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[2018] WADC 164
District Court of WA
2018-11-30
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : THOMPSON -v- J-CORP PTY LTD [2018] WADC 164
Negligence - Occupiers' liability - Duty of care of principal contract organising activity
Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Bou Najem [2009] HCA 48
Anyco Pty Ltd v Kleeman [2008] WASCA 30; (2008) Aust Torts Reports 81-933
Apostolic Church Australia Limited v Dixon [2018] WASCA 146
Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare [1992] HCA 27; (1992) 176 CLR 408
Bowen v Tutte (1990) Aust Torts Rep 81-043
Bryant v Fawdon Pty Ltd (1993) Aust Tort Rep 81-204; (Unreported, WASCA, Library No 930037, 22 January 1993)
CGU Insurance Limited v Coote (by his Next Friend Stephen Desmond Coote) [2018] WASCA 117
Chelini v Northern Territory Port Authority (1976) 12 ALR 519
Czatyrko v Edith Cowan University [2005] HCA 14; (2005) 79 ALJR 839
Department of Housing and Works v Smith (No 2) [2010] WASCA 25; (2010) 41 WAR 217
Dovuro Pty Limited v Wilkins [2003] HCA 51; (2003) 215 CLR 317
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298
Joslyn v Berryman [2003] HCA 34; (2003) 214 CLR 552
Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Fox [2009] HCA 35; (2009) 240 CLR 1
Lyle v Soc [2009] WASCA 3
Lysaght (Australia) Limited [1975] HCA 9; (1975) 132 CLR 201
March v E. & M.H. Stramare Pty Limited [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506
McLachlan v Purchas (Unreported, WADC, 12 February 1998, Library 980038)
McLachlan v Purchas (Unreported, WASCA, 21 December 1998, Library No 980749)
McLean v Tedman [1984] HCA 60; (1984) 155 CLR 306
Medlin v The State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1
Neindorf v Junkovic [2005] HCA 75; (2005) 80 ALJR 341
Papatonakis v Australian Telecommunications Commission [1985] HCA 3; (1985) 156 CLR 7
Paul v Rendell (1981) 34 ALR 569
Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer [2007] HCA 42; (2007) 238 ALR 761
Shire of Manjimup v Cheetham [2010] WASCA 225
State of New South Wales v Moss [2000] NSWCA 133; (2000) 54 NSWLR 536
Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company Proprietary Limited [1986] HCA 1; (1986) 160 CLR 16
Strong v Woolworths Limited [2012] HCA 5
The Commissioner of Railways v Ruprecht [1979] HCA 37; (1979) 142 CLR 563
Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72; (1981) 150 CLR 402
Town of Port Hedland v Hodder (No 2) [2012] WASCA 212; (2012) 43 WAR 383
Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] HCA 62; (2005) 223 CLR 422
Western Australia v Watson [1990] WAR 248
he was instructed to place ceiling joists, measuring span for rafter for employer, ladder access, traffic over wall plate to get to porch ... standing on pier, part on beam, went to walk off, accident.
R10 GALV. ROD IN PIER,
COG 150 INTO PIER
(OR USE 650 x 150 R10 STARTER)
BUILD INTO PERPEND OR CAST INTO CAVITY.
BOLT TO BEAM AT TOP
(a) avoid lifting more than 5 kg with the left hand in neutral position;
(b) avoid lifting more than 1 kg with the left hand in non-neutral wrist positions;
(c) avoid repetitive left wrist rotary movements; and
(d) avoid left hand held vibratory or impact tool use.
An entrepreneur who organizes an activity involving a risk of injury to those engaged in it is under a duty to use reasonable care in organizing the activity to avoid or minimize that risk, and that duty is imposed whether or not the entrepreneur is under a further duty of care to servants employed by him to carry out that activity. The entrepreneur's duty arises simply because he is creating the risk (Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 59 ALJR 564, at p 587; [1985] HCA 41; 60 ALR 1, at p 42) and his duty is more limited than the duty owed by an employer to an employee.
If an entrepreneur engages independent contractors to do work which might as readily be done by employees in circumstances where there is a risk to them of injury arising from the nature of the work and where there is a need for him to give directions as to when and where the work is to be done and to co-ordinate the various activities, he has an obligation to prescribe a safe system of work. The fact that they are not employees, or that he does not retain a right to control them in the manner in which they carry out their work, should not affect the existence of an obligation to prescribe a safe system. Brodribb's ability to prescribe such a system was not affected by its inability to direct the contractors as to how they should operate their machines.
