Ansah v Ansah

1. The proceedings be adjourned to Monday 11 August 2025 at 9.45 am for directions and possible interim hearing.
2. Ms Hettie be joined as second respondent in the proceedings.
3. C Pty Ltd be joined as third respondent in the proceedings.
4. D Pty Ltd be joined as fourth respondent in the proceedings.
5. E Pty Ltd be joined as fifth respondent in the proceedings.
6. The husband, Ms Hettie, and E Pty Ltd [by itself, its servants and agents,] be restrained from withdrawing any funds held in any bank accounts under the names of E Pty Ltd and Account No...98, except:

(a) to pay any reasonable business expenses not exceeding $20,000; or

(b) to pay any tax due and payable by E Pty Ltd.

1. The husband, C Pty Ltd and D Pty Ltd be restrained from selling, encumbering, charging or otherwise dealing with the following properties:

Commercial Property O Street, Suburb P NSW (Suburb P Property)

1. The applicant is to serve the First and Second named Respondents by midday on Wednesday 6 August 2025 with the Initiating Application; Affidavit; Genuine Step Certificate; Financial Statement and these Orders.
2. Leave be granted for the Applicant to serve C Pty Ltd by way of substituted service with the following:

(a) Initiating Application;

(b) Affidavit;

(c) Genuine Step Certificate;

(d) Financial Statement; and

(e) These Orders

by delivering the documents to the address at S Street, Suburb P NSW by midday Wednesday 6 August 2025.

1. Leave be granted for the Applicant to serve D Pty Ltd by way of substituted service with the following:

(a) Initiating Application;

(b) Affidavit;

(c) Genuine Step Certificate;

(d) Financial Statement; and

(e) These Orders

by delivering the documents to the address at T Street, Suburb U NSW

1. Leave be granted for the Applicant to serve E Pty Ltd by way of substituted service with the following:

(a) Initiating Application;

(b) Affidavit;

(c) Genuine Step Certificate;

(d) Financial Statement; and

(e) These Orders

by delivering the documents to the address at V Street, Sydney NSW by midday Wednesday 6 August 2025.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Reynders & Travere has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. On 2 July 2025, the applicant wife filed an Initiating Application supported by an affidavit and Financial Statement.
2. The Initiating Application seeks orders on a final basis pursuant to s 106 B and s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). There are a number of named respondents to the application including a number of companies and the husband's wife of a former marriage. The application also seeks a suite of orders on an interlocutory basis and some discrete orders on an ex parte basis.
3. The wife in her affidavit says the husband has dealt with assets of the parties in such a way as to defeat an anticipated order in the proceedings. She also says that at about the time of filing for a divorce, the husband arranged for a solicitor to witness her signature to a Child Support Agreement and a document that purports to be a Financial Agreement. The wife says that the husband made various threats to her if she did not sign the documents. The wife's affidavit would appear to suggest that she did not receive legal advice at the time of signing the Agreements.
4. The wife contends the matrimonial pool has a gross value of approximately $20,000,000 and contends that to protect herself and her entitlements, it is necessary that the Court make orders on an ex parte basis.

1. The wife says that the parties were married in 2017 in China and entered Australia in 2021 under a business migration programme.
2. She says there is one child of their marriage born in 2019.
3. She says that the parties initially separated in April 2023 but ceased ultimately cohabiting in October 2023. A divorce order was made by the Court in 2024.
4. She contends that during the course of the marriage she and the husband resided in a home at Suburb G.
5. The wife in her affidavit says the following:

1. I seek orders that the bank accounts of [E Pty Ltd] to be frozen, and that such orders be made without notice to the husband on the basis that there is a real risk the husband may dissipate or deal with the funds to defeat my claims if given advance notice.

2. The husband is a sophisticated businessman who has been married four times. Since the breakdown of our marriage in or around October 2023, he has orchestrated the creation of various loan agreements involving his third wife, [Ms Hettie], who now resides with him. He has also further encumbered multiple properties by obtaining second mortgages, including over assets that were previously unencumbered.

3. The husband claims that all the fund [Ms Hettie] transferred to him is a loan. This is not correct. I rely on para 57 to para 68 of this affidavit.

...

1. The husband holds the permanent resident card in [Country Y] and [Country Z]. I am aware of it because the husband revealed it to me during our marriage. If the account of [E Pty Ltd] is not frozen before giving him notice, he will transfer money to [Ms Hettie] or out of country.

