Allunga [2025] QBCCMCmr 427 (11 December 2025)

Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980, ss, 46(3) and 27(4)

The Body Corporate for Allunga (or the Proprietors for Allunga Upper Plan No. 1) must as soon as reasonably practicable but no later than two months from the date of this order:

(a) Reconsider the application made by Cassandra Lee Murphy ('applicant') to bring and keep her Maltipoo/Moodle, Teddy, within Lot 30 at Allunga Upper Plan No. 1 in accordance with applicable law; and

(b) Provide the applicant with a copy of its decision in relation to (a) above in writing.

• [1] Ms Murphy wishes to keep her dog, Teddy, in her apartment. The body corporate for this apartment building, however, will not allow it. Ms Murphy considers this refusal to be unreasonable, and accordingly seeks relief from a referee that allows her to keep Teddy.

• [2] The building plan in question is known as Allunga. It comprises 102 lots and common property. The building contains multiple levels labelled chronologically from A to Z; and then AA to CC.
• [3] Lots 30 and 31 are located on Level I. Lot 64 is located on Level R. Lot 89 is located on Level X.

• [4] The applicant, Ms Murphy, is the proprietor of Lot 30, and the respondent is the Body Corporate for Allunga.
• [5] Relevantly, By-law 19 for Allunga states:

No animals or birds shall be kept in any unit without the consent of the Council[1] which consent may at any time be withdrawn.

• [6] On 20 March 2025, the applicant sought the approval of the committee of the respondent body corporate to keep her dog, Teddy, a male Moodle (or Maltipoo), within her lot.
• [7] On 3 April 2025, the committee considered and voted on the matter. With four votes against the request, and nil votes in favour, the applicant's request to keep Teddy was denied.
• [8] The applicant attempted to resolve the matter with the committee with the aid of her lawyers. During these attempts, the committee revealed that its refusal was based on concerns regarding an immune deficiency affecting an occupier, Mr Honig, as identified in correspondence sent by a proprietor (Mr Honig's carer). The committee evidently added that it could only approve the applicant's request if she could propose suitable conditions that could adequately manage the identified health risk.
• [9] Accordingly, on 4 June 2025, the applicant sought the following information from the committee for the purpose of enabling her to propose suitable conditions:
  1. A redacted copy of the correspondence identifying the health concern;
  2. Additional information in relation to the nature of the Mr Honig's immune deficiency;
  3. Information about any conditions imposed on other approved pet applications within the plan; and
  4. Conditions the committee would consider necessary for the management of the health risk.
• [10] Subsequently, the applicant received correspondence from the committee indicating that Mr Honig suffers from multiple health conditions and uses the common property hallway for regular exercise as part of his medical treatment. Mr Honig's carer evidently expressed concern that the presence of a barking dog could startle Mr Honig and potentially cause him to lose balance and fall.
• [11] The committee noted that Mr Honig is a renal transplant patient and lives with cervical myelopathy and osteoporosis, and therefore uses a walker. His doctor has recommended walking indoors, given direct exposure to the sun is harmful for him considering the medication he is on. Accordingly, Mr Honig uses the common property hallway for exercise, walking thereon several times a day. The concern is noted by his carer and brother as follows:

A dog that is in an apartment either barking as someone approaches is not only disruptive but UNSAFE in the event my brother gets a shock and looses [sic] his balance and falls over given he has osteoporosis.

• [12] The committee noted that this concern has been affirmed by Mr Honig's doctor by way of a letter.
• [13] The committee then adopted the position that no condition would be sufficient to manage the identified health risk, and consequently, that the applicant's request to keep Teddy cannot be granted even subject to conditions. It also noted that it is not for the body corporate to propose conditions on behalf of the applicant.
• [14] The applicant claims that the committee's decision and conduct is unreasonable for the following reasons:
  1. The lack of transparency in its decision-making process;
  2. The failure to consider the comprehensive documentation submitted by the applicant regarding Teddy's training, registration and references from managers of other strata schemes, which demonstrates its positive temperament and behaviour;
  3. The lack of evidence that Teddy poses an actual risk to the occupier in question;
  4. The hypothetical and speculative risk that a barking dog may startle the occupier and cause a fall rather than a demonstrated danger;
  5. That even if there was a demonstrated danger, it is one that can be appropriately mitigated through suitable conditions, such as providing advance notice to the occupier; requiring Teddy to be kept on a leash when on common property; or displaying appropriate signage;
  6. The committee's conduct in inviting the applicant to propose conditions, only to later assert that no conditions would be acceptable under any circumstances is unreasonable.

