Allesch v Maunz

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. The appellant appeals against final property orders made by a learned Magistrate on 8 April 2025.

1. The appellant wife (aged 41 years) and the respondent husband (aged 48 years) commenced a relationship in or around March 2004. In June 2004 they began cohabiting at a home owned by the husband prior to the relationship which became the marital home (the "Suburb B Property"). The parties married in 2006.
2. There are two children of the parties' marriage, aged 16 and 18 years. The wife ceased paid employment in approximately January 2007 and assumed the role of primary homemaker and child carer.
3. The parties separated on a final basis in June 2021. The wife left the Suburb B Property with the children in February 2021 to reside at a hotel. The husband continued to reside in the Suburb B Property from February 2021 until 3 April 2022 when he relocated interstate (notifying the wife by text message of the town to which he intended to relocate). The wife and the children resided at the hotel until approximately June 2021. The housing arrangements of the wife during the interim from June 2021 to December 2023 were not the subject of evidence before the court. The wife resumed occupancy of the Suburb B Property in or about December 2023, before moving to the small town in which the husband was then residing interstate in October 2024.

1. The husband commenced the proceedings on 22 January 2024, seeking an urgent hearing due to non-payment of the mortgage on the Suburb B Property.
2. The matter came before the court on 8 February 2024. The presiding Magistrate made orders by consent for the wife to be liable for any payments associated with the Suburb B Property and for the wife to file her responding documents. The matter was adjourned for directions to 27 March 2024.
3. On 11 March 2024 the wife filed a Response to the Initiating Application. On 27 March 2024 directions were made for the wife to file an amended response, orders were made for disclosure, and a conciliation conference was allocated for 7 June 2024.
4. On 5 June 2024 the wife filed an application in the proceedings, which was listed for the following day. The conciliation conference was vacated and the matter adjourned to 2 August 2024, when the wife's application in a case was dismissed and further procedural orders were made. On 30 August the parties attended a conciliation conference, however the matter did not settle.
5. Various procedural orders were made and the matter was listed for final hearing on 10 February 2025.
6. A further interlocutory hearing was scheduled for 16 January, however it was recorded that:
   1. Shortly prior to the hearing on 16 January 2025, the [wife] lodged correspondence indicating her reluctance to proceed with the financial matters, referencing personal safety concerns for the welfare of herself and the children. She did not file any documents in response to the [husband]'s application, nor did she seek any other orders.
7. Whilst the wife failed to appear at the hearing on 16 January, she was contacted by telephone to enable her to make submissions. The learned Magistrate recounts that:
   1. The [wife] indicated that she was unwilling to proceed with the matter any further, that she viewed the Court system as a means of "subjecting her to further abuse", and that she intended to take "legal action". However, the [wife] was not able to identify what action she proposed to take.
8. Following this court event the learned Magistrate noted:
   1. Given that the [wife] had only communicated her intentions to withdraw from the proceedings on the day of the hearing, I considered it prudent to give her the opportunity to process the effect of her decision and seek legal advice on the matter. In addition, it was unclear whether she had made any attempts to obtain legal representation pursuant to the cross-examination ban. The [wife] had proposed to disengage from the proceedings due to allegations of family violence. By obtaining legal representation, the very concern that led her to want to discontinue could have been alleviated.
   2. Subsequently, I made Orders from Chambers on 17 January 2025 for the [wife] to contact Legal Aid in relation to both the cross-examination scheme and to make inquires in relation to a Dispute Resolution Conference.
9. The wife appears to have disengaged from the proceedings prior to trial, the learned Magistrate recounting that the "[wife] did not attend the hearing on 23 January 2025, nor did she request to attend the hearing electronically. The Court made two attempts to contact the Respondent via telephone, which went to voicemail, with no ability to leave a message" at ([37]).
10. The final hearing proceeded in the wife's absence. The learned Magistrate found that the parties' net assets and superannuation were valued at $1,164,735. Her Honour assessed the husband's contributions at 60% and made an adjustment pursuant to s 75(2) in favour of the wife of 5%, resulting in orders for the wife to receive 45% of the property of the parties.

