What happened

Antony Gabrynowicz, a casual chef who had worked for G + Gracin (trading as Panini Kitchen) since October 2015 on a regular and systematic basis averaging 37.5 hours per week, lodged an unfair dismissal application under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009. The critical incident occurred on 2 December 2019. Mr Gabrynowicz was rostered to start at 6.00am but slept in. The employer, proprietor Ms Rosanna Kulonja, sent a text at 6.38am and telephoned at about 7.08am. The parties disputed what was said in that phone call; the applicant said he was told 'don't bother coming in' and treated that as dismissal, the employers said the call did not amount to dismissal (see [12], [20]-[21]). Later that day (shortly after 1.50pm) the applicant messaged the employer and then received a text advising he was 'no longer required', followed by an email at 2.26pm confirming termination (see [12]-[13]).

G + Gracin advanced a range of performance concerns (ordering, hygiene, leaving tasks incomplete, attitude) which had reportedly been raised informally during employment, but no formal warnings that dismissal could follow had been given (see [15]-[18]). The Commission preferred the employers' evidence on the 7.08am call and the history of performance concerns (see [20], [22]). The Commission found the applicant was protected from unfair dismissal (length of service satisfied ss.383-384 and regular and systematic casual employment) (see [25]-[27]). Commissioner Platt concluded the employer did not comply with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code, that the dismissal was procedurally unfair and, on balance under s.387, that the dismissal was harsh. Reinstatement was considered inappropriate; compensation of $988.20 (one week's pay less 10% for misconduct) was awarded (see [34], [50], [72]).

Why the court decided this way

The Commission's decision follows the statutory structure the Fair Work Act mandates for unfair dismissal claims:

First, the Commission determined protection (ss.382-384): the applicant qualified because his casual employment was regular and systematic since October 2015, satisfying the minimum employment period (see [25]-[27]).
Second, unfair dismissal under s.385 requires that there was a dismissal, that it was harsh/unjust/unreasonable, that it was inconsistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code, and that it was not a genuine redundancy (see [28]). The Commission accepted there was a dismissal and not a redundancy.
Third, the Code (s.388 and the declared instrument) sets out different routes for 'summary dismissal' (gross misconduct) and 'other dismissal' (performance-related). For 'other dismissal' the employer must give the employee a valid reason, warn they risk dismissal if there is no improvement, offer an opportunity to respond, and give a reasonable chance to rectify the issue (see [30]-[31]). G + Gracin conceded the conduct was not gross misconduct and the Commission found the informal comments did not meet the Code's requirement of warning that dismissal could follow, the 'over order meat' comment was insufficient (see [32]-[34]).
Fourth, under s.387 the Commission performs a multi-factorial balancing exercise: was there a valid reason? was the employee notified? given opportunity to respond? warned about unsatisfactory performance? plus employer size and HR resources (see [36]). The Commission applied the definition of 'valid reason' from Selvachandran as 'sound, defensible or well founded' (see [37]). The applicant's failure to attend work after realising he had slept in, and returning to sleep after initial contact, was found to be conduct giving a valid reason for dismissal in the sense of attendance/capacity, particularly given his role in a small business (see [38]). However, the absence of a warning that dismissal was being contemplated and the lack of an opportunity to respond weighed strongly the other way. Taking all s.387 factors together, the Commission concluded the dismissal was harsh (see [40]-[44], [45]-[50]).
Finally, on remedy, the Commission applied ss.390 and 392. Reinstatement was inappropriate; compensation in lieu was appropriate. The Commission assessed the likely period the employment would have continued absent the unfair dismissal as one week (37.5 hours) given performance and relational issues, allowed for mitigation (applicant obtained other work), excluded later earnings beyond the predicted period, and applied a 10% reduction for misconduct (going back to sleep), arriving at $988.20 (see [52]-[67], [72]).

In short: there was a valid reason for dismissal but procedural flaws and failure to comply with the Small Business Code produced an overall finding of harshness, leading to compensation rather than reinstatement.