• [15] In these circumstances, the applicant seeks an order directing the respondent body corporate to approve the pet application to keep Teddy within the applicant's lot subject to any reasonable conditions.

• [16] On 22 July, I provided a copy of the application to all proprietors of lots at Allunga, and the committee on behalf of the respondent body corporate, and invited them to make submissions.
• [17] Subsequently, submissions were made by multiple proprietors and the committee.
• [18] On 25 August 2025, the committee submitted as follows:

1. There are two occupiers at Allunga with serious health conditions, namely Ms Zeimer and Mr Honig; 2. Ms Zeimer is the owner and occupier of Lot B89 and a frequent visitor to Lot A64 owned by her family. She underwent renal transplant in November 2020, is immunocompromised and has severe respiratory issues; 3. Ms Zeimer's doctor, a General Practitioner registered in Victoria, states as follows:

It is extremely important to maintain a safe and healthy environment for renal transplant patients, particularly regarding exposure to pet hair and dander. > > After a transplant, patients are on immunosuppressive medications to prevent their bodies from rejecting the new organ, which significantly compromises their immune system. This makes them more susceptible to infections and allergic reactions. Exposure to pets, especially dogs, in close living conditions - such as an apartment building - materially increase the risk of encountering airborne allergens and pathogens that may be present in pet dander. > > Furthermore, the accumulation of pet hair can exacerbate respiratory issues and lead to complications that could jeopardise the transplant's success. > > For these reasons, it is strongly advised that renal transplant patients avoid environments where they may be regularly exposed to pets, ensuring the health and longevity of their transplant. > > I consider the presence of a dog in the same apartment complex to present a serious and material risk to the patient's ongoing health and the ongoing success of the transplant.

1. Mr Honig is the occupier of Lot 31, located directly next door to the applicant's lot. He has been occupying this lot for several months a year since 1981. He too has undergone a renal transplant, and lives with cervical myelopathy, severe respiratory issues. He cannot be exposed to direct sunlight due to his anti-rejection medication, and as a consequence must meet his exercise regimen by walking in the hallway immediately outside his apartment;
2. A carer and member of Mr Honig's family states as follows:
   1. The cleanliness of the common property at Allunga is crucial to Mr Honig;
   2. The cervical myelopathy affects Mr Honig's balance, and as a result he must be on a walker and be accompanied at all times for his safety;
   3. Immunocompromised people like Mr Honig 'must take all precautions to minimise potential falls if startled by a pet in the event this results in a fall be it a fracture or even a graze that has a very high degree of fighting infection and healing as the body does not heal as quickly as non-compromised individuals';
   4. 'With a dog present that approaches or barks at a person with medical conditions like my brother's in the event he falls is a recipe for disaster'.
3. Mr Honig's doctor (a specialist in Nephrology registered in Victoria) states in a letter dated 13 August 2025, that he is a long-term patient of the Royal Melbourne Hospital, is immunosuppressed and at high risk of infection. She states as follows:

He has multiple health issues, including poor balance, especially when startled. He is at risk of falling while walking, despite use of walking frame and mobility assistance from carer. He is immunosuppressed long-term, and any injury carries increased risk of infection.