2. I have endured prolonged verbal abuse and physical violence throughout the marriage. In October 2023, following an incident of physical assault and escalating emotional abuse from the husband, I left our home and returned to China for my safety and wellbeing.

3. After I left Australia temporarily in October 2023, the husband commenced a series of deliberate and systematic actions aimed at dissipating the matrimonial asset pool without my knowledge or consent. These actions included transferring ownership of assets to third parties, encumbering properties we purchased during the marriage, altering company shareholdings and control structures, and engaging in transactions designed to conceal or reduce the matrimonial pool available for division.

4. In [early] 2024, I informed the husband of my intention to return to Australia in [early] 2024, and I asked him to arrange accommodation for me and the child. He agreed but kept stalling. Due to his delay, I later said that I could stay temporarily at the [Suburb G] property. The husband then told me he did not want my presence to affect our child's school interview or study. I said I could assist our child with study. The husband ultimately agreed that I could return [in early] 2024. Mortgage were secured on all real estate properties with the exception of the commercial property. [Ms Hettie] signed all the loan agreement [in early] 2024

...

1. During our marriage, the husband and I transferred more than AUD $20 million from China into Australia. These transfers took place over a span of several years and were facilitated through a complex network of remitters and intermediaries, as direct international fund transfers were subject to restrictions under Chinese foreign exchange laws. I was actively involved in the transfer process and have direct knowledge of how these transactions were carried out. Specifically, I was the one who contacted the remitters in China, communicated with them via WeChat, and provided them with the necessary instructions on how much to remit, to which Australian account, and under whose name. I also followed up regularly to confirm whether each remittance had been processed and provided the relevant banking details and references for each transaction. From [mid] 2022, under the husband's instructions, [Ms Hettie] began communicating directly with the currency exchange agents. However, I also followed up from time to time.

...

1. The aggregate total of these banked Australian Dollar funds exceeded AUD $20,832,402, with approximately AUD $18,554,803.00 identified as having been deposited into personal accounts held directly under the husband's name (including under his English name), based on the bank statements and transaction descriptions.
2. The remaining balance was deposited into my account or [C Pty Ltd's] account, then used to purchase real estate in Australia in cash, without any borrowings at the time of purchase. These acquisitions were subsequently leveraged by the husband, through mortgages or other encumbrances, for his personal financial benefit or to effect asset transfers.
3. After the sum mentioned in paragraph 32 being transferred to Australia, the husband and I purchased the following properties:

[F Street, Suburb G NSW (Former Matrimonial Home) Registered Owner: the husband

Commercial Property [O Street, Suburb P NSW (Suburb P Property)]

1. To the best of my knowledge, all the properties were originally purchased unencumbered using a total of $20,832,402.00, which the husband transferred from China to Australia through various senders. Subsequently, the husband mortgaged these properties to third-party financiers in order to draw down on the equity. I do not know where the proceeds from these equity withdrawals have been retained or how they have been applied.

...

[D Pty Ltd]

1. [D Pty Ltd] was registered [in early] 2023. Upon incorporation, the husband was appointed as the sole director and secretary of the company and remained in those roles until [early] 2025. Annexed hereto and marked with [MSH]7. is a copy of the historical ASIC search of this company.
2. The husband was also the sole shareholder of [D Pty Ltd] until [late] 2024. On that date, he transferred his 100% shareholding to his friend, [Ms AA], without notice to me and without any disclosed consideration.
3. In [early] 2025, the husband caused himself to be removed as the director and secretary of the company. He simultaneously appointed [Ms Hettie], his third wife, as the sole director and secretary of the company. From that date, neither the husband nor I have held any legal control over [D Pty Ltd].
4. [D Pty Ltd] is the registered proprietor of the following three real properties, all of which were acquired during the course of the marriage and funded from monies transferred to Australia by the husband and me:

a. [H Street, Suburb J NSW (the Suburb J Property)]

b. [K Street, Suburb L NSW (the Suburb L Property)]

c. [M Street, Suburb N NSW (the Suburb N Properly)]

...

[C Pty Ltd]

1. [C Pty Ltd] was registered [in late] 2021. The company's sole director is [Ms BB], who is known to be a close associate of the husband. She assisted us to handle our visa, and migration matters when we first arrived in Australia.

2. At the time of [C Pty Ltd's] registration, the shareholding structure was 60% held by the husband and 40% held by me. I held my 40% shareholding during the marriage and in anticipation of joint business ventures. Annexed hereto and marked with [MSH]9. is a copy of the historical ASIC search of this company.

