1. The Applicant was born in the Brong-Ahafo region in central Ghana.[10] He is the oldest of four children to his parents' union.[11] The Applicant's three siblings are in their late teens or early twenties.[12]
2. The Applicant was privately educated in the Ashanti Region of Ghana.[13] This education, including board, was paid for by his father, who had been working as a truck driver.[14]
3. Following primary and secondary schooling, the Applicant completed a Bachelor of Political Science with a minor in sociology from the University of Ghana, based in Accra.[15] He graduated in 2012 and then completed his compulsory national service with the Ghanaian military.[16]
4. After national service, the Applicant returned to the family home in Techiman.[17] During this period, he helped his mother to start a shop selling fabrics and tailoring material.[18] He also applied for post-graduate admission at ECU.[19]
5. In June 2014, the Applicant obtained a student visa.[20] He flew to Australia on 11 July 2014.[21]
6. Aside from a return trip to Ghana between 17 January 2020 and 7 February 2020, the Applicant has lived in Western Australia since.[22]
7. The Applicant's immediate family remain in Ghana.[23] His parents separated in 2022, and the father, who had been the main breadwinner, is no longer in contact with the Applicant, his mother or the rest of the Applicant's siblings.[24]
8. The Applicant testified that he has a close relationship with his mother, and did not really know his siblings because they were considerably younger than him and because he had spent most of his life away from the family home.[25]
9. The Applicant has a cousin resident in Western Australia, Mr B. The Tribunal will return to Mr B, and his family, later in these reasons.
10. Separate from Mr B, when the Applicant first arrived in July 2014, he befriended another Ghanaian - Mr T.[26] In the initial stages, and particularly when the Applicant's marriage collapsed in late 2020, the Applicant was reportedly heavily reliant on Mr T for support.[27] Because of that reliance, the Applicant felt that he was in Mr T's debt.[28]
11. On 11 March 2021, Mr T enlisted the Applicant's help to cut open some imported car parts which Mr T thought contained methylamphetamine. That is, 'Mr [T] approached [the Applicant] because he trusted him to help him break open the equipment and not report it to anyone.'[29] Unknown to both men, the importation had been detected by the authorities and the drugs substituted for an inert substance and the delivery covertly surveilled by the Australian Federal Police.[30] The Applicant was aware that there was a substantial risk the car parts contained drugs and chose to ignore that risk.[31]
12. Early that morning, Mr T collected the consignment from the courier depot in Perth.[32] He then took this package to the Applicant's residence.[33] On three separate occasions that morning, the Applicant accompanied Mr T to the local Bunnings Warehouse in Belmont, to purchase tools and items to assist them in gaining access to the drugs thought to be inside the consignment.[34] The Applicant paid for these tools and they worked on cutting up the car parts on the Applicant's balcony.[35] By the end of the second trip, the Applicant was aware of the precise nature of what he was involved in, including because he sent messages and video files to the overseas third-party intermediary whom had been instructing Mr T.[36]
13. The Tribunal notes that Mr T, unlike the Applicant, had been involved in the importation earlier in the piece and for profit.[37] The imported drugs were chemically analysed and found to be 484.5 grams of Methylamphetamine at 80.3% purity (389 grams pure).[38]
14. The Applicant was arrested and charged on 11 March 2021. He spent 7 days in custody before being granted bail.[39] The Applicant remained in the WA community until he was sentenced on 6 February 2024.
15. As noted above, on 6 February 2024, the Applicant was sentenced by the District Court of Western Australia to 3 years' imprisonment, to be released on a recognizance release order after serving 18 months. This conditional release is scheduled to occur on 29 July 2025.[40]
16. On 19 July 2024, the Applicant's permanent partner visa was mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act (Cancellation Decision).[41]
17. The Applicant was notified of the Cancellation Decision by hand on 31 July 2024[42] and invited to make representations to the Minister requesting revocation of this decision.[43] He requested revocation on 16 August 2024, with written submissions in support prepared by a registered migration agent.[44]
18. On 21 March 2025, the Minister's delegate refused to revoke the Cancellation Decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act (Reviewable Decision).[45]
19. The Applicant was notified of the Reviewable Decision on 24 March 2025.[46] He sought review of that decision before the Tribunal by application lodged 25 March 2025.[47]

1. The question for determination by the Tribunal is whether the decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's permanent partner visa is the 'correct or preferable decision' on the material before the Tribunal.[48]
2. Section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act provides that a mandatory cancellation may be revoked if:

(a) the Applicant makes representations in accordance with the invitation to do so given by the Minister under s 501CA(3); and > > (b) the decision-maker is satisfied that: > > > (i) the Applicant passes the character test (as defined by s 501); or > > > > (ii) there is another reason why the mandatory cancellation should be revoked.

3. In Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs ('M1/2021'),[49] the majority of the High Court described s 501CA(4) as conferring 'a wide discretionary power' to revoke a mandatory cancellation, if the decision-maker (whether the Minister, their delegate, or the Tribunal on review of a delegate's decision) is satisfied that there is 'another reason' why the cancellation should be revoked.[50] The majority held in the same paragraph that the assessment of whether there was, in fact, 'another reason' was to be undertaken by reference to the representations made by the Applicant.[51]
4. In exercising the power under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act, the Tribunal must comply with Direction no. 110 - Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (the Direction)[52] given by the Minister under s 499(1) of the Migration Act.[53]
5. Informed by the principles set out in cl 5.2 of the Direction, the Tribunal must take into account the factors identified in cls 8 and 9 of the Direction (to the extent relevant in the particular case) in deciding the application.[54] In this review, those factors are:

(a) the protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct; > > (b) the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia; > > (c) the best interests of minor children in Australia; > > (d) the expectations of the Australian community; > > (e) the legal consequences of the decision; and > > (f) the extent of impediments if removed.