4. It is generally accepted that cats and dogs can be kept in high-rise buildings without incident. However, a body corporate must consider whether there is any genuine likelihood of the animal causing an adverse impact on common property or any owner or occupier;
5. The committee did not act unreasonably in the circumstances, given firstly it provided reasons for its decision to the applicant's solicitors; and it took into account the health risk to Ms Zeimer and Mr Honig;
6. Further, at the time the committee invited the applicant to propose conditions, it did not appreciate the seriousness of the health conditions suffered by the two occupiers; it had not received information from any of the medical practitioners treating the two occupiers; and did not appreciate that the issue could not be managed through the imposition of conditions. On that basis the committee asserts that it did not act unreasonably by initially inviting the applicant to propose conditions only to later assert that no conditions would be acceptable;
7. The committee rejects any assertion that there are other dogs living at Allunga;
8. The medical evidence is that the mere presence or existence of a dog at the strata plan presents a serious and material risk to the two occupiers' health and the ongoing success of their transplants. The seriousness of this issue cannot be understated given it is a matter of life and death. This is not an approval that can be managed with conditions.

1. Previously, adjudicators have found that mere allergies were sufficient and reasonable grounds to refuse approval. The medical consequences and impact on Mrs Zeimer and Mr Honig are far more serious;

1. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the committee to refuse the applicant's request to keep Teddy in all of the circumstances.

• [19] Multiple proprietors made submissions against the application, whereas one wrote in support of the same.
• [20] Another proprietor, who is a former committee member made a submission raising concerns with the committee's style of governance, noting among other things that while the committee has permitted dogs connected to 'management associates' without applications, it has refused others.
• [21] One of the proprietors who submitted in favour of the respondent body corporate states that he is an amputee, and that his father is over 90 years of age, and that they accordingly have concerns regarding the likelihood of being startled by a dog.

• [22] The applicant replied to the submission made by the committee on behalf of the respondent body corporate as follows:

1. The evidence indicates that the committee has sought to retrospectively justify its decision, and obtain material after this application was lodged to cultivate evidence to defend its position. Accordingly, this material should be approached critically and sceptically, as they represent advocacy-driven material prepared in response to a dispute rather than contemporaneous, impartial information considered by the committee at the time of decision;

1. The requirement of reasonableness is assessed objectively by reference to the information and circumstances known to the committee at the time of the decision; 2. The respondent body corporate's submission concedes that at the time the committee invited the applicant to propose conditions, it 'did not appreciate the seriousness of the health condition', 'had not received information from any of the medical practitioners' and 'did not appreciate that the issue could not be managed through the imposition of conditions'. This admission confirms that the committee acted without full information and failed to make proper inquiries before deciding; 3. Given the absence of contemporaneous reasons, the reliance on post-decision legal advice, and the committee's acknowledgement that critical medical information was obtained only later, the committee's process was procedurally deficient and arbitrary; 4. Ms Zeimer's medical certificate contains only generalised statements about risks posed by pet dander to transplant patients living 'in the same apartment complex'. It does not identify her proximity to Lot 30, quantify any exposure pathway, or address the physical environment at Allunga. If Ms Zeimer primarily occupies lots B89 or A64 - neither adjacent to Lot 30 - the chance of any incidental exposure to the applicant's small, hypoallergenic dog is negligible;

1. Mr Honig, who occupies the adjoining Lot 31 is said to pace the corridor for exercise due to photosensitivity. While his health circumstances are acknowledged, there is no evidence that the mere presence of a well-maintained Moodle inside the neighbouring unit materially increases infection or allergen risk. The medical material offers no analysis of exposure levels, air exchange rates, or likelihood of contact through closed-door boundaries between lots;