Before and after state of the law

Before this decision, the statutory framework was well settled: ss.385-388 define unfair dismissal and the role of the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code; s.387 sets out the balancing factors, and ss.390/392 set out remedies and compensation criteria. The Commission cited settled authority on the meaning of 'valid reason' (Selvachandran) and on assessing compensation (Sprigg; McCulloch; Smith). The decision applies these principles in a standard way.

After this decision there is no doctrinal shift. What the decision illustrates is practical application of the Code in small-business dismissal cases: even where misconduct or capacity issues exist that would, in isolation, provide a valid reason, failure to provide an intelligible warning and to follow the Code's procedural requirements may tip the s.387 balance in favour of the employee. This decision therefore reinforces the established approach: Code non-compliance and procedural unfairness can render an otherwise justifiable dismissal harsh.

Key passages with plain-English translation

Paragraph [31] (Code excerpt): "The small business employer must give the employee a reason why he or she is at risk of being dismissed... The employee must be warned verbally or preferably in writing, that he or she risks being dismissed if there is no improvement."

Plain English: If you run a small business and plan to sack someone for poor performance (not gross misconduct), you must tell them the problem and warn them they'll be sacked if they do not improve; ideally that warning should be written.
Paragraph [34]: "I find that the dismissal was inconsistent with the Code."

Plain English: The employer did not follow the simple procedural requirements in the small-business dismissal Code, so that element of unfair dismissal under the Act is established.
Paragraph [38]: "Mr Gabrynowicz... in going back to sleep took a cavalier attitude to his attendance. This represents a valid reason for his dismissal..."

Plain English: Sleeping through a shift and not making reasonable efforts to attend can be a legitimate basis to dismiss a key staff member in a small business.
Paragraph [50]: "Having considered each of the factors detailed in s.387 of the Act, I have concluded that the dismissal of Mr Gabrynowicz was harsh."

Plain English: After balancing the statutory factors, reason for dismissal, notification, chance to respond, warnings and small business context, the Commission found the overall decision to dismiss was too severe.
Paragraph [72]: "I award compensation in the amount of $988.20... to be paid with 28 days."

Plain English: The employer must pay the employee $988.20 within 28 days as compensation instead of reinstatement.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

This decision is directly applicable in small-business unfair dismissal scenarios where:

The employee is a regular, systematic casual or otherwise satisfies ss.382-384 protection thresholds (see [25]-[27]).
The employer claims the dismissal arises from a legitimate, single incident of misconduct or capacity (e.g., serious lateness or failing to attend), but had not previously given a clear warning that dismissal could follow for performance issues (see [31]-[34]).
There is a limited procedural interaction on the day of the incident (a short phone call) and no prior formal warnings or invitation to respond (see [14], [40]-[42]).
The employer is small and without dedicated HR processes, the enterprise size is a relevant mitigating context but does not excuse Code non-compliance (see [45]-[46]).

Practically, where a small business dismisses an employee for attendance or performance without formal warnings or a clear opportunity to respond, this case supports a finding of unfair dismissal even if the underlying conduct could be a valid reason.

How later courts have treated it

This decision itself cites and applies established authorities rather than breaking new legal ground. The Commission follows Sprigg and McCulloch for compensation methodology and uses Selvachandran for the 'valid reason' test, and Byrne and Frew for conceptual overlap of harsh/unjust/unreasonable evaluations (see [6], [37], [49], [56]). Any later treatment by courts or Full Bench would be found in subsequent decisions; this decision contributes to the body of Fair Work Commission case law illustrating the practical application of the Code and the s.387 balancing exercise in small-business contexts.

Still-open questions

The Commission noted uncertainty about whether the employment was a genuine casual, stating that if the employee's employment was not correctly described as 'casual' he 'may have an entitlement to notice' (see [24]). The judgment leaves open how a finding of non-casual status in similar fact patterns would affect remedy and notice entitlements; that issue was not litigated or decided here.
The Commission assessed likely continued employment as one week; this is inherently fact-specific. Different tribunals may take different views about how to predict the future course of employment where pre-existing relationship strain and performance issues exist. The methodology for forecasting the likely duration of continued employment remains a discretionary exercise with room for variance.
The 10% reduction for misconduct was imposed for the single incident of sleeping in after contact. The appropriate quantum of reduction for misconduct that contributes to a dismissal is a flexible exercise; the degree to which similar conduct will attract comparable reductions will depend on factual matrices (position criticality, recurrence, impact on business).
The decision recognises allowances for employer size and lack of HR expertise, but it does not and cannot extend the Code’s requirements. How far small-business allowances can mitigate procedural shortcomings without producing unfairness remains a contextual question for future cases.

