Legislative power and punitive detention
40 The respondent's next submission was that, subject to recognised exceptions, it is beyond the legislative competence of the Commonwealth Parliament to enact legislation authorising the punitive detention of a person unless by judicial order following the adjudication and punishment of criminal guilt. In addition, the Commonwealth Parliament lacked the competence, it was submitted, to confer power on a court to punish by punitive detention "contempts" of an executive process. The first seemed to be a submission about process and the second a submission about subject matter.
41 The respondent did not argue that the ACC could not be authorised to undertake the special operation to which the Determination related. He did not challenge the applicant's submission that the special operation was justified by reference to, at least, the powers in s 51(i), (v), (xii) and (xiii) of the Constitution. The respondent accepted that it is within the competence of the Commonwealth Parliament to create, and to authorise the investigation of, the offences to which the Determination referred. He also accepted, at least tacitly, the proposition stated by Emmett J in S v Australian Crime Commission [2006] FCAFC 5; (2006) 149 FCR 361 at [41]:
The provisions of the [ACC] Act that empower the Commission to investigate offences are supported by as many heads of power as are applicable in the particular circumstances in which the coercive powers are exercised.
42 The respondent's submission about process was more confined, but nevertheless involved several facets. It was, in part, a submission that the Australian Constitution does not authorise the enactment of legislation containing a process for the adjudication and punishment of conduct other than by the conventional criminal process; in part, a submission that the Commonwealth Parliament cannot authorise involuntary detention for punitive purposes unless by curial order following an adjudication of criminal guilt; and in part a submission that, having established the offence of failing or refusing to answer an examiner's question, it was not open to the Parliament to legislate for a means of enforcement involving punishment by detention on the basis that the conduct in question did not constitute an offence. The latter submission was that, putting to one side the implications arising from Ch III of the Constitution, the establishment of a "parallel criminal process" could not be justified by the incidental power as it is not reasonably connected with the underlying power.
43 The contentions of the respondent were based on two related premises: first, that the sanctions contemplated by s 34B(5) are punitive in nature and, secondly, that, other than in the case of the recognised exceptions, sanctions of that kind may be imposed only by curial order. Both premises are sound.
44 As to the first, the passage from the reasons in Witham v Holloway quoted earlier in these reasons indicates the punitive nature of sanctions imposed for contempt of court. So does the observation of Deane J in Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15 at 49:
It should no longer be accepted in this country where, regardless of whether it be imposed in proceedings brought by the Attorney-General or some other official acting in the public interest or by a private individual for the indirect or coercive enforcement of a civil order, imprisonment or fine as a consequence of a finding of contempt of court cannot be justified otherwise than as a punishment for past or continuing breach of law. Proceedings seeking the imposition of such punishment upon an alleged contemnor … must realistically be seen as essentially criminal in nature … In any event, it is plain that the offences of which the present appellants were found guilty and for which they have been sentenced were, even on traditional classification, criminal contempts and that the proceedings giving rise to the present appeals were … criminal in nature.
(Citation omitted)
45 In relation to the second, the respondent referred to passages in decisions of the High Court concerning forms of involuntary detention at the behest of the Executive. He referred first to the statement of Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 27:
In exclusively entrusting to the courts designated by Ch. III the function of the adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt under a law of the Commonwealth, the Constitution's concern is with substance and not mere form. It would, for example, be beyond the legislative power of the Parliament to invest the Executive with an arbitrary power to detain citizens in custody notwithstanding that the power was conferred in terms which sought to divorce such detention in custody from both punishment and criminal guilt. The reason why that it is so is that, putting to one side the exceptional cases to which reference is made below, the involuntary detention of a citizen in custody by the State is penal or punitive in character and, under our system of government, exists only as an incident of the exclusively judicial function of adjudging and punishing criminal guilt.
(Emphasis added)
Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ noted (at 28) that a number of recognised forms of involuntary detention are not punitive in nature: detention following arrest while awaiting trial, and detention in cases of mental illness or infectious disease. Their Honours then noted that, apart from the power of the Parliament to punish for contempt and the power of military tribunals to punish for breach of military discipline, "the citizens of this country enjoy, at least in times of peace, a constitutional immunity from being imprisoned by Commonwealth authority except pursuant to an order by a court in the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth."
46 The Court in Lim held that the power of the Commonwealth Parliament vested by s 51(xix) with respect to aliens authorised legislation permitting the Executive to detain in custody an alien for the purposes of expulsion or deportation and that legislation to that effect did not contravene the investment of the judicial power of the Commonwealth in Ch III courts.