1. The Applicant appeared in-person before the Tribunal over two days on 5 and 6 June 2025. The Applicant was represented by a registered migration agent, Mr Chand, and was brought up from prison for that purpose. The Minister was represented by Mr Woods of Sparke Helmore Lawyers, who appeared by video link from Brisbane.
2. The following documents were marked as exhibits:

(a) Hearing Bundle, including the parties' respective Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions (285 pages) (Exhibit 1); > > (b) Extracts from the Department partner visa file (13 pages) (Exhibit 2); > > (c) DFAT Thematic Report - Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) dated 3 December 2020 (DFAT Report) (Exhibit 3); and > > (d) Extract from the Department's Client Service Portal regarding the Applicant's visa history (Exhibit 4).

3. At the hearing, the Applicant was advised, in simple terms, of his right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination prior to his giving evidence.[55] He was also provided an opportunity to respond to matters put to him and to provide answers to questions asked by the Tribunal which were directed at relevant considerations under the Direction.
4. The Tribunal took oral evidence from the Applicant, his estranged wife (Ms M), cousin (Mr B) and Dr Albert Amankwaa, President of the Ghana Association of Western Australia Inc.

1. Regulation 2.52(2)(b) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) prescribes that any representations seeking revocation must be made to the Minister within 28 days after the person is given notice of the mandatory cancellation under s 501CA(3)(a) of the Migration Act.
2. As discussed at [22] above, the Applicant made representations seeking revocation of the Cancellation Decision within that timeframe.
3. Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant made representations in accordance with the invitation for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(a) of the Migration Act.

1. The Tribunal must decide whether the Applicant passes the character test as defined by

s 501 of the Migration Act.[56] Failure to pass the character test arises as a matter of law.[57] 2. Section 501(6) of the Migration Act sets out that a person does not pass the character test if:

(a) the person has a substantial criminal record (as defined by subsection (7)); or ...

1. The term 'substantial criminal record' includes when 'the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more_'_.[58]
2. In February 2024, the Applicant was sentenced by the District Court of Western Australia to 3 years' imprisonment.[59] The fact that this sentence included a conditional release order under s 20(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Crimes Act) does not change that initial imposition of sentence.[60]
3. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant passes the character test for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Migration Act based on the circumstances set out in s 501(6)(a) read with s 501(7)(c).

1. As the Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant passes the character test, the Tribunal must then determine whether, having regard to the representations made by the Applicant, and to any relevant primary and other considerations contained within the Direction, there is 'another reason' why the Cancellation Decision should be revoked.
2. Further guidance as to how the Tribunal is to have regard to the relevant considerations in the Direction can be found in cl 7, which provides that:
   1. In applying the considerations (both primary and other), information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight.
   2. The primary consideration at 8.1 below (protection of the Australian community) is generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations. Otherwise, primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations.
   3. One or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations.

1. The Tribunal is required to consider whether the Australian community requires protection from harm said to have arisen from the criminal activity or other serious conduct engaged in by the Applicant to date, and from any risk of such harm arising in the future.[61] This is a two-stage process, requiring consideration of both the nature and seriousness of conduct to date, and the risk to the community if further offences are committed or the applicant engages in other serious conduct.[62]
2. In addressing this overall question, the Tribunal is directed to 'keep in mind that the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian Government' and to have

particular regard to the principle that entering or remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law abiding, will respect important institutions, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.[63]

Nature and seriousness of the conduct to date

1. The Applicant's only offence or other conduct to date is the attempted possession of a marketable quantity of unlawfully imported methylamphetamine in March 2021. He was then in attempted joint possession of those drugs for a period of about three hours.[64] The Applicant was aware of the substantial risk of the imported car parts containing illicit drugs and chose to ignore that risk when he chose to assist Mr T to gain access to the drugs thought to be inside.[65]
2. The sentencing judge, Herron DCJ, considered this offending to be 'serious'.[66] The Applicant rightly accepted this to be the case.[67] In opening, Mr Chand submitted that the incident represented an 'isolated lapse of judgement', motivated by a desire to 'help a friend'.[68] To the extent that Mr Chand tried to rely on submissions made to the District Court about the Applicant's claimed lack of intention to engage in the criminal activity or his naivety, Herron DCJ did not accept that the Applicant was 'so naive as to completely trust [Mr T], and not suspect or become aware there was a substantial risk that drugs were contained within the prop shaft.'[69]
3. The Minister submitted that the offending should be viewed as 'very serious', because of its objective seriousness as demonstrated by the sentence imposed by the District Court.[70]
4. In response to that submission, Mr Chand observed that the Applicant's conduct did not fall within the categories of conduct identified in cl 8.1.1(1)(a) of the Direction as conduct that is 'viewed very seriously by the Australian Government and the Australian community'.
5. The Tribunal is required to assess for itself the nature and seriousness of an applicant's conduct to date.[71] In making that assessment, it must have regard to the policy position(s) identified in cl 8.1.1 of the Direction. Relevantly, the stated policy does not limit the range of conduct that may properly be regarded as either 'very serious' or 'serious'.
6. The maximum penalty for the offence of attempted possession of a marketable quantity of an unlawfully imported border-controlled drug is 25 years' imprisonment and/or 5,000 penalty units ($1,110,000).[72]
7. The Supreme Court of Western Australia has aptly described the illicit drug trade as a 'scourge', which 'causes human degradation, harm and misery and consequent damage to the community as a whole, as well as to the individuals who are directly affected by it.'[73]
8. The Tribunal respectfully agrees with Judge Herron's assessment that the offending in this case was serious. The Applicant was not involved in the importation. However, he readily became involved in the attempted joint possession on 11 March 2021, and aided Mr T, through the provision of his home, tools and labour to carry out work to cut open the car parts. He also allowed his telephone to be used to communicate with persons higher up in the criminal enterprise. However, it must be said that the Applicant's conduct is less serious than that committed by the co-offender and when compared with conduct traditionally associated with offences of this kind - where the offenders are often involved for commercial gain and are direct participants in the drug trade.
9. The head sentence of imprisonment imposed by the District Court was properly a sentence of last resort.[74] It was required to be proportionate to all the circumstances of the offending and reflected the community's view of the seriousness of the crime.[75]
10. The Applicant was warned by the Department of Home Affairs when he obtained his temporary and permanent partner visas in March 2017 and October 2020 that '[e]ntering or remaining in Australia is a privilege' and that he 'must obey the law and not engage in criminal activity', and that his visa could be cancelled if he did not comply with that expectation.[76] In cross-examination, he recalled receiving and reading those warnings and that he understood his visa status could be affected by the commission of crimes.[77] He told the Tribunal that he did not really think about the consequences on 11 March 2021, and I think that was a fair comment to make notwithstanding that there was a 'degree of persistence and determination' to the offending.[78]
11. The Tribunal finds the applicant's offending to be serious.