Final note: this deep dive summarises and analyses the reasoning in Antony Gabrynowicz v G + Gracin [2020] FWC 2267 based only on the published decision. It is legal information, not legal advice. I can make mistakes. Before you act on or rely on any of the points or on any draft documents you prepare because of this analysis, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check them.

Judgment (101 paragraphs)

[1]

Antony Gabrynowicz v G + Gracin [2020] FWC 2267 (1 May 2020)

[2]

Fair Work Act 2009

[3]

s.394 - Unfair dismissal

[4]

Application for relief from unfair dismissal - Small Business - whether Small Business Fair Dismissal Code requirements met - was dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable - application granted - compensation awarded.

[5]

[1] Mr Antony Gabrynowicz has lodged an application pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) seeking a remedy for an alleged unfair dismissal by his former employer, G + Gracin.

[2] Ms Rosanna Kulonja and Ms Chantal Cavallaro are the joint-proprietors of G + Gracin which is a Restaurant which trades as Panini Kitchen. It is not in dispute that G + Gracin is a small business employer within the meaning of s.23 of the Act.

[3] Prior to his dismissal, Mr Gabrynowicz was employed as a casual Chef since October 2015 and had not received any formal warnings about his performance. Mr Gabrynowicz had been the subject of some informal discussion about his work performance. Mr Gabrynowicz was dismissed on 2 December 2019 after he did not attend for work at 6.00am having slept through his alarm.

[4] Mr Gabrynowicz contends he was dismissed shortly after 7.00am. G + Gracin contends that Mr Gabrynowicz was dismissed at 1.50pm having not arrived at work by that time.

[5] I have found that:

Mr Gabrynowicz is a person who is protected from unfair dismissal pursuant to s.382 of the Act;

G + Gracin did not comply with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code;

The method in which the dismissal was effected was procedurally unfair; and

Having considered the criteria in s.387 of the Act the dismissal was harsh.

[6] Applying the principles in Sprigg v Paul's Licensed Festival Supermarket and taking into account Mr Gabrynowicz conduct, I have determined to award compensation in the amount of $988.20.

[6]

A person has been unfairly dismissed if the FWC is satisfied that:

[7]

(b) the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable; and

[8]

[9]

(d) the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy.

[10]

Note: For the definition of consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code: see section 388."

[11]

[29] I am satisfied that Mr Gabrynowicz was dismissed and that it was not a case of genuine redundancy. I now consider compliance with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (Code).

[30] Section 388 of the Act states:

[12]

The Minister may, by legislative instrument, declare a Small Business Fair Dismissal Code.

[13]

(1) A person's dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code if:

[14]

(a) immediately before the time of the dismissal or at the time the person was given notice of the dismissal (whichever happened first), the person's employer was a small business employer; and

[15]

(b) the employer complied with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code in relation to the dismissal."

[16]

[31] The Code as declared is set out as follows:

[17]

It is fair for an employer to dismiss an employee without notice or warning when the employer believes on reasonable grounds that the employee's conduct is sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal. Serious misconduct includes theft, fraud, violence and serious breaches of occupational health and safety procedures. For a dismissal to be deemed fair it is sufficient, though not essential, that an allegation of theft, fraud or violence be reported to the police. Of course, the employer must have reasonable grounds for making the report.

[18]

In other cases, the small business employer must give the employee a reason why he or she is at risk of being dismissed. The reason must be a valid reason based on the employee's conduct or capacity to do the job.

[19]

The employee must be warned verbally or preferably in writing, that he or she risks being dismissed if there is no improvement.

[20]

The small business employer must provide the employee with an opportunity to respond to the warning and give the employee a reasonable chance to rectify the problem, having regard to the employee's response. Rectifying the problem might involve the employer providing additional training and ensuring the employee knows the employer's job expectations.

