ADQ21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 276

1. The applicant, a citizen of Bangladesh, seeks judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 17 December 2020. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (protection visa). This Court has jurisdiction to determine this matter pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
2. The applicant sought to impugn the Tribunal's reasons and findings on the ground that the Tribunal failed to perform its duty of review by failing to take account of cogent evidence which was said to provide substantial support to the applicant's case and further that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable for the reasons set out at [14] of this judgment.
3. For the reasons set out below, I find the applicant has not demonstrated jurisdictional error and I dismiss the application.

1. On 30 March 2016, the applicant arrived in Australia on a visitor visa that was valid until 30 June 2016 (Court Book (CB) 23). On 17 May 2016, the Department received the applicant's protection visa application (CB 1 to 37).
2. On 18 November 2016, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa on the basis that the delegate did not find the applicant to be an entirely credible witness and did not accept the applicant would face persecution in Bangladesh due to his religion (CB 170). On 10 December 2016, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (CB 178 and 179).

1. On 14 December 2020, the applicant attended the Tribunal hearing assisted by an interpreter in the Bengali and English languages (CB 247 to 249).
2. The Tribunal noted the applicant at the time of its decision was a 40-year-old single man who was a Buddhist from Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh ([12] of its reasons). The Tribunal at [17] to [29] of its reasons set out the country information as to the Buddhists' situation in Bangladesh.

1. The applicant claimed he and his family were amongst the victims of the violence which occurred in Cox's Bazar in 2012 (2012 violence) and that the applicant was threatened and targeted by members of Jamaat-e Islami (JI) because the applicant lodged a complaint, being the first information report (FIR), against Mr Uddin and others who were members of the JI. In the said complaint, the applicant stated that he believed Mr Uddin and others who were members of the JI were amongst the people responsible for the violence at Cox's Bazar in 2012 (applicant's 2012 criminal complaint) ([31] to [33] of its reasons).
2. In relation to that claim, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant and members of his family had been threatened or targeted by JI for the following reasons:

(a) First, the Tribunal found the applicant's evidence regarding the events of the 2012 violence and what followed was confused and unpersuasive as he gave different accounts as to what occurred in his initial statement and the FIR provided to support his claims and the evidence given at the hearing ([50] of its reasons). The Tribunal believed that the FIR was a fraudulent document obtained by the applicant or manufactured on his behalf to support the claims in his initial statement ([54] of its reasons).

(b) Second, the Tribunal at [51] of its reasons said:

... the applicant's claim that local JI leaders played a leading role in instigating or carrying out the violence in 2012 is at odds with the country information regarding these events, most of which suggest that the violence was mostly carried out by people from outside the local area and none of which suggest any involvement by JI. If JI had played a significant part in this violence, I believe it would have been reflected in the reports on the violence.

(c) Third, the Tribunal found it was "far-fetched and implausible" that people named by the applicant in the FIR escaped arrest and were able to continue to threaten the applicant and harass the applicant's family over a period of years with impunity, given JI activities had been restricted and JI members faced repression since the Awami League (AL) came to power in 2008 ([52] of its reasons). The Tribunal was unaware of any evidence that suggested outbreaks of anti-Buddhist violence in Cox's Bazar since 2012, or that Buddhists in the area were at risk of harassment or acts of violence from JI, Islamic fundamentalists or anyone else generally ([52] of its reasons).

1. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant was charged with murder in 2014 after a JI leader made a false complaint against the applicant (2014 false murder charges). The Tribunal found that claim to be "far-fetched and implausible" for the following reasons ([68] and [71] of its reasons):

(a) First, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant's 2012 criminal complaint caused the applicant to be targeted by a JI leader or anyone else, nor motivated another JI leader or anyone else to lodge the 2014 false murder charges ([69] of its reasons). The Tribunal was also not satisfied the applicant's faith as a Buddhist would be the sole reason that caused a JI leader to falsely accuse him, given the evidence before the Tribunal did not suggest that Buddhists such as the applicant were at risk of serious harm.

(b) Second, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant would be charged with murder when he was working as a police officer with other police officers at a distance of 150km away from the alleged crime scene ([70] of its reasons).

