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[2025] QCA 83
respondent. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed. No order as to costs.
The Court of Appeal did not reconsider whether the burial assistance limits were discriminatory or whether the funding decision was correct. It considered whether the proposed grounds could be appealed from QCATA's final decision and whether any legal error justified leave. Most proposed grounds had not been decided by QCATA, and one alleged factual error rather than a question of law. The Human Rights Act ground was legally arguable in form, but the Act did not apply to the earlier decision and proceedings because of its transitional provision. Leave was refused.
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2,448 words · generated 07/10/2026
The appeal arose from a dispute about the scope of State burial assistance after the death of Mr Angelopoulos' father. His father died on 23 June 2018. The judgment says the father was Greek Orthodox and that Mr Angelopoulos wanted him to have a Greek Orthodox funeral, but could not afford the funeral and burial costs at the time (at [3]).
3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Mr Angelopoulos sought assistance under the Burials Assistance Act 1965 (Qld). The funding supported specified burial-related services, including reopening a pre-purchased burial plot, a graveside service, the funeral director's fee, a coffin, preparation of the body if required, and transport from the morgue to the burial site. It excluded costs associated with a Greek Orthodox service and the viewing of the deceased in an open coffin (at [4]). The judgment records that the Greek community and Greek Orthodox Church ultimately helped fund a church service, but not the private open-coffin viewing. The father was buried on 16 November 2018, and Brown JA noted the delay added to Mr Angelopoulos' grief (at [4]).
Mr Angelopoulos complained to the Anti-Discrimination Commission on 25 October 2018. His case was that the funding restriction amounted to indirect discrimination because, he argued, people outside the Greek Orthodox faith would be more likely to comply with the restriction and bury family members without the excluded religious practices (at [5]). The Commission referred the complaint to QCAT in January 2019.
QCAT dismissed the application on 11 May 2022. As Brown JA summarised it, QCAT read ss 3 and 4 of the Burials Assistance Act as dealing with arrangements for burial or cremation, rather than funding a religious, cultural or civil remembrance ceremony and related costs. It concluded that the Chief Executive's decision accorded with that Act and was reasonable under s 106 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), because it was necessary to comply with, and authorised by, the Burials Assistance Act (at [6]). QCAT also considered that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) did not apply because the complaint pre-dated the Act's commencement (at [6]).
QCATA dismissed Mr Angelopoulos' appeal on 31 October 2023. It held that s 108(2) of the Human Rights Act excluded the Act's application because both the relevant State decision and the complaint proceedings occurred before the relevant provisions commenced on 1 January 2020 (at [9]).
The Court of Appeal proceeding was not a fresh hearing of the original discrimination complaint. Mr Angelopoulos sought leave to appeal QCATA's decision. Brown JA grouped the proposed grounds into issues about natural justice and evidence, interpretation of the Burials Assistance Act, the Anti-Discrimination Act, the Human Rights Act, and an alleged factual error in an affidavit (at [10]). The Court's task was narrower: it had to determine whether there was jurisdiction to hear each proposed ground and whether leave should be granted.
The Court dismissed the application for leave. There was no order as to costs (at [22]).
The Court's reasoning turned on the statutory limits governing appeals from QCATA, rather than the merits of the underlying funding decision.
Section 150(2)(b) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) allows an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a QCATA decision only where that decision is a final decision. Section 150(3) further requires an appeal to be on a question of law and to have the Court's leave (at [13]). Section 151 sets a time limit of 28 days from receipt of written reasons. Although Mr Angelopoulos' application was about two days late, the State did not object on that basis (at [11]–[12]).
The Court considered grounds 1–3 and 5 outside its jurisdiction. Grounds 1–3 addressed matters considered in the original QCAT decision, including the application of the Human Rights Act, the interpretation of the Burials Assistance Act, and the Anti-Discrimination Act. But those matters were not the subject of QCATA's appeal or its final decision. Brown JA held that their consideration by the first-instance tribunal did not make them appealable in the Court of Appeal proceeding (at [18]). The key distinction is between an issue appearing somewhere in the history of a case and an issue determined by the final decision being appealed.
