[2026] FWC 590
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2026-02-24
Original judgment source is linked above.
s.365 - General protections
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal - jurisdictional objection - whether Applicant dismissed - jurisdictional objection upheld - found that Applicant was not dismissed within the meaning of s 386(1) of the Fair Work Act.
[1] On the 15 December 2025, Mr Andrew Shaw (the Applicant) lodged an application pursuant to s 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) in which he asserts that the termination of his employment on 26 November 2025 by Sales Accent (Qld) Pty Ltd (the Respondent) contravened his workplace rights. In its Form F8A response, the Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection to the application, that the Applicant was not dismissed within the meaning of s 386 of the Act.
[3] Following allocation of the matter to my Chambers, Directions were issued on 16 January 2026 for the filing of material in relation to the jurisdictional objection. The Respondent filed material on 30 January 2026 in accordance with the Directions. The material filed included submissions, a witness statement of Mr Peter Hopkinson (Director of the Respondent) and other documents on which the Respondent sought to rely. The Applicant failed to file any material in reply by the required filing date, that of 13 February 2026. In correspondence sent by my Chambers at 9.15am on 16 February 2026, the Applicant was advised the following;
I draw your attention to the Notice of Listing and Directions sent on the 18 December 2026. These Directions required submissions from the Applicant by 5pm, Friday 13 February 2026. At this time, Chambers has not received these submissions.
Chambers requires these submissions by close of business today 16 February 2026. Otherwise, the Deputy President will determine the current matter on-the-papers, that is, without a Hearing.
If you object to that course of action or require an extension of time, you are required to notify Chambers by 5:00pm today.
[4] The Applicant failed to respond to the above correspondence; by way of filing his material, objecting to my proposed course of action of dealing with the matter on the material before me, or seeking an extension of time to file his material. Having received no response, further correspondence was sent to the parties advising that the notice of listing and directions were vacated and that I would proceed to determine the Respondent's jurisdictional objection on the papers. It is to that I now turn to.
[5] In a document attached to his Form F8 application the Applicant made a number of assertions which may be summarised as follows;
[6] Mr Hopkinson gave the following unchallenged evidence on the background to the relationship between the Applicant and Respondent which may be summarised as follows;
(1) Each company in the affiliation had and obtained its own clients.
(2) If one of the respective clients wanted to reach customers in another State, one of the companies would be able to pass work on to the other companies in the affiliation and leverage their experience and connections in the relevant State.
(3) The commission received from the client would be shared based on the sales achieved in each State.
[7] Mr Hopkinson went on to state that the Respondent;
[8] Finally, Mr Hopkinson states that Applauder Vic was free to delegate or have any of its employees do work and that the Applicant used his own Applauder Vic email address and was never given an email account by the Respondent.
[9] Section 365 of the Act provides that a person who has been dismissed may apply to the Commission to deal with the dispute. Section 368 of the Act confers authority on the Commission to deal with a dismissal dispute in the event that an application is made under s 365.
[10] The circumstances in which a person is taken to be "dismissed" are set out in s 386 of the Act. Section 386(1) relevantly provides as follows:
(a) the person's employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer's initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.
[11] In the present case, the Respondents contend that the Applicant was not an employee and therefore could not have been dismissed within the meaning of s 386(1). Determination of whether the Applicant is an employee is to be determined by reference to s 15AA of the Act which relevantly provides as follows;
"15AA Determining the ordinary meanings of employee and employer
(1) For the purposes of this Act, whether an individual is an employee of a person within the ordinary meaning of that expression, or whether a person is an employer of an individual within the ordinary meaning of that expression, is to be determined by ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the individual and the person.
(2) For the purposes of ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the individual and the person:
(a) the totality of the relationship between the individual and the person must be considered; and
(b) in considering the totality of the relationship between the individual and the person, regard must be had not only to the terms of the contract governing the relationship, but also to other factors relating to the totality of the relationship including, but not limited to, how the contract is performed in practice.
Note: This section was enacted as a response to the decisions of the High Court of Australia in CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd [2022] HCA 1 and ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2.
[12] Section 15AA of the Act was inserted by the Fair Work Legislation Amendment (Closing Loopholes No. 2) Act 2024 (Cth) and commenced on 26 August 2024. By reason of Clause 116(1)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Act, s 15AA applies to a relationship entered into before the commencement date and that is in existence as at that date. It is not contested that the Applicant entered into a relationship with RPMAH before 26 August 2024 and that the relationship was in existence at that date.
[64] In French Accent, a Full Bench of this Commission usefully summarised the considerations, derived from various court authorities, which may be relevant in the application of the multi-factorial test referred to in Brodribb. However as was stated by Winneke P in the Victorian Court of Appeal decision in The Roy Morgan Research Centre P/L v The Commissioner of State Revenue, the task in applying the test is not to be approached as a mechanical exercise of running through items on a checklist, but is rather "a matter of obtaining the overall picture from the accumulation of detail". This involves "an assessment and evaluation of evidence for the purpose of identification and isolating factors or indicia which are capable of pointing in one direction or the other, and then weighing or balancing those factors in accordance with established principles, none of which is conclusive, in order to reach a conclusion". (footnotes omitted)
[17] Turning now to consider whether the Applicant was an employee or contractor. In doing so I note that the evidence of Mr Hopkinson was unchallenged. That leads me to find as follows;
[18] All of the above matters which go to the practical control the Respondent was able to exert over the Applicant tells strongly against a finding that the Applicant was an employee of the Respondent.
[19] Turning to other indicia, the following findings are made;
[20] Having considered the various indicia, it is evident that the matters set out above point overwhelmingly to the Applicant carrying on his own business and that he was not an employee of the Respondent. The most compelling of these factors are;
(1) The Applicant ran his own business which was based in Victoria and while it formed part of the Applauder alliance, it was free to operate independently, engage its own clients and sub-contract or delegate work.
(2) The practical control exerted by the Respondent was limited.
(3) The manner in which the Applicant arranged his business and taxation affairs were consistent with that of an independent contractor. Specifically, his company Applauder Vic received commission payments from the Applauder group for sales generated in the area Applauder Vic serviced.
(4) The Applicant did not receive a salary, superannuation, paid leave or other entitlements from the Respondent that would normally characterise an employment relationship.
(5) The Applicant employed his own staff through the Applauder Vic entity.
[21] I do not consider that the relationship between the Applicant and Respondent, when looked at in its totality, contains the essential features that would ordinarily characterise an employment relationship: that being the relevant contractual terms and the right of the Respondent to exclusively control when and how work was to be performed by the Applicant. The weight of the matters considered, lead me to conclude that the Applicant was not an employee of the Respondent and was in fact carrying on a business of his own.
[22] It necessarily follows from the foregoing that the Applicant was not an employee of the Respondent, was not dismissed within the meaning of s 386 of the Act and is therefore unable to make a general protections dismissal dispute application The application must be dismissed. An order giving effect to this decision will be separately issued.
[1] Coles Supply Chain Pty Ltd v Milford [2020] FCFAC 152; [2021] HCASL 37.
[7] [2011] FWAFB 8307 at [30].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Andrew Shaw
Sales Accent
(1986) 160 CLR 16
(2001) 207 CLR 21