47 In Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562, the High Court, by majority, upheld the validity of legislation authorising the indefinite detention by the Executive of a stateless person whose removal from Australia was not reasonably practicable. The respondent referred to the reasons of McHugh J at [44]:
Nor does the continued detention of a person who cannot be deported immediately infringe Ch III of the Constitution. Chapter III is always infringed where the detention of a person other than by a curial order - whatever the purpose of the detention - is authorised by a law of the Commonwealth and imposes punishment. However, a law authorising detention will not be characterised as imposing punishment if its object is purely protective. Ex hypothesi, a law whose object is purely protective will not have a punitive purpose. That does not mean, however, that a law authorising detention in the absence of a curial order, but whose object is purely protective, cannot infringe Ch III of the Constitution. Even a law whose object is purely protective will infringe Ch III if it prevents the Ch III courts from determining some matter that is a condition precedent to authorising detention.
(Emphasis in the original)
48 The respondent emphasised the statement that Ch III of the Constitution is infringed whenever a person is detained, other than by curial order, for the purposes of punishment.
49 Next, the respondent referred to the judgment of Gaudron J in Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, in which Her Honour suggested that, subject to recognised exceptions, s 51 of the Constitution should not be regarded as authorising the enactment of legislation involving the involuntary detention of persons in custody divorced from any breach of the law. Gaudron J said at 110-1:
I do not doubt that there is a broad immunity similar to, but not precisely identical with that enunciated by Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Lim. In my view, however, it does not derive from Chapter III. Rather, I am of the view that the true constitutional position is that, subject to certain exceptions, a law authorising detention in custody, divorced from any breach of the law, is not law on a topic with respect to which s 51 confers legislative power.
50 The decision in Kruger concerned the validity of Northern Territory legislation permitting the forced separation by the Chief Protector of Aboriginals and, later, the Director of Native Affairs of Aboriginal children from their parents.
51 Gaudron J had also raised this possible limitation on legislative power in Lim at 55-57. I note that in Al-Kateb, Gummow J at [130]-[132] considered that the reasons of Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ in Lim were to be preferred to those of Gaudron J.
52 Finally, the respondent referred to passages in the reasons of Gummow J in Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575. In that case, the Court considered the validity of legislation authorising the Supreme Court of Queensland to make an order for the indefinite detention for protective purposes of persons considered to be an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sexual offence if released into the community. Gummow J referred at [77] to the proposition stated by Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Lim quoted above, and to the observation of Kirby J in Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 49; (2003) 216 CLR 161 at [56] that, "loss of liberty as a punishment … is ordinarily one of the hallmarks reserved to criminal proceedings conducted in the courts, with the protections and assurances that criminal proceedings provide". Gummow J then continued at [80]:
I would prefer a formulation of the principle derived from Ch III in terms that, the "exceptional cases" aside, the involuntary detention of a citizen in custody by the State is permissible only as a consequential step in the adjudication of criminal guilt of that citizen for past acts.
53 The respondent contended that the quoted passages indicate that, other than in the case of the recognised exceptions, the imposition of the sanction of imprisonment requires an exercise of the judicial power. I accept that that is so. Adjudging and punishing criminal guilt is an exclusively judicial function: Magaming v The Queen [2013] HCA 40; (2013) 302 ALR 461 at [47]. I also accept that proceedings for the punishment of a contempt, whether of this Court itself or as contemplated by s 34B, are criminal in nature.
54 However, the soundness of these premises does not establish the lack of legislative competence for which the respondent contended. Plainly, the punitive sanctions contemplated by s 34B may be imposed only by curial order. For the respondent's submission to succeed, it requires, in addition, acceptance of the proposition that the curial order may be made only after a finding of "criminal guilt" in proceedings having the hallmarks of a criminal trial. None of Lim, Al-Kateb or Kruger concerned that question.
55 As the Solicitor-General for South Australia noted, the respondent's claim involves not only a contention that the Constitution permits punishment for contempts of the ACC to be imposed only by an exercise of the judicial power, but also a contention that it requires that that power be exercised only in accordance with a particular procedure. He submitted that the Court was thereby being invited to "constitutionalise" criminal procedure, so as to hold that it was not open to the Commonwealth Parliament to enact a procedure which is sui generis or which departs in some respect from the conventional hallmarks of a criminal trial.