[21]

In discussions with an employee in circumstances where dismissal is possible, the employee can have another person present to assist. However, the other person cannot be a lawyer acting in a professional capacity.

[22]

A small business employer will be required to provide evidence of compliance with the Code if the employee makes a claim for unfair dismissal to Fair Work Australia, including evidence that a warning has been given (except in cases of summary dismissal). Evidence may include a completed checklist, copies of written warning(s), a statement of termination or signed witness statements."

[23]

[32] G + Gracin appropriately conceded that Mr Gabrynowicz's conduct did not fall within the definition of gross misconduct.

[33] I now consider the 'Other Dismissal' provisions of the Code. The evidence before me was that Mr Gabrynowicz was dismissed as a result of his unsatisfactory work performance. The key issue here is whether G + Gracin met its obligation to warn Mr Gabrynowicz '....that he .... risks being dismissed if there is no improvement.' The statement made to Mr Gabrynowicz that if he continued to over order meat that everyone will lose their jobs is not in my view a sufficient warning to meet this requirement. There was no other evidence of any warning in relation to performance.

[34] I find that the dismissal was inconsistent with the Code.

[35] I now consider if Mr Gabrynowicz's dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

[36] Pursuant to s.387 of the Act, in considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:

[24]

"(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person's capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and

[25]

(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and

[26]

(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and

[27]

(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and

[28]

(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person - whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and

[29]

(f) the degree to which the size of the employer's enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

[30]

(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and

[31]

(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant."

[32]

[37] Notwithstanding its formulation under a different legislative environment, I have adopted the definition of a valid reason set out by Northrop J in Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd[10] which requires the reason for termination to be "sound, defensible or well founded."

[38] Mr Gabrynowicz did not attend for work in accordance with his obligation. Whilst a single short period of lateness will not normally provide a valid reason, in this case the Applicant did not attend for work for a lengthy period after he realised he had slept in. Having rejected his assertion that he thought he had been dismissed at 7.08am, it appears to me that Mr Gabrynowicz in going back to sleep took a cavalier attitude to his attendance at work. This represents a valid reason for his dismissal particularly when his important role in the small business is considered.

[39] The other work performance issues raised by G + Gracin, whilst not minor, were never escalated to the point where the discussion could be regarded as disciplinary in nature. The issues were not mentioned in the termination correspondence. In the circumstances I do not accept that they provided additional valid reasons for the dismissal. They are relevant to the consideration of how long the employment would have continued but for the dismissal.

[33]

[40] An employee protected from unfair dismissal must be advised of a valid reason for termination prior to the decision being made.[11]

[41] Mr Gabrynowicz was advised of his lateness on 2 December 2019. He was not advised that G + Gracin was considering dismissing him as a result. There was no additional communication prior to sending the dismissal text and email. He was not advised of previous issues in respect of his work performance which was a factor in the decision to dismiss. This factor weighs in favour of a finding that the dismissal was unfair.

[34]

[42] Mr Gabrynowicz was advised that he was late for work in a telephone call at 7.08am and a short discussion ensued. Mr Gabrynowicz was not invited to respond to the proposal that he would be dismissed prior to being advised of his dismissal by text message later in the day. This factor weighs in favour of a finding that the dismissal was unfair.

[35]

Unreasonable refusal to allow for a support person - s.387(d)

[36]

[43] No request for a support person was made noting that the circumstances did not facilitate the making of such a request. This is a neutral factor.

[37]

Warnings relative to unsatisfactory performance - s.387(e)

[38]

[44] Mr Gabrynowicz was not subject to any prior disciplinary process but had been spoken to about deficiencies in his work as they occurred. This factor weighs in favour of a finding that the dismissal was unfair.

[39]

[45] I have made allowances for the fact that G + Gracin was a small business and its proprietors were clearly not experienced in the performance management process.

[40]

Absence of dedicated human resources support - s.387(g)

[41]

[46] G + Gracin did not have access to dedicated human resources support.

[42]

[47] There were no other matters that were relevant.