Risk to the Australian community should the Applicant engage in further conduct

1. The Tribunal is required to have regard to the future risk that may be posed by the Applicant to the Australian community by considering, cumulatively, the nature of the harm to individuals or to the community should the Applicant engage in further criminal or other serious conduct, and the likelihood of the Applicant engaging in such conduct.[79]
2. In making this risk assessment, the Tribunal is directed:

to have regard to the Government's view that the Australian community's tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases [and that] some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated may be unacceptable.[80]

3. There is no statutory constraint on the way that risk is assessed by the Tribunal other than that there must be a rational and probative basis for the assessment.[81]

1. The Applicant submitted that he 'has never caused harm to anyone in Australia', and it was advanced that he was remorseful and ashamed of his actions, 'particularly for failing to question his friend about the contents of the prop shaft'.[82]
2. The Minister sought to characterise the offending as 'involving the supply of drugs into the community' and that repetition would have 'the potential to cause serious physical, psychological injury and/or financial harm'.[83]
3. The Tribunal rejects the Applicant's characterisation of the conduct. As found by Herron DCJ, it was not simply a 'failure to question' or the Applicant being 'naive'.
4. The Tribunal considers that the offending is properly characterised as an attempt to aid in the distribution of methylamphetamine into the Australian community. The difficulty in detecting importation offences, and the great social consequences that follow, is why deterrence was a primary consideration in sentencing.[84] An attempted possession can involve a wide range of moral culpability which is not necessarily in a less serious category than that of importing the drugs.[85] However, in this case, the applicant had limited involvement in the criminal enterprise and, but for the assistance rendered on 11 March 2021, was not himself part of the drug trade.
5. The Tribunal finds that further involvement by the Applicant in the drug trade has the potential to cause very serious harm to individuals and to the Australian community. As the Court of Criminal Appeal identified in La Rosa v The Queen (Supreme Court of Western Australia, 31 October 1996, Library No 960628C), at 14-15:

The consequences of drug dealing flow well beyond the immediate parties to the illegal transaction. It is behaviour that leaves innocent third parties as victims, tears families apart, creates enormous economic and social dislocation and, more than occasionally, leads to loss of life.

1. The Applicant noted that he had been assessed in 2024 as being at a low risk of recidivism and submitted that this was not an 'unacceptable risk'.[86] He relied heavily upon a psychological pre-sentence report (PSR) prepared by the State where it was noted by Herron DCJ that the psychologist thought him to be a low risk, and that it appeared that he was 'an overall law-abiding citizen who associates with prosocial peers and engages in prosocial activity[, such that] there is no need [for him] to attend program[mes].'[87]
2. The Minister referred to that risk assessment and other similar risk assessments conducted in early 2024.[88] However, it was put that the original motivations for the offending (being 'debt of friendship or cultural expectations') remain and that the Applicant's 'protective factors such as employment and a strong support network' did not prevent the previous offence from occurring and there was no compelling evidence to suggest that these factors would be any more effective in the future.[89] The Minister contended for that reason that the Applicant poses a risk of re-offending which is 'unacceptable'.[90]
3. There were two psychological PSRs provided to the District Court, one authored by Ms Daniela Barbuzza; the other by Mr Hans-Peter Hergo. Neither are before the Tribunal. Herron DCJ did not accept part of the Applicant's explanation for his offending to either psychologist.[91] However, his Honour did accept that the Applicant was at a reduced risk of re-offending.[92]
4. The Applicant was assessed by Corrective Services using the 'Risk of Re-offending - Prison Version' (RoR-PV) screening tool in March 2024.[93] This is a tool which assesses four items known to predict recidivism: age at admission; number of convictions in the past decade; convictions for assault or related offences; and convictions for a 'Breach of Justice' offence.[94] The Applicant had a score of 1 out of 22 on this tool, which is very low risk.[95]
5. The Applicant is expected to be released on a recognizance release order on 29 July 2025. This is subject to a $5,000 security and will expire on 29 January 2027.[96]
6. The Tribunal finds, based on the evidence before it, that the Applicant poses a very low risk of re-offending in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Conclusion on the protection of the Australian community

1. The Tribunal has found the Applicant poses a very low risk of re-offending. The question that arises then is whether that risk is 'unacceptable'?
2. The Tribunal recently referred to this evaluative judgment in Re CLKQ and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] ARTA 231 at [90]-[91].
3. The Applicant relied on a series of cases dealing with the question of 'danger to the Australian community' under s 36(1C)(b) of the Migration Act, and the decisions in CKL21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 1019 (CKL21 FC) and EBD20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 334 (EBD20 FC), to argue that he was not an 'unacceptable risk' and that this primary consideration weighs 'significantly in favour of revoking the visa cancellation'.[97]
4. The Minister argued that any risk of re-offending in this case is so serious that it would be 'unacceptable'.[98] The Tribunal asked Mr Woods to articulate the basis upon which this submission was made against the propositions set out in cls 5.2(7), 5.2(8) and 8.1.2(1) of the Direction. He was unable to do so.
5. The Tribunal notes that, in CKL21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 70; (2022) 293 FCR 634, the Full Court allowed an appeal from the primary judgment in CKL21 FC and found that there was no probative basis for the Minister's finding in that case that CKL21 posed an ongoing risk of committing murder or another similar offence ([86]). Further, the Minister successfully appealed EBD20 FC in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v EBD20 [2021] FCAFC 179; (2021) 287 FCR 581. The Full Court relevantly found that there was no irrationality or inconsistency between finding that a person is not a danger to the Australian community but nevertheless finding that they present sufficient risk to warrant exercising the discretion in s 501(1) of the Migration Act not to grant them a visa ([52]).
6. The Tribunal accepts, in principle, that a low risk of re-offending may be found to be 'unacceptable' if the gravity of the harm that might eventuate from any re-offending is sufficiently serious.
7. The Tribunal has found that the Applicant poses a very low risk of re-offending in a similar way. Involvement in criminal enterprises to import and distribute methylamphetamine into the Australian community is conduct that the community should be protected against. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the Applicant has been chastened by the experience of being charged, convicted and imprisoned for his involvement in the criminal enterprise in this case. That involvement was restricted to assisting his co-offender to access the consignment and occurred in somewhat unusual circumstances. Moreover, the Applicant, from 29 July 2025, will be subject to the requirements of a recognizance release order until January 2027. Failure to comply with that order will mean that the Applicant will be liable to be dealt with under s 20A of the Crimes Act, including the prospect of potential return to prison for the balance of the 3-year term (namely 18 months' imprisonment). In the Tribunal's view, the risk of recidivism in this case does not cross the threshold where the risk of repetition is properly considered to be 'unacceptable'.
8. The Tribunal finds this primary consideration to weigh against revocation but not to any significant degree.

Strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia

1. The Tribunal is required to consider any impact of the decision on the Applicant's immediate family members in Australia.[99] The Tribunal must also consider the strength, nature, and duration of any other ties that the Applicant has to the Australian community, having regard to how long he has resided in Australia,[100] and the 'strength, duration and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents and/or people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia'.[101]
2. The Applicant's family members in Australia comprise his estranged wife (Ms M), who is based in Queensland and has twin children (who are not the Applicant's children), and his cousin (Mr B) and his partner and three children. They are all Australian citizens or permanent residents.[102]
3. The Applicant's case was initially advanced on the basis that there were no immediate family members in Australia.[103] The Minister agreed with that proposition.[104] However, in closing submissions, the Applicant relied on the impact of any decision on Ms M, and Mr B and his family. The Minister maintained that these persons were not 'immediate family members' but accepted that they would be other 'family or social links' for the purposes of cl 8.3(2) of the Direction.
4. The term 'immediate family members' in then Direction 90 was considered by SM Illingworth in Re Calimoso and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] AATA 511 in the context of an argument made by the Minister in that case that a daughter-in-law was not such a person. The Senior Member observed:

[155] The meaning of 'immediate family member' is not defined in the Act. Other Commonwealth legislation differently defines the term 'immediate family member'. The Tribunal has considered the term in VWLL and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Re (2012) 138 ALD 626. The Tribunal said at [120] that: > > "the applicant's immediate family are his 2 daughters and his former de facto wife LTP who are Australian citizens. His nieces, SLK and H, JS and JD, the partners of SLK and EKD, his former brother-in-law JK and his friend BB are all Australian citizens. His sister MD is also a person who has a right to remain in Australia indefinitely." > > [156] The Tribunal in ZSQC and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration), Re [2021] AATA 1738 said at [214] that: > > "the applicant's sister-in-law C, gave evidence that R is very close to the Applicant, that he enjoys visiting the Applicant and that he talks about the Applicant frequently. The applicant's sister-in-law M also has a young daughter, AM, who was born during the applicant's most recent term of imprisonment and so he has not been able to spend any time in the community with her. The Tribunal finds that if the applicant is removed from Australia, his nephews in particular may suffer emotional detriment if they are unable to have their uncle personally involved in their lives." > > The Tribunal said at [215] that: > > "It is evident that the applicant's family ties to Australia are very strong. All the applicant's immediate family reside in Australia. The evidence given by various family members, including the evidence outlined above, indicates that he is loved and respected by his family members as a loving partner, father, brother- in law and uncle, and that his family members rely on him for support." > > [157] In Pretorius and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration), Re [2021] AATA 1869 the Tribunal said at [171] that the applicant had three members of his immediate family residing in Australia namely his daughter, son-in-law (daughter's husband), and his grandchild. In footnote 94 of the decision, the Tribunal explained, "out of an abundance of caution, I note my specific finding that the Applicant's son-in-law is a member of his "immediate family." > > [158] The decisions indicate that the Tribunal has given a broad meaning to the term "immediate family" but in my view the nature of the relationship between the applicant and that person must be considered in determining whether he or she is a member of an applicant's "immediate family". > > [159] It is necessary to consider the nature of the familial relationship between the applicant and his daughter-in-law, to determine, as a matter of fact, whether the daughter-in-law is properly regarded as an immediate family member. The relationship must be something more than the mere consequence of the marriage. It is not a transient relationship. It must be a relationship in which the daughter-in-law has a close and loving relationship with the applicant and plays an important role in his life and that of his family members. Each matter will turn on its own facts.

5. The Tribunal separately notes that the term 'immediate family member of a person' is defined in s 500A(14) of the Migration Act, in the context of the refusal or cancellation of temporary safe haven visas, to mean 'another person who is a member of the immediate family of the person (within the meaning of the regulations).'
6. Regulation 1.12AA of the Migration Regulations relevantly provides that:

person 'A' is a member of the immediate family of another person 'B' if: > > (a) A is a spouse of B; or > > (b) A is a dependent child of B; or > > (c) A is a parent of B, and B is not 18 years or more.