Ground 5 alleged a factual error in an affidavit relied on by the State. It had not been raised in the QCATA appeal and was not the subject of its final decision. In addition, the Court held that it did not raise a pure question of law, as s 150(3)(a) required (at [18]). Thus, this proposed ground faced two separate barriers: it did not arise from the appeal tribunal's final decision, and it was factual in character.
Ground 4 was different. It challenged QCATA's conclusion about the Human Rights Act, arose from QCATA's final decision, and raised a question of law (at [16], [19]). The Court nevertheless found no reasonably arguable error. Section 108(2) provides that the Act does not affect proceedings commenced or concluded before commencement and does not apply to a public entity's act or decision made before commencement. The Act commenced on 1 January 2020. Brown JA identified the funding decision complained of as having been made on 19 July 2018 and the complaint proceeding as having been signed on 18 January 2019 and received by the Tribunal on 21 January 2019 (at [19]). On that chronology, the transitional provision precluded the Act's application in this case.
The judgment's background also says assistance was granted in October 2018 (at [4]), while the legal analysis identifies 19 July 2018 as the date of the challenged decision (at [19]). The Court did not explain that difference in the extract provided. Its conclusion on s 108(2), however, relies on the relevant decision and proceedings being before 1 January 2020.
The Court referred to Allen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2024] QCA 24 for the leave principles. As described at [14], the Court must consider whether there is a reasonable argument that an error of law requires correction and whether leave is needed to correct substantial injustice or an important point of principle. The Court concluded that ground 4 did not present an arguable error requiring correction to avoid substantial injustice, and the other grounds were either outside the available appeal or not questions of law (at [20]). Leave was therefore dismissed.
This judgment applied the statutory appeal framework in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act. It did not purport to change that framework. The provisions identified by the Court were s 150(2)(b), concerning final decisions; s 150(3), concerning questions of law and leave; and s 151, concerning the time for applying (at [11]–[13]).
Before this decision, as described in the reasons, Allen had set out relevant considerations for granting leave: a reasonable argument of legal error, and a need to correct substantial injustice or address an important point of principle (at [14]). The Court applied those considerations here. The judgment does not state that it modified or rejected Allen.
The decision's contribution is its application of the final-decision requirement to grounds drawn from different stages of tribunal proceedings. It confirms for this case that a proposed ground does not become appealable merely because the original QCAT member considered the topic. The question is whether the ground arises from QCATA's final decision (at [18]).
The judgment also applies s 108(2) of the Human Rights Act to a decision and complaint proceedings that pre-dated commencement. It treats the transitional text as decisive for this matter, notwithstanding Mr Angelopoulos' reference to unidentified authorities said to support a different result (at [17], [19]). The Court did not identify or analyse those authorities, and it did not decide any broader question beyond the application of s 108(2) to the dates before it.
The decision did not decide the general scope of burial assistance under the Burials Assistance Act, the merits of the indirect discrimination allegation, or the construction of the Human Rights Act's substantive rights provisions. Those matters formed part of the procedural background or proposed grounds, but the Court's jurisdictional analysis prevented it from determining most of them. Accordingly, the "after" state of the law should be stated narrowly: this Court refused leave on the grounds and chronology before it; it did not announce a new test for discrimination claims or burial assistance.
At [13], Brown JA explains that an appeal to the Court of Appeal is available only against a QCATA final decision, only on a question of law, and only with leave. In plain English, a party cannot use this kind of appeal simply to ask the Court to reconsider all disputed facts or every issue previously raised.
At [14], the judgment draws on Allen and describes factors relevant to leave: whether there is a reasonable argument of legal error and whether leave is necessary to correct substantial injustice or address an important point of principle. This does not mean that merely labelling a complaint an error of law is sufficient. The proposed appeal must meet the statutory threshold and the leave considerations.
