Aldridge, L.J. v. Booth, G.R. [1988] FCA 279

Federal Court of Australia|1988-05-30|Before: Spender J

Amendments to the judgment of his Honour Mr. Justice Spender of

page 14 line 10 read 'Against' for 'Aqain'. page 19 line 21 read 'Convention' for 'Constitution'. page 29 line 6 insert 's.' before '9(10)'; and

line 14 insert ° " after the word 'women'. page 37 line 27 insert 's.' before '81(1)(b)'. 1 June 1988 Gillian Lyons

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CTH.) - powers of the Commonwealth Parliament - External affairs - whether certain provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth.) are a valid exercise of the

SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION - the elements of sexual harassment

proscribed by s.28 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth.)

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - nature of proceedings in Federal Court to "enforce" order of Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission - evidentiary value of such an

order ~- power of Federal Court to make "such orders as it thinks

The Constitution 1901 (Cth.) 3.51 (xxix) Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth.) gs. 9(4), 9(10), 28, 81(1)(b) (iv), 82(2) and 106.

LYNETTE JANE ALDRIDGE V. GRANT RODNEY BOOTH QLD. NO. G22 OF 1987

Applicant AND: GRANT RODNEY BOOTH Respondent MINUTE OF ORDER

JUDGE MAKING ORDER: SPENDER J. DATE OF ORDER: 30 MAY 1988 WHERE MADE: BRISBANE

The respondent, Grant Rodney Booth, pay the sum of $7,000.00 damages by way of

compensation to the applicant for the loss and damage suffered by her by reason of his conduct.

The question of costs be adjourned to a date to be fixed to be brought on at 7 days' notice.

NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

Applicant AND: GRANT RODNEY BOOTH Respondent SPENDER J. BRISBANE

This is an application to the Federal Court of Australia pursuant to s.82(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 ("the Act") for an order to enforce a determination of the Human Rights Commission made on a complaint of sexual harassment in the workplace. Serious questions of practice and procedure and a challenge to the Constitutional validity of certain sections

of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 have tended to overshadow the

factual dispute between the applicant and the respondent.

By an application filed in this Court on 9 March 1987, Lynette Jane Aldridge sought an order giving effect to the determination of the Human Rights Commission made on 5 November 1986 that the respondents pay to the applicant the sum of

$7,000.00 damages. She also sought interest and costs.

Section 28 of the Act appears in Part II Division 3 of that Act, which division is headed "Discrimination Involving Sexual Harassment". Section 28 deals with sexual harassment in

"(1) It is unlawful for a person to harass sexually -

(3) A person shall, for the purposes of this section, be taken to harass sexually another person if the first-mentioned person makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request for sexual favours, to the other person, or engages in other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in relation to the other person, and -

(a) the other person has reasonable grounds for believing that a rejection of the advance, a refusal of the request or the taking of objection to the conduct will disadvantage the other person in any way in connection with the other person's employment or work or possible employment or possible work; or

(b) as a result of the other person's rejection of the advance, refusal of the request or taking of objection to the conduct, the other person is disadvantaged in any way in connection with the other person's employment or work or possible employment or possible work.

(4) A ceference in sub-section (3) to conduct of a sexual nature in relation to a person includes a reference to the making, to, or in the presence of, a person, of a statement of a sexual nature concerning that person, whether the statement is made orally or in writing.

Thus, unlike legislation in some other jurisdictions, the Act makes specific provision concerning sexual harassment in employment. The elements constituting sexual harassment in

(b) (i) the applicant having reasonable grounds for believing that the taking of objection to the conduct would disadvantage her in any way in connection with her employment or work; or

(ii) as a result of her taking objection to the conduct, the applicant was disadvantaged in any way in connection with her employment or work.

By "unwelcome", I take it that the advance, request or conduct was not solicited or invited by the employee, and the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive: see Michael

Rubenstein The Law of Sexual Harassment at Work, (1983) 12

Industrial Law Journal 1 at p.7 and Henson v. City of Dundee

It is to be noted that it is not mere unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature which is proscribed: it 1s such conduct, coupled with reasonable grounds for belief that resistance to that conduct will result in disadvantage in connection with a person's employment or actual disadvantage. The section is concerned with the unlawful exploitation of a position of power and, in the context of unwelcome sexual requests or conduct, prohibits a kind of blackmail. So understood, it does not

inhibit non-exploitative amorous or sexually oriented advances.

