[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
The appellant, Mr Agius, was an expatriate Australian accountant practicing in Vanuatu at the firm Moore Stephens. He was charged, along with three accountants employed at the Australian firm, Owen T Daniel & Co (OTD), with two counts of conspiracy. First, conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth, contrary to ss 86(1) and 29D of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Second, conspiracy to dishonestly cause a loss or deliberately cause a risk of loss to the Commonwealth, knowing or believing that the loss would occur or that there was a substantial risk of loss occurring, contrary to s 135.4(5) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The conspiracy alleged was an agreement to defraud the Tax Commissioner of tax revenue by concealing the true taxable incomes of clients of OTD and dishonestly depriving the Commonwealth of, or jeopardising its right to, income tax, or causing a loss or risk of loss of income tax.
The conspiracy was effected by means of a scheme promoted by and/or on behalf of Mr Agius, carried out through the OTD accountants. The evidence at trial revealed that for each of OTD's clients involved in the scheme, there was a flow of funds out of the client's business to overseas companies, in respect of which false claims for tax deductions were made. The funds then flowed back to the client's business and/or its directors as loans, in respect of which false claims for interest were also made on a number of occasions. Further, for three of the clients, sham insurance arrangements were created, in respect of which tax deductions were claimed.
Many of the witnesses at the trial gave evidence that the appellant had explained the scheme to them, had drawn diagrams to illustrate the flow of funds and was present at meetings at which the scheme was discussed. The evidence also demonstrated that the appellant executed a number of documents in connection with the scheme.
On 31 July 2012, a jury convicted Mr Agius and one of the alleged co-conspirators, Mr Zerafa, on both counts of conspiracy. The trial judge sentenced the appellant to 4 years and 5 months imprisonment in respect of the first count, 4 years 6 months imprisonment in respect of the second count and a fixed single non-parole period of 6 years and 8 months.
Mr Agius appealed his conviction and sentence. The main issues on appeal were:
Whether the trial judge erred by failing to direct the jury: to acquit the appellant; that the Crown must prove that the appellant was involved in filing false tax returns; that certain evidence may be unreliable; that two clients may have been involved in another conspiracy; clearly identifying the knowledge, belief or intent said to render the relevant conduct dishonest.
Whether the trial judge erred in directing the jury: on the involvement of the OTD clients who were witnesses; on the co-accused giving evidence; linking Moore Stephens to the scheme and the appellant to Moore Stephens.
Whether the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported by evidence.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in: assessing the objective seriousness of the offence; imposing an unjustifiably disparite sentence on the appellant, compared to Mr Zerafa; imposing a sentence which was manifestly excessive.
The Court held (Bathurst CJ, RA Hulme and Bellew JJ agreeing), dismissing the conviction and sentencing appeal:
Whether the trial judge erred by failing to make certain directions to the jury
(i) Section 86(1) of the Crimes Act and s 135.4(5) of the Criminal Code are continuing offences. In order to prove the requisite 'state of affairs', The Crown only needs to prove that the accused and one other party to the conspiracy participated in an agreement to commit the offences in s 29D Crimes Act or s 135.4(5) Criminal Code, respectively. [962], [964] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
R v LK [2010] HCA 17; 241 CLR 177; Agius v The Queen [2013] HCA 27; 248 CLR 601, applied
(ii) A conspiratorial agreement has three stages which must be distinguished, first, making or formation, second, performance or implementation, third, discharge or termination. In general, the offence is complete at the first stage, when the agreement is made. Under the Criminal Code, the offence is not complete until an overt act is performed. [971] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Saffron v The Queen (1988) 17 NSWLR 395; Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot (1973) AC 807; Agius v The Queen [2013] HCA 27; 248 CLR 601, applied
(iii) The trial judge did not err by failing to direct the jury to acquit the appellant as there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could conclude that the conspiracy as particularised, as distinct from separate conspiracies, was entered into by the appellant and that he participated in the conspiracy during the conspiracy period. [973]-[991] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Saffron v The Queen (1988) 17 NSWLR 395; Doney v The Queen [1990] HCA 51; 171 CLR 207, considered
(iv) The trial judge did not err by failing to direct the jury that the Crown needed to prove that the appellant was involved in filing false tax returns as the agreement alleged was that the scheme was promoted by the appellant and implemented by the OTD accountants. [997]-[998] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
(v) The purpose of s 165(1)(d) of the Evidence Act is to ensure that the jury is alerted to facts that may adversely affect the weight to be given to evidence. A warning is required if, without it, the jury may not be aware of a particular fact which affected the reliability of evidence. [1023] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
R v Fowler [2003] NSWCCA 321; 151 A Crim R 166, applied
(vi) The trial judge's directions on unreliability were not erroneous as they were adequate to deal with the matters in s 165(1)(d) of the Evidence Act and it was open to her Honour to conclude that it was not necessary to indicate that certain evidence was unreliable. [1022]-[1023] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Brown v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 69, distinguished
