AFS20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FedCFamC2G 56

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. Mr AFS20 (the applicant) is an Iranian citizen of Kurdish ethnicity. He came to Australia in 2013 as an irregular maritime arrival. He applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa (also known as a 'SHEV') in 2017 but that application was refused by a delegate of the minister. (The minister is the first respondent in these proceedings.) The unsuccessful application was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) for review. On 20 December 2019, the IAA affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the visa. Mr AFS20 has sought judicial review of the IAA's decision.
2. The IAA's decision is reproduced in exhibit one (the court book) at pp 258ff. The IAA was concerned by what it took to be inconsistencies in the applicant's account over the course of the application process. It found the applicant had provided false documents in support of his claims.
3. In his further amended application for judicial review, Mr AFS20 said the IAA's finding that he supplied false documents was unreasonable, irrational or illogical.
4. I am satisfied the finding was legally unreasonable. I explain my reasons for that conclusion below.

1. The applicant's family arranged for him to leave Iran in mid-2013. He made his way at first instance to Dubai, thence to Indonesia where he made contact with people smugglers. He arranged transportation by boat to Australia. He arrived here in July 2013.
2. Mr AFS20 was initially detained by immigration authorities upon his arrival in Australia. He was eventually released into the community on a bridging visa. He thereafter progressed his claim for a SHEV. He provided a statement of claims with his application. The statement dated 27 September 2017 is reproduced in the court book at pp 75ff.
3. In that statement, Mr AFS20 recalled he formed a romantic relationship with a woman in Iran. The woman's father was a conservative who did not approve of the applicant's Kurdish ethnicity. The father was also a member of the regime's oppressive security apparatus. The father refused to allow his daughter to marry the applicant on account of his ethnicity. When the father became aware his daughter and the applicant had engaged in a sexual relationship, he was irate. The applicant claimed he feared the woman's father would use his position in the security services to persecute the applicant. He said he became aware agents of the state had been looking for him - presumably at the father's behest. The agents had visited the homes of the applicant's relatives. The applicant said his girlfriend contacted him to say her father would kill the applicant. He decided to flee Iran with the assistance of members of his family.
4. Mr AFS20 said he learned the authorities in Iran had continued looking for him after his arrival in Australia. Agents of the state had visited his family and demanded to know his whereabouts. He said his girlfriend's father levied false charges against him to get revenge. Mr AFS20 said he had been summoned to attend court in Iran. He said he feared arrest and persecution if he returned to Iran for that or any other purpose. He said he was at risk given the animus of his girlfriend's father, but also on account of his ethnicity and concerns that he and his family might be accused of being opponents of the regime. He said in the statement that he had not had contact with his girlfriend since the last time they spoke prior to his departure in 2013.
5. Mr AFS20 acknowledged in his statement that he was not entirely forthcoming with Australian authorities when he arrived in this country. He said he initially feared anything he said might be reported back to the Iranian authorities.
6. The applicant was invited to attend an interview with a delegate of the minister on 20 August 2019. In advance of the application, Mr AFS20's representative supplied a detailed set of submissions and some supporting documents, including a further statutory declaration and court documents from Iran. The submissions are reproduced in the court book at pp 132ff. Translated versions of the court documents are reproduced at pp 155ff. The statutory declaration is reproduced at pp 172-173.
7. Mr AFS20 attended the interview on 20 August 2019 but it ran longer than anticipated. A further interview was scheduled for 28 August 2019. The delegate's decision refusing the application for a visa is dated 8 November 2019. The delegate's decision is reproduced in the court book at pp 226ff.
8. The delegate was troubled by aspects of the applicant's evidence - in particular, by the fact the applicant was able to leave Iran on his own passport without being detained. The delegate reasoned Mr AFS20 would not have experienced such a smooth departure if he was subject to criminal proceedings or was being sought by the security service. The delegate also doubted the veracity of the court documents given their appearance and given the fact the documents logically would have been lodged with the department earlier in the process if they were available.
9. In his statement of reasons, the delegate relied on country information derived from several sources. There were repeated references to a 2018 country information report published by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (2018 DFAT report). There were also references to:
   • a report published jointly by the Danish Refugee Council, Landinfo (a Norwegian service) and the Danish Immigration Service in February 2013 (the Landinfo report) which was exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Moyes in these proceedings; and
   • a targeted report prepared by the Country of Origin Information Services Section of the minister's department dated 19 May 2016 (the COISS report) exhibited to the affidavit of Ms Fiolo. That report was prepared at the delegate's request.
10. The delegate's decision was automatically referred to the IAA for review under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The IAA was provided with the decision and the relevant material on the file pursuant to s 473CB of the Act. The review was conducted on the papers in accordance with s 473DB.