Miss Aldridge was employed by the first respondent ina cake shop business known as "The Tasty Morsel" cake shop from 21 January 1985 to 24 January 1986. Mr. Booth's wife and parents, (who were the other respondents), were registered with the Office of the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs as the proprietors with him of that business. Miss Aldridge claims that throughout her employment she was subjected to sexual harassment by the first

On 13 February 1986, Miss Aldridge complained of sexual

harassment to the Human Rights Commission in Brisbane.

The Human Rights Commission, which I shall call "the former Commission", was established by the Human Rights

Commission Act 1981. Under the Human Rights Commission Act 1981

and the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, the former Commission had

the power to hold an inquiry and make a determination in respect

of alleged breaches of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984. The

Human Rights Commission Act 1981 was repealed by s.4 of the Human

Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (Transitional Provisions

and Consequential Amendments) Act 1986. The Human Rights and

Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 established a statutory

corporation, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission.

The functions of the Commission are conferred by ss.11(1) and 31

of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986, s.48(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, and s.20 of the

Under powers conferred on the former Commission by s.57(1)(b) of the Act, an inquiry was held on 4 and 5 November 1986 into the complaint lodged by Miss Aldridge.

On 5 November 1986, the former Commission, pursuant to the powers conferred on it by s.81(1) of the Act, made a

(2) declares that the respondent Grant Booth engaged in conduct rendered unlawful under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, namely sexual harassment of the complainant,

(3) declares that at all material times the said Grant Booth was the agent of the other three respondents and that those respondents took no steps to prevent the said Grant Booth from doing the acts which were unlawful under the Act,

(4) declares that the respondents should pay to the complainant the sum of $7000 damages by

way of compensation for the loss and damage suffered by her.

On 6 November 1986, the solicitors for Miss Aldridge wrote to the solicitors for the respondents demanding payment from them of $7.000.00 damages by way of compensation. That sum, or any part of it, has not been paid to Miss Aldridge. She now has applied to the Federal Court to give effect to the determination of the Human Rights Commission pursuant to s.82 of

"81. (1) After holding an inquiry, the Commission may -

(a) dismiss the complaint the subject of the inquiry; or

(b) find the complaint substantiated and make a determination, which may include any one or more of the following:

(i} a declaration that the respondent has engaged in conduct rendered unlawful by this Act and should not repeat or continue' such unlawful conduct;

(ii) a declaration that the respondent should perform any reasonable act or course of conduct to redress any loss or damage suffered by the complainant;

(iii) a declaration that the respondent should employ or re-employ the complainant;

(iv) except where the complaint was dealt with as a representative complaint - a declaration that the respondent should pay to the complainant damages by way of compensation for any loss or damage suffered by reason of the conduct of the respondent;

(v) a declaration that the respondent should promote the complainant;

(vi) a declaration that the termination of a contract or agreement should be varied to redress any loss or

damage suffered by the complainant; (vii) a declaration that 1t would be

inappropriate for any further action to be taken in the matter.

(2) A determination of the Commission under sub-section (1) is not binding or conclusive between any of the parties to the determination.

(3) The Commission may, in the making of a determination under sub-section (1), state any findings of fact upon which the determination is based.

(4) The damage referred to in paragraph (1)(b) aincludes injury to the complainant's feelings or humiliation suffered by the complainant."