56 In my opinion, there is force in this critique and it should be accepted. The implications and assumptions arising from Ch III of the Constitution and from the right to trial by jury in respect of indictable offences established by s 80 of the Constitution which bear on these questions are to be considered in the next two sections of the these reasons and can be put to one side for present purposes. The present limitations on the legislative power of the Commonwealth for which the respondent contended were said have their basis in Ch I of the Constitution. However, apart from the reference to the passage in the reasons of Gaudron J in Kruger to which I referred earlier, the respondent did not point to any basis upon which the legislative powers of the Commonwealth should be regarded as restricted in the way for which he contends. The approach of Gaudron J has not commanded majority support in the High Court.
57 The respondent did not attempt to identify the particular elements of the "conventional criminal process" in respect of which the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament is said to be confined.
58 It is true that the Commonwealth has no general legislative power in relation to criminal law. Nevertheless, it can create criminal offences in the areas of its enumerated legislative powers, provided that the creation of the criminal offence is sufficiently connected to a legislative power: S v Australian Crime Commission [2006] FCAFC 5; (2006) 149 FCR 361 at [40]. To like effect, Murphy J said in Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88 at 161:
The Commonwealth has full power (which it has freely exercised) to make criminal as well as non-criminal law with respect to the subjects on which it is empowered to legislate.
59 The Commonwealth's power with respect to criminal law can be exercised to provide different modes of trial. This power is exercised when the Parliament provides that an offence is indictable (thereby entitling the accused to trial by jury) or that it is a summary offence, with the consequence that it can be charged and determined in a summary way: Kingswell v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 264.
60 I will refer later to the reasons of Brennan J in Nicholas v The Queen [1998] HCA 9; (1998) 193 CLR 173 concerning the power of the Parliament to make laws prescribing matters of criminal evidence, practice and procedure in respect of those subject matters over which it has legislative competence. The exercise of that power is readily apparent in the provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and in the Criminal Code forming the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) prescribing particular procedures for the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of criminal guilt. The recognition of that power militates against the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament being limited in the way for which the respondent contends.
61 The provisions in several enactments with respect to civil pecuniary penalties are another illustration of the exercise of legislative power to provide for a punishment, and the means of its imposition, which departs from the conventional criminal process.
62 There may of course be some departures from the conventional criminal process which are so significant as to indicate that the power which the courts are intended to exercise cannot reasonably be regarded as judicial at all. The respondent did not contend that the present was such a case. Having regard to the features of the process contemplated by ss 34A-34C, to which I will refer shortly, such a submission would, in any event, have been difficult to sustain.
63 As indicated, the respondent also relied on the circumstance that a witness' refusal or failure to answer a question which an examiner requires him or her to answer is an offence. He submitted that, having so provided, it was not open to the Parliament to establish a "parallel system" for the punishment of the same conduct.
64 Section 30 of the ACC Act contains relevant offence provisions:
(1) A person served, as prescribed, with a summons to appear as a witness at an examination before an examiner shall not:
(a) fail to attend as required by the summons; or
(b) fail to attend from day to day unless excused, or released from further attendance, by the examiner.
(2) A person appearing as a witness at an examination before an examiner shall not:
(a) when required pursuant to section 28 either to take an oath or make an affirmation--refuse or fail to comply with the requirement;
(b) refuse or fail to answer a question that he or she is required to answer by the examiner; or
(c) refuse or fail to produce a document or thing that he or she was required to produce by a summons under this Act served on him or her as prescribed.
….
(6) A person who contravenes subsection (1), (2) or (3) is guilty of an indictable offence that, subject to this section, is punishable, upon conviction, by a fine not exceeding 200 penalty units or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years.
(7) Notwithstanding that an offence against subsection (1), (2) or (3) is an indictable offence, a court of summary jurisdiction may hear and determine proceedings in respect of such an offence if the court is satisfied that it is proper to do so and the defendant and the prosecutor consent.
(8) Where, in accordance with subsection (7), a court of summary jurisdiction convicts a person of an offence against subsection (1), (2) or (3), the penalty that the court may impose is a fine not exceeding 20 penalty units or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 1 year.
….
As can be seen, subs (1) provides that a summonsed witness shall not fail to attend as required by the summons. Subsection (2) provides that the witness shall not, amongst other things, "refuse or fail to answer a question that he or she is required to answer by the examiner". A person who contravenes those requirements is guilty of an indictable offence punishable by fine or imprisonment (subs (6)).
