austlii:nsw/NSWPIC/2025/478
General information, not legal advice.
NSWPIC
2025-09-15
Original judgment source is linked above.
Ait Aiss v Vistamaze Pty Ltd [2025] NSWPIC 478
WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workers Compensation Act 1987; ; reasonably necessary; as a result of an injury; , , , and considered and applied; - hydrotherapy is not reasonably necessary as a result of the accepted work injury sustained; physiotherapy is reasonably necessary as a result of the accepted work injury sustained; award for the respondent in respect to the claim pursuant to for the costs of hydrotherapy; the respondent is to pay the reasonably necessary costs of physiotherapy treatment pursuant to
A brief statement is attached setting out the Commission's reasons for the determination.
(a) Whether hydrotherapy and/or physiotherapy is reasonably necessary as a result of the accepted work injury: s 60 of the 1987 Act.
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE PERSONAL INJURY COMMISSION
12 August 2025. Mr Josh Beran, counsel, instructed by Mr Jimmy Dufour, solicitor, appeared for the applicant, who was present. Mr John Gaitanis, counsel, instructed by Mr Rahul Balan, solicitor, appeared for the respondent. The proceedings were conducted in-person. I am satisfied that the parties to the dispute understand the nature of the application and the legal implications of any assertion made in the information supplied. I have used my best endeavours in attempting to bring the parties to the dispute to a settlement acceptable to all of them. I am satisfied that the parties have had sufficient opportunity to explore settlement and that they have been unable to reach an agreed resolution of the dispute.
(a) Application to Resolve a Dispute and attached documents;
(b) Reply and attached documents, and
(c) documents attached to an Application to Lodge Additional Documents lodged on behalf of the respondent dated 7 August 2025.
"(1) If, as a result of an injury received by a worker, it is reasonably necessary that -
(a) any medical or related treatment (other than domestic assistance) be given, or
(b) any hospital treatment be given, or
(c) any ambulance service be provided, or
(d) any workplace rehabilitation service be provided,
the worker's employer is liable to pay, in addition to any other compensation under this Act, the cost of that treatment or service and the related travel expenses specified in subsection (2).
Compensation for domestic assistance is provided for by section 60AA."
"Treatment, in the medical or therapeutic context, relates to the management of disease, illness or injury by the provision of medication, surgery or other medical service designed to arrest or abate the progress of the condition or to alleviate, cure or remedy the condition. It is the provision of such services for the purpose of limiting the deleterious effects of a condition and restoring health. If the particular 'treatment' cannot, in reason, be found to have that purpose or be competent to achieve that purpose, then it is certainly not reasonable treatment of the condition and is really not treatment at all. In that sense, an employer can only be liable for the cost of reasonable treatment."
"The question is should the patient have this treatment or not. If it is better that he have it, then it is necessary and should not be forborne. If in reason it should be said that the patient should not do without this treatment, then it satisfies the test of being reasonably necessary."
"In determining whether a particular regimen is medical treatment and whether it is reasonably necessary that such be afforded to a worker and that such necessity results from injury, it appears to me some general principles can be stated:
"Reasonably necessary does not mean 'absolutely necessary' (Moorebank at [154]). If something is 'necessary', in the sense of indispensable, it will be 'reasonably necessary'. That is because reasonably necessary is a lesser requirement than 'necessary'. Depending on the circumstances, a range of different treatments may qualify as 'reasonably necessary' and a worker only has to establish that the treatment claimed is one of those treatments. A worker certainly does not have to establish that the treatment is 'reasonable and necessary', which is a significantly more demanding test that many insurers and doctors apply."
"[88] In the context of s 60, the relevant matters, according to the criteria of reasonableness, include, but are not necessarily limited to, the matters noted by Burke CCJ at point (5) in Rose......namely:
(a) the appropriateness of the particular treatment;
(b) the availability of alternative treatment, and its potential effectiveness;
(c) the cost of the treatment;
(d) the actual or potential effectiveness of the treatment, and
(e) the acceptance by medical experts of the treatment as being appropriate and likely to be effective.
[89] With respect to point (d), it should be noted that while the effectiveness of the treatment is relevant to whether the treatment was reasonably necessary, it is certainly not determinative. The evidence may show that the same outcome could be achieved by a different treatment, but at a much lower cost. Similarly, bearing in mind that all treatment, especially surgery, carries a risk of a less than ideal result, a poor outcome does not necessarily mean that the treatment was not reasonably necessary. As always, each case will depend on its facts.
[90] While the above matters are 'useful heads for consideration', the 'essential question remains whether the treatment was reasonably necessary' (Margaroff v Cordon Bleu Cookware Pty Ltd [1997] NSWCC 13; (1997) 15 NSWCCR 204 at 208C). Thus, it is not simply a matter of asking, as was suggested in Bartolo, is it better that the worker have the treatment or not. As noted by French CJ and Gummow J at [58] in Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28, when dealing with how the expression 'no reasonable prospect' should be understood, '[n]o paraphrase of the expression can be adopted as a sufficient explanation of its operation, let alone definition of its content'."
"[57] ...a condition can have multiple causes (Migge v Wormald Bros Industries Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 236; Pyrmont Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Peters (1972) 46 WCR 27; Cluff v Dorahy Bros (Wholesale) Pty Ltd (1979) 53 WCR 167; ACQ Pty Ltd v Cook [2009] HCA 28 at [25] and [27]; [2009] HCA 28; 237 CLR 656). The work injury does not have to be the only, or even a substantial, cause of the need for the relevant treatment before the cost of that treatment is recoverable under s 60 of the 1987 Act.
[58] Ms Murphy only has to establish, applying the commonsense test of causation (Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452; 10 NSWCCR 796), that the treatment is reasonably necessary 'as a result of' the injury (see Taxis Combined Services (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Schokman [2014] NSWWCCPD 18 at [40]-[55]). That is, she has to establish that the injury materially contributed to the need for the surgery (see the discussion on the test of causation in Sutherland Shire Council v Baltica General Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 12 NSWCCR 716)."
"Physiotherapy is not required apart from building up muscle support and he should have been taught this over a period of the 40 sessions you mention."[1]
Ait Aiss
Vistamaze Pty Ltd [2025] NSWPIC 478;
(1986) 2 NSWCCR 32
(1997) 14 NSWCCR 233
(1997) 15 NSWCCR 204
(1973) 47 ALJR 236
(1994) 35 NSWLR 452
(1996) 12 NSWCCR 716