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Category: Principal judgment

Parties: Rizwan Ahmad (Applicant)
The University of Sydney (First Respondent)
Carol Hsu (Second Respondent)

Representation: Counsel:
R Graycar (First and Second Respondents)
Solicitors:
MinterEllison (First and Second Respondents)
Applicant (Self-represented)

File Number(s): 2025/00359303

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. By a summons filed 15 October 2025 the applicant (Mr Ahmad) seeks leave to appeal and commence an appeal from a decision of the Judicial Registrar in the District Court in which Mr Ahmad’s statement of claim was summarily dismissed.

2. Mr Ahmad is unrepresented. He also failed to appear at the hearing of his summons on 28 August 2026, despite knowing that the hearing was listed for that day.

Background matters summarised

3. Mr Ahmad was enrolled as a student in the Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) program at the University of Sydney Business School. In February 2024, he submitted his thesis for examination. Two external examiners considered that the thesis did not meet the criteria for the award of that particular degree. It was recommended by the examination committee that Mr Ahmad be awarded a different degree, namely, a Master of Philosophy (MPhil). Mr Ahmad took advantage of an opportunity to respond and he said that the outcome was unacceptable to him.

4. On 24 September 2024, Mr Ahmad was informed that if he made corrections to his thesis in accordance with the examiners’ comments and to the satisfaction of the Business School, he would be awarded an MPhil.

5. Instead of pursuing the internal appeal process available to him under the University of Sydney (Student Academic Appeals) Rule 2021 (the Rule****s), on 13 March 2025, Mr Ahmad filed a statement of claim in the District Court, naming the “University of Sydney trading as Academic Institution ABN 15211513464” and “Wei Hsu trading as Chair of Exam” as first and second defendants respectively. Mr Ahmad presumably intended to refer to Professor Carol Hsu, who is the Chair of the Examination Committee which considered Mr Ahmad’s PhD examination. By way of relief, Mr Ahmad sought orders from the District Court granting him a PhD and the payment of his filing fees and other costs.

6. No pleadings were set out in the body of the statement of claim. Instead, Mr Ahmad attached various documents, including a statement by him in narrative form of his grievances against the University. In brief, he complained about the delay in examining his thesis and that the examiners’ report contained untrue and unsubstantiated statements. He alleged that some of the material was “fake”, “fabricated” and “manipulated”.

7. The defendants moved in the District Court to have the statement of claim struck out under r 14.28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR).

8. The matter came before Judicial Registrar Howard in late August 2025. He upheld the defendants’ motion and delivered ex tempore reasons. Mr Ahmad’s proceedings in the District Court were dismissed and he was ordered to pay the defendants’ costs.

9. In brief, the Judicial Registrar’s reasons were as follows:

(a) Although the statement of claim was partly compliant with the pleading requirements set out in Pt 14 of the UCPR, there was no claim for damages. The problem of discerning from the statement of claim and attached documents the particular cause of action relied upon by Mr Ahmad was highlighted. (b) The statement of claim did not disclose a cause of action within the District Court’s jurisdiction because:

(i) the statement of claim was not based on negligence or contract, nor (as noted above) was there a claim for damages; (ii) the granting of a PhD degree as sought by Mr Ahmad appeared to seek a form of equitable relief in terms of an injunction or a declaration or mandamus, which was beyond the District Court’s jurisdiction; (iii) no action was pleaded by Mr Ahmad within the District Court’s jurisdiction so as to attract the “ancillary equitable relief” available under s 46 of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW); and (iv) reference was also made to the availability of an internal appeal and the possibility of Mr Ahmad seeking administrative law relief if he was not satisfied with that internal process.

Procedural history in this Court

10. On 18 September 2025, Mr Ahmad filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeal from the Judicial Registrar’s decision. The notice of appeal names the first respondent as “University of Sydney ABN 15211513464 trading as an Academic Institution”. The second respondent is named as “Wei Hsu trading as Chair Of Exam”. Mr Ahmad sought to strike out the District Court’s order that he pay the then defendants’ costs. Again, he sought an order that he be granted a PhD degree.

11. Subsequently, on 15 October 2025, Mr Ahmad filed in the Supreme Court a summons commencing an appeal and seeking leave to appeal. The University and Professor Hsu are named as respondents in the summons in the same terms as in the notice of appeal.

12. On 10 December 2025, the University and Professor Hsu filed a notice of motion seeking an order pursuant to r 14.28 of the UCPR that the whole or part of Mr Ahmad’s summons filed 15 October 2025 be struck out. It should be interpolated here that by an email dated 19 August 2026, the instructing solicitors acting for the University and Professor Hsu indicated that they would not press their notice of motion. It remains appropriate, however, to refer to that motion as part of the procedural history.

13. On 11 February 2026, the Registrar listed the notice of motion filed 10 December 2025 for hearing before a judge of the Common Law Division on 24 March 2026. Mr Ahmad subsequently said that he was unavailable to attend on that date. The applicants on the motion said that they would consent to an adjournment.