At [18], the Court distinguishes the original QCAT decision from QCATA's final decision. Grounds 1–3 had been addressed at the first tribunal stage but were not decided by QCATA. The Court therefore could not hear those grounds in this appeal. Ground 5 was also not part of QCATA's final decision and, independently, did not raise a pure question of law. In practical terms, appeal grounds must be tied to the decision that the statute permits the Court to review.
At [19], Brown JA applies s 108(2) of the Human Rights Act. The relevant State decision and the complaint proceedings took place before the Act commenced. The Court therefore concluded that the Act did not apply to this case. The judgment's point is about the statutory commencement and transition rule, not a rejection of the substantive rights identified in the grounds of appeal.
At [20], the Court brings those conclusions together: grounds 1–3 and 5 did not raise questions of law arising from QCATA's final decision, and ground 4 did not raise an arguable legal error requiring correction to avoid substantial injustice. That combination meant leave was refused.
The reasoning is most directly relevant where a party seeks to appeal from a tribunal appeal body's final decision under ss 150 and 151 of the QCAT Act. It is particularly relevant if the proposed grounds concern issues decided at an earlier tribunal stage but not included in, or determined by, the appeal tribunal's final decision. The judgment treats that distinction as jurisdictional, not a matter that can be overcome simply by restating the earlier arguments (at [18]).
It also matters where the proposed appeal challenges a finding of fact. The Court's treatment of ground 5 illustrates that a factual dispute does not satisfy the statutory requirement for a question of law merely because it is framed as an error by the tribunal (at [18]). The judgment does not comprehensively define every boundary between fact and law, but it applies the requirement to the affidavit allegation before it.
The decision is relevant to arguments based on the Human Rights Act where the challenged public entity decision and proceedings pre-date 1 January 2020. In this case, the Court applied s 108(2) to exclude the Act's operation on the dates identified (at [19]). The precedent should be used with attention to those dates and the statutory transitional language, rather than as a conclusion about claims involving later decisions or proceedings.
Finally, the judgment is relevant to leave applications where an applicant must show an arguable legal error and a reason for the Court to exercise its discretion. It illustrates that a ground can raise a question of law but still fail to justify leave if the Court finds no reasonably arguable error and no substantial injustice requiring correction (at [19]–[20]).
The supplied judgment does not cite any decision that considered how later courts treated Angelopoulos v State of Queensland [2025] QCA 83. Nor does the material provided include subsequent judgments. It is therefore not possible, on this source alone, to say that later courts have followed, distinguished, applied or limited this decision.
The judgment itself cites Allen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2024] QCA 24 for leave principles and applies those principles (at [14]). It also refers to the earlier Angelopoulos proceedings: the original QCAT decision, [2022] QCAT 163, and QCATA's decision, [2023] QCATA 138, as procedural history and sources for the grounds and background (at [6]–[9]). These are earlier stages of the same matter, not later treatment of the 2025 Court of Appeal decision.
For research purposes, any claim about post-2025 treatment would require checking later case law beyond the judgment supplied here. No such later history is asserted in this analysis.
The Court did not determine whether the funding terms, considered on their merits, amounted to indirect discrimination under the Anti-Discrimination Act. It recorded QCAT's conclusion that the funding decision was reasonable because it was necessary to comply with, and authorised by, the Burials Assistance Act (at [6]), but the Court of Appeal did not reassess that conclusion in this leave application.
Nor did the Court decide how ss 3 and 4 of the Burials Assistance Act should be construed in a case where that issue properly arises from an appeal tribunal's final decision. The applicant argued that the Act did not expressly exclude church services (at [10]), but the Court held it had no jurisdiction to consider that ground in this proceeding because it was not the subject of QCATA's final decision (at [18]).
The judgment did not identify or assess the District Court authorities to which Mr Angelopoulos referred in oral argument concerning the Human Rights Act. It concluded that s 108 clearly precluded the Act's application on the facts and dates before it (at [19]). It remains outside the scope of this decision to determine the effect of any unidentified authority in a different procedural or factual setting.