3. In [early] 2024, without my consent or knowledge, my 40% shareholding was unilaterally removed by the director and transferred to the husband.

4. From [early] 2024 until [mid] 2025, the husband was the sole shareholder of [C Pty Ltd].

5. [Ms CC] is the mother of [Ms Hettie]. I am aware of their relationship because I have previously transferred fund to her.

6. In [mid] 2025, the husband transferred 100% of his shares in [C Pty Ltd] to [Ms CC]. This transfer was affected without any disclosed consideration and took place shortly after my solicitor issued correspondence raising concerns about the dissipation of marital assets. I have only become aware of this transfer when my solicitor did an ASIC search [in] 2025].

55. [C Pty Ltd] holds several valuable assets, including:

1. [S Street, Suburb P NSW], an unencumbered commercial property valued at approximately $400,000.00;

2. [Motor Vehicle 1], valued at approximately $50,000.00.

3. [Motor Vehicle 2], valued at approximately $180,000.00.

...

1. [Ms Hettie] is the husband's third wife. According to the husband, they divorced in or around early 2016. At the time of their divorce, the husband transferred a property to her and agreed to pay her RMB 1 million, allegedly at a rate of RMB100,000 per year -although only approximately RMB500,000 was paid. The remaining RMB 500,000 was given to [Ms Hettie] as a discount on the purchase of a property developed by the husband. Despite their divorce, she has remained financially dependent on the husband. He continued to pay her a monthly salary of ¥10,000 through a company under his control, even though she performed only domestic duties such as child transportation and housework.
2. During our marriage, the husband repeatedly informed me that [Ms Hettie] was merely a figurehead or nominee used for the purpose of holding and managing his assets and financial affairs. He made it clear to me on numerous occasions that although certain properties, funds, or business interests appeared to be in [Ms Hettie] name, she had no real ownership or control over them. According to the husband, [Ms Hettie] was acting at his direction and solely for his benefit. He stated that this arrangement was necessary to minimise exposure to legal or financial risk, both in China and in Australia, and to facilitate the transfer of funds internationally. I was led to believe that [Ms Hettie] was not involved in decision-making regarding these assets and that she was not entitled to any beneficial interest in them.
3. In [October] 2023, the husband sent me some photos of our child. I felt quite happy at the time. Shortly thereafter, he asked me to sign a loan agreement between himself and [Ms Hettie]. He told me that an issue had arisen with an Australian currency exchange company and that many fund transfers were under investigation, with accounts being frozen. He said the purpose of the agreement was to ensure the safety of the funds and to guarantee the financial security of our child. He assured me that if I signed the document, the funds would be safe, and he would send me a copy the following day. He specifically asked me not to disclose this to anyone. However, instead of sending the document directly to me, he instructed his family member [Ms DD] to bring it to me for signature later that night. I was not shown the contents of the agreement in advance. When I finally received the document from [Ms DD] , I discovered that it was a loan agreement involving [Ms Hettie]. I did not sign it. I immediately messaged the husband via WeChat and informed him that I had not signed the agreement. The Husband said to me:

   1. All the funds transferred from China were channelled through [Ms Hettie]. He also stated that he is in possession of the IOU (debt acknowledgment) and that [Ms Hettie] does not have a copy of this document. Under Chinese law, it is crucial for the lender to hold the original IOU. He indicated that although [Ms Hettie] had no actual control over the funds, if the matter were to proceed to court, he could use the IOU in [Ms Hettie's] favour.

   2. He confirmed that he did not actually owe any money to [Ms Hettie], nor did [Ms Hettie] owe money to him; it was merely a procedural formality and had nothing to do with her.

   3. If I did not sign the document, he would transfer all the properties to others, and in the event of a divorce, I would receive neither money nor property.

   4. If I agreed to sign, he would transfer [Suburb R] Property to our son and that [Ms Hettie] would have no further connection to it.

   5. the purpose of signing the loan agreement with [Ms Hettie] was to circumvent potential legal risks, both domestic and international because he concerned about the investigation of these fund transfers.

   6. Once the legal risks were avoided, the assets would still be used within our family, and the property and future money would ultimately belong to two children.

   7. If the loan document was completed properly, our marital assets could not be at risk.

...