14. The matter was listed before the Registrar again on 31 March 2026. On 19 March 2026, Mr Ahmad sent an email stating that he could not attend on 31 March 2026. He provided no explanation for his unavailability to attend on either 24 March 2026 or 31 March 2026.

15. By an email dated 30 March 2026, the Registrar informed the parties that the proceedings would be listed for further directions on 7 May 2026 with a view to setting a hearing date for the notice of motion. The Registrar noted that Mr Ahmad had said that he was not available on 31 March 2026 or any time in April 2026.

16. On 7 May 2026, there was a directions hearing before the Registrar. There was no appearance by Mr Ahmad. The notice of motion was listed for hearing on 28 August 2026 with an estimate of half a day. The Registrar also ordered that Mr Ahmad’s summons seeking leave to appeal filed 15 October 2025 be listed for hearing with the respondents’ notice of motion. Mr Ahmad was directed to file any written submissions by 14 August 2026. The matter was listed for directions on 30 June 2026 to confirm these orders.

17. On 9 June 2026, Mr Ahmad acknowledged by an email that he had received information from the Court regarding the proceedings. He noted that the hearing date was 28 August 2026 and that the matter was listed for directions on 30 June 2026. He then stated “Anyway, I have the Information for the Court Hearing on August 28, 2026”.

18. On 28 June 2026, the Registrar sent an email to the parties noting that Mr Ahmad was aware of the final hearing date on 28 August 2026. She said that appearances were not expected at the directions hearing listed on 30 June 2026. The parties were advised that they should anticipate that orders would be made on 30 June 2026 confirming the hearing date on 28 August 2026.

19. At the hearing on 28 August 2026, the respondents tendered copies of some correspondence between their solicitor (Mr Adam Karras) and Mr Ahmad (Exhibit A). This included an email dated 24 August 2026 in which Mr Karras politely asked Mr Ahmad to confirm that he was aware of the hearing date on 28 August 2026. Mr Ahmad responded with the following text:

Adam Karras, if this is your real name. Do you know who you are. As I understand you are a Fraud & a Murderer, an absconder from some other country. Australia is under International law. If this is what your name is and if this who you are. Dont [sic] call me up again. – Riz

20. There is no doubt that Mr Ahmad was aware of the hearing listed on 28 August 2026.

The parties’ evidence

21. Mr Ahmad filed an affidavit by him on 27 February 2026. Although it was said to be filed in response to the respondents’ notice of motion (which is not now pressed) the affidavit was admitted in evidence on the summons subject to relevance. The bulk of the affidavit contains unsubstantiated assertions and allegations by Mr Ahmad, including an allegation that the respondents had engaged in “Academic Fraud”. A copy of the statement of claim filed in the District Court and the accompanying documents are annexed to the affidavit.

22. The respondents tendered the correspondence referred to above (Exhibit A) and other correspondence which I accept establishes that, apart from the statement of claim which Mr Ahmad filed in the District Court, no other documents filed by Mr Ahmad in the proceeding have been served on Professor Hsu (Exhibit B).

Consideration and determination

23. As noted above, Mr Ahmad failed to appear when the matter was called on for hearing on 28 August 2026, including being called outside the courtroom. In those circumstances, Ms Graycar (who appeared for the respondents) asked the Court to proceed with the hearing, relying on r 29.7(2) of the UCPR, which provides that:

29.7 Procedure to be followed if party is absent

…

(2) If any party is absent, the court—

(a) may proceed with the trial generally or so far as concerns any claim for relief in the proceedings, or

(b) may adjourn the trial.

…

24. In Adelaide Concrete Cutting & Drilling Pty Ltd v Marino (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 499 at [61]-[62], Meek J discussed the relevant principles applicable to the Court’s power under r 29.7:

A party fails to appear, for the purpose of the present rule, if they have adequate notice of the hearing, and fail either to attend (personally or by a representative) or to provide the Court with an apparently credible explanation for their non-attendance: Ritchie’s Uniform Civil Procedure NSW at [29.7.2], citing Magjarraj v Asteron Life Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1433 at [22], NSW Trustee & Guardian as Executor of the Will of Michael Robert Walsh (dec’d) v Gregory [2012] NSWSC 681; (2012) 18 BPR 35,153 (Gregory) and Hill v Dunn [2019] NSWSC 419 at [8]–[21].

In Gregory, Hallen AsJ (as his Honour then was) observed that a party will not be found to be “absent” within the meaning of r 29.7 unless that party has knowledge or notice of the date of the trial: Gregory at [18]–[22]. However, in Elite Realty Development Pty Ltd v Sadek [2022] NSWSC 1333, whilst accepting that natural justice must be observed, Peden J at [16] respectfully disagreed that UCPR r 29.7 requires a plaintiff to notify a defendant of the date of the trial in order for the defendant to be “absent” and the hearing to proceed.

25. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that Mr Ahmad had adequate notice of the hearing and has failed to attend without offering any explanation. Accordingly, the hearing proceeded in his absence.