1. A copy of the IAA's decision and statement of reasons is reproduced in the court book at pp 258ff. The statement of reasons focuses on the applicant's assertion in his statement of claims that he was summoned to attend court on four occasions in 2013 and 2014. After describing the summons documents produced to the minister's department on 19 August 2019, the IAA noted (at [16]) the document issued in May 2014 was actually an arrest warrant, not a summons. The IAA went on to observe at [17]:

I have a number of concerns about these documents. Country information indicates that prior to June 2015 summonses are always filled out by hand and only the copy is served to the summoned. The summons is stamped by the issuing authority. None of the summons dated August 2013, November 2013 or February 2014 contain a stamp from the Court as they should. Secondly, as the applicant was not in Iran at the time of service, they could not be delivered to "the summoned". They have however all been signed in the area headed "signature by the summoned." The delegate asked the applicant who had signed the documents and he said he didn't know: his father or brother or someone. I do not accept that a court issued summons is taken to be served on a person when it has been randomly given to and signed by another person. Thirdly, despite the claim that "the matter will be referred to the court to make a decision in absentia" if the summoned person fails to appear, this did not occur but summonses continued to be issued every three months. Finally, the applicant claimed that he had been issued with four summons but this is clearly not the case; the fourth document is an arrest warrant. He has at no point mentioned that there is an arrest warrant in force against him. The applicant has not explained how his family obtained the arrest warrant, which is not addressed to him or his family. Taken overall, I do not accept that these documents are genuine.

1. The IAA was unimpressed by what it took to be inconsistencies in the applicant's story. The IAA's adverse credibility finding was also informed by a finding that the applicant provided false documents and continued to have contact with his girlfriend in Iran when he had earlier claimed he did not speak with her. Given those findings, the IAA concluded it was unable to be satisfied the applicant met the criteria in s 36 of the Act which governed protection visas.

THE FURTHER AMENDED APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. The applicant's legal representative in this Court had foreshadowed relying on an amended application for review in their submissions. The amended application included two grounds of review. The minister did not oppose leave to amend being granted and prepared submissions in reply. On the morning of the hearing, the applicant sought leave to lodge a further amended application. Ms Baw, the applicant's counsel, said the further amended application was prompted by some additional information that had only just come to hand. She noted the applicant no longer pressed the second ground of review. Mr Harvey, counsel for the minister, initially opposed the application to rely on the revised ground given the late notice. Mr Harvey managed to obtain instructions, and he was able to deal with the revised ground in oral submissions. I gave leave for the applicant to rely on the further amended application in those circumstances.
2. The single remaining ground of review focuses on the reasonableness of the finding that the applicant provided false documents. The applicant's principal argument arises out of the fact the IAA had before it a range of country information, including the Landinfo report. (Ms Baw pointed out the Landinfo report was before the delegate: it was foot-noted in the statement of reasons. That report was presumably communicated to the IAA pursuant to s 473CB of the Act.) The Landinfo report in particular was said to contain information that pointed away from the factual findings the IAA made. The applicant says the IAA should have acknowledged and resolved the inconsistencies in the country information or explained why it preferred other evidence.
3. Ms Baw criticised at least six findings that were said to be made in [17] of the IAA's reasons (set out above). The first criticism relates to the assertion that "[c]ountry information indicates" certain matters. Ms Baw says that statement is problematic because it is not clear what country information is being discussed. I do not think this criticism has any substance: the next sentence in the paragraph which forms part of the reasoning on this issue includes a footnote which references p 8 of the COISS report. The information in question is actually found at pp 8-9 of the COISS report. It follows the IAA's finding - to the extent it is a stand-alone finding - is based on identified country information in the form of the COISS report.
4. The second issue relates to the signatures that appeared on the summonses that had been provided in evidence. Those signatures were apparently offered as evidence that the summonses in question had been served. The applicant said he had left Iran by this point and denied signing the documents. The applicant was unsure who signed the documents but surmised they may have been signed by a relative. The IAA (at [17]) doubted a court-issued summons would be regarded as being validly served "when it has been randomly given to and signed by another person." That finding is consistent with (but does not directly cite) information contained in the COISS report. The COISS report refers (at p 9) to Article 112 of the version of the Iranian Code of Criminal Procedure (ICCP) in force at the time which provided:

Summoning an accused is done via a summons letter. The summons letter is issued in two original copies. One is taken by the accused and the other one is signed by the accused and returned to the summons officer. [Emphasis added]

1. The text of Article 112 does not appear to authorise a stranger (such as a friend, relative or neighbour) affixing their signature to a summons.
2. I observed the IAA did not expressly cite the COISS report in connection with its doubts that a stranger might sign the summons document. Having said that, I note the IAA did reference the same section of the COISS report elsewhere in the same paragraph of the IAA's reasons for decision. It is inconceivable that the IAA missed the reference to Article 112 of the ICCP. That country information provided a basis for the finding.
3. Ms Baw points out there was other country information before the IAA that offered a contrary or qualified view. The Landinfo report says (at p 60) the person named in the summons would be expected to sign a copy of the document when served - but it goes on to note:

If the person in question is not present, a family member can receive the summons in his or her place. The same procedures for receiving the summons apply in that the family member signs the copy which must go back to the court and keeps the original. ... [Emphasis added]

1. The IAA did not reference this observation or otherwise refer to the Landinfo report in this connection. Ms Baw said the omission of any reference to the Landinfo report is a problem. That brings me to the question lying at the heart of the applicant's argument: to what extent is the decision-maker required to address inconsistencies in the evidence before it?
2. The authorities make clear there is no general duty to address inconsistencies in the material: see SZQIQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 135 ALD 33; [2012] FCA 1356 at [45] per Nicholas J. But Nicholas J went on in that paragraph to acknowledge a failure to reconcile conflicts in the evidence may be a problem in some cases. Whether a duty arises will depend on the circumstances of the particular case: see also VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 at [77] per Hill, Sundberg and Stone JJ and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431; [2013] FCAFC 114 at [69]- [70] per Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317, Robertson J said one must consider the importance of the material (or the claim) to the question being decided before one concludes the decision-maker's failure to reference or deal with the material was a jurisdictional error: at [111]. While a failure to deal with "substantial and consequential...evidence" may establish jurisdictional error (SZRKT at [111] per Robertson J), the decision-maker would not be expected to deal with a matter that was so "insignificant that the failure to take it into account could not have materially affected the decision": Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 at [23] per Mason J, cited in VAAD at [77].
3. The information contained in the Landinfo report regarding signatures was "substantial and consequential" in the circumstances of this case given the IAA rejected out of hand the applicant's claim about the summons - a finding which obviously contributed to the IAA's adverse assessment of the applicant's credit. It is clear the information contained in the Landinfo report may have provided a basis for making a different finding (which might have had consequences for the IAA's assessment of the applicant's credit) if that material had been considered and accepted. The IAA's disbelief of the applicant's account in relation to the signatures contributed to its negative impression of the applicant's credit which potentially infected the IAA's view of other material it was required to assess.