7. The term 'spouse' is defined in s 5F of the Migration Act. This requires, amongst other things, a valid marriage and a relationship that is 'genuine and continuing' and occurs in circumstances where the couple 'do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.'
8. The Applicant testified in cross-examination that he was married to Ms M in April 2016 and that they were separated (since the end of 2020) but not formally divorced.[105] He said that they were still in contact and that he considered that there was some potential for them to renew their relationship in the future.[106]
9. In this respect, Ms M had been living in Queensland from about 2022.[107] She studies in Western Australia by remote means and her employment includes work in this State.[108] Ms M testified that she had been living with the Applicant between 2015 and 2020.[109] She was pregnant with her twins after they separated, and the Applicant assisted her with that pregnancy (notwithstanding that he was not the father).[110] She had visited the Applicant once in prison and speaks to him on a weekly basis.[111]
10. Ms M said that her twins, Miss E and Master S, are 3 years of age and that they know the Applicant as an 'Uncle'.[112] Their father is not in their lives.[113] She told the Tribunal that removing the Applicant from Australia would not only deeply hurt and/or crush the Applicant but also those who love and support him.[114]
11. The Tribunal notes that Ms M's written evidence contained a series of factual errors regarding the Applicant's family composition and with respect to his future plans.[115] When she was cross-examined on these issues by the Minister, she was argumentative and did not make any concessions notwithstanding that her evidence on these issues was clearly incorrect. To the extent that she spoke about the Applicant having potential employment and/or treatment with her cousin/employer, Neta Care Holistic Health Services, this was far from convincing and did not meaningfully assist.
12. The Tribunal recalled the Applicant to give further oral evidence after Ms M's evidence gave rise to the discovery of the twins' existence. He told the Tribunal that he did not mention the twins in his earlier evidence because they were Ms M's 'life' and they are not together.[116] He advised the Tribunal that, unlike himself, Ms M has considerable family in Australia; her mother and brothers live in Western Australia and she has a sister in Queensland. The twins' grandparents are also in Australia. He accepted in cross-examination that he had a far closer relationship with Mr B's children (and with another child, discussed further below), than with the twins, whom he had not seen since 2022. He also accepted that he might have a relationship with them in the future through their mother but only if they were to renew their marriage. However, he admitted that this was a big 'if'.
13. The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant previously had a close and loving relationship with Ms M. They are former spouses and remain cordial with each other. However, it could not be said, on the evidence before the Tribunal, that she is presently an 'immediate family member' for the purposes of the Direction. Nevertheless, the Tribunal accepts that Ms M and her children will be adversely affected by a negative decision in this matter. It gives this some weight in favour of revocation.
14. Mr B is the Applicant's maternal cousin.[117] He came to Australia in 2012 and is the Applicant's closest relative in Australia.[118] Mr B met his partner, Ms LS, in 2017 with the Applicant.[119] He describes the Applicant as his 'brother' and they are each other's respective 'emergency contact'.[120] Mr B and Ms LS have three children (Miss CB (6), Miss RB (5) and Master NB (2)).[121] The Applicant is their godfather and they call him 'Uncle PK'.[122] The Applicant and Mr B speak on a daily basis.[123] The Tribunal was informed that the Applicant would previously assist Mr B and Ms LS with looking after the children when they each had to work (their respective employment often required them to work irregular hours or interstate).[124] The children have extended family based in South Australia.[125] Mr B presently stores the Applicant's property (including his car), and they have also prepared a room for the Applicant to live in when he is released from prison.[126]
15. In the Applicant's absence, Ms PM has been caring for the children.[127] Ms PM's daughter, Miss L is a similar age to Mr B's children and they have spent a lot of time together.[128] The Applicant therefore has a relationship with that child as a consequence.[129]
16. Mr B, Ms LS and Ms PM were present in-person during the Tribunal hearing. Ms LS also gave a reference during the sentencing hearing before Herron DCJ.[130]
17. The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant and Mr B and his family have a loving and close relationship, and that, on the facts of this case, they are 'immediate family members' of the kind contemplated by cl 8.3(1) of the Direction. It accepts that they will be adversely affected by a negative decision in this case, and it gives that weight in favour of revocation.
18. The Tribunal also received written evidence from a friend of the Applicant, Mr CAB.[131] He informed the Tribunal that the Applicant is the godfather to his son, Master Q (10), and that he would look after his two children (including Master Z (2)) and help Mr CAB's parents when he was away at work on a FIFO basis.[132] Mr CAB and his family are not 'immediate family members' but the Tribunal accepts that they, and Ms PM (and her daughter), are social ties that would be affected by an adverse decision in this matter.
19. The Tribunal also took oral evidence from Dr Albert Amankwaa, who is a lecturer at the School of Business and Economics at the University of Tasmania.[133] Dr Amankwaa is concurrently the President of the Ghana Association of Western Australia.[134] He told the Tribunal that he has known the Applicant for 6 years, and gave evidence about how the Association intends to use the Applicant as a tool to educate their community on the drug trade and its ills. The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant has considerable support in Western Australia from the local African community. Similarly, the Tribunal received an unsigned letter from the 'GH Soccer Club WA' dated 24 April 2024, which is a football club in Carlisle comprising African-Australian players and which spoke to the Applicant's involvement in that club.[135]
20. The Tribunal also received letters from a Mr N, based in Darwin, and a Ms GM, based in Perth, who each spoke to their friendship and support for the Applicant.[136]
21. Lastly, the Tribunal heard evidence about the Applicant's former employment as a forklift driver with Asahi Beverages in Perth. It was told, by the Applicant and Mr B, that they had offered to re-employ him upon release from prison. It also received a reference from the Applicant's former supervisor, Mr J, dated 23 April 2025.[137]
22. The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant has built a life in Australia and that he has family and social links to this country.
23. The Minister accepted that that this consideration weighed in the Applicant's favour but submitted that it should not outweigh the other primary considerations.[138]
24. The Tribunal finds that this primary consideration, including the impact on the Applicant's immediate family and the strength, nature and duration of the Applicant's ties to Australia, weighs in favour of revocation.

1. The Tribunal is required to consider the best interests of minor children in Australia that are affected by the decision. Clause 8.4(4) of the Direction outlines the factors that the Tribunal must consider when determining the best interests of a child affected by the decision. Where there are two or more relevant children, the best interests of each child should be given individual consideration to the extent that their interests might differ.[139]
2. There are at least eight minor children in Australia that may be affected by a decision in this matter:

(a) Ms M's twins: Miss E and Master S (3 years of age); > > (b) Mr B's three children: Miss CB (6), Miss RB (5) and Master NB (2); > > (c) Ms PM's daughter: Miss L (under 6); and > > (d) Mr CAB's children: Master Q (10) and Master X (2).