26. It is plain that Mr Ahmad requires leave to appeal from Judicial Registrar Howard’s decision, having regard to the terms of ss 127(2)(a) and (d) of the District Court Act, which provide:

127 Right of appeal to Supreme Court

(1) A party who is dissatisfied with a Judge’s or a Judicial Registrar’s judgment or order in an action may appeal to the Supreme Court.

(2) The following appeals lie only by leave of the Supreme Court—

(a) an appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order,

…

(d) an appeal from a judgment or order on an application for summary judgment under the rules

…

27. Section 127(2)(d) applies in its own terms because the decision the subject of Mr Ahmad’s challenge concerns an application for summary judgment.

28. Mr Ahmad has not explained why leave to appeal should be granted. He has failed to file any written submissions in the proceedings despite the directions made on 7 May 2026.

29. It is well-established (see Khanal v FSU Property Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 10 at [16] (Free JA with whom Adamson JA agreed)) that leave to appeal should only be granted where:

… the proposed appeal raises an issue of principle, a question of public importance, or seeks to address a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable: Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das [2012] NSWCA 164 at [32]-[38]; Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (NSW) v Smith (2017) 95 NSWLR 597; [2017] NSWCA 206 at [28]. Related to the last point, it is an essential prerequisite of a grant of leave to appeal that the Court be persuaded that the decision appealed from is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal: Sharpe v Heywood [2013] NSWCA 192 at [34].

30. While that passage was directed to an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the same principles apply to an application in the Supreme Court for leave to appeal from a Judicial Registrar of the District Court (see Dun**n v Kim [2023] NSWSC 499 at [16] per Basten AJ). I do not consider that Mr Ahmad has established any basis for granting leave to appeal. He has not identified any issue of principle, question of public importance or reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable. Indeed, he has not identified any error in the Judicial Registrar’s orders or the related ex tempore reasons.

31. For these reasons, I decline to grant leave to appeal which necessarily means that the summons filed 15 October 2025 must be dismissed. I see no reason why costs should not follow the event.

32. For completeness, I also note that the respondents’ submissions dated 7 August 2026 addressed the possibility that Mr Ahmad may have intended by his summons to seek judicial review of the Judicial Registrar’s decision. The respondents said that this was on the basis that Mr Ahmad may have understood the Judicial Registrar to say that he might have a remedy by way of judicial review had he sought to exercise his internal appeal rights under the University’s Rules and was dissatisfied with that outcome.

33. As the respondents correctly point out, the summons filed 15 October 2025 falls far short of what is required of a summons under Pt 59 of the UCPR, which applies to judicial review proceedings. First, Mr Ahmad has failed to identify any jurisdictional error or error of law on the face of the record.

34. Secondly, he has not identified any judicial review remedy which the Court would be empowered to grant under ss 65 or 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).

35. Thirdly, assuming that Mr Ahmad sought judicial review, the Court is empowered to refuse any judicial review relief in its discretion, including where he has failed to avail himself of the University’s internal appeal processes.

36. For all these reasons, the significant deficiencies are not overcome if the summons is treated as an application for judicial review.

37. There are other fundamental deficiencies in the proceedings brought by Mr Ahmad which should be addressed. First, the notice of appeal filed 18 September 2025 should be dismissed. As noted above, it was filed in the Court of Appeal relying on rr 15.3 and 15.5(1)(a) of the UCPR. Neither of those provisions apply. Rule 15.3 relates to the requirement of a pleading and the provision of particulars of any fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence on which the party relies. It does not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal. Rule 15.5(1)(a) provides for the particulars which must be given by a pleading which alleges negligence or breach of statutory duty. Again, that provision does not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal. It is true that any appeal from a decision of a Judge of the District Court is allocated to the Court of Appeal (see s 48(1)(iv) of the Supreme Court Act), but that provision expressly excludes a decision made by a Judicial Registrar of the District Court. The notice of appeal filed 18 September 2025 is incompetent. It should never have been filed and will be dismissed (see s 51(2)(c) of the Supreme Court Act).

38. There are some other procedural matters. The first is the misdescription of the University. I accept that its correct name is The University of Sydney and not the name ascribed to it in the summons filed 15 October 2025. That error should be rectified.

39. Secondly, there is no proper reason to add the second respondent as a party. As noted above, the only Court document which Mr Ahmad has served on Professor Hsu (which is her correct name) is the statement of claim in the District Court. I accept that there is no proper basis for her to be named as a party in the District Court or this Court. Her name ought to be removed as a party pursuant to r 50.5(3) of the UCPR.

Conclusion

40. For all these reasons, I will make the following orders:

41. The notice of motion filed 10 December 2025 is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

42. The name of the first respondent be amended to The University of Sydney.

43. Pursuant to UCPR r 50.5(3), the second respondent be removed as a party to the proceedings.

44. The notice of appeal filed 18 September 2025 is dismissed.

45. The summons filed 15 October 2025 is dismissed.

46. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

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