1. Both medical letters come from Victorian practitioners who have not inspected Allunga or considered its cleaning standards, building ventilation, or the body corporate's hygiene protocols. They are generic, geographically remote opinions, not empirical assessments of this particular scheme or plan; 2. The fact that both practitioners are based in Victoria strongly suggests that Mr Honig and Mrs Zeimer ordinarily reside there and that their ongoing medical care is centred in that state. The applicant by contrast proposes to be a permanent resident of her lot. It is unreasonable for the body corporate to impose restrictive conditions on the ordinary use and enjoyment of a permanent resident's property in deference to temporary or occasional occupants who voluntarily choose to stay in communal accommodation despite their medical vulnerabilities; 3. When weighed in overall reasonableness, the committee's reliance on this limited material is misplaced. The risk allegedly posed by Teddy is no greater - and almost certainly far less - than the everyday immunological risks inherent in communal living among other people. Humans shed more microbes and airborne particles than a small, regularly groomed, hypoallergenic animal. Humans are at greater risk of communicable diseases from other humans. Cross-species infection is comparatively rare - it is topical to note that the most common forms of cross-species infection arise from direct consumption or handling of animals rather than from mere proximity in a shared space. Accordingly, it is not reasonable for the committee to adopt the most risk-averse stance possible in respect of pet ownership while tolerating ordinary human interaction in a multi-unit environment; 4. In these circumstances, the committee's initial refusal and maintenance of that refusal is disproportionate. It gives determinative weight to speculative, non-site specific medical evidence while disregarding the building's real-world context, the dog's hypoallergenic nature and the availability of straightforward mitigation measures; 5. Reasonableness suggests that the respondent body corporate is obliged to consider reasonable mitigation measures before defaulting to refusal;

1. Without conceding that any medical risks exist, the applicant remains willing to adopt practical conditions to mitigate theoretical concerns, including the following: 1. Teddy to be professionally groomed at least once a month; 2. Teddy to be carried or contained in a pet carrier whenever traversing common property; 3. Installation of an air-tight (hermetically sealed) door strip at the base of the unit's entry door; 4. Teddy not to enter a lift already occupied by another individual without consent of the occupant; 5. Teddy not to be brought into the level 13 corridor when Mr Honig is undertaking his exercise routine.

• [23] Further, the applicant adds that on 23 October 2025, the respondent body corporate issued a policy as follows:

Pets kept purely for recreation or companionship - not as certified assistance or emotional support animals - are not permitted in the building. This restriction ensures protection of hygiene, quiet enjoyment, and safety; consistent management across all lots; and compliance with Queensland tribunal decisions rejecting blanket bans but upholding reasonable restrictions in high density environments.

• [24] Allunga is regulated under the Registration of Plans (H. S. P. (Nominees) Pty. Limited) Enabling Act 1980 ('ROPE Act') and certain provisions of the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 ('BUGTA').
• [25] Referees have consistently accepted that the dispute resolution provisions under BUGTA are applicable to disputes under ROPE.
• [26] Section 3 of the ROPE Act makes provision for the application of BUGTA, and section 5A of BUGTA provides for its application regarding the ROPE Act.
• [27] Section 77(1) of BUGTA states:

A referee may, pursuant to an application of a body corporate, a body corporate manager, a proprietor, a person having an estate or interest in a lot or an occupier of a lot in respect of a parcel, make an order on any person entitled to make an application under this subsection or on the chairperson, secretary or treasurer of the body corporate for the settlement of a dispute, or the rectification of a complaint, with respect to the exercise or performance of, or the failure to exercise or perform, a power, authority, duty or function conferred or imposed by this Act in connection with that parcel.

• [28] Accordingly, I am satisfied I have jurisdiction to determine this dispute by virtue of section 77(1) of BUGTA.

• [29] While I have not detailed every element of the application, submissions and reply, all such material have been duly considered.
• [30] The question before me for determination is whether the body corporate acting through its committee, acted unreasonably and in doing so contravened sections 46(3) and 27(4) of BUGTA; and if so, whether the order sought by the applicant is warranted.

