Abramsson & Abramsson (No 5) [2025] FedCFamC1F 500 (24 July 2025)

1. There is no Court by the name "Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia". This Court was formerly known as the Family Court of Australia and is now known as the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1).
2. The design of the seal affixed to this Order issued by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) was determined by the Attorney-General pursuant to the undated Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Seal) Determination 2021 signed by the Attorney-General.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). In addition to the use of pseudonyms for the parties, other changes have been made to the published judgment to protect the identity of a party or a witness. Such changes (other than when a letter is used instead of a name or an address) are apparent on the face of the judgment by the use of square brackets

1. A rehearing of competing parenting applications between Mr Abramsson ("the father") and Ms Abramsson ("the mother") is due to commence on 28 July 2025 for seven days. This follows successful appeals by both parties against the final parenting order made by another judge of this Court on 6 December 2024. On 13 May 2025, the Full Court remitted the matter for rehearing, and on 5 June 2025, the matter was set down for trial commencing on 28 July 2025.
2. The order made on 6 December 2024, provided for the children, X who is 7 and Y who is 4, to live with the father and spend time with the mother, initially during daytime hours only but from February 2025 for alternate weekends and half school holidays.
3. The mother withheld the children and on 29 May 2025 a recovery order was made, and the mother was restrained from spending time or communicating with the children until further order.
4. Since the matter last came before me on 12 June 2025, both parties have now become legally represented through the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme ("the Scheme").
5. On 18 July 2025, the father filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking that the trial of this matter be vacated and that the matter be set down for a final hearing on a date to be fixed. In the alternative, the father's legal practitioners seek leave to withdraw from the proceedings but requested that submissions in relation to the alternative position be made after the determination of the adjournment application.
6. The adjournment application is opposed by the mother and by the Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL").
7. The parties were informed that if the trial is adjourned, alternative dates for trial could not be allocated prior to January 2026.

1. Counsel for the father submitted that neither she nor her instructing solicitors will have sufficient time to prepare for the trial due to commence next Monday, 28 July 2025 and it is on that basis that the adjournment is sought.
2. On 12 June 2025 (a Thursday), an order was made under the discretionary provisions of s 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") banning the parties from personally cross-examining the other. The father contacted Legal Aid Queensland on 17 June 2025, seeking the appointment of legal representatives under the Scheme. On 8 July 2025, the father's solicitor was appointed and they initially retained counsel on 11 July 2025, but the brief was returned on 14 July 2025, as counsel indicated they did not have sufficient time to prepare. The father's solicitor retained Ms Mythen of counsel on 16 July 2025, who was provided with an e-brief on 17 July 2025.
3. Notice was given to the other parties of the proposed application for adjournment on 17 July 2025 when Ms Mythen became aware of the extent of the brief and her assessment that she would not have time to properly prepare.
4. It is submitted on the father's behalf that as there are significant complexities in what has been a highly contested parenting dispute involving potentially 1,800 pages of subpoenaed material and hundreds of hours of recordings, it would be highly prejudicial to the father for the matter to proceed, where his legal representatives contend they will have insufficient time to properly prepare.

1. The mother opposes the adjournment application. Her counsel, Mr Mould, was retained on 4 July 2025. Mr Mould submits that there are serious questions to be tried, namely, the mother's allegations of the father's continuing neglect of the children, who live with him and spend no time nor communicate with her. The nature of the neglect includes a failure to provide basic necessities such as food and a failure to bathe the children or ensure they attend school (although I note that only one child attends school while the other child attends an early learning facility).
2. It is conceded that many of these allegations were the subject of evidence at the trial last year, but it is contended that there are fresh allegations of this nature.
3. Further, it is submitted on behalf of the mother that the children have expressed clear wishes not to live with the father. However, given the children's tender ages, it is conceded that their wishes will not be determinative.
4. It is further argued on behalf of the mother, that should the adjournment be granted there will likely be a further interim application by the mother to spend time with the children pending the adjourned trial and there would likely be a need for a further Family Report for trial.
5. The ICL also opposes the adjournment of the trial and submits that the paramountcy of the children's welfare supports the trial proceeding.
6. Ms E, the Family Report writer, last saw the children on 17 June 2025, when both children were distressed, particularly Y who was highly distressed. In her addendum report filed on 20 June 2025, Ms E opined:

... [the children's] behaviour is a direct result and a reflection of the traumatic impact of the prolonged parental conflict and parenting dispute, and the multiple abrupt changes in parenting arrangements.

In my opinion, to avoid further harm being experienced by the children, it is imperative that a final decision about the parenting arrangement be made as soon as possible. In my opinion, there is no likely prospect of a co-parenting arrangement being successful, and therefore, the children should live with one of their parents and have no contact with the other.

