Applicant S395 of 2004 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT WILCOX J: 1 This is an appeal from a decision of Moore J given on 15 March 2005. His Honour was dealing with a proceeding remitted to this Court by Heydon J, of the High Court of Australia, by an order dated 1 November 2004. Moore J held this Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the proceeding. 2 The proceeding challenges a decision of the Acting Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. On 5 May 2004, the Acting Minister informed the appellant of the result of an application the appellant had made that the Acting Minister exercise his powers under s 417 of the Migration Act 1958 ('Cth') ('the Act'). 3 The Acting Minister said: 'After considering your case, I have decided not to exercise my public interest power.' 4 Section 476(2) of the Migration Act states this Court does not have any jurisdiction in respect of a decision of the Minister not to exercise, or not to consider the exercise of, the Minister's power, inter alia, under s 417 of the Act. 5 Section 476(4) of the Act provides that, despite s 44 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), the High Court must not remit a matter to the Federal Court if it relates to a decision or matter in respect of which the Federal Court would not have jurisdiction because of s 476. 6 At one time, there might have been some uncertainty as to the operation of these statutory provisions. However, it is clear from the decision of the High Court in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex Parte Applicants S134/2002 [2003] HCA 1, 211 CLR 441, that relief cannot be granted pursuant to s 75(v) of the Constitution in relation to a decision by the Minister under s 417 of the Act: see [34], [38] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan JJ) and [98] to [100] (Gaudron and Kirby JJ). 7 Relief under s 75(v) was the type of relief that was sought by the present appellant when he commenced this proceeding in the High Court. It ought, therefore, to have been obvious, when the matter was before the High Court, that the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief that was sought by the appellant. It should also have been obvious, having regard to s 476(2) and s 476(4) of the Act, that this Court also would lack jurisdiction to grant the desired relief. 8 Despite this, and unfortunately, Heydon J remitted the matter to this Court, putting the Court to the unnecessary burden of hearing a matter in relation to which it had no jurisdiction, and imposing on this Full Court the necessity of considering the appellant's meritless appeal against the first instance decision. Moore J correctly held the Federal Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. He dismissed the proceeding with costs, fixed in the sum of $2000. 9 I am of the opinion that his Honour was correct in ordering that the proceeding be dismissed. However, I think that, under the circumstances, it was an erroneous exercise of discretion for his Honour to order that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the hearing before him. I cannot but feel that, if the matter had been properly argued before Heydon J, the proceeding would not have been remitted to this Court at all; thus the appellant would not have been exposed to the burden of a costs order against him. 10 The legal representatives of the Minister must bear the prime responsibility for the matter of jurisdiction not being properly argued before Heydon J. The appellant has at all times been self represented. He could not have been expected to understand the complexities of the law in this area. 11 On the other hand, the appellant should, in my view, pay the respondent's costs of this appeal. The appellant filed a notice of appeal against the decision of Moore J. He set out a number of grounds of appeal. However, none of them is really comprehensible. None dealt with the problem of jurisdiction identified by Moore J. 12 When the appellant was asked to explain to this Court why Moore J had erred in law. He said he had nothing to say about that matter. If the appellant had nothing to say against the judge's decision, it was irresponsible for him to file an appeal that would require the constitution of a Full Court in order to consider his non-argument. 13 I propose that the orders made by Moore J on 15 March 2005 be varied so as to delete orders 2 and 3; otherwise the appeal be dismissed with costs.