Consideration
11 As explained above, the appellant directs his argument to two aspects.
12 The appellant focussed the submission on [39] of the Minister's reasons, which are recited above. Simply put, as to the first aspect, the appellant contends that the Minister narrowed the claim that was put by re-stating it at [39] as: "he fears for his safety if he returns to Samoa because he gave evidence against his co-offenders". The appellant submitted that the word "safety" signifies harm but not to the serious extent that he expressly claimed - that is, that the appellant would be killed. It was submitted that this is also reflected in the conclusory paragraph of the Minister's reasons, which refers to the "hardship and harm if returned to Samoa because he gave evidence against his co-offenders". It was submitted that to water down his claim of being killed to a hardship or harm is not to grapple with the factual assertion which was being put to the Minister, and the dilution accordingly impacted the weighing process of the Minister. As to the second aspect, the appellant submitted that there was no proper engagement with the claim, but rather it was dealt with in a one-line finding at [39]: "I find that [the appellant]'s risk of harm is reduced if he participates in witness protection and would have access to police protection, in the event that he requires it". The appellant submitted that this finding was inadequate, as it did not address to what extent the risk was reduced and how it was weighed against the appellant in the circumstances. The absence of any exploration or statement on those matters suggested that the claim had not been adequately dealt with, or given the attention which such a serious claim required.
13 The appellant's submission that the primary judge misunderstood the claim is said to be reflected in the second and third sentences of [40] and the first sentence of [41] of the primary judge's reasons, as recited above. It was submitted that the appellant's claim was concerned with police protection, and not family support. The appellant focussed his submission on the level of seriousness of harm he fears, contending that the claim asks for an effective level of protection so that he will feel safe from the fear or risk of being killed (as opposed to some lesser harm).
14 The appellant submitted that, contrary to the finding of the primary judge at [47], and the approach of the Minister, "the prominence of the risk of death infers the claim is that the protection would not be effective to eliminate or significantly reduce the risk of being killed. The improper simplification and narrowing of the claim by the Minister caused him to fail to confront the substance of the claim in making the finding at [39]".
15 The appellant's submissions cannot be accepted.
16 It is necessary to recall at the outset the nature of the appellant's claim: he feared he would be killed if he returned to Samoa because he gave evidence in criminal proceedings in New South Wales against his co-offenders and that, in Australia, he had the protection of the police. The claim is limited to a subjective fear. The appellant did not claim that he would be "unable to access effective protection if returned to Samoa". Nor did he claim that there was no form of witness protection available to him in Samoa. Moreover, those representations were not supported by any evidence which might have enabled the Minister to engage in any comparative analysis between Samoa and Australia concerning the risk of harm to the appellant or any analysis of the nature and extent of such risk. Nor was there any evidence of any threats of harm in Samoa, or who in Samoa would seek to harm him (the offending having occurred in Australia).
17 Although a claim containing a representation about revocation of a cancellation decision may enliven a duty to consider the content of it, the degree of engagement with that claim will necessarily vary depending on factors such as the length of the claim, the clarity with which the claim is expressed and whether any evidence in support of the claim has been proffered by the formal visa holder.
18 It suffices to refer to the recent statements by the plurality in Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; (2022) 96 ALJR 497 at [24]-[25]:
[24] Consistently with well-established authority in different statutory contexts, there can be no doubt that a decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate the representations. Adopting and adapting what Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) said in Tickner v Chapman, the decision-maker must have regard to what is said in the representations, bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward, and appreciate who is making them. From that point, the decision-maker might sift them, attributing whatever weight or persuasive quality is thought appropriate. The weight to be afforded to the representations is a matter for the decision-maker. And the decision-maker is not obliged "to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims" made by a former visa holder.
[25] It is also well-established that the requisite level of engagement by the decision-maker with the representations must occur within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness. What is necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for a valid exercise of power will necessarily depend on the nature, form and content of the representations. The requisite level of engagement - the degree of effort needed by the decision-maker - will vary, among other things, according to the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations. The decision-maker is not required to consider claims that are not clearly articulated or which do not clearly arise on the materials before them.
19 Similarly, it was recently observed in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane [2021] HCA 41; (2021) 96 AJLR 13 (Viane) at [22]:
[22] It finally remains to be observed, and emphasised, that an applicant's prospects of persuading the Minister to revoke a cancellation decision will doubtless be all the greater if the applicant adduces evidence, or other supporting material, to make good the claims that she or he makes. The production of such evidence or material in the applicant's representations would engage the need for the Minister to consider such evidence and, if necessary, to answer it with further or different evidence, or other material, if the claims are to be rejected.
20 At [13]-[15], the Court summarised the operation of s 501CA in light of its statutory context:
[13] The relevant statutory scheme mandated by s 501CA of the Act comprises: the giving of relevant information to a person whose visa has been cancelled; inviting that person to make representations about why that cancellation decision should be revoked; the receipt of representations by the Minister made in accordance with that invitation; and, thereafter, the formation of a state of satisfaction, or not, by the Minister that the cancellation decision should be revoked. That scheme necessarily requires the Minister to consider and understand the representations received. What is "another reason" is a matter for the Minister. Under this scheme, Parliament has not, in any way, mandated or prescribed the reasons which might justify revocation, or not, of a cancellation decision in a given case. It follows that there may be few mandatorily relevant matters that the Minister must consider in applying s 501CA(4)(b)(ii). Thus, the Minister is not obliged to take account of any non-refoulement obligations, as expressed in the Act or otherwise, when determining whether there is another reason to revoke a cancellation decision where the materials "do not include, or the circumstances do not suggest, a non-refoulement claim". The power must otherwise be exercised reasonably and in good faith.