1. I have in my possession audio recordings and text message exchanges between the husband and me, in which the husband clearly stated that the purported loan documents were merely "a matter of procedure," "they do not mean anything," "they are for protection ," and "they are not real." These statements demonstrate that the alleged loan agreements were not genuine and were fabricated solely for the purpose of shielding assets.

...

1. Annexed hereto and marked with [MSH]13. is a copy of all the caveats [Ms Hettie] filed on the following properties, where the description stated the loan agreement dated [early] 2024:

F Street, Suburb G NSW (Former Matrimonial Home) Registered Owner: the husband

H Street, Suburb J NSW (Suburb J Property) Registered Owner: D Pty Ltd

K Street, Suburb L NSW (Suburb L Property) Registered Owner: D Pty Ltd

1. The Loan Agreement dated [early] 2024, as well as the preparation for the caveat lodgement, took place while I was still in China, and the husband was deliberately delaying my return to Australia by telling me not to come back until he arranged accommodation. I was financially dependent on him, lacked English skills, and had no personal support in Australia. I believe the caveats were timed and lodged in a coordinated attempt to transfer or obscure matrimonial assets while I was incapacitated and out of the country.
2. I believe it is significant that all mortgages and alleged loan transactions occurred after I was in China and refused to sign the loan agreement between the husband and [Ms Hettie].

DISPENSING WITH SERVICE AND PROCEEDING EX PARTE

1. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules") provide that the Court may proceed without service of an application. In summary, the Rules provide as follows:

(1) Rule 2.34(1) provides that a party who is unable to serve a document may apply, without notice, for an order to dispense with service of the document, with or without conditions.

(2) Rule 2.34(2) provides that when considering an application under r 2.34(1), the Court may have regard to a number of factors including the nature of the proceeding.

(3) Rule 2.34(3) provides that if the Court orders that service of a document is dispensed with, then the document is taken to have been served.

1. The wife bears the onus of establishing to the satisfaction of the Court that the orders that she seeks should be made without notice to the husband.
2. The Rules also make provision for what someone in the position of the wife must establish to ground the making of an ex parte order. In that respect, r 5.11 provides:

5.11 Applications without notice

An applicant seeking that an interlocutory order be made without notice to the respondent must:

(a) satisfy the court about why:

(i) shortening the time for service of the application and the fixing of an early date for hearing after service would not be more appropriate; and

(ii) an order should be made without notice to the other party; and

(b) in an affidavit or orally, with the court's permission, make full and frank disclosure of all the facts relevant to the application, including the following:

(i) whether there is a history or allegation of child abuse or family violence between the parties;

(ii) whether there have been any previous proceedings between the parties and, if so, the nature of the proceedings;

(iii) the particulars of any orders currently in force between the parties;

(iv) whether there has been a breach of a previous order by either party to the proceeding;

(v) whether the respondent or the respondent's lawyer has been told of the intention to make the application;

(vi) whether there is likely to be any hardship, danger or prejudice to the respondent, a child or a third party if the order is made;

(vii) the capacity of the applicant to give an undertaking as to damages;

(viii) the nature of the damage or harm that may result if the order is not made;

(ix) why the order must be urgently made;

(x) the last known address or address for service of the other party.

1. In Stowe and Stowe [1980] FamCA 92; (1981) FLC 91-027 ("Stowe"), the Full Court of the then Family Court of Australia made the following observations at 76,258-76,259:

Ex parte orders are dealt with in reg. 42. That regulation makes it clear that ex parte orders are to operate only until a specified time or (as in the present case) until further order of the Court (para. (5)). The Court is empowered to give directions as to the service of the order and the hearing of an application for a further order (para. (6)). Regulation 42 was considered by the Full Court in the case of Sieling [1979] FamCA 23; (1979) FLC 90-627, where reference was made, with approval, to Ansah (1977) 2 W.L.R. 760. In that case, the Court of Appeal emphasised that if an order was made ex parte it should be limited in time to the shortest possible period which must elapse before a preliminary hearing could be arranged. It is implicit in the decisions of Sieling (supra) and Ansah (supra) that wherever possible short notice of the proceedings should be given to the respondent:

"The general principles are that the Court must be satisfied that the matter is of such urgency that the applicant's interests (or the interests of the child) can be protected only by an immediate order. It is necessary to balance the likelihood of harm to the applicant against the hardship to the respondent of making an order without hearing him. The more drastic the order the more grave must be the risk to be averted and the more important the requirement that the respondent be heard at the earliest opportunity. An order that a party be excluded from the home or that a child be removed from the custody of a party must be supported by evidence of an imminent risk of such a nature that the Court cannot wail even the period of time necessary for short service." (Sieling [1979] FamCA 23; (1979) FLC 90-627 at p. 78,254.)