4. That analysis suggests the IAA should have dealt with the information in the Landinfo report about signatures, but the minister argues more is required. The authorities suggest the existence of a case-specific duty to reconcile inconsistent evidence may also depend on whether the decision-maker was actively aware of the inconsistency in the country information - most obviously because that inconsistency was drawn to their attention. Mr Harvey, counsel for the minister, pointed out the applicant's extensive submissions to the delegate do not refer to any inconsistency in the reports in relation to this question, and he noted there were no fresh submissions made to the IAA on this issue.
5. One can accept the IAA was at least constructively aware of the Landinfo report because it should have formed part of the material before the delegate that was transmitted to the IAA. The IAA decision does not expressly refer to or discuss the Landinfo report in its statement of reasons. I have already explained the IAA was aware of the COISS report which also addressed the requirements of a valid summons, albeit without the extra information about signatures supplied in the Landinfo report.
6. There is no doubt the IAA is generally entitled to prefer more recent country information reports provided by DFAT because those detailed reports are intended to be comprehensive: see DIJ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1038 at [37] per Mortimer J; see also BTK18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 110 at [40] per Jagot J; CTE16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 759 at [76] per Kenny J; AVJ17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1056 at [43] per O'Bryan J. But the question urged on me by the applicant is not whether the IAA was entitled to prefer the more recent DFAT reports to the extent of any inconsistency. The applicant says there is no evidence the IAA was actively aware of any inconsistencies in the country information in relation to this issue. Ms Baw pointed out the 2018 DFAT report is not even discussed or cited in connection with the IAA's finding that it was unlikely a summons would be signed by someone other than the person to whom it was directed. The COISS report is footnoted in [17] of the IAA's reasons. As I have explained, that report does set out the requirements in Article 112 of the ICCP but the IAA cited that report in support of a different finding about the form of the summons and the practice of affixing an official stamp.
7. Mr Harvey argued the IAA was not obliged to refer to inconsistent but potentially significant material that had not been drawn to its attention. In DIJ16, Mortimer J explained (at [37]):

The Authority did, as the Minister submitted, refer to sources of country information other than the 2015 DFAT report: see [10] of its reasons. In any event, the 2015 DFAT report was intended to be a comprehensive source for decision-makers and cross-referenced to other sources of information. It is not inappropriate for the Authority to focus on a document such as this, particularly in the absence of any submissions or material from a referred applicant suggesting a source of country information is inaccurate or unreliable, and in the absence of submissions or other material from a referred applicant expressly directing the Authority to other particular parts of different country information. Any allegations of error in the use of country information will be highly fact-dependent, and will require a high degree of specificity to have prospects of success. [Emphasis added]