[14] No part of the statutory power conferred by s 501CA of the Act obliges the Minister to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims made by an applicant. Based upon the representations made by an applicant, the cancellation decision and the "relevant information" given to the applicant pursuant to s 501CA(3)(a), the Minister must, when the Minister is not satisfied that an applicant passes the character test, then determine relevantly whether to be satisfied that there is "another reason" why the cancellation decision should be revoked. Deciding whether or not to be satisfied that "another reason" exists might be the product of necessary fact finding, or the product of making predictions about the future, or it might be about assessments or characterisation of an applicant's past offending.
[15] If the representations made lack any substance altogether, then this of itself might justify a decision not to be satisfied that "another reason" exists to revoke the cancellation decision, without any need to make any findings of fact about the various claims made. Moreover, some of the topics that might be traversed might not lend themselves to be addressed by way of evidence. They may involve matters of judgment, especially when weighing factors for and against revocation. The breadth of the power conferred by s 501CA of the Act renders it impossible, nor is it desirable, to formulate absolute rules about how the Minister might or might not be satisfied about a reason for revocation.
21 Against that background, once the nature of the claim is appreciated, it is readily apparent that the primary judge's description of the generality of the claim, and what flows therefrom, is unexceptionable: see PJ at [40]-[43]. With that understanding, it is plain that the primary judge did not misconstrue or misconceive the appellant's claim in [40] and [41]. We do not accept the submission that the primary judge in [41] misunderstood the claim and limited it to the appellant having no family support. The statement in [41], read with the surrounding paragraphs, encompasses the appellant's claim in respect of the police looking after him. Those paragraphs, and what follows, is an accurate recitation of the claim and the state of the evidence before the Minister. In that context, it is appropriate to mention [42] concerning the scant nature of the evidence as to his position in respect of protection in Australia.
22 Despite the appellant accepting during the hearing the correctness of the propositions as to the nature of the claim, described above at [7] and [16], this ground, as advanced, suggests otherwise. For example, the appellant's repeated submission that the Minister was required at [39] to go further by quantifying the level of risk to the appellant in Samoa, and the degree to which that risk was reduced by the availability of police protection, fails to grapple with the nature of the claim, and the absence of evidence on which it was based. Although the appellant submitted that he was not saying that the Minister was obliged to quantify the extent of the risk, he contended that a meaningful qualitative assessment was necessary. However, the appellant never addressed how, in the absence of evidence, the assessment could be made.
23 Given the nature of the claim, the appellant has not identified any error in the reasoning of the primary judge. As his Honour recognised, the Minister referred expressly to the appellant's stated fear that he would be at risk of serious harm in Samoa, but found that the risk of harm would be reduced (which does not mean that it would be eliminated) by the availability of witness protection and police protection: PJ at [46]-[47]. As the primary judge correctly concludes, in the circumstances of this case, the Minister was not obliged to quantify the extent of the risk, as contended for by the appellant. Indeed, given the paucity of the material, nor could he have done so: PJ at [46]. There was nothing in the evidence that the appellant placed before the Minister that indicated that the risk of him being harmed in Samoa "was anything more than a possibility" and, moreover, there was "no supporting material … which the Minister was required to answer" pertaining to "the existence of any credible threat posed to the [appellant]'s safety" or "the effectiveness of the witness or police protection available [in Samoa]": PJ at [46]. Given the generality of the claim, the primary judge concluded that the Minister was not obliged to make more detailed findings: PJ at [48].
24 The appellant's submission as to the Minister's reasons at [39] cannot be sustained on a proper reading of that paragraph in the context in which it appears. The Minister did not misconstrue or minimise the claim. Rather, read in light of [33] (and earlier passages) where the claims are expressly stated, the harm referred to in [39] plainly is a reference to the fears of being killed. Moreover, the final sentence of [39] is a finding that the risk is reduced if he participates in witness protection and would have access to the police, in the event he requires it. That reflects the absence of evidence supporting any basis for the fear if he were in Samoa. As discussed above, given the generality of the claim and the absence of evidence, it has not been established that any such quantification was required, or indeed could be made. The consideration being made is not whether the appellant's subjective fear is assuaged, but the issue of actual risk. The appellant's submission repeatedly elided the two concepts.
25 We also note for completeness that, as the primary judge correctly observed at [43], in the context of s 501CA decisions, it is incumbent on the applicant to put before the Minister any representations and material that he or she wishes the Minister to consider when deciding whether or not there was another reason why the original decision should be revoked: see, for example, Pennie v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 129 at [14]; Viane at [22].
26 The primary judge delayed the resolution of this matter until the High Court handed down its decision in Viane, at which time the appellant's solicitor indicated that he required time to consider whether to bring an application to re-open his case to adduce further evidence. Procedural orders were subsequently made to facilitate the making of any such application and for the provision of further written submissions: PJ at [24]. The appellant did not seek to adduce any further evidence.