• [31] A body corporate must control, manage and administer the common property for the benefit of the proprietors.[2] To this effect and for the purpose of the use or enjoyment of the lots and common property, a body corporate may make by-laws.[3] [4] In this case, By-law 19 of Allunga allows an animal to be kept subject to committee approval. (I note that the validity of this by-law is not in dispute.)
• [32] Importantly, there is a general requirement under section 27(4) of BUGTA that a body corporate must act reasonably in anything it does, including making or not making a decision when (among other things) exercising its powers or performing its functions under the by-laws.
• [33] Similarly, under section 46(3) of BUGTA, a committee must act reasonably in making or not making a decision. The decisions of the committee (save for those on restricted matters) are deemed to be decisions of the body corporate.[5]
• [34] The question of whether a body corporate has acted unreasonably is not a straightforward one. What is reasonable is a question of fact, based on a consideration of all relevant matters in the circumstances of the particular case. There is no onus on a body corporate to satisfy a referee that it acted reasonably.[6] Rather, it is for the person alleging that the conduct or decision was unreasonable to prove the same.
• [35] The test of reasonableness was considered by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('QCAT') in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall[7] ('Beaches') - in considering similar provisions under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 ('BCCM Act') - which held as follows:
  1. 'Reasonable action is evidence-based and rational';[8]
  2. 'A finding that a decision or action in issue is "not irrational, absurd or ridiculous" does not necessarily mean it is a reasonable one'.[9]
• [36] A legally reasonable decision is not a uniquely right one. It involves matters of degree about which contrary - even opposite - conclusions can be reasonably reached on the same body of evidence by different lines of reasoning or by reference to other determinants without either being demonstrably right or manifestly wrong'.[10] Accordingly, it is not sufficient to find that the body corporate could have made a better or more reasonable decision, or that a different body corporate could reasonably have come to a different decision.[11] Further, it is not the referee's role to substitute his/her own view as to what would be the preferable decision by the body corporate.[12]

3.2 What does legal reasonableness require or allow the committee to do when considering a pet application?

• [37] A body corporate acting reasonably must consider each request to keep an animal in a lot on its merits, taking into account relevant factors and ignoring irrelevant factors.
• [38] Beaches (discussed above) involved a dispute about a committee decision to decline an application by a lot owner for his grandchildren to bring their dog, Marley, to his lot when they visit. The committee declined the application based on 'the unsuitability of the lifts for transporting (such) a (malodorous) dog'.[13]
• [39] In this context, QCAT provided some useful guidance as follows:

1. "Pets are clearly not an 'as of right' proposition at Beaches nor an incident of lot ownership or occupation. The question whether and on what terms residents will be permitted to keep pets is entrusted by law to the body corporate."[14] 2. "...the only expectation a lot owner can reasonably have is that the body corporate will not unreasonably refuse permission to keep an animal on the [community titles scheme] or impose overly onerous approval conditions."[15]

1. "While acting reasonably in the [community titles scheme] context within the BCCM [Act] does not always imply even-handedness, a conciliatory approach to a dispute or a recognition of the rights or wishes of others, a body corporate committee is still expected to weigh up competing personal rights with community interests. It is not a simple case of majority rule: the attitude of the majority of other residents is relevant but not decisive."[16]

1. "...the committee could not properly exercise its discretion in line with [the BCCM Act's] demands without, at least, genuinely looking for ways of granting, as well as reasons for denying, permission. It was incumbent on the committee to adequately consider whether Marley's visitation could be permitted on terms that reduced her smelliness on hot days to the level of acceptability rather than default to outright refusal."[17] 2. "The primary issue for a body corporate or committee in considering how to exercise its discretion to approve or request an application under its standard by-laws to keep a pet is "...the likelihood and acceptability of an adverse impact on common property or a person" in the future."[18] 3. Relevant factors to be considered by the committee when considering a pet application include "the breed, size, characteristics and proven behaviours of the pet, as well as the proposed frequency and type of use of common property."[19] 4. Further, "a reasonable committee... would consider: 1. its proper legal requirements and its functions; 2. the source, purposes and limits of its discretion; 3. all the relevant circumstantial considerations; 4. arguments for and against permitting Marley as distinct from dogs or pets in general; 5. the likely future consequences or gravity of refusing or granting permission on both the applicant and the [community titles scheme] including any precedent value of its decision either way; 6. the nature and extent of any infringement on the applicant's rights, interests and reasonable expectations of the other pet loving residents; 7. the majority view; 8. the assessed magnitude and frequency of the risk that dog smells would adversely impact on the enjoyment rights of others; 9. whether the objections could be ameliorated (e.g. whether the perceived risks to rights and reasonable expectations of other [community titles scheme] users could be reduced to the level of acceptability by affordable practical measures via imposition of conditions); and 10. practical ways of resolving the tension between the rival positions rather than reasons not to do so."[20]