1. The appellant is unrepresented. The grounds of appeal are not expressed in the usual format, instead setting out many general allegations which were not particularised in the grounds or the Summary of Argument filed for the appeal.

1. Procedural Fairness Denied - Duress and Vulnerability Ignored

• The Appellant was in a state of vulnerability and unwell health during all material proceedings and compelled under duress to agree to initial consent orders (8 Feb 2024), a key event that later shaped the court's assessment of contributions and conduct.
• No allowance was made for her mental, emotional, and physical health, or her lack of legal representation.
• Relevant Law Breached:
  • Family Law Act 1975, s.75(2)(b), (c), (d), (g): Court failed to properly consider health, care of children, earning capacity, and standard of living needs of the Appellant.
  • Principles of Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness.

1. The appellant did not provide any evidence of health issues to the learned Magistrate or during the appeal.
2. There is no evidence of duress with respect to the 8 February 2024 orders. Whilst the appellant was unrepresented on that day, she appeared by audio visual link. The transcript records that the appellant chose not to speak to the solicitor for the respondent (Transcript 8 February 2024, p.2 line 42). The respondent had sought orders of the sale of the Suburb B property as there were concerns that the financier may take possession and sell the property. The appellant said that she "was cooperative to the sale" but disputed the terms of the sale process (Transcript 8 February 2024, p.3 line 8). She then expressed her views about the method of sale (Transcript 8 February 2024, p.3 - 4) to which the respondent ultimately consented (Transcript 8 February 2024, p.7 lines 22-23).
3. The sale of the property was simply to liquidate the asset. It was not a "key event that later shaped the court's assessment of contributions and conduct". As it transpired, the property was not sold prior to the final hearing, and even now remains unsold. There is no basis for the appellant to allege error on the part of the learned Magistrate with respect to these Orders.
4. The balance of the orders made on that day were unremarkable: the respondent was required to file a Response, an affidavit and a financial statement within 28 days, costs of the application were reserved and the matter adjourned for a directions hearing.
5. On 30 August 2024, trial directions were made, noting that there was a ban on personal cross-examination (pursuant to s 102NA of the Family Law Act) and annexing a notice providing information to the appellant on how to access the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross Examination of Parties Scheme. The provisions of s 102NA were engaged as a result of a Family Violence Restraining Order dated 4 June 2024, and the subsequent "Conduct Agreement Order" made on 13 August 2024, under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA). No doubt it was in light of this history that the presiding Magistrate took care to ensure that the appellant could participate in the final hearing, recounting:
   1. On 22 January 2025, the [respondent] filed a Form 2 Application seeking leave to attend the trial on 10 February 2025 via video link, which was listed to the existing hearing on 23 January 2025.
   2. The [appellant] did not attend the hearing on 23 January 2025, nor did she request to attend the hearing electronically. The Court made two attempts to contact the [appellant] via telephone, which went to voicemail, with no ability to leave a message.
6. The appellant has not shown that she was denied a real opportunity to be heard as a result of the learned Magistrates' management of the hearing process.

1. The respondent, in his Initiating Application filed 11 March 2024, at paragraph 3(1)(iii), had sought orders effecting a 50/50 division of the assets of the parties. On 30 August 2024 a registrar ordered that:
   1. By no later than the close of Registry on 6 January 2025, each party file and serve each other party with a Minute of Final Financial Orders Sought setting out the orders they are seeking on a final basis.
2. The respondent filed a Minute of Final Orders on 7 Jan 2025, again setting out orders to effect a 50/50 division (respondent's Minute of Final Orders on 7 Jan 2025 paragraph 2(g)).
3. On the day of the final hearing, which the appellant did not attend, the respondent's lawyer sought orders effecting a 60/40 split in favour of the respondent. This was not sought by way of amendment of the Initiating Application, but by informally providing a written version of the orders then sought (respondent's amended Minute of Final Orders, paragraph 2(i)). As the appellant was not present, the draft of the orders then sought could not be provided to her at court and instead were sent to her electronically at 9.12am on that day (as admitted by her at the hearing of the appeal). The lawyer for the respondent and the learned Magistrate had an exchange at Transcript 10 February 2025, p.70 lines 28-38:

HER HONOUR: All right. We obviously don't have the respondent here. Have you had any recent communications with her since I've seen you last?

