ADB20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 191

1. Before the Court is an application made pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) seeking judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) made on 12 December 2019. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision made by a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) to not grant the applicant a protection (Subclass 866) (Class XA) visa (visa).

1. The applicant, who is a citizen of Pakistan, arrived in Australia on 10 February 2011 as the holder of a Maritime Crew (subclass 988) visa, which ceased on 13 February 2011 (Court Book (CB) 267). The applicant has a lengthy migration history which was relevantly summarised by the delegate as follows:

(a) on 18 February 2011, he lodged his first application for a protection visa (first protection visa applications) (CB 1 to 43). The first protection application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent (CB 79 to 91) and the refusal decision subsequently affirmed by the Tribunal on review (CB 99 to 112).

(b) on 28 May 2011, the applicant lodged a second application for a protection visa which later was found to be invalid pursuant to s 48A of the Act;

(c) on 19 March 2012, the applicant applied for Ministerial intervention pursuant to s 417 of the Act. The first respondent elected to not consider the s 417 request (CB 113 to 145); and

(d) on 16 October 2012, the applicant lodged a third application for a protection visa (CB 146 to 177).

1. It is that third protection visa application which is the subject of the instant judicial review proceedings.
2. For reasons which will become relevant later in respect of the hearing of these proceedings (see below [28] to [38] below) it warrants recording at this juncture that, by his protection visa application, the applicant said he required an interpreter in the Urdu language (CB 12). In answer to the question "Which languages to you speak, read or write (including English)?" the applicant responded as follows:

1. On 10 February 2016, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa. The delegate found, by reference to the judgment of the Full Court of the Federal Court in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; (2013) 212 FCR 235, that s 48A of the Act did not prevent the applicant from making the visa application on the basis of complementary protection claims under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (CB 267). However, the delegate was not thereafter satisfied there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there was a real risk he would be subject to significant harm.
2. On 15 March 2016, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision and appointed his migration agent as his authorised recipient (CB 287 to 288). The review application again also specified that the applicant required an interpreter in the Urdu language (CB 287).
3. On 16 September 2019, the Tribunal invited the application (via his authorised recipient) to attend a hearing of the Tribunal (CB 315 to 316). By a response to hearing information form returned to the Tribunal on 24 September 2019 (CB 319 to 322), the applicant's migration agent advised that the applicant required an interpreter in the Pashto language (CB 320). This was again instead confirmed by email from the migration agent to the Tribunal on 30 September 2019 (CB 324) following an email enquiry emanating from the Tribunal to clarify the language discrepancy (CB 325 to 326). On 17 October 2019, the applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal with his representative and was assisted by an interpreter in the Pashto language (CB 329).
4. On 23 October 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant (via his authorised recipient) pursuant to s 424A of the Act (s 424A letter) inviting him to comment on or respond to the following (CB 341 to 344):

(a) inconsistencies between his evidence in the current visa application and the 2011 application; and

(b) his knowledge of the Awami National Party (ANP), which seemed vague given the applicant's claimed involvement.

1. On 26 October 2019, a different migration agent responded to the Tribunal to acknowledge receipt of the s 424A letter and to advise that he had now been appointed as the applicant's representative and authorised recipient (CB 346 to 347). The new representative requested an extension of the time in which to respond to the s 424A letter given his recent appointment. The Tribunal responded on 28 October 2019 granting the extension (CB 348). On 4 November 2019, the applicant's initial migration agent wrote to the Tribunal requesting an extension of time to respond to the s 424 letter on the basis he had been overseas, seemingly unaware that the applicant had since replaced him (CB 351). On 12 November 2019, further correspondence was sent to the Tribunal, this time from a law firm, attaching a form newly appointing a different solicitor as the applicant's representative and authorised recipient (CB 354 to 355) and seeking a further extension of the time in which to respond to the s 424A letter. That further extension was also granted by the Tribunal (CB 356).
2. On 20 November 2019, the applicant's newly appointed solicitor responded to the s 424A letter providing a statutory declaration and documents from the NSW Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors (STARTTS) regarding their treatment of the applicant (CB 360 to 380). The solicitor also provided written submissions by which he requested that the Tribunal further adjourn the review application for a "reasonable period of time" to allow the applicant to receive further psychological treatment before providing additional evidence and arguments in support of his review application (CB 364).
3. On 21 November 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant (via his authorised recipient) notifying the applicant that this most recent request for an adjournment had been refused. The letter relevantly said (CB 383):

...The Tribunal declines this request because a hearing has already been conducted and, therefore, an opportunity already provided for you to give evidence. To the Tribunal's observation, you were well able to meaningfully participate in that hearing and, accordingly, the Tribunal sees no need for another hearing to be held. The Tribunal will now proceed to determine your review and, in doing so, will take into account the submissions and evidence provided on your behalf about your mental state.