• [40] It is not uncommon for bodies corporate to impose conditions on the keeping of a pet within a lot. However, these conditions must also be reasonable in the circumstances. Any conditions that are based on unwarranted or excessive caution may therefore be challenged on the grounds of unreasonableness.
• [41] In Crystal Waters Permaculture Village & Ors v Boyle[21], QCAT noted the following as common conditions bodies corporate impose on the keeping of animals:

1. The animal is not allowed on the common property, except for the purpose of being taken in or out of the scheme land; 2. The animal must be on a lead or adequately restrained while on common property; 3. The animal must be regularly treated for fleas; 4. The animal must not cause nuisance or interfere unreasonably with any person's use or enjoyment of another lot or common property; 5. The animal be kept in good health and free from fleas and parasites;

1. Any animal waste must be disposed of in such a way that it does not create noxious odours or otherwise contaminate the scheme;

1. Reasonable steps must be taken to minimise the transfer of airborne allergens from the animal, such as regular vacuuming and/or grooming;

1. The committee can withdraw approval for the animal to remain on the scheme if the specified conditions are not complied with;

1. The approval only applies to the animal in the application and does not allow the keeping of any additional replacement or substitute animals on the lot

3.3 Did the body corporate act unreasonably in rejecting the applicant's request?

• [42] I find that on 3 April 2025, the respondent body corporate acted unreasonably in denying the applicant's request to keep Teddy in her lot. My reasons for this finding are set out below.
• [43] Based on the evidence, the committee arrived at this decision prior to the receipt of any formal medical evidence regarding Mr Honig and Ms Zeimer.
• [44] I note that the body corporate makes an obscure reference to prior medical evidence for Mr Honig in its letter dated 18 June 2025 to the applicant. This letter includes a paragraph quoting Mr Honig's doctor. (The same paragraph later appears verbatim in the medical certificate dated 13 August 2025 which as it explains was produced pursuant to a hospital visit on the same day.)
• [45] However, the respondent body corporate confirms explicitly in its submission that 'at the time of inviting conditions' which is well after its initial decision dated 3 April 2025, that the committee 'had not received information from any of the medical practitioners treating Mr Honig and Ms Zeimer'.
• [46] Accordingly, the committee was in no position to properly and genuinely consider any reasonable conditions (to be potentially imposed on keeping Teddy) that could effectively manage any risk to the health and safety of Mr Honig and Mr Zeimer without this crucial medical evidence.
• [47] In this case, the committee in failing to await medical evidence prior to making its decision, and in relying solely on statements made by the occupier concerned or their carers is in my view unreasonable in the circumstances.
• [48] It is abundantly clear that the committee arrived at its decision on 3 April 2025 prematurely, and in doing so contravened sections 27(4) and 46(3) of BUGTA.

3.4 Did the committee act unreasonably in determining that there are no conditions that could possibly mitigate the risks identified?