[43]

[48] The Explanatory Memorandum to the Act[12] explains the approach of the Commission in considering the elements of s.387:

[44]

"FWA must consider all of the above factors in totality. It is intended that FWA will weigh up all the factors in coming to a decision about whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable and no factor alone will necessarily be determinative."

[45]

[49] In Byrne and Frew v Australian Airlines Pty Ltd,[13] the following observations made by McHugh and Gummow JJ are relevant to my conclusion:

[46]

"It may be that the termination is harsh but not unreasonable, unjust but not harsh or unreasonable, or unreasonable but not harsh or unjust. In many cases the concepts will overlap. Thus, the one termination of employment may be unjust because the employee was not guilty of the misconduct on which the employer acted, may be unreasonable because it was decided upon inferences which could not reasonably have been drawn from the material before the employer, and may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct in respect of which the employer acted."

[47]

[50] Having considered each of the factors detailed in s.387 of the Act, I have concluded that the dismissal of Mr Gabrynowicz was harsh.

[48]

[51] The relevant provisions of Division 4 of Part 3-2 of the Act state:

[49]

390 When the FWC may order remedy for unfair dismissal

[50]

(1) Subject to subsection (3), the FWC may order a person's reinstatement, or the payment of compensation to a person, if:

[51]

(a) the FWC is satisfied that the person was protected from unfair dismissal (see Division 2) at the time of being dismissed; and

[52]

(b) the person has been unfairly dismissed (see Division 3).

[53]

(2) the FWC may make the order only if the person has made an application under section 394.

[54]

(3) the FWC must not order the payment of compensation to the person unless:

[55]

(a) the FWC is satisfied that reinstatement of the person is inappropriate; and

[56]

(b) the FWC considers an order for payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

[57]

Note: Division 5 deals with procedural matters such as applications for remedies.

[58]

(1) An order for the payment of compensation to a person must be an order that the person's employer at the time of the dismissal pay compensation to the person in lieu of reinstatement.

[59]

(2) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (1), the FWC must take into account all the circumstances of the case including:

[60]

(a) the effect of the order on the viability of the employer's enterprise; and

[61]

(b) the length of the person's service with the employer; and

[62]

(c) the remuneration that the person would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if the person had not been dismissed; and

[63]

(d) the efforts of the person (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered by the person because of the dismissal; and

[64]

(e) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation; and

[65]

(f) the amount of any income reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation; and

[66]

(g) any other matter that the FWC considers relevant.

[67]

(3) If the FWC is satisfied that misconduct of a person contributed to the employer's decision to dismiss the person, the FWC must reduce the amount it would otherwise order under subsection (1) by an appropriate amount on account of the misconduct.

[68]

(4) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt, caused to the person by the manner of the person's dismissal.

[69]

(5) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not exceed the lesser of:

[70]

(a) the amount worked out under subsection (6); and

[71]

(b) half the amount of the high income threshold immediately before the dismissal.

[72]

(6) The amount is the total of the following amounts:

[73]

(whichever is higher) for any period of employment with the employer during the 26 weeks immediately before the dismissal; and

[74]

(b) if the employee was on leave without pay or without full pay while so employed during any part of that period - the amount of remuneration taken to have been received by the employee for the period of leave in accordance with the regulations."

[75]

[52] The prerequisites contained in ss.390(1) and (2) have been met in this case.

[53] Mr Gabrynowicz did not seek reinstatement (partly as a result of his loss of trust in the employer) and I am satisfied that reinstatement is not appropriate in this case.

[54] Section 390 of the Act makes it clear that compensation is only to be awarded as a remedy where the Commission is satisfied that reinstatement is inappropriate and that compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances.

[55] I now turn to whether compensation in lieu of reinstatement is appropriate.

[56] The Full Bench in McCulloch v Calvary Health Care Adelaide[14] confirmed, in general terms, that the approach to the assessment of compensation, as undertaken in cases such as Sprigg v Paul's Licensed Festival Supermarket,[15] remains appropriate.

[57] Section 392(2) of the Act requires the Commission to take into account all of the circumstances of the case including the factors that are listed in paragraphs (a) to (g). Without detracting from the overall assessment required by the Act,[16] it is convenient to discuss the identified considerations under the various matters raised by each of the provisions.