The judgment also does not explain the difference between the background statement that some assistance was granted in October 2018 and the identification of 19 July 2018 as the date of the challenged decision (at [4], [19]). It resolves the temporal issue by noting that the relevant decision and proceedings pre-dated 1 January 2020. The source does not indicate that this date difference altered the result.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Angelopoulos v State of Queensland [2025] QCA 83
PARTIES: ANGELOS ANGELOPOULOS / (applicant) v / STATE OF QUEENSLAND / (respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 15230 of 2023 / QCATA No 177 of 2022
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Application for Leave Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act
ORIGINATING COURT: Queensland Civil and Administrative Appeal Tribunal at Brisbane – [2023] QCATA 138 (Senior Member Aughterson)
DELIVERED ON: 27 May 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 12 May 2025
JUDGES: Boddice and Brown JJA and Kelly J
ORDERS: The application for leave is dismissed. No order as to costs.
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – ERROR OF LAW – WHAT IS – GENERALLY – where the applicant applied for and was granted burial assistance under the Burials Assistance Act 1965 (Qld) – where a request for additional funding for a burial and ceremony in accordance with religious requirements was refused – where the applicant made a complaint to the Anti-Discrimination Commission which was referred to QCAT – where the applicant seeks to rely on the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) – where the complaint application to QCAT and subsequent appeal to QCATA were dismissed – whether the grounds of appeal relate to a “final decision” – whether the Senior Member erred in not applying the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) – whether leave to appeal should be given / Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 106 / Burials Assistance Act 1965 (Qld), s 3, s 4 / Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 108(2) / Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 150, s 151 / Allen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2024] QCA 24, cited / Angelopoulos v State of Queensland [2022] QCAT 163, cited / Angelopoulos v State of Queensland [2023] QCATA 138, cited
COUNSEL: The applicant appeared on his own behalf / M J Brooks for the respondent
SOLICITORS: The applicant appeared on his own behalf / C E Christensen, Crown Solicitor for the respondent
BODDICE JA: I agree with Brown JA.
BROWN JA: Mr Angelopoulos seeks leave to appeal a decision from the QCAT Appeals Tribunal (QCATA) dated 31 October 2023.
The background facts, which are not the subject of any contention, were summarised by the member who heard the appeal.1 Mr Angelopoulos’ father sadly passed away on 23 June 2018. Mr Angelopoulos’ father was Greek Orthodox and Mr Angelopoulos desired his father to have a Greek Orthodox funeral. He, however, could not afford to pay for the funeral service and burial at the time of his father’s passing.
Mr Angelopoulos applied for financial assistance under the Burials Assistance Act 1965 (Qld). Some financial assistance was granted to him in October 2018, but the funding was for the re-opening of a pre-purchased burial plot, a graveside service, the funeral director’s fee, a coffin and any required preparation of the body and transportation from the morgue to the burial site. A term of the funding was that it would not extend to costs associated with the conduct of a Greek Orthodox Service and viewing of the deceased in an open coffin (which accorded with the religious ceremony in the Greek Orthodox Church). Mr Angelopoulos ultimately received the support of the Greek community and the Greek Orthodox Church to fund a church service, but it did not extend to the costs of the private viewing of the deceased in an open coffin. Mr Angelopoulos’ father was eventually buried on 16 November 2018. The delay added to Mr Angelopoulos’ grief.
Mr Angelopoulos complained to the Anti-Discrimination Commission on 25 October 2018 that the decision was discriminatory. The Commission referred the matter to QCAT on 18 January 2019 and was stamped by QCAT on 21 January 2019.2 Mr Angelopoulos contended that the State of Queensland breached the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) as a result of imposing a term on the funding which excluded the expenses of the church service and viewing of the deceased as part of the ceremony, which required him to bury his father without his complying with his father’s and his own religious beliefs. He contended that the Chief Executive, in imposing a restriction on the funding, imposed a term that constituted indirect discrimination. According to Mr Angelopoulos a higher proportion of people who are not of Greek Orthodox faith would be able to comply with the term and bury family members without a church service or private viewing.