3. Mr N has unspecified children whom he refers to in his letter dated 27 March 2025.[140] Whilst he refers to the Applicant being 'like a second father' to these children, there was insufficient evidence before the Tribunal for it to make a decision whether revocation is, or is not, in their best interests (including whether they are, in fact, under 18 years of age). The Tribunal also notes that they live in Darwin.
4. Ms M testified that the Applicant provided her with support when the twins were born in 2022 (prior to their move to Queensland), and that they had spent considerable time in the intensive care unit. She spoke to the Applicant's assistance when she was depressed during and after the pregnancy. The twins' father is not in their lives, but Ms M and the twins have the support of her immediate family, including her parents and siblings. The relationship between the twins and the Applicant is non-parental and there has clearly been limited meaningful contact. The Tribunal accepts that they are aware of the Applicant's existence. However, to the extent that Ms M's oral evidence suggested a more meaningful relationship, this was inconsistent with the Applicant's evidence. The Tribunal accepts that revocation is notionally in the twins' best interests, on the premise of potential for the Applicant and Ms M to renew their marriage should the cancellation be revoked.
5. The Applicant testified that he had a close relationship with his godchildren (being Ms B's three children and Mr CAB's eldest child) and with Miss L, who regularly spent time with Mr B's children. The Tribunal heard evidence from multiple sources about how the Applicant would regularly care for these children when their parents had to work irregular hours or when the Ghanaian community would be playing football on Saturdays. It accepts that the relationship with these children is non-parental and that they see the Applicant as an uncle. It was clear that Mr B's three children are very close to the Applicant and that they have maintained contact with him since his imprisonment, including visiting him on a frequent basis. The Applicant intends to live with Mr B and his family when he is released in July. There is no evidence of any adverse impact on these minor children arising from the Applicant or his conduct. The Tribunal finds that revocation would in the best interests of Miss CB, Miss RB, Master NB, Miss L, Master Q and Master X. The relationship with Mr B's children is far more consequential than that with Miss L, Master Q and Master X. Their best interests should be weighted accordingly. There is otherwise insufficient evidence to materially distinguish between the children's individual interests (save for the comparison between Mr B's children and the other children).
6. This primary consideration weighs in favour of revocation.

1. This primary consideration is a 'kind of deeming provision',[141] which requires the Tribunal to consider the Minister's articulation of community expectations.[142]
2. Clause 8.5(1) of the Direction provides that 'the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia'. The Direction goes on to state that:[143]

[w]here a non-citizen has engaged in serious conduct in breach of this expectation, or where there is an unacceptable risk that they may do so, the Australian community, as a norm, expects the Government would not allow such a non-citizen to enter or remain in Australia.

3. Clause 8.5(2) then adds to that first 'norm_'_ and indicates that non-revocation may be appropriate in a particular case 'simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences is such that the Australian community would expect that the person should not be granted or continue to hold a visa'. It specifies particular conduct, namely family violence, serious crimes against women, children or other vulnerable persons, crimes against government officials, involvement in violations of international humanitarian law, or worker exploitation, as attracting that further expectation.[144]
4. The stated norms apply 'regardless of whether the Applicant poses a [measurable] risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community'.[145] The Direction also states that 'decision-makers should proceed on the basis of the Government's views as articulated [within the Direction], without independently assessing the community's expectations in the particular case.'[146]
5. The Applicant submitted that the Australian community would be supportive of revocation in this case, and that it would be 'compassionate and willing to allow the Applicant to reintegrate'.[147]
6. The Minister in opposition to that proposition referred the Tribunal to Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 94 ALJR 196 at [51]-[52], where the High Court unanimously held that an equivalent direction in the previous Direction 90 did not require or involve the Tribunal attributing to the hypothesised community knowledge of an applicant's circumstances, and, instead, what was required was to proceed on the basis of the articulated expectation(s) contained within the Direction, which are then 'to be weighed with other relevant matters as required by paras 6 and 7 of [the] Direction'.[148]
7. The Applicant's argument about this primary consideration is contrary to the terms of the Direction (specifically cl 8.5(4)) and to prior authority on the former iterations of the Direction.[149]
8. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant has contravened the first norm contained within the Direction, in that he engaged in serious conduct in breach of the expectation that he complies with Australian law. This occurred within 6 years of arrival as a tertiary educated adult, and 5 months of the grant of permanent residency. The Tribunal will consider those circumstances (and the Applicant's risk of re-offending, together with the other relevant considerations) in deciding what relative weight is to be given to this primary consideration.
9. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the Applicant's previous conduct, and the risk of its repetition, is of such severity that it comes within the second norm articulated at cl 8.5(2) of the Direction or the principles identified at cls 5.2(7) and 5.2(8).
10. The Tribunal finds that this primary consideration weighs against revocation. In assessing the weight to be given to it, the Tribunal is guided by the principles articulated at cl 5.2 of the Direction. Specifically:
    1. Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to ... remain in Australia. Being able to ... remain [here] is a privilege [conferred] on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding, will respect important institutions..., and will not cause harm to individuals or the Australian community.
    2. The safety of the Australian Community is the highest priority of the Australian Government.
    3. Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect to ... forfeit the privilege of staying in Australia.
    4. The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should ... cancel [non-citizen's] visas, if they engaged in conduct...that raises serious character concerns ... regardless of whether [they pose a risk] of causing physical harm to the Australian community.
    5. Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by ... non-citizens who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time.

1. [Whilst the Tribunal must consider the Applicant's particular circumstances, the nature of some conduct, or the harm that would be caused if it were to be repeated] may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify...revoking a mandatory cancellation.
2. The inherent nature of certain [very serious] conduct ... is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify ...revoking a mandatory cancellation, even if the information available at the time of consideration suggests that the non-citizen does not pose a [measurable] risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.

1. The Tribunal is required to consider the legal consequences of its decision.[150] That is, the Tribunal must have regard to the statutory framework in which the power to revoke a mandatory cancellation decision exists, including the direct and immediate consequences of an exercise of the power (including any decision under s 105 of the ART Act).
2. Both parties agreed with the Tribunal's recent summary of the legal consequences arising in matters of this kind in Re QHXW and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] ARTA 615 (QHXW) at [117]-[120].
3. As the Tribunal observed in QHXW, there are three major consequences of visa refusal or cancellation under s 501 and related provisions:

(a) a prohibition, within the migration zone, on applying for other types of visas under

s 501E of the Migration Act (other than a protection visa or a bridging (removal pending) visa);[151]

(b) refusal/cancellation of other visa applications/visas under s 501F of the Migration Act; and

(c) the possible application of periods of exclusion and special return criteria under s 503 of the Migration Act and SRC 5001 and 5002 in Sch 5 to the Migration Regulations. This includes permanent exclusion where SRC 5001 applies unless the Minister acts personally to grant a permanent visa to the person under s 195A.