• [49] On 18 June 2025, the committee wrote to the applicant indicating that it was of the view that the risks to Mr Honig cannot be mitigated by the imposition of any conditions on keeping Teddy within the applicant's lot.
• [50] In arriving at this subsequent decision, the committee certainly had the benefit of some information provided by Mr Honig's doctor, who evidently confirmed a fall risk even when walking with aid, and especially when startled.
• [51] Neither Mr Honig's doctor nor his carer expresses a health and safety concern for Mr Honig as a result of any exposure to hair, dander or any other pathogens introduced by dogs. Rather their concerns are solely limited to the possibility of Mr Honig being startled by a dog such as Teddy and thereafter injuring himself. They are further concerned that upon sustaining any such injury, Mr Honig, being immunocompromised would be highly susceptible to infection, and very slow to recover.
• [52] I reiterate that the committee held that there are no conditions whatsoever that could mitigate the identified risk.
• [53] In the above circumstances, a condition that required for e.g., the applicant to provide adequate notice to Mr Honig when taking Teddy in and out of the applicant's lot, or for Mr Honig to provide notice of his walks in the hallway to the applicant, would have been sufficient to ensure that Mr Honig and Teddy do not cross paths. In turn, there would be no risk of Mr Honig seeing Teddy approach or bark, hence eliminating the possibility of Mr Honig being startled.
• [54] The committee may even consider whether there are any alternative common property areas that Mr Honig can easily access and use for exercise, instead of the hallway/corridor which is generally meant for ingress and egress.
• [55] Accordingly, I find that the committee in dismissing the possibility of suitable conditions that could tackle the risk identified by Mr Honig's carers, contravened sections 27(4) and 46(3) of BUGTA.

• [56] In the circumstances described above, I am satisfied that an order directing the respondent body corporate to reconsider the applicant's request to keep Teddy is warranted.
• [57] I note that the applicant seeks a different order, i.e., one directing the respondent body corporate to approve the request to keep Teddy within the applicant's lot subject to any reasonable conditions.
• [58] I note that the medical information pertaining to Ms Zeimer is relevant to the making of such an order. However, there are other crucial details pertaining to the scheme and Ms Zeimer that I currently do not have the benefit of. Further, it is the respondent body corporate as opposed to myself, that is best placed to acquire this information.
• [59] Accordingly, the best way forward in the circumstances in my view is for the respondent body corporate to have a further opportunity to consider the applicant's request to keep Teddy in her lot. I am also of the view that such an approach also takes cognisance of the autonomy of the body corporate.
• [60] In reconsidering its decision, the respondent body corporate or its committee must act reasonably. It would also be prudent for it to take into account my observations below.

3.6 Relevant factors to be considered when redetermining the decision

• [61] The respondent body corporate has detailed further information that was made available to it after it made its decision, including details pertaining to Ms Zeimer, which in its opinion further justifies the decision ex post facto.
• [62] I reiterate that the information available to the committee at the time did not justify its decision. Given I have remitted the decision regarding the keeping of Teddy back to the respondent body corporate for redetermination, it is important to consider any new information that may impact the same.

• [63] In particular, Ms Zeimer's medical condition as detailed by her doctor, warrants careful consideration similar to that of Mr Honig.
• [64] I note that unlike Mr Honig, Ms Zeimer lives in and frequently visits lots that are several levels above the applicant's lot. Accordingly, the committee must take into account the fact that Ms Zeimer would not be living in close proximity to Teddy.
• [65] A condition that requires for e.g., that Teddy's access to common property must be limited to direct entry and exit to and from the applicant's lot; and that the applicant must refrain from entering a lift with Teddy without the consent of those already onboard, would practicably ensure that Ms Zeimer does not come into direct contact with Teddy.
• [66] Based on my understanding, the risk associated with exposure to hair, dander and other pathogens introduced by Teddy is therefore likely to be posed by way of Ms Zeimer traversing the same path from the lifts to the building exit that Teddy would tread. Accordingly, the committee may explore whether any conditions may effectively tackle this risk or reduce the same to a 'level of acceptability', such as for e.g., establishing a dedicated route for Teddy's entry and exit to the applicant's lot that Ms Zeimer and other concerned occupiers can reasonably avoid; or requiring Teddy to be placed in a suitable carrier when being taken in and out of the building; and regular grooming and vacuuming etc.
• [67] Further, as argued by the applicant, the medical certificate provided for Ms Zeimer does not indicate whether the doctor took into account the size, layout and other physical characteristics of the building, the distance between the relevant lots, and Teddy's breed, when opining that 'the presence of a dog in the same apartment complex [will] present a serious and material risk' to Ms Zeimer.
• [68] It is not unreasonable for the committee to require Ms Zeimer to obtain written clarification or a report from her doctor on this point, and as to whether any appropriate measures may be taken (by Ms Zeimer and/or the applicant) to effectively tackle this risk or reduce it to a level of acceptability.
• [69] There is some onus on Ms Zeimer or anyone else claiming to have a medical condition that warrants prohibiting or limiting Teddy's presence at the building, to provide evidence to the satisfaction of the committee of their medical condition and any risk mitigation measures.