[SOLICITOR]: No. I've emailed her this morning, actually, a minute, an amended minute that I will hand up a bit later, but, no, since - I can't remember exactly when, but it has been a while since we've had any communication with her, which is in contrast to how the proceedings have been up until around about the time she said she was no longer going to proceed or participate.

1. Despite the application consistently seeking orders to effect a property settlement at 50/50, the outcome was a division 55/45 in favour of the respondent.
2. The outcome was worse for the appellant than the worst-case scenario presented in the respondent's Initiating Application and later filed version of the orders he sought, without effective notice that such an outcome was possible. Whilst the ultimate percentage difference is modest (5%) this meant that she received approximately $58,000 less than she would have received had the split been 50/50.
3. Procedural fairness requires that a person be provided with a real opportunity to be heard. For the opportunity to be heard to be a real opportunity, it is necessary that the person have reasonable notice of the hearing and the substance of the orders that are sought. This is not a complaint that the details of the orders (such as the sale process, etc) changed, but that the substantive effect of the orders made differed from the notice she received prior to the hearing. Notice to the unrepresented appellant (who was not present at court) on the day of the final hearing was not sufficient to reasonably put the appellant on notice of the orders then sought by the respondent in the circumstances of this case. The appellant was not afforded procedural fairness by such late notice.
4. Whilst the appellant made submissions that she was suffering mental health issues that prevented her effective participation in the process at this time, I am nonetheless persuaded that there is a real possibility that she may have acted differently if provided with reasonable notice of orders where the respondent sought more than half of the property pool. The appellant has established a miscarriage of justice in this respect.
5. The appellant has therefore made out this ground of appeal.

2. Failure to Enforce Disclosure and Full Evidence

• The Family Court did not enforce full and frank disclosure from the Respondent under Rule 6.06 of the Family Law Rules 2004.
• Appellant's Form 13 Financial Statement, contempt applications, and Notice to Inspect were ignored or inadequately addressed.
• Relevant Law Breached:
  • Family Law Act 1975, s.117C and s.117(1): Duty of disclosure.
  • Federal Circuit and Family Court Rules 2021, rr. 6.06, 6.08 and 1.12.

1. This Ground sets out only general allegations. The appellant's Summary of Argument also recounts general claims. The appellant was unable to point to any written or oral application for orders for disclosure of specific documents, nor evidence that disclosure was inadequate in a material respect. There is no contempt application in the appeal book.
2. On the material before the court on this appeal, this ground of appeal is not made out.

3. Misuse of Family Court Procedures by Respondent (Systemic Weaponisation)

• The Form 1 Initiating Application was filed by the Respondent citing "financial hardship" without appropriate supporting evidence-resulting in false urgency and bypass of pre-court procedures and mediation.
• The Court accepted misleading or untested affidavit evidence as uncontested, without scrutiny, as the trial proceeded undefended due to Appellant's inability to cope and lack of support.
• Relevant Law Breached:
  • Family Law Act 1975, s.60I(7): Mandatory pre-filing mediation not considered.
  • Misleading the Court and Abuse of Process, see Guss v Guss (2008) 39 Fam LR 190.

1. The substance of this Ground appears to be a claim that the respondent persuaded the court to exempt the parties from the requirements of s 60I of the Family Law Act (pre-filing dispute resolution processes). There is no basis for concluding that any failure of the parties to participate in pre-filing dispute resolution led to an appealable error by the learned Magistrate at the final hearing.

4. Ignoring Conduct Agreement Order and Ongoing Family Violence

• The 13 August 2024 Conduct Agreement Order under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) specifically prohibits the Respondent from intimidating or hindering the Appellant, yet the Court's 8 April orders empowered the Respondent to enable him to enter and dispose of the Appellant's personal property.
• This action risked a breach of national protection provisions.
• Relevant Law Breached:
  • Family Law Act 1975, s.68R: Court should have modified inconsistent parenting/property orders in light of protection orders.
  • Family Violence and Cross-examination of Parties Scheme, s.102NA-102NC.

