The remaining question is whether the damages assessed by the learned trial judge were excessive. The learned trial judge commenced by determining that the difference between the price paid by the appellants for the land and its value as affected by the road widening proposals was $133,000. This element in the assessment was not challenged before us. He then assessed consequential damage at $18,745. Three items in this part of the assessment also were not challenged. The remaining items, which totalled $13,215, and which were challenged, comprised Council rates, and water and sewerage rates, for the years 1973 and 1974, land tax for 1974, insurance and the additional stamp duty and solicitors' costs payable because the price of the land was the contract price rather than the amount of its real value as affected by the proposals. It was submitted on behalf of the Council that if the appellants, who had the land, were given $133,000 in addition, they would be in the same position as if the land had not been affected by the proposals and that the payment to them of the additional items would give them a windfall benefit. It was submitted that if they had received the land unaffected by the road widening proposals they would have been bound to meet the additional expenses in question, and that since they were to be given an amount which would mean that they would receive the full value of the land in the condition in which they intended to buy it they should not be paid in addition the amounts which they would have been required to spend if the Council's representation that the land was unaffected by the proposals had been true. No question of directness, remoteness or foreseeability arises. The only question is whether in fact there has been a duplication in the assessment of damages. The appellants are entitled to be put, so far as money can do, in the same position as if they had not made the purchase. If the purchase had not been made the appellants would have kept the money paid to the vendor and would not have made the other payments in question. The award of $133,000, when added to the actual value of the land bought, recompensed the appellants for the payment out of the purchase money, but did not recompense them for the other expenses that they had to meet. It is true that the rates, tax, insurance, stamp duty and costs would have been payable if the land had not been affected by the road widening proposals, but it was so affected, and the payments would not have been made if the Council had not made the negligent mis-statement on which the action is founded. Of course the appellants were bound to mitigate their loss, but the learned trial judge was entitled to find that it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to continue to hold the land until the end of 1974, while they were exploring what could be done with the land and endeavouring to salvage what they could from the disastrous purchase. For these reasons the challenge made to the assessment of damages should not succeed. The assessment also included an amount of interest on the amount employed in the purchase from the date of purchase until the end of 1974 and this was not challenged.