with possible future debate about the amount of costs payable, but in the result I have concluded that costs will be awarded on the standard basis, to be taxed in default of agreement. The costs claimed here are across many items, involving three separate pieces of litigation, which overlap in different ways. For example, the contempt summons was brought in the Bygrave appeal, but was said to be relevant to the grounds in the Elmes appeal. In all aspects of the case, Ms Mazi appeared self-represented. She opposes the fixing of costs, and prefers them to be taxed.
4. The Respondents relied upon affidavit material to set out the basis upon which they had arrived at their respective claims for the fixing of costs.
5. The First and Second Respondents say that they have incurred $56,020.83 costs on a standard basis across all three proceedings. They allocate the costs incurred as follows: 20% to the contempt proceeding; 40% to the substantive hearing of the Bygrave appeal, and presumably 40% to the Elmes appeal in which they were not successful. They apply a 25% reduction to each amount. Accordingly, they seek costs orders on the contempt summons and the Bygrave appeal fixed in the amounts of $8,403.13, and $16,806.25, respectively. The total fixed costs sought by the First and Second Respondents is $25,209.38.
6. The First and Second Respondents participated in all three proceedings. The Elmes proceeding involved a considerable amount of effort and time. The premise of the First and Second Respondents' submission as to costs is that the Elmes appeal and the Bygrave appeal should be treated as contributing to the costs incurred in the proceeding in equal measure. That is difficult to accept at face value given the breadth of the Elmes Appeal.
7. The Third and Fourth Respondents' claim that they have incurred $58,376 in the proceeding, but seek orders fixing costs at $36,767.60 - representing what on its face appears to be a very significant discount on fees incurred on a solicitor client basis. It is of note that the amount sought by the Third and Fourth Respondents is significantly higher (by approximately 30%) than the fixed costs claimed by the First and Second Respondents, notwithstanding that the Third and Fourth Respondents' involvement in this part of the proceedings was confined to the contempt summons, whereas the First and Second Respondents were required to deal with the contempt summons as well as the substantive appeal. The differences in the amounts claimed makes it difficult to reach a concluded view as to whether the amounts 'appear reasonable' in all the circumstances such as to weigh in favour of fixing costs for any of the Respondents.
8. Ms Mazi objects to the calculation of a fixed costs order and the assumptions made by the Respondents. She says there was necessary overlap which is not properly accounted for in the assumptions made by the First and Second Respondents. Ms Mazi submits that all the costs should be taxed.
9. In all the circumstances, I will award costs on the standard basis to be taxed in default of agreement. I am conscious that a taxation of the costs might result in a higher overall amount to be paid in costs than those presently claimed by the Respondents, and in so observing, I remind the parties that the orders that I make allows them the opportunity to agree on the amount of costs before they embark upon the costly and time consuming process of taxation.

Mazi v Kao (No.3) (Notice to Vacate) [2025] VSC 630

1. The First and Second Respondents accept that I should make the orders generally as foreshadowed in the judgment.
2. Ms Mazi broadly agrees, but instead seeks an order requiring the First and Second Respondents pay the fee for commencing the appeal, in the amount $939. I will make that order.

[1] [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 at [67]-[69].

[2] [2022] VSC 119.