1. This issue turns upon the terms of the Conduct Agreement Order, which relevantly provides:

PART A: ORDERS. EXCEPT AS SET OUT IN PART B YOU MUST NOT:

...

enter or remain upon [Suburb B Property address] or any other premises where the Person Protected lives or works or is educated or be within 200 metres of the nearest external boundary of those premises,

approach or remain within 50 metres of the Person Protected,

...

1. On the evidence before the learned Magistrate, the appellant had vacated the Suburb B Property prior to the final hearing. Earlier orders had been in place for the sale of the property, which had still not occurred. The learned Magistrate made orders providing the appellant 28 days to remove any of her property that remained in the premises and for the respondent to be appointed trustee for sale.
2. A fair reading of the Conduct Agreement Order is that it related to places where the appellant lived or worked. Whist the order specified the Suburb B Property address, it is clear that the address was where the appellant lived at the time. As the appellant no longer lived or worked on the property, it was no longer covered by the terms of the order.
3. There is no merit in this ground of appeal

5. Injustice in Property Division (Disproportionate Orders)

• The decision to award the Applicant both $100,000 in proceeds, exclusive control over sale, and sole trustee status - alongside delayed or limited superannuation transfer - ignored Appellant's primary caregiving contributions and current housing disadvantage.
• Magistrate found contributions "equal during the marriage" yet unjustly adjusted 10% in favour of the Respondent for alleged discretionary spending without clear or tested evidence.
• Relevant Law Breached:
  • Family Law Act 1975, s.79(2), s.75(2), and Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52: Just and equitable requirement.

1. It is convenient to deal with the issues in this ground in the opposite order to which they have been particularised.

1. The learned Magistrate addressed whether it was just and equitable to make orders, as discussed in Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52; (2012) 247 CLR 108, saying:
   1. I have little difficulty concluding that it would be just and equitable to make a property settlement order. At the time of the trial, the parties had been separated for nearly 4 years. Their circumstances fall within the type of case identified by the High Court in their judgment in Stanford v Stanford. In those circumstances, I find that it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order.
2. There is no error in this respect, particularly given that the parties had separated and neither had the use of the home any longer as it was vacant.

