Abdallah v Paco Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2)

Cases Cited: Abdallah v Paco Nominees Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1267
Abdallah v Paco Nominees Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1582

Category: Consequential orders

Parties: Georges Abdallah (Plaintiff)
Paco Nominees Pty Ltd (First Defendant)
Liam Thomas Bailey in his capacity as the trustee for the bankrupt estate of Georges Abdallah (Second Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
A Byrne (Plaintiff)
A Hopkins (First Defendant)
A Kozary (solicitor) (Second Defendant)
Solicitors:
Aquinas More Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Branden Smith McKnight (First Defendant)
McInnes Wilson Lawyers (Second Defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/00016105

Publication restriction: None

JUDGMENT

1. PAYNE JA: On 30 October 2025, I delivered judgment in the primary proceedings: Abdallah v Paco Nominees Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1267. In what follows familiarity with that decision is assumed. The orders I made were as follows:

2. Leave to appeal on grounds 1, 2 and 4 refused.

3. Appeal dismissed.

4. Plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs.

5. The funds the subject of the undertaking to the orders of 28 August 2025 held in the trust account of the plaintiff's solicitors in these proceedings, Aquinas More Lawyers, not be distributed without further order of the court.

6. Leave granted to the defendant, after a period of 7 days from the date of these orders, to apply to the chambers of Payne JA by email (copied to the plaintiff’s lawyers) for an order releasing the funds referred to in order 4.

7. In accordance with order 5 an application was made for an order releasing the funds referred to in order 4. That application was listed for hearing. On 7 November 2025, shortly prior to that hearing the Plaintiff, Mr Abdallah, became bankrupt on his own petition. Liam Thomas Bailey was appointed as his trustee in bankruptcy.

8. The matter came before me on 13 November 2025. After hearing the parties on that date, I made the following orders:

9. Direct that Aquinas More Lawyers pay into court from their trust account the sum of $420,463 pending determining of entitlement to those funds, reserving in full the rights of the trustee Liam Thomas Bailey, Paco Nominees, and Aquinas More Lawyers to make submissions as to the proper disposition of those funds.

10. That Liam Thomas Bailey in his capacity as trustee of the bankrupt estate of Georges Abdallah be joined as the second defendant to these proceedings.

11. Direct Paco Nominees to file any application under UCPR 36.17 to the chambers of McGuire J by 4pm Friday 14 November 2025.

12. In the event that an order is made under UCPR 36.17 by McGuire J, within 48 hours of that order being entered, Paco Nominees to communicate by email with the chambers of Payne JA proposing a timetable for the filing and service of evidence and submissions dealing with the funds the subject of order 1.

13. In the event that an order is not made by McGuire J under UCPR 36.17, within 7 days of determination of that application, Paco Nominees to file and serve an application in the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal out of time.

14. The application for leave to appeal be prosecuted with due dispatch.

15. Liberty to apply on 2 days notice granted to all the parties.

16. The reason for my orders relating to UCPR 36.17, “the slip rule”, were that, as noted in my principal judgment, immediately prior to this case being heard, the Plaintiff approached the duty judge and obtained a stay of further enforcement of the judgement of the Appeal Panel. A stay, of course, was an uncontroversial order. I noted, however, that the orders sought by the Plaintiff went much further than simply providing for a stay of enforcement of the Appeal Panel’s orders. First, an order was sought directing the Registrar General to remove a record on the title to a property of a Writ of Property issued by the District Court of New South Wales in proceedings 2025/11197 on 28 January 2025. That order was granted. The orders made also incorporated undertakings given by two non-parties to the proceedings. As I said in the principal judgment, a significant problem with the undertakings in the form they took is that the undertakings only remained operative the earlier of the time “until judgment is given in the Supreme Court proceedings in 2025/16105” or further order of the court. Those undertakings expired upon my giving the principal judgment.

17. In accordance with my orders dated 13 November 2025, the matter returned to McGuire J, for consideration of a slip rule application. On 18 December 2025, McGuire J made the following orders (Abdallah v Paco Nominees Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1582):

18. Pursuant to rule 36.17 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the orders of 28 August 2025 made by McGuire J be corrected by the deletion of the portion of those orders that reads “3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs of the notice of motion dated 15 August 2025”;

19. Pursuant to rule 36.17 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the orders of 28 August 2025 made by McGuire J be corrected by the insertion of a further order in the following terms:

(a) Order that as a condition of the granting of orders 1 and 2 that the plaintiff is to provide security in favour of the defendant (and as security for the defendant’s judgment debt). Such security being charged in favour of the defendant in the form of the balance of the funds referred to in order 4 of the orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia on 2 June 2025 in proceedings (P)PAC2094/2025, and following any deduction for the plaintiff's reasonable legal costs in these proceedings up to a limit of $20,000 from such amount; and (b) Such security is to be immediately released to the defendant upon the plaintiff's summons seeking leave to appeal filed 14 January 2025 being dismissed.

3. The second defendant pay the first defendant's costs of the notice of motion filed 14 November 2025.

4. On 23 December 2025, solicitors for Paco Nominees made an application to me for an order for payment out to their client of the funds paid into court. I made orders for the exchange of evidence and submissions about that proposed course.

5. On 16 January 2026, by email to my chambers, the solicitor for the Second Defendant, the trustee in bankruptcy, advised:

I have received instructions this morning and advise that the Second Defendant does not oppose the making of an order that funds held in Court be paid to Paco Nominees Pty Ltd.

8. On 20 January 2026, by email to my chambers the solicitor for Mr Abdallah advised, relevantly:

I act for the Plaintiff in these proceedings. The solicitors for the First and Second Defendants are copied into this email and consent to it.

After having constructive discussions with the solicitors for the First Defendant and the Second Defendant it has been agreed between the parties that $20,000 of the total funds held in Court are to be paid to my firm, Aquinas More Lawyers and the balance of the funds are to be paid to the First Defendant's solicitors. We have attached a form of the consent orders which have been agreed to by the plaintiff and first defendant and incorporates the relevant parties’ bank account details for His Honour's consideration. The second defendant, whose solicitor is copied, does not oppose the making of the orders.

9. Attached consent orders were proposed which provided:

1. The amount of $20,000 held by the Court be paid to the account of Aquinas More Lawyers details of which are as follows:

Account Name: Aquinas More Lawyers Legal Services

BSB: XXXXX

Account: XXXX

Ref: XXXXX

2. The amount of $400,463 representing the balance of funds held by the Court be paid to the trust account of the first Defendant's solicitors, Brander Smith McKnight details of which are as follows:

Account Name: Brander Smith McKnight Law Practice Trust Account

BSB: XXXX

Account: XXXXX

Ref: XXXXX

Conclusion

10. As explained in my principal judgment, this matter has had a long and tortuous litigation history. The First Defendant succeeded before NCAT and again before the Appeal Panel. They were entirely successful before me. Shortly prior to a hearing where the fruits of that victory were to be obtained, the unsuccessful Plaintiff became bankrupt on his own petition. All parties, including the trustee in bankruptcy have had a proper opportunity to consider the proposed orders. The Plaintiff and the First Defendant consent and the trustee in bankruptcy does not oppose the making of those orders. I am satisfied that the interests of justice favour the making of those orders and I hereby make them.

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