(c) Third, the Tribunal noted that fraudulent FIRs could easily be obtained in Bangladesh and the applicant's FIR did not confirm he was charged with murder or suspended from his position as a police officer ([71] of its reasons).

(d) Fourth, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant's claim that he decided to leave his police officer job and flee from Bangladesh despite the fact that it was difficult to obtain government jobs in Bangladesh ([72] of its reasons).

1. The Tribunal accepted the applicant's claim that he was a Buddhist but did not accept he faced significant problems practising his religion in Bangladesh, except during the period of the 2012 violence ([77] of its reasons).
2. The Tribunal accepted that Buddhists in Bangladesh could experience discrimination, harm and violence for reasons of religion, and there were instances of societal and Islamist violence, particularly demonstrated by the 2012 violence ([82] of its reasons). However, the Tribunal was not satisfied such problems were widespread and frequent and that Buddhists in Bangladesh were at risk of experiencing serious or significant harm generally. The Tribunal also noted the Bangladesh government's response to the 2012 violence and the continued deployment of security forces to protect Buddhists in Cox's Bazar, which demonstrated its willingness to protect and support Buddhists and their places of worship.
3. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant met the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act ([88] of its reasons).

1. On 25 February 2026, the applicant filed a re-amended application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision after leave was granted. The application contained the following ground of review with particulars:
   1. The Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error due to overlooking cogent and relevant evidence, irrational reasoning and findings, and misunderstanding the review material, and/or failing to give proper consideration to an issue, such that its decision is legally unreasonable.

(a) In rejecting the applicant's claim to have faced problems from members of the Jamaat-e-Islami group after an attack on his village in September 2012 (the JI claim), the Tribunal found the applicant was not "a truthful or a credible witness" and that "much of his evidence regarding the events of 2012 and the problems he and his family faced as a result [were] lacking in credibility": Court Book (CB) 257 at [30], 259 at [49], 260 at [53].

(b) The Tribunal's rejection of the JI claim was based upon its findings at CB 259 - 260 at [50]- [52] that:

1. the applicant's evidence regarding the events of 2012 and the problems which followed was confused and unpersuasive and that account of events in the FIR he provided was significantly different from the account provided during the hearing: CB 259 - 260 at [50].
2. the applicant's claim that local JI leaders played a leading role in instigating or carrying out the violence in 2012 is "at odds with the country information ... none of which suggest any involvement by JI. If JI had played a significant part in this violence, I believe it would have been reflected in the reports on the violence": CB 260 at [51].
3. the claim that the people named in the FIR lodged escaped arrest and were able to continue to threaten the applicant and harass his family over a period of years with impunity far-fetched and implausible: CB 260 [52].

(c) It was not open for the Tribunal to impugn the applicant's claim and credibility on the basis that "none" of the country information suggested any involvement by JI and that his claim "is at odds with the country information" (CB 260 at [51]) when country information contradicted this proposition and supporting the applicant's claim, namely:

1. the delegate's decision, which the Tribunal was tasked with reviewing under s 414 of the Act, extracted country information that reported:

"Buddhists have been subjected to infrequent acts of societal violence because of their perceived political affiliations with the AL. On 30 September 2012 BNP and JI members burned several Buddhist temples and approximately 50 Buddhist houses in Cox 's Bazar during broader lslamist protests sparked by a posting on Facebook (see 'Rohingyas above). DFAT understands that this was the worst attack against the Buddhist community in Bangladesh's history and that police responded effectively to the incident, preventing further violence": see CB 172 and DFAT Country Information Report on Bangladesh dated 5 July 2016 at [3.28] annexed to affidavit of Abu Siddique dated 16 January 2026. (Emphasis added.)