Section 81(2) is important. The express provision that a determination of the Commissian under s.81(1) is "...not binding or conclusive between any of the parties to the determination" reflects a recognition of the limitation of the judicial power of the Commonwealth under Chapter III of the Constitution. A determination of the Commission is not an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. This sub-section, it seems to me, reinforces the conclusion that the functions of the Human Rights Commission, and now the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, under the Act and the other statutes with which it is concerned, are primarily educational and conciliatory. If, as the result of its inquiries and efforts, complaints, for example of sexual harassment are resolved without the necessity of court proceedings, that is obviously a socially desirable result and conducive to achieving

That the Human Rights Commission has been successful in these primary purposes is clear, in that I was informed that of the many thousands of matters referred to the Human Rights Commission and its successor, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, this is the first occasion on which an

order for "enforcement" pursuant to the Sex Discrimination Act

The jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court in relation to the Act are set out, very tersely, in s.82, which

"(1) The Commission or complainant may institute a proceeding in the Federal Court for an order to enforce a determination made pursuant to sub-section 80(1) or 81(1).

(2) Where the Federal Court is satisfied that the respondent has engaged in conduct or committed an act that is unlawful under this Act, the Federal Court may make such orders (including a declaration of right) as the Federal Court thinks fit.

sub-section (2) may give effect to a determination of the Commission."

Some difficulties as to practice and procedure are immediately apparent. Section 82(1) permits the Commission or complainant to institute a proceeding for "...an order to enforce a determination made pursuant to sub-section ...81(1)". As s.81(2) provides, such a determination is not binding or conclusive between any of the parties to the determination, so that the proceedings in the Federal Court are to "enforce" a

To what extent does a determination made by a Commission have any part to play in the Federal Court's being satisfied? To what extent, if at all, can findings of fact made by the Commission have any bearing on the proceedings in the Federal Court? As to the power in the Federal Court to make such orders (including a declaration of right) as the Federal Court thinks

fit, what are the limitations, if any, on such a power?

Section 82(2) requires the Federal Court before it makes any order to be "...satisfied that the respondent has engaged in

conduct or committed an act that is unlawful under this Act". The

satisfaction referred to in s.82(2) imports the civil standard of proof, that is to say, the necessary facts have to be established on the balance of probabilities, taking into account the gravity of the matters alleged: Briginshaw v. Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R. 336; Helton v. Allen (1940) 63 C.L.R. 691; and Rejfek v. McElroy

(1965) 112 C.L.R. 517. There was no contention otherwise.

As to the procedure to be adopted, the proceedings in the Federal Court are not expressed to be an appeal. The terms of s.82(2) suggest that the Court is not concerned only with questions of law; the Court is required to be satisfied as to Matters of fact. How matters of fact are established to the satisfaction of the Court will depend upon the nature of the case but where, as here, the dispute requires an assessment of the credibility of the parties and their witnesses, it seems to me impossible to avoid the conclusion that those issues must be determined on the basis of oral evidence. In other cases it may be possible to deal with the matter on the basis of an agreed statement of facts. Such a course may be appropriate where the real question is essentially a question of law or a question of characterisation: for example, whether a particular body is bound by the Act, or whether a particular work practice is

Next, the Court is bound to proceed only on evidence properly admitted before it in accordance with the rules of evidence, a stricture that does not necessarily apply to the Commission. Independently of that consideration, the evidence

before the Court will frequently not be the same as that before

the Commission. It seems to me, having regard to the terms of s.81(2), that any findings by the Commission can be of no assistance in the performance of the task entrusted to the Federal Court by s.82(2). That is not to say that what occurred before the Commission is irrelevant; by way of example only, it frequently will happen that, in matters of credibility, the consistency of accounts will have significant evidentiary consequences; but the Court has to exercise its own mind on

Having regard to these matters, on 26 March 1987, at the directions hearing in respect of the Federal Court proceedings, I indicated that, the determination of the Commission being neither binding nor conclusive between any of the parties to that determination, I considered it proper that, before the Federal Court could be satisfied that the respondent has engaged in conduct or committed an act that is unlawful under the Act, it was necessary that issues be defined and evidence called to establish the matters of complaint. I directed the applicant file and serve points of claim within 7 days and the respondents file points of defence within a further 7 days. I set the matter

On 18 May 1987, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission sought leave to intervene in these proceedings, which was granted. It is to be noted that, pursuant to s.82, the Commission itself has power to institute proceedings in the Federal Court to enforce a determination made pursuant to s.81(1)

"(gb) where the Commission considers it appropriate to do so, with the leave of the Court hearing the proceedings and subject to any conditions imposed by the Court, to intervene in proceedings that involve issues of discrimination on the grounds of sex, Marital status or pregnancy or discrimination involving sexual harassment;"

This subsection was introduced into the Act by s.37 of

the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 1986.

