(The reference to "commencement" is a reference to 1 July 1998.)
14 Having regard to the changes which took effect on 1 July 1998 (and to the fact that, according to the evidence, each of the twelve "A" class shares having a par value of £1/-/-, or $2.00, was fully paid and was not issued at a premium), the present situation must be approached on the footing that parts of the constitution were repealed by s.1427(1) of the Corporations Law as of 1 July 1998 and that the sum of $2.00 is to be regarded as paid on each of the twelve shares.
15 The repeal effected by s.1427(1) caused to become inoperative the provisions in the company's constitution stating its capital and dividing that capital into shares of a fixed amount. Clause 3 of the memorandum and article 5(1) of the articles of association are both provisions of this kind. But each provision, as well as stating the capital and dividing it into shares of £1/-/-, specified the numbers of shares that were to be "A" class shares, "B" class shares, "C" class shares and ordinary shares. To the extent that the provisions thus classified shares, they went beyond the matters specified in s.1427(1) of the Corporations Law and it seems to me that those additional aspects must be taken to have survived the repeal effected by that section. It follows that the twelve shares issued as "A" class shares continued to be "A" class shares after 1 July 1998. In addition and as I have already said, each must today be regarded as a share on which the sum of $2.00 has been paid.
16 Returning to the general principle of proportional participation recognised in the case law, it seems clear that the rule now pays attention to interests in the share capital measured by numbers of shares held - subject, however, to the provisions of the constitution. The general principle is always subject to modification by the constitution. It is therefore necessary to construe the particular provisions that apply in this case, being articles 5(2)(iii) and 141. The scheme of distribution of surplus those provisions create will be the scheme that s.501 requires to be adopted; and the general principle to which I have referred will be relevant only to the extent that the provisions of the constitution do not cover the field.
17 Mr A J Grant of counsel, who appeared for the liquidator, referred to a number of decided cases. Included among them are cases in which holders of shares of a particular class have been held to have no right to participate upon a winding up beyond a fixed amount representing return of the capital paid up on their shares. Examples are Re National Telephone Company [1914] 1 Ch 755 and Re Isle of Thanet Electricity Supply Co Ltd [1950] Ch 161 in England and Re William Bedford Ltd [1967] VR 490, Re Plashett Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1969] NSWR 243 and Seaton v Federal Hotels Ltd (1981) 29 SASR 290 in Australia.
18 But all these cases involved a contest between holders of issued shares having different attributes under the company's constitution. By recognising and giving effect to a limitation upon the rights of holders of shares of one class, the court was upholding and vindicating a right of the holders of shares of another class, that is, a right not to suffer curtailment of participation though unauthorised augmentation in favour of the members of the first class.
19 The situation here is quite different. There is no question of contest or competition among the holders of shares or classes of shares. Although the constitution purports to differentiate among members according to the classes of shares held by them, each of the two members occupies exactly the same position as the other, holding six "A" class shares in circumstances where no further shares have been or can now be issued, where the rights of the members cannot now be changed (see s.493(2) of the Corporations Act) and where the process of winding up provided for in the Act is about to be completed.
20 In these circumstances, the question is not one of resolving competing claims upon surplus advanced by different segments of the membership. It is, rather, whether the constitution shows an intention that the members as a whole, both of whom hold "A" class shares only, are to be denied altogether participation beyond the amounts paid up on their shares. If the answer is in the affirmative, a further question arises by way of corollary: how must the liquidator apply so much of the surplus as remains after the entitlements to the amounts paid up on the twelve "A" class shares have been satisfied?
21 There can be no real doubt, in my view, that if "B" class, "C" class or ordinary shares were on issue in addition to "A" class shares, those other shares would entitle their holders to the balance of the surplus beyond $24.00. Under article 5(2)(iii), that balance would "belong exclusively" to the holders of those other shares. But, of course, there are, in the circumstances actually prevailing, no such holders and therefore no persons to whom that provision causes the balance to "belong exclusively".
22 Attention must then be focussed on the second and third sentences of article 141. The second sentence deals with the situation where, in a winding up, the assets for distribution among members are more than sufficient to repay the paid up capital. As things stand, the paid up capital is $24.00 and the second sentence applies. It says that the balance of the surplus over and above the paid up capital of $24.00 is to be distributed among the members in proportion to the capital that had been or ought to have been paid on their shares at the commencement of the winding up. That general rule is then qualified by the final sentence, which says that it operates "without prejudice to the rights of the holders of shares issued upon special terms and conditions".
23 The words "without prejudice to" indicate that the rights in question are not to be curtailed or detracted from so as to be less advantageous or attractive to the persons enjoying the rights. Adopting the approach taken by McPherson J to the words "without prejudice to our client's rights" in Alleyn v Thurecht [1983] 2 Qd R 706, the rights are to remain available in an undiminished way. The general specification in the second sentence of article 141 must therefore yield to and accommodate "the rights of the holders of shares issued upon special terms and conditions".
24 If "B" class, "C" class or ordinary shares were on issue, those shares would be shares "issued upon special terms and conditions". This is because article 5(2)(iii) would be the source of an entitlement of the holders of those shares to so much of the surplus on winding up as remained after repayment of the amounts paid on the "A" class shares. That entitlement would be part of the "rights of the holders of " the "B" class, "C" class and ordinary shares. The last sentence of article 141 would then cause the entitlements of those shareholders created by the "shall belong exclusively" specification in article 5(2)(iii) to prevail over any residual right of participation in excess that the second sentence of article 141 might otherwise leave with the holders of the "A" class shares.