1. The Tribunal decision also refers to the 2014 DFAT report on Bangladesh, which reported:

"Buddhists have faced sporadic instances of societal violence because of their perceived political affiliations with the AL. Such violence generally results in property damage rather than personal injury. Pro-Muslim BNP and JI members burnt several Buddhist temples and approximately 50 Buddhist-owned houses in Cox's Bazar on 30 September 2012 in response to a Facebook post made by a Buddhist youth that allegedly defamed the Quran. Local and international commentators considered the incident to be the worst attack against the Buddhist community in Bangladeshi history": see CB 256 at [28] and DFAT Country Report on Bangladesh dated 20 October 2014 at [3.34] annexed to affidavit of Abu Siddique dated 16 January 2026. (Emphasis added.)

(d) In the premises, the Tribunal's finding that "none" of the country information suggests "any involvement by JI", and impugning the applicant's claim as "at odds with country information" was irrational, indicative of a critical misunderstanding of relevant country information, and reflected a failure to meaningfully consider an issue.

(e) The Tribunal's error was material, as it influenced the conduct of the review, tainted the Tribunal's rejection of one of the applicant's main claims, and affected the Tribunal's adverse assessment of the applicant's credibility: CB 259 at [47] - CB 260 at [56].

1. The applicant was represented at the hearing before me by Mr Chris Honnery of counsel (Mr Honnery). The Minister was represented by Mr Timothy Reilly of counsel (Mr Reilly).
2. The applicant, without objection, relied on Mr Abu Siddque's affidavit deposed on 16 January 2026 (Siddque Affidavit), which annexed the following DFAT Country Information Reports on Bangladesh:

(a) DFAT Country Information Report dated 20 October 2014 (2014 DFAT Report).

(b) DFAT Country Information Report dated 5 July 2016 (2016 DFAT Report).

(c) DFAT Country Information Report dated 22 August 2019 (2019 DFAT Report).

1. The Minister tendered the Court Book, which was marked "Exhibit R1".
2. The Minister, without objection, relied on Ms Kah-Mun Wong's Affidavit affirmed on 20 January 2026 (Wong Affidavit), which attached the following documents that were not included in the Court Book:

(a) Photographs contained in the Minister's file in relation to the applicant.

(b) Applicant's movement record.

(c) Screenshots from the Department's Integrated Client System Environment records.

(d) Transcript of the recording of the Department's interview with the applicant on 14 November 2016.

1. The applicant relied on his counsel's written submissions dated 16 January 2026 and the Minister relied on his counsel's written submissions dated 28 January 2026. I also had the benefit of the helpful oral submissions from Mr Reilly and Mr Honnery.

1. The re-amended application in ground 1 puts the Tribunal's alleged error in a number of different ways, being first, the Tribunal failed to take account of cogent evidence which provided substantial support to the applicant's case; second, the Tribunal's reasons for decision are legally unreasonable in that the reasons contained irrational reasons and findings and third the Tribunal misunderstood the review material.

Alleged failure to take account of cogent evidence, which provided substantial support to the applicant's claim

1. Before considering this ground, I set out the relevant legal principles as to when a failure to take account of cogent evidence, which provided substantial support to the applicant's claim, gives rise to jurisdictional error.

1. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA; CQZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; BEG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (SZMTA) (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3 at [13], Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ said the following:

[13] Amongst the obligations to be observed by the Tribunal in the conduct of the review which are implicit in the scheme of Pt 7 is the obligation to reconsider the merits of the decision under review "in light of the information, evidence and arguments which are relevant to the application and which are provided to it or which it obtains for itself": Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; 75 ALD 630; [2003] FCAFC 184 at [44]. That obligation is fundamental to the nature of the review for which Pt 7 provides. Whilst it is for the Tribunal to assess the relevance of, and the weight to be attributed to, any item of evidence, the Federal Court has properly recognised that the Tribunal would fail to perform its duty of review if it failed to take account of cogent evidence providing substantial support to the applicant's case: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; 302 ALR 572; 136 ALD 41; [2013] FCA 317 at [111]-[112], including any such evidence contained in a document or report provided to it by the Secretary, in the same way that the Tribunal would fail to perform that duty if it failed to take account of a substantial and clearly articulated argument advanced by the applicant in support of that case: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088; 197 ALR 389; 73 ALD 321; [2003] HCA 26 at [24]-[25].