1. On 12 December 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 387 to 403).

1. By his 2011 application, the applicant claimed that he and his brother were involved in politics in Pakistan and represented ethnic Pashtuns through the ANP in Karachi (CB 18 to 21). He claimed that he and his family were attacked by thugs affiliated with the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) during riots, that their lives were in great danger, the MQM did not have any regard for human life, and that his family were strong supporters of the ANP. He also claimed that the MQM had attempted to kill he and his brother, and controlled the police and other authorities.
2. At the Tribunal hearing referred to at [2(a)] above, the applicant repeated claims from his first protection visa application that he was of adverse interest to the Taliban because he had been implicated in their activities (CB 111 at [62]).
3. At an interview with the delegate in respect of the instant visa application held on 30 May 2014, the applicant raised new claims that he:

(a) had experienced issues with other ANP members in a particular region in 2009 (CB 273); and

(b) feared harm in Pakistan from the brothers of a woman with whom he had been in a relationship in Pakistan, and who had become pregnant outside of marriage (CB 273 to 275).

1. The Tribunal outlined the factual background and summarised the applicant's migration history (CB 388 to 389 at [1] to [7]), including that the current visa application had been accepted by the Department as valid on the basis of the decision in SZGIZ (CB 389 at [8]). It observed that as a result that its task was only to determine whether the applicant met the complementary protection criterion (CB 389 at [8]).
2. The Tribunal summarised the applicant's evidence given at hearing (CB 389 to 392 at [10] to [25]) and identified numerous inconsistencies between the protection claims made in the first protection visa application (including his evidence given at an interview with a delegate and the hearing before the Tribunal relating to that application), the Ministerial intervention request and the current visa application (CB 392 to 393 at [26] to [34]).
3. The Tribunal found that the applicant's evidence had varied at different stages and was also inconsistent with the account he gave to the Tribunal at the hearing held on 17 October 2019 (2019 hearing) (CB 394 at [35] to [39]). For example, at the 2019 hearing the applicant said he had never been attacked in Pakistan, which was in contrast to his 2011 claim to have been attacked by members of the MQM party (CB 394 at [35]).
4. The Tribunal recounted having put its concerns to the applicant by the s 424A letter and described the contents of the applicant's Statutory Declaration provided in response (CB 394 to 395 at [40] to [49]). It found the applicant's responses to the concerns to be "very poor attempts" to conceal obvious inconsistencies in his accounts about his life in Pakistan (CB 394 to 395 at [40] to [42]). The Tribunal set out the key inconsistencies it had identified in his evidence and found that the applicant's explanations for those inconsistencies did not explain why certain evidence was not advanced at the hearing or when he made his initial claims for protection (CB 395 to 396 at [43] to [49]). It also had regard to the applicant's submission that any inconsistencies were caused by to his mental health issues, as well as to the summaries about his psychological treatment.
5. The Tribunal did not accept that the "manifold and very significant" inconsistencies between 2011 and 2019 were due to lapses of memory, or to anxiety. Rather, it found that the inconsistencies in the applicant's accounts were due to his lack of truthfulness as a witness (CB 396 at [50] to [52]). It further found that this lack of truthfulness reflected in his response to the s 424A letter where he had advanced new claims, which it characterised as being an attempt to conceal the inconsistencies in his evidence. The Tribunal also rejected the applicant's claims made at earlier stages in various visa applications that his representative had failed to put forward certain claims (for example about his relationship with a Punjabi woman) but found that these did not "overcome the sheer scale of the inconsistency" of the applicant's evidence (CB 396 to 397 at [53]).
6. In relation to the applicant's knowledge of the ANP and politics in Pakistan, the Tribunal found he had not explained his persistent vagueness about his own political party. It did not accept that his claimed mental state could excuse his failure to respond properly to questions, and concluded this could only be attributed to the lack of truthfulness of his evidence (CB 397 at [57] to [58]). It further found that this vagueness to be inconceivable for someone who claimed to have supported and undertaken activities for a party for a number of years (CB 397 to 398 at [59]).
7. Having considered the applicant's evidence cumulatively, the Tribunal found he was not a witness of truth and that the account of events on which his claims were based were false (CB 398 at [60]). The Tribunal disbelieved all claims made by the applicant (CB 398 at [61] to [62]). The Tribunal observed that it had no credible evidence before it (CB 398 at [62]):

