Liability of Mr Amin
49ASIC contends that Mr Amin was "involved" in the contraventions of ss 911A, 911C and 1041H committed by Vault, and seeks declarations to that effect, an order pursuant to s 206E disqualifying him from managing a corporation, and an order pursuant to s 1101B(1) restraining him from carrying on a financial services business.
50Section 79 provides that a person is involved in a contravention where that person:
(a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; or
(b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention; or
(c) has been in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or
(d) has conspired with others to effect the contravention.
51Mr Amin was at all material times the sole director, secretary and shareholder of Vault.
52From his meeting with Pepperstone in June 2013, he knew that Vault would be required to hold an AFSL if it were to carry on a business of the kind envisaged, and he knew that no AFSL had been obtained. He was responsible for establishing most of the conditions necessary for Vault to carry on its business: he registered the domain name, incorporated the company, opened its bank accounts and registered its business name. He was the sole signatory of and controlled Vault's bank accounts, into which Vault's clients paid almost $1.1 million. He was thus knowingly concerned in Vault conducting a financial services business without holding an AFSL.
53Mr Amin established Vault's website (using the domain name www.kiwifxbank.com), and he knew that the website documents were to be published on it. He admits that he knew that those documents conveyed representations that were misleading; in particular, he was party to the decision to include in the financial services guide the fictitious name of Alex Edward as managing director. I am satisfied that Mr Amin actually knew that the website and website documents conveyed representations that were misleading and deceptive, and intentional participated and assisted in the publication of those representations. Accordingly, I am satisfied that he was knowingly concerned in Vault holding out that it held an AFSL when it did not, and engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct.
54Accordingly, Mr Amin was involved, in the relevant sense, in each contravention. However, s 79 is not a "stand alone" provision that operates universally in respect of every contravention of the Act: it operates in conjunction with other provisions of the Act which impose liability on a person involved in a contravention: see, for example, ss 181, 182 and 183 (directors' duties); s 209(2)-(3) (related party transactions); s 254L(2), (3) (redemption of redeemable preference shares); s 256D(3), (4) (share capital reductions); s 412(9) (explanatory statement in relation to compromise with creditors); s 1041I (civil liability for misleading or deceptive conduct). As I explained in ASIC v Maxwell [(at 388 [57], [76], [124] and [125]), the availability of s 79 to impose accessorial liability has been carefully and deliberately marked out through the Act and, in this way, the Act specifies when, for the purposes of the Act, consequences attach to being "involved" in a contravention. No such consequences were specified for being "involved" in a contravention of ss 727, 734, 911A and 911B, and accordingly, the accessorial liability provisions of s 79 were not available, or did not have any relevance, in respect of contraventions of those sections. The same applies in respect of s 911C.
55However, ASIC submitted that "involvement" within s 79 in a contravention was relevant, even where the section concerned did not attached consequences to it, by reason that s 83 had the effect that the words "person has ... contravened" in s 206E(1)((a)(ii) and s 1101B(1)(a)(i) extend to include a person who was "involved" in a contravention within the meaning of s 79 - a conclusion which is apparently supported by ASIC v Australian Investors Forum Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 267; (2005) 53 ACSR 305, [92], [110]-[111] (Palmer J), see also ASIC v Scott [2012] NSWSC 1643, [26] (Black J)]. For the reasons that follow, I regret that I am unable to agree.
56Section 83 provides as follows:
Officers, and other persons, in default
83 A reference, in relation to a contravention, to an officer of a body corporate, or to a person, who is in default is a reference to an officer of the body (including a person who later ceases to be such an officer), or to a person, as the case may be, who is involved in the contravention.
57The starting point for s 83 is that there be a reference, elsewhere in the Act and in relation to a contravention, to an officer or a person who is in default. The sole function of s 83 is to define the meaning of the terms "officer in default" and "person in default" where they appear elsewhere in the Act - in particular in ss 270(2), (3), 271(5), 328A(4) and 328B(2); see also s 1314(4). These provisions impose liability on an "officer in default" or a "person in default", in terms of which the following (using s 270(2) as an example) is typical (emphasis added):
Where a person who becomes the holder of a registrable charge fails to comply with subsection 268(1) , the person and, if the person is a body corporate, any officer of the body corporate who is in default, each contravene this subsection.
58Section 83 is the successor of (NSW) Companies (NSW) Code 1981, s 572(1), which provided:
Where a provision of this Code provides that an officer of a corporation or other person who is in default is guilty of an offence, the reference to the officer or other person who is in default shall, in relation to a contravention of, or failure to comply with, the provision, be construed as a reference to any officer of the corporation ... or any person, as the case may be, who is in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention or failure.
59Thus, in Bethune v Hamilton (1987) 12 ACLR 279, (WA) Companies (WA) Code 1961, s 263, provided:
If a company fails to comply with this section, the company and any officer of the company who is in default are each guilty of an offence.
60Pidgeon J said (at 285):
What must be established in order to make the defendant a party to the offence is that the company failed to file its annual return, that the defendant was an officer of the company and was in default. Section 572 defines an officer or person in default and indicates how it can be proved.
61In Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Smith (1988) 13 ACLR 406, the question was whether the defendant was an "officer in default" for the purposes of Companies (NSW) Code, s 96(3), which provided (emphasis added):
A corporation that, or other person who, contravenes this section and any officer of such a corporation who is in default are each guilty of an offence".
62It was in that context that, as McInerney J said (at 409):
The question arose whether the respondent was an officer in default in the terms of s 572(1) of the Companies (NSW) Code.
63Thus s 83 has work to do only where there is a reference in some other provision to an officer, or to a person, who is in default, in those terms. There must be a reference to "an officer in default" or "a person in default" before s 83 is attracted. There is no such reference in s 911A or s 911C. The Act does not provide for accessorial liability in respect of those sections, and accordingly, I do not consider it appropriate to make a declaration that Mr Amin was involved in the contraventions of s 911A and s 911C.
64The position is somewhat different in respect of the contravention of s 1041H, because s 1041I imposes civil liability on a person involved in such a contravention. However, unlike s 911A and s 911C, a contravention of s 1041H is not an offence, and s 1041I gives rise only to a private right to damages by a person who has suffered loss or damage, not a public right [contrast, in this respect, s 1041E, which can found criminal as well as civil liability and therefore involves a public right]. The essential basis on which declarations of this kind are made in this type of proceeding - vindication of the public right - is not present where the only potential relevance of being a "person involved" is liability to a private claim for damages. Accordingly, I do not consider it appropriate to make a declaration that Mr Amin was a person involved in the contravention of s 1041H.
65However, that does not conclude whether the banning orders sought are available against Mr Amin.