1. These adverse consequences can each be avoided by a positive decision to revoke the cancellation decision, and it should not be assumed that Parliament has evinced any preference as to the outcome of the review.[152]
2. When the Applicant's permanent partner visa was cancelled, he became an 'unlawful non-citizen'.[153] That is, a non-citizen in the migration zone that did not hold a visa that is in effect.[154] Because of that status, the Applicant is liable to be detained under s 189(1) of the Migration Act. However, at the time of the Tribunal hearing, this had not occurred because of the Applicant's incarceration pursuant to the Warrant of Commitment issued by the District Court.
3. The Applicant is relevantly required to be detained under the Migration Act until he is either removed from Australia under s 198 or he is granted a visa (including having his partner visa restored to him under s 501CA(4)).[155]
4. Sections 198(1) and (2B) of the Migration Act relevantly provide for removal either at written request or where there has been a mandatory cancellation and a subsequent decision made not to revoke that cancellation, respectively.
5. There is no reason to suppose that any required removal to Ghana would not be practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future and the Applicant previously returned there in early 2020.[156]
6. Further, the Applicant is not presently the subject of a protection finding.[157] Mr Chand specifically confirmed in opening submissions that the Applicant was not claiming to engage Australia's non-refoulement obligations with respect to Ghana notwithstanding the provision of an online article titled '7 serious social problems in Ghana and their solutions'.[158]
7. The Applicant submitted that a likely consequence of a decision to affirm the reviewable decision would be that the Applicant would be excluded from Australia and from the members of his Australian family into the foreseeable future, and that this would be a factor that would favour revocation.[159] The Minister agreed with that proposition in closing submissions.
8. The Tribunal finds that the legal and other consequences of an adverse decision weigh in favour of revocation.

1. The Tribunal must consider the extent of any impediments that the Applicant may face if removed from Australia to Ghana, in establishing himself, and in maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens in that country), taking into account the Applicant's age and health, whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers, and any social, medical and/or economic support available to him in Ghana.[160]
2. The Applicant is 38-years-old. He testified that he is generally in good health, save that he has knee cartilage issues for which he has not sought treatment. He has worked as a forklift driver in Australia for about 7 years.
3. The Applicant's first language is English (which is the official language of Ghana) and he also speaks Twi, which is spoken over much of southern Ghana.[161] The Applicant was educated to tertiary level in Ghana, has completed his national service and returned there in 2020. There are no language or cultural barriers to the Applicant's return.
4. The main thrust of the Applicant's evidence and argument with respect to Ghana was unemployment and poverty.[162]
5. The Tribunal notes that Ghana is in the ECOWAS, in the 'anglophone block'.[163] DFAT notes that economic growth in the region is 'uneven', with countries like Ghana, who are relatively rich in natural resources, tending to have higher rates of economic growth when compared with other less fortunate countries in the region. However, poverty continues to be a major challenge.[164] Unemployment and underemployment is very high,[165] and the health system across the region faces significant challenges.[166] The security situation is unstable, particularly across Ghana's northern borders, and there is a relatively high risk of violent crime.[167]
6. The Applicant's parents and siblings remain in Ghana. However, no one has heard from the Applicant's father since he separated from their mother when the Applicant was in Australia. It was the father who funded the Applicant's education in Ghana.
7. The Applicant accepted in cross-examination that he could return to Ghana, and live with his mother, but submitted that she barely made enough to subsist and that her tailor shop could not support them both.
8. The Minister accepted that the Applicant may face 'some difficulty' in re-establishing himself in Ghana and that this would weigh in favour of revocation.[168]
9. The Tribunal considers that the Applicant will be personally affected by any removal to Ghana. The potential emotional and psychological hardship can be withstood, and the Applicant has previously adjusted to life in foreign places such as Western Australia and prison with little issue, but it should not be dismissed.
10. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant could likely re-establish himself in Ghana and maintain basic living standards. However, it must be said that these living standards would be very basic indeed and this would not be without considerable difficulty. From the material before the Tribunal, there appears to be limited to no supports available to the Ghanian population in general, and the region is plagued by poverty, unemployment and crime. Notwithstanding those issues, the Applicant has been tertiary educated in Ghana. He has also managed to return there without issue in the past and he has transferable skills acquired from forklift driving in Australia. Nevertheless, removal to Ghana is a potentially devastating consequence, with very real impediments to permanent return. This weighs in favour of revocation.

1. The Applicant advanced a case to the effect that he is a skilled forklift driver, with a proven track record with Asahi Beverages, and that future employers (including potential renewed employment with the former employer) would be deprived of his 'valuable qualities' should he be removed.[169]
2. The Tribunal accepts that this other consideration is not restricted to business interests that involve an impact on a major project or service.[170] Rather, the Tribunal is required to consider any claimed impact on Australian business interests, irrespective of the scale or importance of the business.[171] Whether such impact compromises the delivery of a major project or the delivery of an important service in Australia, is a matter affecting the weight to be given to this consideration.[172]
3. The Minister and the Tribunal challenged Mr Chand on the absence of evidence regarding any potential impact on an Australian business interest in this matter.[173] Mr Chand's response to that concern was to assert from the bar table that it was 'difficult to find good people'. That may be accepted but does not amount to a meaningful impact on an Australian business interest. Further, Mr Woods quite properly pointed out in closing submissions that Asahi Beverages is a multinational beverage company and includes the businesses formerly known as Schweppes Australia, and Carlton & United Breweries, and it is most unlikely to be impacted in any material way by the loss of a single forklift driver, however hard-working and experienced that person may be.
4. For those reasons, the Tribunal does not accept that the Applicant has established that there would be any impact on an Australian business interest if he was not allowed to remain in Australia. This 'other consideration' is not relevant. If the Tribunal was wrong about that conclusion with respect to Asahi Beverages, it would give that impact no weight.