(a) that the applicant or any member of his family suffered harm in Pakistan;

(b) that anyone in Pakistan sought to harm him or his family;

(c) to explain why he left Pakistan and why he did not want to return;

(d) to suggest he would undertake activities for the ANP on return to Pakistan; and/or

(e) about his political opinions.

1. The Tribunal found that the documents submitted by the applicant at various stages did not overcome its concerns about his credibility, noting his having given inconsistent evidence including in relation to the matters discussed in those documents, and therefore it did not give weight to them (CB 398 to 399 at [64] to [66]).
2. The Tribunal set out its consideration of the request for a further hearing and referred to its earlier findings that the applicant's mental state was, in its view, not the reason for evidential inconsistencies and repeated that concerns about the applicant's credibility arose because he was not a witness of truth. The Tribunal observed that the applicant appeared able to comprehend, and respond to, its questions and considered that he had a meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing (CB 400 at [71] to [72]).
3. The Tribunal assessed whether the complementary protection criterion was met on the basis of the "only grounds remaining for consideration", namely that the applicant was a Pashtun man who would return to Karachi (CB 401 at [75]). It had regard to country information that indicated that Pashtuns formed a large community in Karachi and that there had been a significant decline in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, including in Karachi (CB 401 to 402 at [75] to [78]). The Tribunal concluded that there were not substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm upon return to Pakistan on this basis and concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed (CB 402 to 403 at [80]).
4. For completeness, the Tribunal noted that a certificate had purportedly been issued pursuant to s 438(1) of the Act in respect of documents on "Department file B" (being the first visa application). The Tribunal found the certificate to be invalid (CB 403 at [81] to [82]). It found there was no need for the documents themselves to be disclosed to the applicant because they were "nothing more than administrative records", were not relevant to the grounds on which the review was determined and were not adverse to the applicant.
5. It also considered a s 438(1) certificate issued in respect of documents on "Department file A" (being the instant visa application). The Tribunal found the certificate to be invalid (CB 403 at [81] to [82]). It found that the contents of the administrative documents that were the subject of that certificate were also irrelevant and not adverse to the applicant. The other documents emanated from a media publication in Pakistan regarding candidates for elections for the ANP. In relation to the latter documents, the Tribunal found that although that information was relevant to the applicant's claims, it disbelieved his claims to have undertaken activities for that party and that information about candidates for elections in that particular area was not adverse to the applicant.
6. The Tribunal concluded that it was not satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) (CB 403 at [85] to [87]).