• [70] I note that on or about 23 October 2025, the body corporate introduced a new pet policy, as follows:

1. Category 1: Certified assistance animals cannot be refused by the body corporate;

• aaa. Category 2: Applications for 'companion or emotional support' animals that do not hold certification may be considered by the committee on 'compassionate and therapeutic' grounds;
  • bbb. Category 3: 'Pets kept purely for recreation or companionship - not as certified assistance or emotional support animals - are not permitted in the building. This restriction ensures protection of hygiene, quiet enjoyment and safety; consistent management across all lots; and compliance with Queensland tribunal decisions rejecting blanket bans but upholding reasonable restrictions in high-density environments'.
• [71] Whilst I note that this policy is not the subject of this application, I shall make some comments about the same (based on the limited evidence before me) in the hopes that it will prevent further dispute, and given that I anticipate its application by the committee when redetermining the request to keep Teddy (pursuant to my order in this decision).
• [72] This policy is in my view prima facie unreasonable and its implementation by the committee may constitute unreasonable conduct in contravention of sections 46(3) and 27(4) of BUGTA. This is because:

1. There is an overlap between the second and third categories of animals. An application for a 'companion' pet which I assume constitutes the majority (if not all) of pet applications across plans and schemes in Queensland, may be considered by the committee under the second category, but will apparently not be considered under the third category. Accordingly, there is room for the committee to deny any application for a pet on the basis of the Category 3 prohibition;

• ddd. The only basis provided for the distinction between Categories 2 and 3 is that the prohibition of the latter ensures hygiene, quiet enjoyment, safety, and consistent management. This underlying rationale to me is flawed, given the purpose of a pet belonging to either category prima facie has little to no bearing on hygiene, safety, quiet enjoyment and management consistency. An approved emotional support dog broadly speaking, can pose no risk to hygiene, safety, quiet enjoyment or management consistency any more than a 'companion' dog of the same breed, size and temperament;
  • eee. While the benefit of the animal to its owner can be taken into consideration, the primary issue for the body corporate as held in Beaches, is the likelihood and acceptability of an adverse impact on common property or a person. The purpose of the animal where its owner is concerned often has very little to do with any adverse impact on common property or any person.
  • fff. Precedent requires committees to consider each application for a pet on its merits. This policy prima facie hinders such an approach.
• [73] Accordingly, it would be prudent for the body corporate to revisit this policy, prior to redetermining the request to keep Teddy in the applicant's lot. A further denial of this request on the basis of this policy without genuinely considering the merits of the matter, may be unreasonable and in contravention of the legislation.

• [74] I am satisfied that the body corporate acted unreasonably in refusing the applicant's request to keep Teddy in her lot on 3 April 2025, and in maintaining that refusal on 18 June 2025.
• [75] Accordingly, I order the body corporate to reconsider the applicant's request to keep Teddy in her lot.

[4] While BUGTA provides or a set of default by-laws under Schedule 3, bodies corporate are free to amend, add to or repeal them (See sections 30(1) and (2) of BUGTA).

There are other provisions in BUGTA that allow a referee to make specific orders relating to animals kept in contravention of the by-laws; and animals causing a nuisance or hazard or an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of another lot or common property. (See section 86 and 86 of BUGTA)

[6] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[7] [2016] QCATA 177

[8] SZLGP v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198 [15] - [16] as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [23]

[9] McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 228 CLR 423 [60] (Hayne J) as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [24]

[10] Woden Valley Glass v Psaila (1993) 122 ALR 378, 391 as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [47]

[11] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[13] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [7]

[14] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [92]

[16] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [28]

[21] [2020] QCATA 80 at [74]