Abbott & Dale [2025] FedCFamC2F 1861 (24 December 2025)

1. Unless otherwise specified in these Orders and save for the purpose of enforcing any monies due under these or any subsequent Orders:

(a) Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property (including choses-in-action) in possession of such party as at the date of these Orders;

(b) Monies standing to the credit of the parties in any bank account is to become the property of that party in whose name the account is registered;

(c) Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all superannuation entitlements in that party's name;

(d) Insurance policies remain the sole property of the owner named therein;

(e) Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these Orders; and

(f) Any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.

1. All extant applications be otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This is an application for a property division brought by the applicant de facto husband, Mr Abbott ("the husband"). It is opposed by the respondent de facto wife, Ms Dale ("the wife"), who says that it would not be just and equitable for there to be any order made by this court altering the parties' current property interests.
2. For ease of reference, although they were not married, I shall refer to the parties as the husband and wife respectively.

1. The husband is 74 years of age, and the wife 70 years.
2. The husband says the parties' relationship commenced in March 2004 and that they commenced living together in May 2004.
3. The wife's position was less clear from her court material. In her amended response filed on 2 September 2025, the wife specifically says the date of separation is not agreed but takes no issue with the date of co-habitation.[1] In addition, the wife refers in her affidavit to cohabitation being in 2006.[2] Nonetheless, in the witness box, the wife seemed reluctant to admit there was ever even an intimate relationship let alone a de facto relationship. However, she ultimately conceded under cross-examination that the de facto relationship commenced in 2009.
4. The parties have no children between them. The husband has five adult children from former relationships. In 2004 the husband's children were aged four, ten, 14, 17 and 19. At that time the husband was paying about $818 per month in child support. The wife had one adult child, Mr J ("Mr J"), who is now aged 46 years of age and was a witness in this proceeding.
5. In 2004, the wife had a house at K Street, Suburb L ("the Suburb L property"). There was no retrospective valuation of that property. The wife also had superannuation of $45,000.
6. In March 2004, the husband was renting a property at M Street, Suburb N. The husband had superannuation of $159,000, a motor vehicle that he later traded in for $5,845, a child support debt of $10,000 and about $2,000 in parking fines.
7. When the parties met the wife was working as a health care worker earning about $50,000 per annum. The wife says the husband was a transport worker earning about $7,500. He says he was earning about $25,000. On any view, it was a modest wage.
8. The wife gave evidence that in or about 2004/2005, the parties purchased a campervan which was converted into a food truck. The parties subsequently commenced a business selling food at markets and field days. The husband was also successful in obtaining a tender for a major sporting event in 2006.
9. The Suburb L property was subject to a major renovation and subsequently sold for $790,000 in 2006. The proceeds of sale were applied to the purchase of a property at B Street, Suburb C ("the Suburb C property") in late 2006. When that property settled, it had a mortgage of $310,982. The husband says that he and the wife moved from the Suburb L property into the Suburb C property in late 2006. The wife denies this. In 2007, the husband was diagnosed with cancer. In her oral evidence, the wife said she "allowed" the husband to live in the Suburb C property during the period he was recovering from cancer, being about 18 months between late 2007 and 2008/2009. She described herself as being the husband's carer at that time.
10. In October 2007, the husband purchased a caravan with his superannuation. He conceded that at that time the outcome of his treatment was not known and he intended to use the caravan for holidays. Fortunately, the husband appears to have made a full recovery, and in 2009 the parties commenced a business together travelling to camping and caravan shows to sell outdoor products, and other related camping equipment ("the business"). From that time the parties spent a great deal of time travelling around Australia to caravan and camping shows.
11. From 2009 the Suburb C property was placed on the short-term rental market and rented out during periods the parties were away at the caravan and camping shows. The wife says during periods they were in Victoria, the husband stayed in the caravan either parked outside the Suburb C property or in a nearby caravan park.[3] Although the parties upgraded the caravan at various times throughout the relationship, and at times it was more correctly described as a motorhome, I shall use the term "caravan" to encompass all of these vehicles.
12. In 2013/2014, the husband registered a business, F Business.
13. In 2014, the parties purchased a property at D Street, Suburb E, in Queensland ("the Suburb E property") with the intention to also rent it out on the short-term rental market. The husband says that each year they spent about 90 to 120 days staying in the Suburb C property, about the same in Suburb E property, and the remainder travelling to caravan and camping shows. The wife denies the husband lived in the Suburb C property when they were in Victoria and says he continued to live in the caravan.
14. In 2020, when COVID 19 hit Australia, the parties decided to spend most of their time in Queensland, staying in the Suburb E property when they were not at caravan and camping shows. In keeping with this, the parties each changed their address on their tax returns to the Suburb E property.
15. It appears common ground that there were a number of separations throughout the relationship. The wife asserts the husband was on internet dating sites from March 2021. The parties attended relationship counselling in April 2022. The wife says this was unsuccessful and that separation occurred on 12 April 2022.
16. The husband applied for a single pension on 12 June 2022.
17. The husband says the parties subsequently reconciled. The wife denies this ever occurred.
18. The wife ceased working in the business on 31 December 2023
19. The parties' last sexual encounter was in March 2024.