In those limited circumstances where it is necessary to make an ex parte order, the onus rests upon the applicant for the injunction both at the ex parte stage and at the later hearing of the matter to satisfy the Court that the circumstances justify the making and continuation of the order. This is so irrespective of whether the respondent formally applies to set aside the order. Counsel for the appellant husband submitted - correctly in our view - that the Court's discretion could miscarry if the onus were put upon the respondent to satisfy the Court that the order should be discharged.

1. To proceed in the absence of and without notice to a party is an extraordinary thing for a court to do. The circumstances in which a court does so have in the authorities been variously described as 'anomalies' or 'exceptional'. The Full Court in Stowe as referred to above, cited with approval the observations of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Ansah v Ansah [1977] 2 All ER 638. Their Lord Justices observations bear repeating, where they stated at 642:

Orders made ex parte are anomalies in our system of justice which generally demands service or notice of the proposed proceedings on the opposite party (see Craig v Kanseen [1943] 1 KB 256 at 262). Nonetheless, the power of the court to intervene immediately and without notice in proper cases is essential to the administration of justice. But this power must be used with great caution and only in circumstances in which it is really necessary to act immediately. Such circumstances do undoubtedly tend to occur more frequently in family disputes than in other types of litigation ... but even in such cases the court should only act ex parte in an emergency when the interests of justice or the protection of the applicant or a child clearly demands immediate intervention by the courts. Such cases should be extremely rare ... Circumstances, of course, may arise when prior notice cannot be given to the other side; for example, cases where one parent has disappeared with the children, or a spouse, usually the wife, is so frightened of the other spouse that some protection must be provided against a violent response to service of proceedings, but the court must be fully satisfied that such protection is necessary.

1. I am satisfied that the circumstances of this matter are exceptional and that there is a basis established on the evidence to which I have earlier referred to proceed ex parte.

1. Section 114 of the Act provides that the Court may make such order or grant such injunction as it considers proper, including an injunction in relation to the property of a party to the marriage.
2. In Tsiang & Wu and Ors [2019] FamCAFC 128; (2019) FLC 93-911, the Full Court summarised the relevant law in relation to injunctions in the following terms:
   1. The grant of an injunction is discretionary and the basis on which such an order is made is well established. A purpose, as in this case, is to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the controversy. An applicant must demonstrate first that there is a serious issue to be tried. While that statement has been the subject of various iterations, in essence it requires the demonstration of an arguable case or as was said in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65], the applicant must "show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo".
   2. Next the applicant must demonstrate that the balance of convenience favours making the order sought. As part of this, the applicant must show that there is a "danger" or risk of dissipation of or dealings with assets which will frustrate any judgment in favour of the applicant.
   3. In Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319, Gleeson CJ said after discussing the discretionary nature of the remedy at 321-325:

... as a general rule a plaintiff will need to establish, first, a prima facie cause of action against the defendant, and secondly, a danger that, by reason of the defendant's absconding, or of assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction or otherwise dealt with in some fashion, the plaintiff, if he succeeds, will not be able to have his judgment satisfied.

...

It is not difficult to imagine situations in which justice and equity would require the granting of an injunction to prevent dissipation of assets pending the hearing of an action even though the risk of such dissipation may be assessed as being somewhat less probable than not.