1. As I understood Mr Harvey's argument, the IAA was entitled to focus on and prefer the comprehensive country reports published by DFAT without the need for further explanation. The IAA was not obliged to address other potentially inconsistent country information that it had to hand unless the inconsistencies were expressly drawn to the IAA's attention. That deference to the DFAT reports was said to be justified given the attenuated decision-making and review process of the IAA and the special status of current comprehensive DFAT country information reports.
2. Ms Baw argued it was unrealistic to expect the applicant to draw the IAA's attention to the information contained in the Landinfo report about the circumstances in which a stranger might sign a summons. She said that issue did not appear to arise before the delegate, and the circumstances in which the documents came to be signed were not expressly addressed in the section of the delegate's statement of reasons (court book at pp 237-238) where the delegate explored the various concerns he had over the court summons and the arrest warrant. While the applicant was plainly aware at the time of the IAA review that there were issues over the veracity of his account in respect of the summons and arrest warrants, Ms Baw argued the applicant had no reason to think the identity of the signatories was an issue that had to be addressed in submissions to the IAA which drew out the additional information contained in the Landinfo report. Ms Baw said the applicant should not be expected to intuit the IAA might focus on that detail when the delegate had not.
3. In summary, Ms Baw argued the applicant did not fall short of the demanding standard referred to by Mortimer J in DIJ16 at [37] in circumstances where Ms Baw said:
   • the delegate had not made anything of the fact people other than the applicant had signed the summons;
   • there was no direct inconsistency between the Landinfo report and the other country information on the signature issue. The Landinfo report qualified or added important nuance to the general discussion of the summons process in the COISS report;
   • the 2018 DFAT report did not address the issue directly. The COISS report is a more focused report that was prepared by an internal research service in response to a request for information. It sets out the requirements in Article 112 of the ICCP but it also identifies the Landinfo report (amongst others) as 'further reading' on the topic. The COISS report does not pretend to be a comprehensive country information report; and
   • the IAA did not directly refer to the 2018 DFAT report or the COISS report in support of its finding that it was unlikely the summons would have been signed by someone other than the applicant.
4. With the benefit of hindsight, a careful reading of the delegate's statement of reasons might have put the applicant on notice of an issue about the signatures on the summons documents. After commenting on the absence of a stamp on the summons, the delegate went on (at pp 237-238 of the court book) to observe "the other [court summons and arrest] documents do not adhere to the details outlined in country information above. This causes further concerns about the authenticity of the documents." [Emphasis added] The "country information above" was presumably a reference to the Landinfo report and the COISS report which had been footnoted by the delegate. (The 2018 DFAT report is not footnoted or discussed in that section of the decision.) That line in the reasons leaves open the possibility the summons may not have conformed to the standard described in the reports in several respects apart from the absence of a stamp. But the delegate does not refer to or suggest there is any conflict in the two reports over what those requirements were.
5. While the applicant might have intuited from the delegate's decision that questions over the form of the summons might necessitate the applicant referring to the Landinfo report in submissions to the IAA, it is unsurprising he did not appreciate the need to do so in the circumstances. A fair reading of the decisions of the delegate and the IAA suggests the IAA's focus on the issue with the signatures was unexpected.
6. I am satisfied the IAA acted unreasonably when it made an adverse credibility finding that was premised at least in part on concerns about the genuineness of the summons documents. Those concerns were in turn premised (at least in part) on the criticisms recorded at [17] of the reasons for decision. Two of those criticisms were potentially answered by the evidence contained in the Landinfo report. If the IAA had considered that report, the IAA might have understood why the summons was signed by someone other than the applicant and how the family might have come into possession of the document and communicated it to the applicant even though he was overseas. Having chosen to focus on the signatures on the summons when that had not hitherto been done, the IAA was acting unreasonably when it failed to have regard to the evidence before it which directly addressed that issue.

1. I acknowledge an applicant would ordinarily be expected to have drawn the IAA's attention to material in the country information which was relevant if the applicant later wished to criticise the IAA for failing to take that material into account in its decision. But as Mortimer J observed in DIJ16 at [37], "allegations of error in the use of country information will be highly fact-dependent" and exceptions to the general rule - to the extent it is one - will be made where appropriate. This is such a case. I am satisfied the factual finding was unreasonable because it was made without regard to the information in the Landinfo report - information that had not been expressly drawn to the IAA's attention because there had not hitherto been an issue over the signatures on the summons. The applicant should not have been expected to intuit the IAA's focus on that issue: requiring the applicant to make such detailed submissions on the off-chance the IAA would take a different approach to the facts compared to the delegate would not be consistent with the attenuated review process contemplated in the Act.
2. I am satisfied the jurisdictional error is material in circumstances where the outcome might have been different if the error had not been made. I am also satisfied it is appropriate to exercise the discretion to provide relief. I therefore order that (a) a writ of certiorari be issued that quashes the decision of the IAA, and (b) a writ of mandamus be directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal (the successor body to the second respondent) directing it to reconsider the decision according to law.
3. I will hear from the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge McCabe.