1. The appellant's contributions were identified and taken into account in the judgment, the learned Magistrate discussing them at [67] and following, concluded:
   1. It is undisputed that both parties made significant financial and non-financial contributions to their marriage. The Applicant spent considerable periods away from the family unit working on a fly-in-flyout basis, generating sufficient income to support the family.
   2. On the other hand, the Respondent also made contributions. She undertook the role of the homemaker and primary caregiver to the children, often single-handedly, given the evidence that the Applicant was often away working. Post-separation, the Respondent has remained the sole caregiver for the children, although not by preference of the Applicant.
2. The learned Magistrate's overall conclusions on contributions were:
   1. I am of the view that during the relationship, the parties' contributions would be considered equal.
   2. However, the Respondent would appear to have made several poor choices that affected the parties' financial position, including living in a rental or hotel accommodation when the [Suburb B] Property was available, giving away 10% of her income post-separation, and generally spending excessively.
   3. In addition, the Applicant made additional initial contributions. His superannuation has increased by over $200,000 post-separation, which is a large portion of the current asset pool.
   4. I consider that there should be an adjustment in the Applicant's favour of 10% by way of contributions.
3. It is apparent that the findings as to contributions were not based solely on conduct by the appellant after separation, but also recognised significant initial contributions by the respondent, which are identified earlier in the judgment at [57] which provides:
   1. At the commencement of the relationship, the Applicant had recently purchased the [Suburb B] Property with around $200,000 equity. He also held superannuation with Military Super, which was valued at $61,409 as at 30 June 2004. The Applicant spent approximately $30,000 to furnish the [Suburb B] Property prior to cohabitation with the Respondent. The Applicant owned a motor vehicle worth approximately $12,000. The Applicant deposed that the Respondent had nominal assets at the commencement of the relationship.
4. Unfortunately, however, the reasons for judgment appear to misread the husband's trial affidavit where he recounts that he "purchased this property in or about 2003 for approximately $215,000. I took out a mortgage for approximately $200,000 and paid approximately $15,000 cash towards the deposit." (husband's Trial Affidavit dated 27 December 2024, paragraph 12). This error was not propounded by counsel for the husband who set out in his Case Outline that "[a]t the commencement of cohabitation the Husband owned the property at ... with approximately $15,000-$20,000 in net equity." (husband's Case Outline filed 9 January 2025, paragraph A) and made submissions at the hearing that the husband came to the relationship with "equity in the home of 15 to 20 thousand" (Transcript 10 February 2025, p.6 lines 39-40). This is a significant error of fact in the context of a case involving assets of less than $1.2m.
5. The respondent argues that the statement in paragraph [57] of the reasons is a slip and doesn't represent the learned Magistrate's views, referring to paragraph [6] where it was recorded that "The Applicant purchased the Suburb B Property prior to the parties' relationship for approximately $215,000.00 with a $15,000.00 deposit, with the balance financed by a loan secured by a mortgage." The difficulty with the reference in [6] is that it is to the time of purchase of the property, not the time of cohabitation, which is the point in time referred to in [57].
6. Secondly, it was argued that the contribution assessment must have been made relying upon the correct figure having regard to the other factors. The contributions assessment was that the respondent contributed more than the appellant by 20% of the assets and superannuation of the parties. There are no other significant differences in contributions as the parties continued their respective roles after separation (the appellant continued to care for the children and the respondent continued in employment). There is no evidence as to the cause of the increases in the respondent's superannuation that would show it is a contribution to be attributed largely to the respondent that is not either natural growth of the investments or matched by the appellant's child caring contributions. The more likely inference from the contributions assessment is that the learned Magistrate took into account the larger amount of equity in the Suburb B Property as an initial contribution. These factors do not lead to a conclusion that the error was not material to the decision.

1. Although not clearly articulated by the appellant, it also appears that the learned Magistrate erred in the approach to assessing contributions after listing the various facts and circumstances bearing upon the assessment of contributions, the learned Magistrate said:
   1. I consider that there should be an adjustment in the Applicant's favour of 10% by way of contributions.
2. The approach of making an "adjustment" erroneously assumes a starting point of equality, (see Preston & Preston [2022] FedCFamC1A 157; (2022) 66 Fam LR 285 at [24]-[29] per Alstergren CJ, McClelland DCJ and Austin J). The difficulties with such an approach are explained in Dumont & Cabrara [2025] FedCFamC1A 82:
   1. The language of adjustment requires an assumption of a starting point (presumably of equal contributions), otherwise there would be nothing to be adjusted. The High Court has clearly stated that there is no presumption of equality of contributions: see Mallett v Mallett [1984] HCA 21; (1984) 156 CLR 605 at 610, 613, 625, 639-640 and 647; Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 537. This aspect of legal doctrine flows from the fact that Australia does not have a community property system (Wirth v Wirth [1956] HCA 71; (1956) 98 CLR 228 at 231-232 and 247-248; Stanford at [37]-[39], [50]): parties to marriages have individual property rights (at least since the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts in the 19th century). The question s 79 poses is whether the rights and the individual interests of the parties ought to be altered: Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52; (2012) 247 CLR 108 at [39].
   2. Although there may be a finding of equality of contributions in many cases, this does not justify departing from established legal doctrine in favour of a heuristic that commences with an assumption of equality.
   3. The Full Court has consistently required (as it must in accordance with the doctrine of precedent) that the principles in Mallett be followed: see, for example, the recent decisions in Preston & Preston [2022] FedCFamC1A 157; (2022) 66 Fam LR 285 at [24]-[29] per Alstergren CJ, McClelland DCJ and Austin J; Chapman & Chapman [2014] FamCAFC 91; (2014) FLC 93-592 at [100]-[101]; and Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154; (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 at [23]-[25].
3. Even if the reasons indicated that after assessing the contributions during the relationship as equal, adjustments were then made, such an approach would be a departure from the requirement that there be a holistic assessment of the contributions of the parties (see Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154; (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 at [23]-[25]).
4. The appellant has made out this ground of appeal.