1. By an application to show cause filed with this Court on 9 January 2020, the applicant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. By his application to the Court, in the section to specify whether the applicant requires an interpreter (and, if so, of which language) the applicant simply responded "Pakistani".[1]
2. The proceedings were initially docketed to another Judge of the Court (first primary Judge). On 13 February 2020, a Registrar of the Court made procedural orders for the preparation of the matter for hearing before the first primary Judge. The proceedings were later transferred to the Court's central migration docket. On 10 March 2025, a Registrar made further procedural orders. The proceedings remained in the central migration docket until 15 July 2025, on which date they were docketed to me and I made orders listing them for final hearing on 2 December 2025, with orders for their preparation (December orders). By the December orders, the applicant was granted a further opportunity to file and serve an amended application and any Affidavit evidence. The applicant and first respondent were ordered to file written submissions 14 and 7 days before the final hearing (respectively).
3. On 16 September 2025, a Notice of Address for Service was filed by the applicant appointing Mr Abu Siddque as his solicitor. On 18 November 2025, a Notice of Intention to Withdraw as Lawyer was filed by Mr Siddque. On 25 November 2025, a Notice of Withdrawal of Lawyer (Withdrawal Notice) was filed by Mr Siddque, by which he erroneously stated that the applicant required an interpreter in the Arabic language for the final hearing. Having regard to the many junctures at which the applicant had previously specified his language preferences, on which occasions Arabic had never been requested, this inclusion in the Withdrawal Notice appeared to be in error.
4. A Withdrawal Notice is an important court form because it not only puts a party (in this case an applicant in migration proceedings for whom English is not a first language) on notice of the details of their next Court event, but also informs the Court as to the need for any interpreter, and the language required. Had the Court not noticed the discrepancy in the language sought (see [36] to [37] below), there existed a real risk that because of the error in Withdrawal Notice, the final hearing might not have been able to conveniently proceed. The effects of that, quite aside from inconvenience to the instant parties, would have included a waste of Court resources being a hearing fixture which could not readily have been filled by another case at such short notice. Care must be taken by practitioners in the completion of forms. Small errors can have broad consequences.
5. Section 190 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (Court Act) prescribes the overarching purpose of the Court's practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. This includes the need for parties to conduct their proceedings in a way which takes into account the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court and efficient disposal of the Court's overall caseload: see ss 190(2)(b) and (c) of the Court Act. Section 191 of the Court Act requires that parties conduct proceedings consistent with the overarching purpose and imposes a duty on the legal representative of a party to assist that party in complying with their own duty (see s 191(2) of the Court Act).
6. Where a legal practitioner gives notice of their intention to withdraw as a party's representative on the same date that their client is required to file documents as ordered by the Court, and the party fails to do so, a real question arises as to whether that lawyer has complied with s 191(2) of the Court Act. While in the present case that circumstance did not prevent the final hearing from proceeding, should the hearing not have been able to conveniently do so, the effect of s 191(4) and (5) of the Court Act and r 32.05 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) is that the Court would be mandated to consider whether Mr Siddque should bear the costs thrown away occasioned by those circumstances: see Saleem v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 241 at [41] to [47].
7. Other than the documents pertaining to the appointment and withdrawal of his lawyer, no other documents have been filed for the applicant in these proceedings since their commencement (in time, or at all). It will be observed from the preceding paragraphs and by reference to the December orders referable to the date of the hearing, that the applicant's solicitor notified the applicant of his intention to withdraw as his lawyer on the same date that the applicant's amended application, Affidavit evidence and written submissions were due to be filed with the Court.
8. The first respondent filed written submissions as directed.
9. On 27 November 2025, prior to the hearing, the Registry approached my chambers seeking clarification as to which language the applicant spoke in order to organise an interpreter the Court. In order to ascertain what interpreter was required, the Court's Registry:

(a) emailed Mr Siddque, noting that the Notice of Withdrawal had requested an Arabic interpreter. Mr Siddque responded by email to say: "[a]pologies for the earlier oversight. The applicant speaks Pashto and will require a Pashto interpreter for the upcoming hearing"; and

(b) rang the applicant directly, where he confirmed that "either an Urdu or Pashto [interpreter] will be suitable for the hearing."

1. The Court's Registry ultimately booked an interpreter in the Urdu language having regard to the fact that an Urdu interpreter had been utilised at the previous callover before the Registrar on 10 March 2025.

1. On 2 December 2025, the parties appeared before me for hearing. The applicant was unrepresented but assisted by an interpreter in the Urdu language.
2. At the commencement of the hearing I confirmed with the applicant and interpreter were able to understand each other and, despite certain matters which are detailed at [29] to [38] below, by the conclusion of the hearing I was satisfied that the applicant had understood the interpreter and been able to meaningfully engage with the Court, and with the submissions of the first respondent.
3. The Court Book was tendered for the first respondent and marked as Exhibit "1R". For the first respondent were also read the following Affidavits, without objection:

(a) Affidavit of Matthew Davis Sheedy affirmed on 25 November 2025 (Sheedy Affidavit);

(b) Affidavit of Matthew Davis Sheedy affirmed on 27 November 2025 (Affidavit of Service).