The duty to use reasonable care in organizing an activity does not import a duty to avoid any risk of injury; it imports a duty to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary risks of injury and to minimize other risks of injury. It does not import a duty to retain control of working systems if it is reasonable to engage the services of independent contractors who are competent themselves to control their system of work without supervision by the entrepreneur. The circumstances may make it necessary for the entrepreneur to retain and exercise a supervisory power or to prescribe the respective areas of responsibility of independent contractors if confusion about those areas involves a risk of injury. But once the activity has been organised and its operation is in the hands of independent contractors, liability for negligence by them within the area of their responsibility is not borne vicariously by the entrepreneur. If there is no failure to take reasonable care in the employment of independent contractors competent to control their own systems of work, or in not retaining a supervisory power or in leaving undefined the contractors' respective areas of responsibility, the entrepreneur is not liable for damage caused merely by a negligent failure of an independent contractor to adopt or follow a safe system of work either within his area of responsibility or in an area of shared responsibility.
Was the risk of harm one which the defendant knew or ought to have known?
Would a reasonable person in the defendant's position have taken the precautions suggested?
The probability that harm would occur if care was not taken
The burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm
Did that breach cause the injuries sustained by Mr Thompson
At common law, a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence when the plaintiff exposes himself or herself to a risk of injury which might reasonably have been foreseen and avoided and suffers an injury within the class of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed (McHugh J [16]).
The standard of care in contributory negligence ... depends on foreseeability and is that of the reasonable and prudent man, so that a defendant is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable and prudent man, he would expose himself to risk of injury: Commissioner of Railways v Ruprecht [1979] HCA 37; (1979) 142 CLR 563.
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) the care which an occupier of premises is required by reason of the occupation or control of the premises to show towards a person entering on the premises in respect of dangers which are due to the state of the premises or to anything done or omitted to be done on the premises and for which the occupier is by law responsible shall, except in so far as he is entitled to and does extend, restrict, modify or exclude by agreement or otherwise, his obligations towards that person, be such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that that person will not suffer injury or damage by reason of any such danger.
(2) The duty of care referred to in subsection (1) does not apply in respect of risks willingly assumed by the person entering on the premises but in that case the occupier of premises owes a duty to the person not to create a danger with the deliberate intent of doing harm or damage to the person or his property and not to act with reckless disregard of the presence of the person or his property.
...
(4) Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), in determining whether an occupier of premises has discharged his duty of care, consideration shall be given to -
(a) the gravity and likelihood of the probable injury; and
(b) the circumstances of the entry onto the premises; and
(d) the knowledge which the occupier of premises has or ought to have of the likelihood of persons or property being on the premises; and
(e) the age of the person entering the premises; and
(f) the ability of the person entering the premises to appreciate the danger; and
(g) the burden on the occupier of eliminating the danger or protecting the person entering the premises from the danger as compared to the risk of the danger to the person.
dangers which are due to the state of the premises or to anything done or omitted to be done on the premises and for which the occupier is by law responsible ...
1. The gravity and likelihood of the probable injury
2. The circumstances of the entry onto the premises and the knowledge of which the defendant has or ought to have had of the likelihood of persons being on the premises
5. The ability of Mr Thompson to appreciate the danger
(i) to be advised by others that the pier cavity was unfilled. This did not occur; or
(ii) to observe that the cavity was unfilled. This could be done by Mr Thompson physically inspecting the pier (which was 2.4 m high) via a ladder or scaffold arrangement or checking it as he 'marked up' from the beams; or
(iii) to enquire of others as to whether the cavity was filled. This did not occur.
6. The burden on J-Corp of eliminating the danger or protecting Mr Thompson from the danger as compared to the risk of the danger to Mr Thompson
where a plaintiff has suffered a significant disabling injury which obviously affects the range and nature of the work he can therefore perform, a tribunal of fact can, without specific evidence as to what other persons with that kind of disability can earn, make a judgment and assessment on a percentage basis or otherwise of the value of the lost capacity [applying Yammine v Kalwy [1979] 2 NSWLR 151].
Where it is clear that the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity as where there has been total loss of capacity to earn in the occupation or profession for which the plaintiff has previously been employed, the court will do its best to place a value on that loss, notwithstanding the absence of evidence of the availability of employment within the plaintiff's residual capacity and evidence of the amount which could be earned in such employment (68,086).
12 August 2014 - 13 October 2016 including Fox v Wood (agreed)
12 August 2014 - 13 October 2016 including Fox v Wood
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
(1979) 142 CLR 563
(1981) 150 CLR 402
(2012) 43 WAR 383
(2005) 223 CLR 422
(1985) 59 ALJR 564
(2005) 221 CLR 234
(1992) 176 CLR 408
(1976) 12 ALR 519
(2005) 79 ALJR 839
(2010) 41 WAR 217
(2003) 215 CLR 317
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(2003) 214 CLR 552
(2009) 240 CLR 1
(1975) 132 CLR 201
(1991) 171 CLR 506
(1984) 155 CLR 306
(1995) 182 CLR 1
(2005) 80 ALJR 341
(1985) 156 CLR 7
(1981) 34 ALR 569
(2007) 238 ALR 761
(2000) 54 NSWLR 536
(1986) 160 CLR 16