Mr Angelopoulos’ application to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Appeal Tribunal (QCAT) was refused by Member Browne on 11 May 2022. Member Browne considered sections 3 and 4 of the and found that the Chief Executive was limited by the respective sections to provide for the disposal of a deceased body to burial or cremation when the Chief Executive is satisfied no satisfactory arrangements have been made. He found “other place” would include a site for burial such as a cemetery or a site for cremation, and that the did not provide for payment of expenses related to a religious, cultural or civil remembrance ceremony and associated costs of such a ceremony. Thus, Member Browne concluded that the decision of the Chief Executive accorded with the . Given that finding, Member Browne also found that the Chief Executive’s conduct was reasonable under s 106 of the because it was necessary to comply with, and authorised by, the . Member Browne also found the (Qld) () had no application because Mr Angelopoulos’ complaint was made prior to the commencement of the Act.
“The grounds of appeal raise a question of law and are as follows:
1)Whether the Member, in making the decision dated 11 May 2022, properly applied the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), which required the following mandatory consideration:
a)The relevant provisions of the Burials Assistance Act 1965 (Qld) (including sections 3 and 4) must to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights: sub-section 48(1) Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld);
b)If the relevant provisions of the Burials Assistance Act 1965 (Qld) (including sections 3 and 4) could not be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights, the provision must, to the extent possible that is consistent with its purpose, be interpreted in a way that is most compatible with human rights: sub-section 48(2) Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).
c)The provisions of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) relevant to the section 48 inquiry and mandatory construction may have included;
i) section 15 (Recognition and equality before the law);
ii) section 20 (Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief); and
iii) section 27 (Cultural rights – generally).” (footnotes omitted)
QCATA found that s 108(2) of the HR Act operated such that the Act did not apply to the act or the decision made by the Chief Executive in October 2018 or the proceedings instituted in the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal and referred to QCAT, all of which occurred before the commencement of the relevant sections of the HR Act on 1 January 2020. Mr Angelopoulos’ appeal was therefore dismissed.
According to Mr Angelopoulos’ outline of submissions he wishes to appeal on the basis that:there was a denial of natural justice due to the consideration of the matter by QCATA being limited to the evidence listed in the exhibit list (Ground 1);QCATA misinterpreted the Burials Assistance Act 1965 in failing to recognise that it did not explicitly exclude church services under ss 3 and 4 (Ground 2);QCATA neglected to apply the Anti-Discrimination Act 1992; (Ground 3);QCATA overlooked the HR Act 2019 (Ground 4); andthere was an error of fact in the affidavit of Ms Spears, relied on by the respondent, in stating that the Burials Assistance Act “does not allow for expenses related to religious or cultural ceremonies, including church services, to be paid from the consolidated fund” and that this statement represented a significant factual error underlying the respondent’s argument (Ground 5).
Limits of appeal
Pursuant to s 151 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) any application for leave to appeal from the decision of the appeal tribunal is required to be made by application within 28 days of the applicant being giving written reasons of the appeal tribunal.
The State of Queensland takes no issue with Mr Angelopoulos’ appeal being approximately two days out of time.
Section 150 (2) and (3) of the QCAT Act sets out the decisions of QCATA which may be appealed and the conditions which must be met before there can be any such appeal. Pursuant to s 150(2)(b) of the QCAT Act a person relevantly may appeal to the Court of Appeal against a decision of the appeal tribunal, which is a final decision. Under s 150(3) of the QCAT Act an appeal may be made only on a question of law and only if the party has obtained the Court’s leave to appeal.
In Allen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission9 the Court discussed the legal principles governing an application for leave noting that firstly leave to appeal can only be granted if the proposed appeal is “only on a question of law” (s 150(3)(a) QCAT Act), which requires the question to be considered upon appeal to be confined to pure questions of law.10 Even if a proposed appeal from a final decision of the appeal tribunal is only on a question of law, an applicant will still need leave to appeal to this Court, which will involve the exercise of judicial discretion. While the discretion is unfettered, the matters which have been identified in the authorities relevant to the exercise of the discretion include:11
“(a) whether there is a reasonable argument that there is an error of law to be corrected; and
whether leave is necessary to correct a substantial injustice, or an important point of principle sufficient to warrant the grant of leave [that] has been identified.”