1. Despite having had a number of opportunities to amend, the applicant had not done so. As such, the grounds which fall for consideration are those contained in the originating application, which are as follows (emphasis in original):
   1. The Second Respondent's (the Tribunal) decision to refuse to exercise its power under s 427(l)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) to adjourn the hearing to allow the applicant to receive treatment for his mental health issues was unreasonable and irrational, unfair and in breach of s 422B(3) of the Act and/or constituted a constructive failure by the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction.
   2. The tribunal's notice issued under s 424A of the Act to the applicant was defective.

Particulars

1. The notice failed to give to the applicant clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and
2. The notice failed to ensure the applicant understood why the information in the notice was relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review.

1. Each of the grounds was interpreted to the applicant and he was given the opportunity address them in turn. When responding to ground 2 the applicant began to engage the interpreter in discussion which then involved the applicant appearing agitated and gesturing at the interpreter. The interpreter indicated that the applicant was asking him to explain the meaning of the ground to him. While trying to ascertain why the ground required explanation (given it had been drafted by the applicant himself), the applicant said he required a different Urdu interpreter[2]. After some discussion with the Court, the applicant said he did not in fact have any difficulty understanding the interpreter, to whom he also apologised.

1. By this ground the applicant alleges that the Tribunal refused to exercise its power under s 427 of the Act to adjourn the hearing so that he could receive treatment for mental health issues. The applicant says that this refusal was unreasonable, irrational and unfair.
2. When asked to address this ground the applicant said that, at the time of the Tribunal hearing, he was being treated by a psychologist and was suffering with memory loss. The applicant contends that the Tribunal member asked him "too many questions" and that he requested another hearing, but was not given a further hearing opportunity. The applicant said that if his circumstances had been understood properly by the Tribunal, he would have been granted the visa. The applicant further explained that he believed there to be a legal error because he did not have a legal representative to act on his behalf before the Tribunal. I drew the applicant's attention the Court Book to observe that he had been represented throughout the Tribunal proceedings, ultimately by a solicitor. The applicant said he was aware that other applicants like him had been granted the same type of visa and that it was merely "luck of the draw" depending on before which Tribunal member one appeared.
3. The first respondent says ground one has no merit and contends that, to the extent the ground directs itself to the manner in which the Tribunal exercised its discretion in respect of the adjournment request, it considered the written submissions provided by the applicant's solicitor requesting the adjournment, as well as the documents from STARTTS providing summaries of the applicant's psychological treatment. The first respondent says that the Tribunal gave cogent reasons for refusing to provide a further hearing opportunity, namely that it had already conducted a hearing and considered that the applicant had been able to meaningfully participate therein (CB 383 and 400 at [71] to [72]). The first respondent says this constitutes an evident and intelligible justification such that it cannot be said that proceeding in that way was irrational or unreasonable, citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (Li) at [76].
4. In respect of the earlier summary of psychological treatment provided by STARTTS which said that the applicant had experienced issues with concentration and memory (CB 378 to 379), the Tribunal observed that a more recent summary reported slight improvement in the applicant's concentration, and said he was coping well after having found a job and he had agreed to be discharged from STARTTS (CB 374 to 375). As the first respondent correctly observes, that was the extent of the medical evidence before the Tribunal. The first respondent contends that this evidence was not so compelling that no reasonable decision-maker could have refused the applicant's request: Li at [91].
5. I accept the submissions of the first respondent. While cast as a ground challenging the reasonableness of the Tribunal's exercise of discretion, in truth the applicant is reiterating his claim that mental health issues affected his ability to participate in the Tribunal hearing. I agree that the Tribunal's expressed reasons for refusing the applicant's adjournment request were evident and intelligible. Further, the psychological evidence which was provided by the applicant did not touch upon the applicant's ability to accurately recall and convey information at the Tribunal hearing in response to matters raised by the Tribunal. In all of the circumstances, there is no meaningful foundation upon which to impugn what the Tribunal did on the basis of the evidence before it, and for the reasons it gave. I am not satisfied that the error alleged by ground 1 is established.