65 Sections 33 and 35 are also pertinent. Section 33(1) proscribes the giving of evidence at an examination before an examiner which the person knows is false or misleading in a material particular and provides that a contravention is an indictable offence. Section 35 provides:
(1) A person must not:
(a) obstruct or hinder:
(i) the ACC in the performance of its functions; or
(ii) an examiner in the performance of his or her functions as an examiner; or
(b) disrupt an examination before an examiner; or
(c) threaten any person present at an examination before an examiner.
(2) A person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable offence that, subject to this section, is punishable, upon conviction, by a fine not exceeding 200 penalty units or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years.
…
66 It is to be observed that the provisions in s 34A establishing the contempts which may be committed by a witness do not replicate entirely the offences as specified in ss 30, 33 and 35. The conduct of failing to attend to which s 30(1) refers has no counterpart in s 34A. Nor does the hindering or obstruction of the ACC itself, as distinct from the hindering or obstruction of an examiner, have a counterpart in s 34A. It is apparent therefore that s 34A contemplates that only certain forms of criminal conduct will also constitute a contempt of the ACC.
67 There are distinctions in principle between the offences established by s 30 and a contempt of the ACC. In a case like the present, it is the contempt of the ACC involved in the refusal or failure to answer the required question which is to be dealt with under s 34B, and not just the refusal or failure by itself. Although the considerations bearing on the appropriate punishment for that conduct will have much in common with punishment for a contravention of s 30(2), those considerations will not be identical. The latter is directed to the punishment of past conduct but the former is directed in addition to the defendant's future conduct. As King CJ observed in Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116 at 118 in an analogous context:
The Court must do what it can to prevail upon the applicant to see the matter in a clearer light and to comply with his legal obligation.
See also the discussion by Dodds-Streeton J in Hannaford v HH (No 2) [2012] FCA 560; (2012) 203 FCR 501 at [25]-[42].
68 The legislative enactment of two or more criminal sanctions for conduct of the same or substantially the same kind is not uncommon. The power of this Court to punish for contempts of its own power and authority recognised by s 31 provides an example. The conduct constituting such contempts may also constitute an offence of the kind established in Division 3, Part II of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) such as intimidation of a witness (s 36A), corruption of a witness (s 37), deceiving a witness (s 38), destroying evidence (s 39), or preventing witnesses from attending court (s 40). Similarly, conduct constituting offences of the kind established by ss 147.1 and 147.2 of the Criminal Code (causing harm or threatening to cause harm to a Commonwealth public official) may be a contempt of this Court. Other forms of conduct may be both a criminal offence and contempt of this Court.
69 In addition, there are numerous circumstances in which a person may be subject to punishment for past conduct under two regimes. Conduct constituting an offence under both State and Commonwealth laws provides an example, and s 35A of the ACC Act contemplates such a possibility in relation to offences under that Act. Further still, as Gageler J observed in his dissenting judgment in Magaming v The Queen at [69], there is nothing unusual about the prosecutorial discretion as to the choice of charge or as to the mode of trial which may affect the maximum penalty which a court might ultimately impose on an individual as a result of a determination of criminal guilt.
70 This particular submission of the respondent seems to involve the notion that, once the Commonwealth Parliament has legislated for a particular criminal sanction and the means by which that sanction may be imposed, its powers are exhausted, with the effect that it is not open to it to enact an alternative sanction and the means by which that alternative sanction may be imposed. Again, the respondent did not point to any authority for this limitation on the Commonwealth's legislative power. In my opinion, no basis for such a limitation can be found in the Constitution.
71 Of course, notions of abuse of process or of double jeopardy in the event that both regimes for punishment are invoked in relation to the same conduct may arise in a given case, but that does not go to the legislative competence of the Parliament.
72 Finally, I refer to the submission that the Parliament may not enact legislation providing for contempt of an executive process. I did not understand the respondent to develop this submission in any detail.
73 In my opinion, the power of the Parliament to provide for punishment of contempts of executive processes can properly be regarded as an incident of the substantive powers granted to it, or as granted by the incidental power in s 51(xxix) of the Constitution. It is a means by which the Parliament may ensure respect for, and compliance with, executive processes. I note that there are several instances of the exercise of a power of this kind: for example, ss 372 and 434 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (contempt of the Migration Review Tribunal and the Refugee Review Tribunal); s 6O of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) (contempt of a Royal Commission); s 63 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (contempt of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal); s 89 of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (contempt of service tribunals); and s 66 of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (contempt of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission).
74 This aspect of the respondent's submissions regarding an absence of legislative power fails.
75 For these reasons, I consider that the respondent's challenge to the legislative competence of the Commonwealth Parliament to enact ss 34A-34C fails.