1. The husband relied upon the following documents:
   • his trial affidavit filed 4 August 2025;
   • his financial statement filed 4 August 2025;
   • his affidavit in reply filed 19 August 2025;
   • the affidavit of Ms O filed 18 August 2025;
   • his outline of case filed 28 August 2025; and
   • his written submissions filed 29 September 2025.

1. The wife relied upon the following documents:
   • her trial affidavit filed 4 August 2025;
   • her financial statement filed 4 August 2025;
   • her affidavit in reply filed 19 August 2025;
   • the affidavit of Ms P ("Ms P") filed 4 August 2025;
   • the affidavit of Mr J filed 4 August 2025;
   • her written submissions filed 15 September 2025;
   • her written submissions in reply filed 6 October 2025;
   • her outline of case filed 28 August 2025; and
   • the Notice to Admit.
2. I have had regard to the entirety of the wife's submissions, save for the aide memoire annexed to same. Counsel for the wife sought to rely on a similar schedule at trial pursuant to section 50 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). I determined that the schedule could not be relied upon in circumstances where the husband had not been provided with all the documents contained in the schedule, and/or there was a dispute about its accuracy. Counsel for the husband maintains in her written submissions, that a number of inaccuracies remain in the aide memoire. Accordingly, I shall have no regard to same. In any event, as was repeatedly pointed out to counsel for the wife, the summary of the parties' nett taxable income was of little or no assistance to the court in this matter, for reasons I shall return to shortly. Furthermore, the wife's own evidence was that the tax returns, which formed the basis for the schedule, were not all accurate.

1. The husband seeks the parties' total asset pool, including superannuation, be divided 40 per cent in his favour. The wife says there should be no order adjusting the parties' current property interests, which on her case would see her retaining 81.4 per cent of the pool.

1. The wife says the husband's evidence is unreliable. For example, the wife points out that the husband told the Australian Taxation Office ("the ATO") in 2008, that he was living at his ex-wife's house when he now says he was living at the Suburb C property. The wife also argues in her affidavit "from 2019 onwards, the Applicant's listed address was the Suburb E property, which [they] jointly owned. [She] say[s] if the Applicant did in fact live at B Street [the Suburb C property], he would not have changed his address on his tax returns".[4]
2. The husband says he used various addresses for the purposes of correspondence given the parties were frequently travelling, and that in any event he received most of his correspondence via email. It should also be noted that the wife likewise changed her address to the Suburb E property on her tax returns from 2019.
3. Having heard the husband's evidence in its totality I accept that for the most part he was a reliable witness. Whilst there were aspects of his evidence that I did not accept, in particular with respect to placing mugs in the property after separation and some other aspects were contradictory, such as his evidence about the key to the Suburb C property, generally he presented as a credible witness. Although the husband applied for a single aged pension in June 2022 and continued to receive it thereafter, I accept his evidence that he has now contacted Centrelink and is prepared to pay it back if required.

1. Rule 8.01 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules") state as follows:

(1) A party may, by serving a Notice to Admit on another party, ask the other party to admit, for the purposes of the proceeding only, that a fact is true or that a document is genuine.

(2) A Notice to Admit must include a note to the effect that, under subrule 8.02(2), failure to serve a Notice Disputing a Fact or Document will result in the party being taken to have admitted that the fact is true or the document is genuine.

(3) If a Notice to Admit relates to a document, the party serving the Notice must attach a copy of the document to the notice, unless:

(a) the other party has a copy of the document; or

(b) it is not practicable to attach a copy of the Notice.

(4) If paragraph (3)(b) applies, the party serving the Notice must:

(a) identify the document; and

(b) specify a convenient place and time at which the document may be inspected; and

(b) produce the document for inspection at the specified place and time.

1. The wife's solicitors served upon the husband a notice to admit on 1 April 2025 ("the notice"). The husband duly responded to the notice and made a number of admissions. The difficulty in relying on the husband's admissions is that in some key respects the wife gave evidence which contradicted the facts in the notice. For example, it was put to the husband in the notice that at all times since October 2007 he lived in his caravan. Even on the wife's case this was clearly not an accurate statement, as the husband lived with her for 18 months from 2007 to 2008/2009 while he was recovering from cancer. Another matter put in the notice was that the income of the business was split equally between the parties,[5] and yet the tax returns showed that this was not in fact the case.
2. Rule 1.31 of the Rules provides that the court may dispense with these Rules as follows:

1.31 Court may make orders or dispense with these Rules

(1) The court may, in the interests of justice, dispense with compliance, or full compliance, with any of these Rules at any time.

