113 Stephen J said that the necessity, in cases of pure economic loss, 'for some further control of liability apart from that offered by the concept of reasonable foreseeability arises in part because, in cases of physical injury to person or property, the concept has been given a very far-reaching operation' (573). There was a requirement for 'some control mechanism based upon notions of proximity between tortious act and resultant detriment' (574). His Honour was of the view that the case before the court contained 'a number of salient features which will no doubt ultimately be recognised as characteristic of one particular class of case among the generality of cases involving economic loss' (576). The features of the case in question, which established sufficient proximity to entitle the plaintiff to recover its pure economic loss, were: the defendant's knowledge that the pipelines were property of a kind inherently likely, when damaged, to be productive of consequential economic loss to those who relied directly upon their use; the defendant's knowledge or means of knowledge, from various charts being used on the dredge, that the pipelines extended across Botany Bay from AOR's refinery to the plaintiff's terminal, leading to the 'quite obvious inference' that the pipelines were used to transport refined products from the refinery to the terminal; the infliction of damage by the defendant to AOR's property (that is, the pipelines) as a result of the defendant's breach of a duty of care owed to AOR; the nature of the detriment suffered by the plaintiff, that is, its loss of use of the pipelines to receive refined products from AOR; and the nature of the damages claimed, which directly reflected that loss of use of the pipelines, and not merely some indirect loss of profits (576 - 577).