1. The Tribunal is required to bring together the relevant considerations in this matter and consider, as part of a single evaluation, their relative significance in terms of whether the Tribunal is ultimately satisfied that there is 'another reason' why the mandatory cancellation decision should be revoked.[174]
2. Clause 7(2) of the Direction states that the primary consideration in cl 8.1 (protection of the Australian community) is 'generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations', and that, otherwise, the relevant 'primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the [relevant] other considerations'. This guidance is consistent with the principle articulated at cl 5.2(2), that 'the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian government'. The Tribunal notes that this guidance does not mean that the other considerations are secondary to the primary considerations, or that they should always be given less weight.[175]
3. In this case, the Tribunal has found that the Applicant poses a very low risk of re-offending. His previous conduct was undoubtedly serious but is not of a kind where any risk of repetition is unacceptable. It was clear to the Tribunal that the Applicant has developed significant ties to the Australian community over the last decade, and that he has a close-knit relationship with the Ghanaian community in Australia. The Tribunal has considered the relevant considerations in this matter and determined that there is 'another reason' to revoke the cancellation. Those factors which weigh against revocation, particularly the consideration of the protection and expectations of the Australian community, were outweighed by those factors that are in favour of revocation, including his ties to Australia, the best interests of relevant minor children, the consequences of an adverse decision and the impediments to removal. The correct decision is therefore to set aside the decision under review and substitute it for a decision that the mandatory cancellation be revoked.

1. The reviewable decision, dated 21 March 2025, not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's Class BS Subclass 801 Partner (permanent) visa under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958, is set aside. In substitution for that reviewable decision, the Tribunal revokes the decision to cancel the partner visa dated 19 July 2024.

I certify that the preceding 147 (one hundred and forty-seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member J Papalia

...................[SGD].....................................................

[1] See Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 151; (2019) 271 FCR 326, [41], [48].

[22] Exhibit 1, p 71; Evidence on 5 June 2025.

[36] See Exhibit 1, pp 167, 185-186, 195.

[48] Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act) ss 9, 54, 56(1)(a); See also Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286, [140]-[143]; Re Becker and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1977] AATA 12; (1977) 1 ALD 158, 161-162.

[51] M1/2021, [22]. See also Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane (2021) 274 CLR 398, [13]-[15]; Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v McQueen [2024] HCA 11; (2024) 94 ALJR 594, [6].

[53] Direction, cl 5.1(4); Migration Act s 499(2A).

[55] See Bainbridge v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1080, [64]-[65].

[56] See Smith v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 652, [40]. See also Direction, cl 5.1(3) and Annexure A.

[57] See Re Harrison and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 47; (2009) 106 ALD 666, [63].

[58] Migration Act s 501(7)(c).

[60] See Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 33; (2010) 183 FCR 113, [9], [12], [114].

[65] See Exhibit 1, pp 177-178, 193-195, 199.

[67] See Exhibit 1, p 68 [21]; Opening submissions, 5 June 2025.

[70] See Exhibit 1, pp 110-112 [27]-[29]; Closing submissions, 6 June 2025.

[71] See BNY23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCAFC 14; (2025) 307 FCR 150, [107]

[72] See Exhibit 1, pp 129 [1]-[2], 192.

[73] MXP v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 215; (2010) 41 WAR 149, [64]; see also Ngo v The Queen [2017] WASCA 3, [63(d)].

[74] See Crimes Act 1914, s 17A(1).

[75] See Lauritsen v The Queen [2000] WASCA 203; (2000) 22 WAR 442, [52]-[53].

[81] See BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1181, [68]; Hambledon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 7, [41].

[84] See R v Nguyen [2010] NSWCCA 238; (2010) 205 A Crim R 106, [72(g)].

[85] See R v Nguyen [2010] NSWCCA 238; (2010) 205 A Crim R 106, [72(l)]-[72(m)].

[89] See RSFIC, [35(a)], [36], citing Re LQZW and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 93, [93].

[94] See 'The Effectiveness of Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs: Integrating Global and Local Perspectives to enhance Correctional Outcomes: Research Report', University of Sunshine Coast Sexual Violence Research and Prevention Unit, August 2019, pp 64-65; Department of Corrective Services (WA), Asian and Pacific Conference of Correctional Administrators Newsletter (44th Edn, April 2018), pp 4-5.

[95] See Exhibit 1, pp 214, 232 [1.9].

[97] See ASFIC, [31]-[43]; Re MHCZ and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 4259; Vabaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1997] FCA 148.

[120] Ibid; See also Exhibit 1, pp 262-263.

[124] Ibid; see also Exhibit 1, pp 262-263.

[132] Ibid; Evidence on 5 June 2025 (from the Applicant).

[141] YNQY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1466, [76].

[147] ASFIC, [57]-[58]; Applicant's Reply Submissions dated 30 May 2025, [15]-[16].

[149] See DBWG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 3; (2024) 301 FCR 344. [35]-[38], [58], [64]; Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v HSRN [2023] FCAFC 68; (2023) 297 FCR 662, [24], [35]; FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 272 FCR 454, [61], [66]-[67], [75], [86], [97], [101], [103]-[104].

[150] Direction, cl 9.1(1). See also NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; (2014) 220 FCR 1, [3], [9]-[10]; Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 177; (2016) 246 FCR 146, [84], [88].

[151] See also Migration Act s 46(1)(d).

[152] See Stoneley and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 143, [36].

[153] Migration Act s 15.

[154] See Migration Act ss 13-14.

[155] Migration Act ss 196(1)(a), 196(1)(c), 196(4)-(5), 501C(6)-(7).

[156] See Exhibit 1, p 71; RSFIC, [57].

[167] See DFAT Report, [2.9]-[2.12]; Ghana Travel Advice & Safety | Smartraveller.

[170] See QXNS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1369, [111].

[171] QXNS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1369, [112].

[172] Ibid, citing Tabuarua v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 748, [102].

[174] See CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138, [27]-[28]; VZWF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1160, [8].

[175] See Suleiman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 594; (2018) 74 AAR 545.