1. The ICL concedes that the material in the case is significant but relevantly submits:

(a) In relation to the trial last year, although there were hundreds of recordings referred to by the parents, only three audio and one video recording were tendered into evidence in circumstances where both parents were privately legally represented;

(b) The recordings and the transcripts for the three audio recordings (which are relatively short) were made available to both parents' lawyers on 7 July 2025, and in the previous proceedings the transcripts were accepted as accurate;

(c) The mother has made additional recordings in December 2024 and January 2025, and the ICL intends to tender one of those recordings for which her office has prepared a transcript, also provided to both parents;

(d) The ICL submits that the Department of Families, Seniors, Disability and Child Safety have had ongoing involvement in this matter since the trial last year and she has issued a subpoena or hopes to issue a subpoena for a representative to attend at the trial to indicate what, if any, intentions they have to further intervene in the future with the family;

(e) At this stage, the Court continues to have jurisdiction as no orders have been made in any child protection proceedings;

(f) The ICL informed the Court that she is currently liaising with two further potential witnesses: Ms GG, the director of the Early Learning Centre attended by Y, and Ms HH, the guidance officer at X's current school, to ensure that the Court has available current evidence about the children for the trial;

(g) If the trial is adjourned, the ICL concedes that a further Family Report may be necessary, but submitted she would have grave concerns about the children's further involvement in that process which could be regarded as system's abuse;

(h) Both parents are highly intelligent and should be able to adequately assist their legal representatives in preparation for the trial and the ICL confirmed her willingness to continue to provide assistance to the lawyers now acting in their preparation for the trial; and

(i) If the adjournment is granted, the father's legal representatives may be able to appear just for the purpose of cross-examination of the mother.

1. I indicated to the parties during the hearing that if the adjournment is not granted, I would be prepared to move the commencement of the trial to Wednesday, 30 July 2025, rather than Monday, 28 July 2025, and to continue the trial, if necessary, until 7 August 2025, rather than 5 August 2025 as currently listed. As counsel for the mother indicated that he is in a part-heard matter recommencing on 7 August 2025, I indicated that I would be prepared to not sit on 7 August 2025, but put the matter over for a final day to 12 August 2025. However, counsel for the father informed the Court that she has plans to be overseas from 11 August 2025.
2. The father's solicitor was retained on 8 July 2025, and his counsel on 16 July 2025. They were each retained in circumstances where they were on notice that the matter had been set down for seven days commencing on 28 July 2025. The length of the trial, of itself, would give a reasonable indication that there is likely to be complexity in the matter including considerable material. The father's solicitor will have had 19 days to prepare (including weekends) if the trial starts on Monday and counsel will have had 11 days to prepare (including weekends). It is to be expected that if lawyers accept retainers to act for a client with a trial imminent, they may have to work on weekends. I have also indicated that I would be prepared to delay the start of the trial.
3. The Court has a wide discretion to grant adjournments, but it is not unfettered. In addition to the reasons for the adjournment, I must consider the potential prejudice to either parent, which is more complicated where s 102NA of the Act applies, as a party will be precluded from cross-examining if they cease to be represented. However, even if that be the case, the children's interests will be represented by the ICL who no doubt will canvass matters pertinent to the determination of what order will best meet the children's needs in the circumstances of the case. If the father, is unrepresented at trial, he may seek to have questions asked on his behalf by counsel representing the ICL, if not already covered during cross-examination. I would consider any such request, although I would also carefully consider any objection by the ICL's counsel to doing so. It is unfortunate that s 102NA does not provide the Court with any discretion to permit cross-examination in necessary circumstances.
4. The Court has an obligation to efficiently manage the business of the Court in a timely manner and to have regard to the impact of an adjournment on other potential litigants whose matters will of necessity be displaced if the seven days commencing next week are not used and if an alternate seven days are to be found next year.
5. Of course, those matters must be balanced against potential prejudice to a party. In this case, as already mentioned, if the father's lawyers are granted leave to withdraw, he will have to represent himself but be unable to personally cross-examine the mother. The mother is currently precluded from having any relationship at all with the children. While it may be, as submitted by the counsel for the father, that this has come about as a result of the mother's own actions, it could not have been envisaged at the time that order was made, that the rehearing would not occur until 2026.
6. Ultimately, my focus must be on the impact of an adjournment on the children. Any decision I make will have some unfortunate consequences but in view of Ms E's opinion of the need for finality for these children, I do not propose to grant the adjournment.
7. In light of the dismissal of the application for adjournment and my indication that I would be prepared to delay the start of the trial to Wednesday, 30 July 2025, the father's legal representatives did not press the alternative relief to be granted leave to withdraw.

I certify that the preceding twenty-six (26) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Carew.