The general position in relation to intervention is

referred to in Australian Railways Union v. Victorian Railways

Commissioners (1930) 44 C.L.R. 319 at p.331, where Dixon J., as

"I think we should be careful to allow arguments only in support of some right, authority or other legal title set up by the party intervening. Normally parties, and parties alone, appear in litigation. But, by a very special practice, the intervention of the States and the Commonwealth as persons interested has been permitted by the discretion of the Court in matters which arise under the Constitution. The discretion to permit appearances by counsel is a very wide one; but I think we would be wise to exercise it by allowing only those to be heard who wish to maintain some particular right, power or immunity in which they are concerned, and not merely to intervene to contend for what they consider to be a desirable state of the general law under the Constitution without regard to the diminution or enlargement of the powers which as States or as Commonwealth they may exercise."

In R. v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; ex

parte Ellis (1954) 90 C.L.R. 55, Webb J., at p.69, having

"If this view be accepted, as I believe it should be, the corollary must follow that leave to intervene, when granted, ought not to _ be interpreted as a general licence to discuss every interesting question in the case but should be acknowledged as limited to the submission of an argument pro interesse suo."

See also Corporate Affairs Commission v. Bradley [1974] 1

I considered it appropriate in the circumstances of this case, in the light of the novelty of the application and the unchartered waters on which it had to be determined, to grant leave to intervene. Further, the interests of the proposed intervener are statutorily recognized in s.48 of the Act and the desirability of permitting the Commission to intervene is

supported by the Commission's entitlement to be a party under

In R. v. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; ex parte

Hardiman (1980) 144 C.L.R. 13, the High Court (Gibbs C.J.,

Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ.), said at pp. 35, 36:-

"Mr. Hughes was instructed by the Tribunal to take the unusual course of contesting the prosecutors' case for relief and this he did by presenting a substantive argument. In cases of this kind the usual course is for a tribunal to submit to such order as the court may make. The course which was adopted by the Tribunal in this Court is not one which we would wish to encourage. If a tribunal becomes a protagonist in this Court there is the risk that by so doing it endangers' the impartiality which it is expected to maintain in subsequent proceedings which take place if and when relief is granted. The presentation of a case in this Court by a tribunal should be regarded as exceptional and, where it occurs

should, in general, be limited to submissions going to the powers and procedures of the Tribunal."

Senior counsel for the Commission indicated that it was not sought by the intervention to become a protagonist in the matter, but to enable submissions to be put concerning the practice and procedures to be adopted and on any questions of law raised in the application. It was indicated that, subject to a reservation to resist any attacks made on the integrity of the former Commission and its procedures, it did not seek to be in

The Commission indicated it would not be seeking an

On 21 May 1987, when the matter was called on for hearing, the applicant sought leave to file amended particulars of claim and particulars of a claim for wages, which was granted. Counsel for the respondents sought leave to file an amended defence. In addition, and for the first time, the Constitutional validity of some sections of the Act were sought to be argued by the respondents. No notice pursuant to s.78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 having been given by the respondents, the matter was then adjourned, and I ordered the costs thrown away by the

Notice pursuant to s.78B was then given. The notice claimed that "(T)he nature of the matters arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation (sought to be argued

(a) whether sections 9(4), 9(10), 28, 81(1)(b)(iv), 82(2) and 106 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 are a valid exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth, particularly its power under section 51 (xxix) of the Constitution; and

(b) whether section 28 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 gives effect to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Again Women."