[14] The Tribunal's decision on completion of the review is ordinarily required by s 430 to be recorded in a written statement (s 430(1)(a) of the Act) which, amongst other things, "sets out the reasons for the decision" (s 430(1)(b) of the Act), "sets out the findings on any material questions of fact" (s 430(1)(c) of the Act), and "refers to the evidence or any other material on which the findings of fact were based" (s 430(1)(d) of the Act). The section "entitles a court to infer that any matter not mentioned in the s 430 statement was not considered by the Tribunal to be material_": Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf_ (2001) 206 CLR 323; 180 ALR 1; 62 ALD 225; [2001] HCA 30 at [69].

1. An issue before the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67; [2014] FCAFC 16 (SZSRS) (Katzmann, Griffiths and Wigney JJ) was whether a letter of a reverend supporting SZSRS's claim of being a Christian had been considered in an application for a protection visa and whether the failure to consider the said evidence amounted to jurisdictional error. At [38], the Full Court noted that the issue of whether SZSRS was baptised was an important matter in considering the claim that he was a Christian. This was because the Tribunal had formed the view that baptism was very important in a Christian's life. The reverend's letter bore directly on the issue of whether SZSRS had been baptised. Given the importance of the letter to the claim being advanced, at [39], the Full Court found that if the letter had been considered by the Tribunal it could readily be expected that it would have been referred to in the Tribunal's reasons. Therefore, it was open to infer that the letter was not considered by the Tribunal ([39] of SZSRS). The Full Court found at [47] that whether the failure to consider the said letter amounted to jurisdictional error turned on "the importance of the ignored material to the Tribunal's process of decision-making".
2. The Full Court also said at [54] of SZSRS:

It may be accepted, too, that the distinction between ignoring evidence and ignoring a claim can be useful. So much was accepted by Robertson J when his Honour described it (at [111] ) as a "tool of analysis". His Honour did not suggest that the previous authorities which had drawn the distinction were wrongly decided. The point his Honour was making was that it is too narrow an approach merely to ask in a case such as this whether the ignored material is a claim or part of a claim on the one hand or evidence on the other. Such an approach may provide the answer in some cases, but not in all. That is because, as his Honour also pointed out (at [98] ), the Tribunal can fail to exercise its jurisdiction or fail to consider a claim in a number of different ways, including by ignoring evidence that is important to a claim, or ignoring evidence that, having regard to the course of its decision-making, acquires importance to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Some cases, including the category of case just referred to, may not comfortably fall on either side of the supposed claims/evidence divide, yet the error in ignoring the material may be serious and go to the exercise of the Tribunal's functions. We respectfully agree with Robertson J's analysis.

(Emphasis added)

1. At [56] of SZSRS, the Full Court found that the reverend's letter could reconcile the conflicting oral and documentary evidence about the applicant's claim to be baptised and therefore was "centrally important" to the Tribunal's decision-making process. Therefore, at [57], the Full Court held that the failure to consider the said letter, which was "centrally important" in considering the claim resulted in jurisdictional error.
2. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CZBP [2014] FCAFC 105 (CZBP) (Gordon, Robertson and Griffiths JJ), the issue before the Full Court of the Federal Court was whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider an email and an Amnesty International report which supported the respondent's claim to fear unfair arrest in Iran ([5] and [63] of CZBP). The Full Court decided the Tribunal did fall into such error in this way, as the email and report were important evidence that were ignored in its decision-making process ([63] and [65] of CZBP). To avoid such error, the email and report would have had to have been evaluated by the Tribunal ([65] of CZBP).

What claim or integer of claim was raised by the applicant in this case

1. There is no issue between the parties that the applicant, as set out at [9] of this judgment, raised a claim that he was threatened and targeted by members of JI because the applicant lodged his 2012 criminal complaint.
2. Therefore, I must consider the following issues:

(a) First, what evidence the applicant says was not considered.

(b) Second, whether the evidence was cogent evidence which provided substantial support to the applicant's claim.

(c) Third, whether the Tribunal considered the evidence.

(d) Fourth, whether the Tribunal's failure to take account of the relevant information was material to the applicant's case.