1. As McDougall J in Skyworks v 32 Drummoyne Road [2017] NSWSC 343 said:
   1. The Court is required to undertake a qualitative evaluation of all the evidence that is available, to see if there is a sufficiently serious risk of frustration to justify the making of a freezing order. Further, the two considerations [namely, (1) whether there is a good arguable case and (2) whether there is a real risk of judgment frustration] should be analysed together (as each may impact on the other), and with an appreciation of both the underlying purpose of the rule and the relative risks of granting or withholding relief - the customary discretionary calculus.
2. In this case the identified risk was that the wife might dispose of assets in Australia and in her name in order to defeat the husband's claim and, equally it was asserted that there was a risk that the second and third respondents too might deal with the partnership assets in a way so as to defeat the husband's possible judgment or claim to that entity.
3. It is unnecessary to demonstrate a positive intention but merely the possibility of the event occurring. The determination about the balance of convenience may thus be an inference drawn from the facts and circumstances established by the applicant's evidence.
4. Nor is it the role of the judge determining the question of the injunction to, in effect conduct a trial of the disputed evidence to resolve those disputes (see Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corporation Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 729).
5. As to the determination of the existence of the risk and its magnitude, in Palmer v Parbery [2019] QCA 27 McMurdo JA (with whom Fraser and Gotterson JJA agreed) said:
   1. The determination of whether there exists a sufficiently serious risk of the dissipation of assets involves the evaluation of future possibilities, rather than the ascertainment of historical facts. The risk of dissipation might justify an order although the probability of the risk eventuating is less than 50 per cent. But, as the risk of dissipation must be a real and not merely a theoretical one, it must have an evidentiary basis. Where a fact is alleged by the plaintiff in support of its case about the risk, but there is contrary evidence from the defendant, must the fact be proved to the court's satisfaction as if the application for the freezing order was the trial of the case? In my view, a plaintiff need not do so. A freezing order is interlocutory in nature; it does not involve a final determination of the parties' positions. Usually it is made in circumstances of urgency in which the court is unable to conduct an extensive and conclusive factual inquiry in a way which is fair to both parties. Where the factual basis for the plaintiff's case about the risk of dissipation is disputed, the risk will commonly have to be evaluated with the recognition that the factual basis for it is in doubt. Nevertheless, the possibility of the plaintiff's evidence being correct, considered with other facts and circumstances, might mean that there is a sufficiently serious risk of the frustration of the satisfaction of a judgment as to justify the making of a freezing order. ...

1. It is the applicant for the injunction who bears the onus of satisfying the Court that the circumstances justify the making of the order: Sieling and Sieling [1979] FamCA 23; (1979) FLC 90-627 at 78,262.
2. To ground the wife's relief, she needs to establish that there is a serious issue to be tried, alternatively expressed as a prima facie case for relief. She must also establish that her claim for relief will be imperilled if the injunction is not granted. To that extent, the Court might be satisfied about risk of dissipation by an assessment of future possibilities of an event occurring, which may be established by the drawing of inferences from the applicant's evidence. The question of prejudice to the respondent needs to be considered and the order made should be no more than is necessary.
3. The wife seeks relief against the husband's former wife and various corporate entities. They have been named as respondents to the application and are thus parties to the proceedings. The entities were at one stage controlled by the husband as referred to in the wife's affidavit. As the matter will return to the Court very shortly, the husband, his former wife and the companies will be able to be heard as to the necessity for and continuation of the injunctions. I am, however, satisfied that the making of the orders are reasonably necessary.
4. Addressing such of the factors in r 5.11 as are relevant, I am satisfied in light of the wife's evidence that it would not have been more appropriate to shorten the time for service and to allocate an early return date (r 5.11(a)(i)). There is, according to the wife, a history of family violence and the wife gives evidence of fearing for her safety (r 5.11(b)(i)). There are no existing proceedings between the parties (r 5.11(b)(ii)).
5. The husband, his former wife, and the various corporate entities have not been told of the intention to make the application (r 5.11(b)(v)). I am unclear as to whether there will likely be hardship, danger or prejudice to any of the respondents if the order is made, but to ameliorate such hardship, danger or prejudice, I will bring the matter back before the Court at the earliest opportunity (r 5.11(b)(vi)). I am satisfied that if the order is not made, there is a risk that the husband and consequentially the respondents may deal with the assets in a way to prejudice the wife's claim. I am satisfied on the basis of the wife's evidence that there is a need for the order to be made urgently (r 5.11(b)(ix)). The wife in her affidavit and in the proposed orders sets out various addresses for the purposes of effecting service (r 5.11(b)(x)).

1. The wife has before the court an undetermined application for financial adjustment under s 79 of the Act. The wife gives evidence of having made both parenting and non-financial contributions over the course of the parties' relationship. I am satisfied for the purposes of this application only and in circumstances where I have not as yet heard from the husband, that the wife has established that the husband has acted in a fashion such as to give rise to a prima facie case that there is a risk of dissipation and/or removal of assets such that her application for property adjustment would be imperilled. Consequently, I am satisfied that it is necessary to make ex parte orders. I note that the wife gives an undertaking as to damages.
2. Conscious of the fact that the respondents the subject of the orders have not had notice of the proceedings and have not had an opportunity to put before the Court evidence as to any prejudice occasioned to them by the making of the orders or whether such orders are even necessary, I will ensure that the matter comes back before the Court as expeditiously as possible.

I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Schonell.