On 9 June 1987, the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia intervened and the matter was set down for hearing on 17 and 18 August 1987. After submissions concerning the Constitutional validity of the Act, I indicated on 18 August that, in my view, the Act was within the power of the Commonwealth Parliament and indicated that I would give reasons later. Counsel for the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of

The hearing proceeded on 18, 19 and 20 August 1987. On 1 September 1987, the application against the second, third and fourth respondents were dismissed by consent with no order as to costs, and the application against the first respondent continued with the calling of further oral evidence. The matter was

The Act is entitled "An Act relating to discrimination on the ground of sex, marital status or pregnancy or involving

(a) to give effect to certain provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;

(b) to eliminate, so far as is possible, discrimination against persons on the ground of sex, marital status or pregnancy in the areas of work, accommodation, education, the provision of goods, facilities and services, the disposal of land, the activities of clubs and the administration of Commonwealth laws and programs;

(c) to eliminate, so far as is. possible, discrimination involving sexual harassment in the workplace and in educational institutions; and

(d) to promote recognition and acceptance within the community of the principle of the equality of men and women."

As indicated, the respondent sought to argue that s8.9(4), 9(10), 28, 81(1)(b)(iv), 82(2) and 106 of the Act were "ultra vires" the legislative power of the Commonwealth and, in particular, were not supported by s.51(xxix) of the Constitution, and that s.28 of the Act did not give effect to the Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. Sections 28, 81 and 82, so far as they are presently relevant, have earlier been set out. Section 9 of the Act deals with the

circumstances in which the Act applies. Section 9(2) provides:- -

"Subject to this section, this Act applies throughout Australia."

Section 9(3) provides that the Act has effect in relation to acts

Section 9(4) then provides that certain sections of the

Act, including prohibiting sexual harassment in employment, have

effect as provided by s.9(3) and the following provisions of s.9

There is then set out a series of subsections dealing

with the application of various sections of the Act in stated

circumstances, clearly relying on specific heads of Commonwealth

legislative power. By way of example, s.9(5) provides that,

Commonwealth employees in connection with their employment as Commonwealth employees; and

",..acts done by a person exercising, by or on behalf of -

the Commonwealth or the Administration of a Territory; or a body or authority established for a public

purpose by a law of the Commonwealth or a law of a Territory,

a power conferred by a law of the Commonwealth or a law of a Territory, being acts done by the person in connection with the exercise of that power."

Other subsections rely on other heads of Commonwealth legislative

trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the

In the factual circumstances of this case, no corporation is involved nor is there any other connection with Commonwealth legislative power except that referred to in

"If the Convention is in force in relation to Australia, the prescribed provisions of Part II, and the provisions of Division 3 of Part II, have effect in relation to discrimination against women, to the extent that the provisions give effect to the Convention."

"Convention", by s.4, means "the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women". A copy of the

English text of that Convention is set out in a Schedule to the

Section 106 is concerned with vicarious liability under

"(1) Subject to sub-section (2), where an employee Or agent of a person does, in connection with the

employment of the employee or with the duties of the agent as an agent -

(a) an act that would, if it were done by the person, be unlawful under Division 1 or 2 of Part II (whether or not the act done by the employee or agent is unlawful under Division 1 or 2 of Part II); or

(b) an act that is unlawful under Division 3 of Part II,

this Act applies in relation to that person as if that person had also done the act.

(2) Sub-section (1) does not apply in relation to an act of a kind referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) done by an employee or agent of a person if it is established that the person took all reasonable steps to prevent the employee or agent

from doing acts of the kind referred to in that paragraph."

In the light of the discontinuance of the application as against the second, third and fourth respondents, this provision is no longer of any direct relevance. It is to be noted that pursuant to subsection (2), it is for an employer or principal to establish all reasonable steps to be taken by that employer or principal to prevent the acts constituting the unlawful conduct. The discharge of this onus, of course, depends on the particular circumstances of a case, but it is seriously to be doubted that it can be discharged in circumstances of mere ignorance or

inactivity. In Tidwell v. American Oil Company (1971) 332 F.

"The modern corporate entity consists of the individuals who manage it, and little, if any, progress in eradicating discrimination in employment will be made if the corporate employer is able to hide behind the shield of individual employee action."