What evidence did the applicant say was not considered

1. The applicant argued that the Tribunal did not consider the following country information which was expressly set out in the delegate's decision dated 18 November 2016 (CB 172):

Buddhists have been subjected to infrequent acts of societal violence because of their perceived political affiliations with the AL. On 30 September 2012 BNP and JI members burned several Buddhist temples and approximately 50 Buddhist houses in Cox's Bazar during broader Islamist protests sparked by a posting on Facebook (see 'Rohingyas', above). DFAT understands that this was the worst attack against the Buddhist community in Bangladesh's history and that police responded effectively to the incident, preventing further violence. A Government committee formed to investigate the incident is yet to report its findings. ISIL claimed responsibility for the murder of a Buddhist monk in the CHT on 14 May 2016.

(Emphasis added)

1. Mr Honnery also submitted that the Tribunal at [28] of its reasons stated:

In 2014 DFAT reported that since 2008 high-profile members of both parties had been arrested and there had also been allegations of disappearances, kidnappings and use of false charges, although these practices had diminished over time.

1. Mr Honnery argued that given this reference in the Tribunal's reasons, the Court could infer the Tribunal had before it the 2014 DFAT Report. The 2014 DFAT Report at [3.34] stated the following (Siddque Affidavit, Annexure B p 12):

Buddhists have faced sporadic instances of societal violence because of their perceived political affiliations with the AL. Such violence generally results in property damage rather than personal injury. Pro-Muslim BNP and JI members burnt several Buddhist temples and approximately 50 Buddhist-owned houses in Cox's Bazar on 30 September 2012 in response to a Facebook post made by a Buddhist youth that allegedly defamed the Quran. Local and international commentators considered the incident to be the worst attack against the Buddhist community in Bangladeshi history. They also reported that the police responded effectively to the incident and prevented further violence. The AL Government formed a committee to investigate the incident but it is yet to publish its findings.

(Emphasis added)

1. Section 414(1) of the Act provides that if a valid application is made under s 412 of the Act for review of a Part 7-reviewable decision, the Tribunal must review the decision. By s 418(1) of the Act, if a valid application is made, the Registrar must give as soon as practicable the Secretary written notice of the making of the application. Pursuant to s 418(2) of the Act, the Secretary must give to the Registrar a statement about the decision under review that "(a) set out the findings of fact made by the person who made the decision; and (b) refers to the evidence on which those findings were based; and (c) gives the reasons for the decision". Pursuant to s 418(3) of the Act, the Secretary must also as soon as practicable after being notified of the application for review give to the Registrar each other document or part of a document that is in the Secretary's possession or control and is considered by the Secretary to be relevant to the review of the decision.
2. Therefore, I find that pursuant to s 418 of the Act, the Tribunal would have ordinarily been given a copy of the delegate's decision, which referenced the evidence contained in the country information as set out at [29] of this judgment. That in my view is sufficient for me to be satisfied that the Tribunal had before it the evidence summarised in the delegate's decision. Further, I am satisfied that, given the Tribunal referenced what DFAT reported in 2014 at [28] of its reasons, the 2014 DFAT Report ordinarily would have been before the Tribunal.

Whether the evidence was cogent evidence which provided substantial support to the applicant's claim

1. The claim being made by the applicant was that following the 2012 violence in Cox's Bazar, the applicant was threatened and targeted by members of JI because the applicant lodged a complaint, being the FIR against Mr Uddin and others who were members of the JI, stating that he believed they were amongst the people responsible for the violence at Cox's Bazar in 2012.
2. I find DFAT's report that JI members had been involved in the 2012 violence, was cogent evidence providing substantial support to the applicant's claim for the following reasons:

(a) DFAT's report of JI's involvement in the 2012 violence was relevant to the Tribunal's assessment of whether the applicant faced threats from JI members after filing the FIR. The Tribunal's reasons disclose at [51] that the Tribunal itself considered such evidence to be relevant to its fact-finding process, in that it looked to see whether there was country information which stated whether JI was involved in the 2012 violence. Notably, the Tribunal stated at [51] of its reasons that "[i]f JI had played a significant part in this violence, I believe it would have been reflected in the [country information] on the violence".