25 But in the circumstances actually prevailing, there are no "shares issued upon special terms and conditions" which are the source of any "rights of the holders" of those shares with respect to surplus, being rights that would be prejudiced by the unfettered operation of the second sentence of article 141. The "A" class shares are also "shares issued upon special terms and conditions". The special terms and conditions include those in article 5(2)(iii). But application of the second sentence of article 141, so as to benefit the holders of the "A" class shares in a way that would not have occurred if "B" class, "C" class or ordinary shares had also been on issue, will not detract from or diminish the rights of the holders of the "A" class shares. It will put those holders into a position that is more favourable to them than is contemplated by their "special terms and conditions". There do not exist any shares to which are attached rights of the kind intended to be preserved and protected by the third sentence of article 141. The second sentence accordingly operates in an unqualified way.
26 In approaching the matter in that way, I am mindful of the following passage in the judgment of Street J in Re Plashett Pastoral Co Pty Ltd (above) at p.246 regarding an article relevantly indistinguishable from the article 141 with which I am now concerned:
"Mr. Handley has contended that this second sentence of art. 158 should be given its full meaning and effect as entitling all members in proportion to the capital paid up to share in the distribution of any excess. He contends that the qualification in the last sentence of art. 158, specifying that that Article 'is to be without prejudice to the rights of the holders of shares issued upon special terms and conditions', does not prevent the rights of shareholders being augmented by the earlier provisions of art. 158. The article, so his argument runs, prevents diminution of rights conferred elsewhere in the articles upon the holders of shares issued upon the special terms and conditions; but it does not prevent augmentation of their rights. In point of terminology there is force in Mr. Handley's argument: the phrase 'without prejudice to' commonly means 'without derogating from'. But in determining whether art. 158 enlarges the rights conferred by art. 9, weight must be given to the clear principle that the rights of preference shareholders are prima facie to be considered to be exhaustively stated unless the contrary can be demonstrated. If, of course, the preference shareholders' rights can be seen to be stated as being in some respects exclusive or particular and in other respects rights in common with all other shareholders, then full effect will be given thereto. Rights given in terms to the general body of shareholders may or may not form part of the specification of the preference shareholders' rights. Mere physical remoteness in the numerical sequence of the setting out of the articles is little to the point. But in determining whether a generally expressed article such as art. 158 does form part of the specification of the rights of preference shareholders this basic principle of construction necessitates a cautious approach. Where, as here, the particular statement of rights deals with return of capital on winding up (art. 9), that is prima facie an exhaustive statement of the rights on that topic. The generally expressed terms of art. 158 are to be considered with this proposition well to the fore."
27 But, as I have said, Plashett Pastoral Co was a case in which the rights attaching to shares of a particular class arose for consideration in a context where shares other than shares of that class were also on issue, so that it became necessary to address questions of competition and relativity. It was that circumstance that caused the court to reject the notion that the equivalent of the present article 141 enlarged the limited rights analogous to those emerging from the present article 5(2)(iii), even though the submission of Mr K R Handley of counsel as to the effect of the "without prejudice" terminology was acknowledged to have "force". In the circumstances now before me, no such inhibition operates to preclude the construction for which Mr Handley there contended.
28 It follows that, as a matter of construction, the constitution provides that the surplus in the plaintiff's hands as liquidator is to be applied, first, in repaying the capital of $24.00 paid up on the twelve outstanding shares and, second, by division among the members in proportion to the capital paid up on their shares at the commencement of the winding up (there being no capital that, at that point, ought to have been paid up but was not). Section 501 of the Corporations Act requires that effect be given to the constitution in this respect, so that, with each of the two members holding six fully paid shares of $2.00 each, the net result is that the surplus remaining after debts, claims and expenses have been paid in full must be divided equally between those two members.
29 I add by way of postscript a brief observation on the possibility that a surplus in a liquidator's hands might pass to the Crown as bona vacantia. That possibility was adverted to in the course of submissions and is referred to at paragraph 14.200 of the fifth edition (2006) of "McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation" by M G R Gronow. The decision of Waddell J in Rees v Dominion Insurance Company of Australia Limited (1981) 6 ACLR 71 is mentioned in that connection. That case involved a superannuation fund in circumstances where no person was any longer entitled to benefits out of the trust fund. It seems to me that any analogous possibility would arise in the context of company winding up only where the constitution made it perfectly clear that no member was to have the surplus and made no other provision as to its disposal (such as, under the kind of regime commonly adopted by certain community and charitable companies, by payment to a named institution or to bodies having objects similar to those of the company). In the case of a commercial company, the intention to exclude all members from enjoyment would have to be clear, as a matter of construction. If all members were not clearly and unambiguously excluded, the principles in Birch v Cropper (above) and Re Driffield Gas Light Company (above), as adjusted for the abolition of par value, would apply by default to recognise members' right to participate in proportion to the numbers of shares held.
30 In the present case, the liquidator should be given a direction by the court that he is justified in proceeding on the footing that the surplus after all debts, claims and expenses cognisable in the winding up have been paid in full is to be divided equally between Mr Sidney McCutcheon and Mr Allan McCutcheon as the only members of the company.
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