On 13 July 1983, the Governor-General in Council approved Australia's ratification subject to reservation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and authorised the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to draw up, complete and deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, an appropriate instrument for ratification by Australia of that Convention. On 20 July 1983, the Minister of State for Trade, for and on behalf of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, signed an instrument of ratification of that Convention, which instrument was deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. There were two reservations: one dealing with the capacity of

the Government of Australia to introduce maternity leave with pay

throughout Australia, the second dealing with the exclusion of women from combat and combat-related duties in the defence

On 23 August 1983, the Secretary-General of United Nations acknowledge Australia's ratification of that Convention and, pursuant to Article 27(2) of that Convention, the Convention

In my opinion, s.28 is clearly within the legislative power of the Commonwealth of Australia. It is plain that it is within the competence of the Commonwealth Parliament to prohibit sexual harassment in employment within the Territories, for instance. What is in dispute is the applicability of s.28 to the circumstances obtaining during the period of the employment by

The Convention being in force in Australia, s.28, by

s.9(10), has effect in relation to discrimination against women

to the extent that s.28 gives effect to the Convention (my underlining). Section 28 is gender-universal in 1ts terms, but in this context, it prohibits discrimination against women only. If s.28, as a provision which prohibits discrimination against women "gives effect" to the Constitution, it is a valid exercise of the foreign affairs power under s.5l1(xxix) of the

In my opinion, it is sufficient to give effect to a Convention if an Act gives effect to principles stated in the Convention: it is not necessary that the legislation implement an obligation imposed on Australia by its adoption of the Convention, and s.28, in relation to discrimination against women in employment, does that. Mason J., as he then was, in The

Commonwealth of Australia v. The State of Tasmania (1983) 158

C.L.R. 1 at p.123-4, said of a test proposed by counsel for the

"The first of the three tests seeks to express the idea that it is the implementation of an obligation imposed on Australia by a treaty that attracts the external affairs power, that it is the treaty obligation and its implementation that constitutes the relevant subject or matter of external affairs. To my mind this is too narrow a view. As I pointed out in Koowarta (1982) 153 C.L.R., at pp. 224-227, the treaty itself is a matter of external affairs, as is its implementation by domestic legislation. The insistence in Burgess (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608 that the legislation carry into effect provisions of the convention in accordance with the obligation which that convention imposed on Australia is not inconsistent with what I have said, though it does raise a question as to the scope of the legislative power in its application to a treaty, a matter to be discussed later. At this point it is sufficient to say that there 1s no persuasive reason for thinking that the international character of the subject-matter or the existence of international concern is confined to that part

of a treaty which imposes an obligation on Australia."

"The extent of the Parliament's power to legislate so as to carry into effect a treaty will, of course, depend on the nature of the particular treaty, whether its provisions are declaratory of international law, whether they impose obligations or provide benefits and, if so, what the nature of

those obligations or benefits are, and whether they are specific or general or involve significant elements of discretion and value judgment on the part of the contracting parties. I reject the notion that once Australia enters into a treaty Parliament may legislate with respect to the subject-matter of the treaty as if that subject-matter were a new and independent head of Commonwealth legislative power. The law must conform to the treaty and carry its provisions into effect. The fact that the power may extend to the subject-matter of the treaty before it is made or adopted by Australia, because the subject-matter has become a matter of international concern to Australia, does not mean that Parliament may depart from the provisions of the treaty after it has been entered into by Australia and enact legislation which goes beyond the treaty or is inconsistent with it."

"It is preferable that the circumstances in which a law is authorized by the external affairs power be stated in terms of what is sufficient, even if the categories overlap, rather than in exhaustive terms. To be a law with respect to external affairs it is sufficient that it: (a) implements any international law, or (b) implements any treaty or convention whether general (multilateral) or particular, or (c) implements any recommendation or request of the United Nations organization or subsidiary organizations such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization or the International Labour Organization, or (d) fosters (or inhibits) relations between Australia or political entities, bodies or persons within Australia and other nation States, entities, groups or persons external to Australia, or (e) deals with circumstances or things outside Australia, or (f) things inside Australia of international concern."