(b) Further, the statement in the 2014 DFAT Report to the effect that JI members burnt several Buddhist temples and approximately 50 Buddhist houses in Cox's Bazar in 2012, albeit one sentence, was clearly evidence which was cogent evidence. As stated at [1.1] of the 2014 DFAT Report, the country report had been prepared by DFAT for protection status determination purposes and provided DFAT's best judgment and assessment at the time of writing. Further, I note that if country information had been considered and accepted by the Tribunal, then it would have been centrally relevant to the Tribunal's fact-finding process of determining whether to accept the applicant's claim.

1. The parties before me agreed that the Tribunal did not consider the evidence summarised in the delegate's decision as set out at [29] of this judgment or the evidence set out in the 2014 DFAT Report as set out at [31] of this judgment. The parties properly accepted that the Tribunal at [51] of its reasons was saying there was no country information that JI had been involved in instigating or carrying out the 2012 violence, when in fact there was such evidence.

Conclusion as to whether the Tribunal failed to consider cogent evidence which provided substantial support to the applicant's claim

1. Given the matters set out at [22] to [36] of this judgment, I find the Tribunal did fail to consider cogent evidence which provided substantial support to the applicant's claim.

Whether the Tribunal's failure to take account of country information was material to the applicant's case

1. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321; [2024] HCA 12 (LPDT) at [14], Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ said the approach the Court is required to take on finding error is as follows:

The question in these cases is whether the decision that was in fact made could, not would, "realistically" have been different had there been no error. "Realistic" is used to distinguish the assessment of the possibility of a different outcome from one where the possibility is fanciful or improbable. Though the applicant must satisfy the court that the threshold of materiality is met in order to establish that the error is jurisdictional, meeting that threshold is not demanding or onerous.

... a court called upon to determine whether the threshold has been met must be careful not to assume the function of the decision-maker: the point at which the line between judicial review and merits review is crossed may not always be clear, but the line must be maintained.

In sum, unless there is identified a basis on which it can be affirmatively concluded that the outcome would inevitably have been the same had the error not been made, once an applicant establishes that there has been an error and demonstrates that there exists a realistic possibility that the outcome of the decision could have been different had that error not been made, the threshold of materiality will have been met (and curial relief will be justified subject to any issue of utility or discretion).

1. In relation to whether the error was material, Mr Honnery submitted that the error was material because:

(a) First, the error was relevant to critical fact-finding, as Mr Honnery put it, "they've damned him based on a false premise, and this has infected the assessment of his credibility and the rejection of a critical claim. If the Tribunal had correctly understood that DFAT had confirmed JI involvement, it changes the whole complexion of the assessment" (Tp20.36-39).

(b) Second, the error tainted the assessment by the Tribunal of the applicant's credibility because it had a "cascading effect" and "coloured" the Tribunal's other findings in relation to the plausibility of the applicant's claims.

1. Mr Reilly submitted that if there was an error, it was not material because notwithstanding the Tribunal at [51] of its reasons found that there was no evidence in the country information of JI members being involved in the 2012 violence, the Tribunal nevertheless proceeded at [52] of its reasons to determine the issue accepting that JI members had some involvement in the 2012 violence. Further, Mr Reilly submitted that even on that basis, the Tribunal found the applicant's claim that the people named in the FIR escaped arrest and were able to continue to threaten the applicant "over a period of years with impunity [was] far-fetched and implausible". Mr Reilly contended that the Tribunal so found on the basis that the country information was to the effect that JI activities had been restricted and the authorities acted relatively quickly to stop the violence and continued to provide protection to the Buddhist community in the area.
2. Mr Honnery submitted that the Tribunal at [52] of its reasons, by using the words "(which I strongly doubt)" after the sentence "even if I accept that JI members had some involvement in the violence in the applicant's local area", showed that the Tribunal was "tainted" in its assessment. Mr Honnery said the following (Tp22.1-8 and Tp46.11-21):

Now, one can see from the language of strongly doubting that a premise that was corroborated by the country information has been misunderstood and that misunderstanding has coloured the implausibility finding at 52. Of course, the tribunal was approaching paragraph 52 from the position that JI involvement was unlikely when the proper starting point, indeed the only starting point, can be, as documented in the DFAT report in the delegate's decision, that JI's involvement was, in fact, confirmed by DFAT, and if the tribunal had correctly understood this, then its calculus in terms of plausibility would have been different.