On 28 August 2024, the parties were directed to address the following in relation to each ground of appeal:whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the grounds of appeal having regard to s 150(3)(a) of the QCAT Act; andif so whether the Court should grant leave to appeal in relation to the proposed grounds of appeal pursuant to s 150(3)(b) having regard to the considerations mentioned in Allen v QBCC at [21]-[23].
The respondent conceded grounds 1-3 were matters of law but contends ground 5 is a matter of fact. The respondent submitted however that leave should be refused in relation to grounds 1-3 and 5 above because they were not the subject of the final decision of QCATA dated 31 October 2023 and therefore cannot be the subject of appeal under s 150(2)(b) of the QCAT Act. The respondent concedes ground 4 did raise a question of law, and arose out of the final decision of QCATA, but submits there was no error as the HR Act did not apply to the applicant’s complaint and that there was no error to be corrected to avoid a substantial injustice.
The applicant contended each question involved a question of law. In oral argument he did not cavil with the fact he had not raised grounds 1-3 and 5 before QCATA, but stated he had received some advice from a voluntary legal centre suggesting he could raise them as part of the appeal. As to ground 4 he contended that there were unidentified authorities supporting the HR Act applying in a case such as this, notwithstanding the commencement date of the HR Act.
Decision
There is no jurisdiction for the Court to determine any appeal in relation to grounds 1-3. While those matters were addressed in the primary decision of QCAT by Member Browne on 11 May 2022, they were not the subject of QCATA’s appeal or its final decision.12 Similarly ground 5 was not raised in the QCATA appeal or the subject of final decision. In any event, ground 5 does not raise a pure question of law.
Ground 4 does arise out of the final decision of QCATA and involves a question of law. However, there is no reasonably arguable error in relation to ground 4. As identified by QCATA the HR Act did not commence operation until 1 January 2020. Section 108(2) of the HR Act provides that the Act does not affect proceedings commenced or concluded before the commencement; nor does it apply to an act or decision made by a public entity before the commencement. In this case the decision refusing the provision of the financial assistance under the Burials Assistance Act, which Mr Angelopoulos complains of, was made on 19 July 2018. The proceeding commenced by the complaint in the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, which was then referred to QCAT, was signed on 18 January 2019 and received by the Tribunal on 21 January 2019. While Mr Angelopoulos has contended that the considerations under that Act somehow apply notwithstanding s 108 of the HR Act and he understood there may be some District Court decisions to that effect, s 108 clearly operates to preclude the operation of the HR Act in the present case.
Leave should not be granted to the applicant given the proposed appeal does not raise questions of law arising from the final decision of QCATA in relation to grounds 1-3 and 5. Nor does ground 4 raise an arguable error of law requiring correction to avoid substantial injustice.
The respondent did not seek an order for costs in the event Mr Angelopoulos’ application was unsuccessful.
Orders
The application for leave is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
[2023] QCATA 138 at [1] & [4]. ↩
[2023] QCATA 138 at [9]. ↩
Angelopoulos v State of Queensland [2022] QCAT 163 at [31]. ↩
Angelopoulos v State of Queensland [2022] QCAT 163 at [32]. ↩
Angelopoulos v State of Queensland [2022] QCAT 163 at [37]. ↩
Angelopoulos v State of Queensland [2022] QCAT 163 at [15]. ↩
Angelopoulos v State of Queensland [2023] QCATA 124 at [6]. ↩
[2023] QCATA 138 at [6]. ↩
[2024] QCA 24. ↩
Allen v QBCC at [16]. ↩
Allen v QBCC at [21]. ↩
The matters the subject of the appeal being identified in [6] of the QCATA decision. ↩
Angelopoulos
State of Queensland [2025] QCA 83
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed. No order as to costs.
A subsequent appeal to QCATA was dismissed on 31 October 2023. Mr Angelopoulos had sought to add grounds to the appeal but that was refused by QCATA on 30 August 2023.7
The member of QCATA summarised the grounds of appeal that had to be considered as follows:8