1. By this ground, the applicant alleges that the s 424A letter was defective. Following the exchanges which are summarised at [41] above, the applicant did not elucidate the error contended for by this ground, but rather said as follows:

Thank you very much. I accept everything about the decision, but I will still insist on requesting that I should be given another opportunity for another hearing.[3]

1. In respect of the ground as it is expressed in the application, the first respondent says that despite the letter having been expressed as being issued pursuant to s 424A, it is well-established that 'information' for the purposes of s 424A of the Act does not include the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence, citing SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 at [18].
2. The first respondent submits that, in the alternative, if the Tribunal was required to comply with s 424A, the s 424A letter did so comply with s 424A(1)(a) of the Act.
3. I accept the first respondent's submission in respect of this ground also.
4. Contrary to the assertion in particular (a) to this ground, I am satisfied that the s 424A letter did clearly particularise the information the Tribunal considered would be the reason, or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. Namely, it detailed specific inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence and what the Tribunal considered to be vague evidence regarding his knowledge of his political party. Further, and contrary to the assertion in particular (b) to the ground, the s 424A letter also complied with s 424A(1)(b) as it explained that if it relied on those inconsistencies to find that the applicant was not a witness of truth, then it would ultimately find that the applicant's evidence was not credible and that there were not substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. It is also relevant context that the applicant was legally represented throughout the review before the Tribunal and that the s 424A letter was responded to and no issue was taken with its validity during the proceedings.
5. However, it is also true that the content of the particulars given were inconsistencies and doubts the Tribunal appears to held about the applicant's evidence to him for comment under s 424A of the Act. There can therefore be no jurisdictional error arising from the Tribunal failing to comply with s 424A, when it was not in fact required to. Conversely, there is no error in the Tribunal, out of an abundance of caution, putting particulars to an applicant (even purportedly pursuant to s 424A of the Act) when the section does not require it.
6. In SZUXO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 162 ALD 62 per Katzmann J at [35] to [36]:

...But the question here is whether they were in fact information within the meaning of s 424A. That question is not answered by what the Tribunal did. At best, the Tribunal's conduct proves that it considered that the information would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the delegate's decision. Yet, the Tribunal may well have taken the course that it did for more abundant caution or out of a concern for fairness although the section had no operation: SZGIY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 68 at [30]. At all events, if the Tribunal believed that the decision records and/or what they revealed amounted to "information" for the purposes of s 424A, then it was mistaken.

It follows that the primary judge was correct. Despite what the Tribunal itself may have thought, s 424A was not engaged.

1. For completeness, the first respondent made submissions in light of the Tribunal's decision not to alert the applicant to the existence of the non-disclosure certificates purportedly issued under s 438(1)(a) of the Act: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421 (SZMTA) at [2]. Those certificates appear at CB 293 to 294. The documents covered by the certificates are at Annexures "MDS-1" and "MDS-2" of the Sheedy Affidavit. The first respondent accepts that both certificates were invalid, as found by the Tribunal: SZMTA at [19].
2. It was further submitted that the Tribunal was required to disclose the existence of the invalid certificates to the applicant. As it did not do so, this was a breach of its obligation to afford procedural fairness: SZMTA (supra) at [2]. However, the breach resulted in no "practical injustice" and was not material to the Tribunal's decision such that it did not result in jurisdictional error: SZMTA (supra) at [38]. I accept that the documents covered by the certificates had no bearing on the review, as found by the Tribunal: see Chi Cong Le v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 178; (2019) 272 FCR 1 at [41] per Nicholas, Katzmann and Bromwich JJ.
3. In relation to the one document that the Tribunal considered to be of some relevance, being the media publication regarding candidates for elections for the ANP in Pakistan, the Tribunal found that the information contained within it was not adverse to the applicant and in any event disbelieved the applicant's claims to have undertaken activities for the ANP (CB 403 at [83] to [84]).
4. In circumstances where the Tribunal did not rely on the document and where it had no bearing on the reasons why the Tribunal made its decision, I am satisfied that the Tribunal's failure to disclose the existence of the document was not material and no jurisdictional error arises.

1. The applicant has failed to establish either of the grounds raised by him and I am satisfied that there is no other error present in the Tribunal's decision. Accordingly, it is a privative clause decision and the applicant must be dismissed. I will so order.
2. I will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given.

[1] Application filed 9 January 2020 at p 4

[2] There was no suggestion by the applicant that he required an interpreter to interpret in a different language

[3] Hearing Transcript 2 December 2025 at T15.14 to T15.16