...

...This is not a case where there is a clean alternative finding. As your Honour has noted, it has maintained strong doubts in paragraph 52. So paragraph 51 isn't neatly quarantined. Noting the High Court's warnings in LPDT about reconstructing a decision-making process - which, I might add, LPDT post-dates Wigney J's decision in the case your Honour mentioned, so it needs to be considered in light of that. We don't reconstruct the decision-making process. Now, here, you can't just cordon off paragraph 51, because the tribunal expressly states in the brackets "which I strongly doubt", but there was no basis for that false premise which it has carried through into its plausibility assessment, and that has in turn cascaded on into paragraph 53, the adverse findings there of concoction.

1. Further, Mr Honnery submitted the following in his written submissions at [26]:

While the Tribunal also reasoned that "even if JI members were involved in the violence in the applicant's local area (which I strongly doubt) the claim that the people named in the FIR lodged by the applicant escaped arrest and were able to continue to threaten him and harass his family over a period of years with impunity was far-fetched and implausible", its express confirmation that it 'strongly doubted' JI members were involved underscores the impact of the errant finding: CB 260 at [52]. The Tribunal's point of departure for its reasoning leading to the implausibility finding was that it "strongly doubt[ed]" JI involvement, which coloured its finding that the claim was implausible: CB 260 at [52]. Moreover, the Tribunal subsequently confirmed that its rejection of the applicant's claim was based upon considering "all of the relevant evidence" - which includes country information that it misunderstood: CB 260 at [53].

1. I do not accept Mr Honnery's submissions, as it is orthodox to use a parenthesis, such as the brackets, to mark off an interjected remark where the sentence would otherwise be complete (Macquarie Dictionary (Pan Macmillan Australia, 2026)). I find the Tribunal by using the parenthesis and inserting the words "(which I strongly doubt)", is interjecting with a remark, that it had made a finding at [51] of its reasons that was contrary to the way it would consider the issue at [52] of its reasons. I also find that on a fair reading of the reasons at [52], the Tribunal in the first sentence was looking at the alternative position of whether it would accept the applicant's claim, accepting that JI members had some involvement in the 2012 violence in the applicant's local area. Further, given the Tribunal was dealing with an alternative position I find that on a proper reading of the Tribunal reasons at [52], the Tribunal's assessment of whether the people named in the FIR lodged by the applicant escaped arrest and were able to continue to threaten him and harass his family over a period of years with impunity was not coloured or affected by the Tribunal's earlier finding at [51] of its reasons.
2. Given that I have found the Tribunal did turn its mind to what its fact-finding would be as to the applicant's claims if it accepted that JI members had some involvement in the violence at Cox's Bazar, I find the error in the Tribunal's reasons at [51], that is failing to take account of cogent evidence, was not material to the Tribunal's decision and no jurisdictional error arises. As I have said, the Tribunal at [52] of its reasons adopted an orthodox approach in considering what its decision would be even if it accepted that the JI had some involvement in the 2012 violence and in the words of the High Court in LPDT at [16], I find the outcome of the Tribunal's decision would inevitably have been the same had the identified error not been made.
3. Accordingly, the ground does not disclose jurisdictional error.

Other ways that the applicant put the jurisdictional error - legal unreasonableness and misunderstanding of review material

1. Given my finding that the Tribunal failed to perform its duty of review by failing to take account of cogent evidence, which provided substantial support to the applicant's case, it is not necessary to deal with the alternative ways the applicant put the jurisdictional error, being legal unreasonableness and misunderstanding of review material. Further, my finding that the error was not material, because the outcome of the Tribunal's decision would inevitably have been the same, would not be any different even if the error on the part of the Tribunal is characterised as legal unreasonableness and/or misunderstanding of review material.

1. As no jurisdictional error has been disclosed, the application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kaur-Bains.