6. Failure to Return Case to Original Magistrate Post-Conciliation

• The matter did not return to the magistrate who originally understood the context and complexity of the case, contrary to procedural expectations for continuity.
• This created a loss of judicial understanding and fairness in the final determination.
• Relevant Law Breached:
  • Family Law Act 1975, s .96: Judicial continuity encouraged where possible.
  • Federal Circuit and Family Court Act 2021, s.67: Efficient conduct of proceedings.

1. There is no basis for arguing that a matter can only be heard by the judicial officer who has decided interlocutory applications of made procedural orders. Almost all courts have different judicial officers dealing with issues prior to final hearings: it is an administrative arrangement some argue improves the efficiency of the courts. If there were circumstances arising from interlocutory hearings that were relevant to the final outcome, it was open to the appellant to lead evidence of those circumstances: she did not do so. The appellant appears to be confused by the principle that the final hearing must be undertaken by only one judicial officer.
2. There is no merit in this ground of appeal.

7. Appellant Silenced - Access to Justice Denied

• Numerous filings and correspondence from the Appellant were rejected or ignored. She was repeatedly silenced, even while homeless and in distress, further enabling coercive control by the Respondent through legal mechanisms.
• Only after threats of external legal action did the magistrate begin to take her submissions seriously.
• Relevant Law Breached:
  • Access to Justice Principles, and United Nations CEDAW (ratified by Australia).
  • Family Law Act 1975, s.117 AB: Abuse of process including litigation used to control a party.

1. The appellant's Summary of Argument sets out a long and general claim in support of this ground (appellant's Summary of Argument filed 7 July 2025, paragraphs 71-76) in the style of contemporary argument and rhetoric concerning family violence, primarily arguing that she was "silenced". There are no specifics or particulars provided.
2. The claims that the appellant was "silenced" are demonstrably false. Orders were made facilitating the appellant's access to legal assistance pursuant to the cross-examination of etc (relying upon s 102NA of the Family Law Act), which it appears the appellant did not utilise. The learned Magistrate took active steps to involve the appellant in the hearing (as discussed above), however the appellant did not appear, nor make even written submissions.
3. There is no merit in this ground of appeal.

1. The appeal must be allowed for the reasons set out above.
2. There is no dispute that the real property must be sold. I am not persuaded that there is any error that relates to the orders for the sale of the property (and the machinery provisions for that order), thus that Order will not be set aside. As a result, only Orders 2(e) to 2(g) and 3 to 14 will be set aside. The orders for the distribution of the net proceeds (Orders 2(e) to 2(g)) will be discharged, and orders made for the net proceeds to be held in the respondent's solicitor's trust account pending further order.
3. The appellant does not consent to this court re-exercising the relevant discretion pursuant to the Family Law Act. She argues that she had been labouring under the effects of mental health issues which impeded her participation in the property settlement proceedings and led to her having no evidence before the court at the final hearing. She says that she now seeks to place evidence before the court and participate in the proceedings.
4. The appeal to this court is by way of "rehearing". On such an appeal "an appellate court may, itself, exercise the discretion in question by reference to circumstances as they then exist, it is not bound to do so.": Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172, [30]. Where the relevant facts have been determined by the court at first instance, it is usually appropriate for this court to determine the matter rather than remitting it for re-hearing. However, in this case the appellant has not placed evidence before the court at first instance leaving considerable gaps in the evidence before the learned magistrate. The appellant is unrepresented. The appellant also had the option of applying to set aside the orders on the basis that they were made in her absence. I am persuaded that the interests of justice demand that this matter be remitted to ensure that justice can be done.

1. The appeal succeeded on errors of law. The appellant has incurred no recoverable costs as she represented herself on the appeal. The error of fact concerning the husband's initial contributions would have resulted in the judgment being set aside regardless of the other errors. That error was not induced by the respondent. I am persuaded that in the circumstances of this appeal the respondent should receive a costs certificate pursuant to s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth).

I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Riethmuller.