(vii) The trial judge did not err in failing to direct the jury that two clients may have been part of a previous tax minimisation scheme as there was no evidence on this. [1045] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
(viii) The trial judge's directions on the requisite dishonest belief of the appellant were not erroneous as her Honour identified the requisite belief rendering the agreement dishonest and encapsulated the facts on which the jury had to decide if the appellant had this belief, namely, that OTD's clients were making claims for deductions not incurred. [1060] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Peters v The Queen [1998] HCA 7; 192 CLR 493; Macleod v The Queen [2003] HCA 24; 214 CLR 230, considered
Whether the trial judge erred by making certain directions to the jury
(i) The trial judge did not err in directing the jury on the involvement of the directors as the directors had admitted involvement in the fraud and the direction was necessary to ensure that the jury was aware that their evidence should be treated with caution. [1027] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
(ii) The trial judge did not err in directing the jury regarding the evidence of the co-accused as this direction did not compliment them for giving evidence or suggest that the appellant's failure to give evidence was because he believed he was guilty of the offence charged. [1035] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Azzopardi v The Queen [2001] HCA 25; 205 CLR 50, considered
(iii) The trial judge's direction referring to Moore Stephens was not unnecessary or prejudicial as there was a large body of evidence linking Moore Stephens to the scheme and indicating that the appellant was a partner of Moore Stephens and that a significant part of the scheme's operation was carried out through employees of Moore Stephens. [1066]-[1068] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Whether the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported by evidence
(i) In determining whether a verdict should be set aside as unreasonable, the Court is required to make its own independent assessment of the evidence. If, after taking into account the primary responsibility of the jury in determining the question of guilt and the benefit of the jury of having seen and heard witnesses, the Court is left in doubt as to the verdict's reasonableness, this doubt, in most cases, is a doubt the jury should have experienced. For a verdict to be unreasonable, it is not enough that a review of the evidence only shows that it was possible for the jury to have reached a different outcome, the jury must have had a reasonable doubt. [1000]-[1001] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
SKA v The Queen [2011] HCA 13; 243 CLR 400; M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; 181 CLR 487; Libke v The Queen [2007] HCA 30; 230 CLR 559, applied
(ii) The verdict was not unreasonable as the evidence disclosed an extremely strong case against the appellant. The agreement the subject of the conspiracy could be inferred from the appellant's promotion of the scheme, the steps carried out by him to establish the overseas structure and his participation during the course of the scheme. [1002]-[1010] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
The sentencing appeal
(i) A sentencing judge does not have to sentence on the basis of a view of the facts most favourable to the offender. This is subject to the constraints that the findings are not inconsistent with the jury's verdict and must be made beyond reasonable doubt. [1100] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Cheung v The Queen [2001] HCA 67; 209 CLR 1; R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374, applied
(ii) The sentencing judge did not err in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence as it was open to find that the appellant's offence was close to the worst type of offence of this nature. [1104] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
(iii) The court will interfere with a sentence on the ground of disparity between the sentence imposed on an accused and a co-accused when it considers that the disparity gives rise to a justifiable sense of grievance, assessed by objective criteria. The court should not intervene when the disparity is justified by a difference between co-offenders' criminal history, general character and the part each played in the criminal conduct. [1120] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; 244 CLR 462, applied
(iv) The difference in sentences imposed on the appellant and Mr Zerafa did not give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance as the appellants offending was in the worst class of its kind, unlike Mr Zerafa's, and he played a far more significant role in promoting and implementing the scheme. [1121] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
(v) The sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive as the offence: had continued over at least eight years, providing a mechanism by which eight companies were able to defraud the revenue of significant amounts of tax; was of a serious nature and of a type that had a corrosive effect on society; was in the worst class of its kind; and there was a need for punishment and general deterrence. [1133]-[1135] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 250; R v Ruha [2010] QCA 10; 198 A Crime R 430; R v Huston [2011] QCA 350; 219 A Crim R 209, applied
(vi) Sentences imposed in other cases can and should provide a yardstick for sentencing judges against which to measure a proposed sentence. However, care must be taken in having regard to these cases and the history of the range of sentences does not establish the correct range or the upper and lower limits of the range. The whole of the circumstances giving rise to a sentence must be examined. [1136] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 250; Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194; 79 NSWLR 1, applied
(vii) The differences between cases referred to by the appellant and the present case meant that they did not support the contention that the sentence was manifestly excessive. [1137]-[1140] (Bathurst CJ); [1144] (RA Hulme J); [1145] (Bellew J)
DPP v Goldberg [2001] VSCA 107; 184 ALR 387; R v Ronen [2006] NSWCCA 123; 161 A Crim R 300; Chen v R [2009] NSWCCA 66, considered