"The constitutional authority for the making of these Regulations is derived from the obligation imposed upon Australia to protect and conserve the listed property. The extent of the legislative

Power 'must depend upon the terms of the convention, and upon the rights and duties it confers and imposes': per Evatt and McTiernan JJ. in R. v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 55 C.L.R. at p. 688. The o gation imposed by the Convention, as we have seen, does not condescend to detail in prescribing the steps to be taken, though the taking of appropriate legal measures necessary for the protection and conservation of the property is one of the appropriate steps mentioned in Art. 5. It is clear, however, that the selection of the appropriate legal measures is left by the Convention to the Party who is to discharge the obligation to protect and conserve the property. It does not follow that the charter of Commonwealth power extends to whatever the Commonwealth thinks appropriate and necessary for the protection and conservation of the property. The obligation being to take appropriate legal measures for the protection and conservation of the property, the power is to make laws which are conducive to that end rather than to make laws which are thought by the Commonwealth to be conducive to that end."

"It is ... relevant for present purposes to note that the responsible conduct of external affairs in today's world will, on occasion, require observance of the spirit as well as the letter of international agreements, compliance with recommendations of international agencies and pursuit of international objectives which cannot be measured in terms of binding obligation. This was recognized by Evatt and McTiernan JJ. in Burgess' Case when, in the sentences following the extract of their judgment set out above (1936) 55 C.L.R., at p. 687, they commented that 'it 1s not to be assumed that the legislative power over 'external affairs' is limited to the execution of treaties or conventions' and illustrated the comment by adding that 'the Parliament may well be deemed competent to legislate for the carrying out of 'recommendations' as well as the 'draft international conventions' resolved upon by the International Labour Organization or of other international recommendations or requests upon other subject-matters of concern to Australia as a member of the family of nations'. Circumstances could well exist in which a law which procured or ensured observance within Australia of the spirit of a treaty or compliance with an international recommendation or pursuit of an international

objective would properly be characterized as a law with respect to external affairs, notwithstanding the absence of any potential breach of defined international obligations or of the letter of international law."

In any event, in my view, article 11.1 of the Convention does impose a relevant obligation upon all the parties to the Convention to take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment. Article 11.1 commences "State Parties shall take all appropriate measures

to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of

employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and

The first four articles of the Convention provide:-

For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 'discrimination against women' shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.

States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:

(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realisation of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohihiting all discrimination against women;

(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination;

(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;

(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organisation or enterprise;

(£) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.

States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men.

Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.

Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory."

Two arguments were advanced by the respondents why s.28 of the Act cannot validly apply to them. First, the conduct made unlawful by s.28 does not involve discrimination "against women" or discrimination "on the basis of sex" and, accordingly, s.28 does not give effect to the Convention. It was said sexual harassment under s.28 is not discrimination on the basis of sex (i.e. gender), but rather the exercise of power by virtue of the employer employee relationship (which power may be exercised without any discrimination between the sexes). Alternatively, if there is any discrimination, it is on the basis of a willingness to provide sexual favours. Secondly, because the application of s.28, by virtue of s.9(10), confers protection upon women but not upon men, the Act fails to ensure "on the basis of equality with men" the same rights and, accordingly, it does not give effect to the Convention. The basis of "equality of men and women" is

referred to, inter alia, in Articles 1, 3 and 11 set out above.

In my opinion, sexual harassment by an employer of a woman employee is discrimination against a woman in the workplace on the basis of sex. Section 9(10) applies s.28 "...in relation to discrimination against women". That sexual harassment under s.28 is a form of discrimination is implicitly recognised in one

(c) to eliminate, so far as is_ possible, discrimination involving sexual harassment in the workplace and in educational institutions;..."

Similarly, Division 3, Part II, of the Act is headed

"Discrimination Involving Sexual Harassment" and s.13(1) of the

"The headings of the Parts Divisions and Subdivisions into which any Act is divided shall be deemed to be part of the Act."

It seems to me plain that sexual harassment is a form of discrimination, as a matter of analysis. Basal though the reasoning may be, the observation in Barnes v. Costle (1977) 561

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (280 paragraphs)

Cited By (1)