[76]

The effect of the order on the viability of the employer - s.392(a)

[77]

[58] G + Gracin did not contend that an order of compensation would impact the viability of the employer.

[78]

The length of Mr Gabrynowicz service with the employer - s.392(b)

[79]

[59] Mr Gabrynowicz was employed by G + Gracin for just over four years.

[80]

The remuneration Mr Gabrynowicz would have received, or would have been likely to receive if he had not been dismissed - s.392(c)

[81]

[60] This involves, in part, a consideration of the likely duration of Mr Gabrynowicz's employment in the absence of what I have found to be an unfair dismissal. G + Gracin were scheduled to close for two weeks over the Christmas New Year Period. Mr Gabrynowicz was dismissed approximately three weeks before the scheduled close down.

[61] In my view Mr Gabrynowicz's work performance and poor relationship with the proprietors are significant issues that would have significantly impact upon the continuation of the employment relationship.

[62] In the circumstances it is reasonable to assess compensation in this matter on the basis that Mr Gabrynowicz would have remained in employment for a further period of one week (37.5 hours).

[63] I have not included any notice requirement in the consideration on the basis that the evidence before me suggests that Mr Gabrynowicz was engaged as a casual employee (albeit regular and systematic).

[82]

The efforts of Mr Gabrynowicz to mitigate the loss suffered by him because of the dismissal - s.392(d)

[83]

[64] Mr Gabrynowicz was successful in finding employment from 22 January 2020 at a rate of pay similar to that received prior to his dismissal.

[84]

Remuneration earned by Mr Gabrynowicz during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation and the amount of any income likely to be earned by him during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation - ss.392(e) and (f)

[85]

[65] Mr Gabrynowicz has earnt $9,929.08 in the period since 22 January 2020. He is not presently working as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. I have not taken these earnings into account as they fall beyond the period I have predicted the employment will continue.

[86]

Any other matter that the FWC considers relevant and the remaining statutory parameters - s.392(g)

[87]

[66] There are no other relevant matters.

[88]

[67] Mr Gabrynowicz's conduct in going back to sleep after being advised that he was late for work represents a cavalier attitude to his attendance. The impact on the small business restaurant was significant and would have been known to him. In my view this represents misconduct and I have discounted the award by 10%.

[68] There are no other relevant matters .

[69] In accordance with s.392(4) of the Act, I make no allowance for any shock, distress or humiliation that may have been caused by the dismissal.

[70] The maximum compensation limit in this case would be the lesser of 26 weeks remuneration or half the amount of the high-income threshold immediately before the dismissal.[17] The amount of compensation awarded is less than that limit.

[71] The compensation confirmed below is also appropriate having regard to all of the circumstances of this matter and the considerations specified by the Act.[18]

[72] I award compensation in the amount of $988.20 (calculated at $29.28 x 37.5(hours) less 10%) to be paid with 28 days. Taxation is to be paid on the amount.

[73] An Order[19] reflecting this Decision will be issued.

[89]

Seal of the Fair Work Commission with member%26#8217;s signature.

[90]

R Kulonja and C Cavallaro on behalf of the Respondent.

[91]

[1] (1998) 88 IR 21

[92]

[10]Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371 at 373

[93]

[11]Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd (2000) 98 IR 137

[94]

[12] Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008

[95]

[13] Byrne and Frew v Australian Airlines Pty Ltd [1995] HCA 24

[96]

[14] [2015] FWCFB 873

[97]

[15] (1998) 88 IR 21. See also Bowden v Ottrey Homes Cobram and District Retirement Villages Inc T/A Ottrey Lodge [2013] FWCFB 431

[98]

[16] Smith and Others v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd [2004] AIRC 57; (2004) 130 IR 446

[99]

[18] Smith and Others v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd [2004] AIRC 57; (2004) 130 IR 446 at par [32]

[100]

[19] PR718718

[101]

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

Antony Gabrynowicz v G + Gracin [2020] FWC 2267

At a glance

Result

Key principles

Issues before the court

Plain English Summary

Cited legislation

Deep Dive