1. Having heard the evidence of the husband, it is in the interests of justice that Rule 8.01 be dispensed with. Whilst it was put that to allow the husband to resile from those admissions after cross-examination was completed may result in procedural unfairness to the wife, I am satisfied that counsel for the wife did in fact cross examine the husband extensively about those admissions and had the opportunity to challenge him on any answers which contradicted same.

1. I found the wife to be a problematic witness. As already discussed, she was reluctant to concede there was ever an intimate relationship let alone a de facto one. It was also evident in her cross-examination that there were numerous matters she failed to disclose in her trial material, which were relevant to the length of the relationship and to the intermingling of the parties' finances. For example, the wife failed to mention in her trial affidavit that the parties commenced a business together in 2005 selling food and that they purchased a van together and converted it into a food truck.
2. The wife also failed to mention in her affidavit material that the husband had in fact stayed at the Suburb C property after she says they separated in April 2022. Indeed, she specifically says in her trial affidavit that he only visited the property twice after that time, once in March 2024 when he came to visit the dogs and they were sexually intimate, and another time when she alleges that he placed two mugs (advertising his solicitor) in her kitchen to intimidate her. However, the husband produced text messages which indicated he was staying at the property after that time. In particular, the following exchange from 19 June 2023:

Wife: Do u mind going in to check the link filter on dryer please?

Husband: Yea no problem

Wife: [...] has made a fruit loaf for you. Can pick up from her place in 30mins she's going to have a bath now

Wife: She is too dumb to know and wouldn't care. Thanks babe[6]

(Errors as per original)

1. In the face of this evidence, the wife conceded that the husband was staying at the Suburb C property at that time (she says he had travelled to Melbourne whilst she was staying at the Suburb E property) but sought to distinguish between "visiting" and "staying" at the property. Nonetheless, the wife did not disclose this in her affidavit.
2. The wife was reluctant to concede the parties were anything other than business partners after April 2022. This was evident in the following exchange with the court:

Her Honour: I want to be clear about how we're using the term, "Relationship". I think you put that it was boyfriend-girlfriend, so was it still boyfriend-girlfriend in June '22?

Wife: Yes. Well yes. Because there were so many breaks - yes.[7]

Counsel for the husband: Thank you, your Honour. So, April 2022, you're done the de facto relationship, that was your evidence. That was your evidence?

Wife: Yes, yes.[8]

Counsel for the husband: But June '22, you're back to boyfriend-girlfriend?

Wife: Yes, because we weren't - well, we weren't - no we weren't boyfriend and girlfriend then. We were business partners, to be precise, as I said, yes.[9]

(As per original)

1. The wife refused to concede an ongoing intimate relationship notwithstanding the following:

On June 2022, the wife sent this text message to the husband:

Get bread rolls for lunch please babe x[10]

(Emphasis added)

On 2 October 2022, the wife sent the following text to the husband:

"Good morning babe, sorry how we left things last night but am super grateful for your driving effort...Love you".[11]

1. The wife also failed to mention in her affidavit that the parties continued to share a bed at the Suburb E property after April 2022. This was notwithstanding that there were other bedrooms available in the house.
2. For all of these reasons, where the evidence of the wife differs to that of the husband and is not otherwise corroborated by other material, I prefer the evidence of the husband.

1. The husband also relied on the affidavit of Ms O, a friend of the husband, whose affidavit was tendered into evidence by consent, save for certain paragraphs which were struck out. Whilst I accept the submission that her affidavit contained a number of hearsay assertions and opinions, this does not mean I dismiss her evidence in its entirety.

1. Ms P gave evidence for the wife. She had been employed to clean and provide other minor assistance with the running of the short stays at the Suburb C property since 2011. Her evidence was that overtime she and her husband had developed a friendship with the parties and would go out to dinner with them, but she had never seen the parties together at the Suburb C property. It was her view that the wife was the one in charge of the short stays, but she would always address invoices to both parties, along with a greeting to both, because she knew the husband would read them.
2. Despite giving evidence on behalf of the wife, Ms P presented as a fairly neutral witness, with no particular agenda.

1. Mr J was unsurprisingly a strong supporter of his mother. It was also evident he was prepared to exaggerate the assistance he provided to her. For example, he says in his affidavit that he worked with the wife on several building projects. However, it must be noted the first of these projects commenced when he was one year of age, the second commenced when he was nine years old and the third when he was 11 years of age.[12] Another example was an invoice he issued to the wife in 2024 for $32,318, being for works allegedly completed by Mr J in 2023.[13] This was not only issued a year after the works were done, and after the wife paid for them, but did not match the amounts she paid in 2023.
2. Furthermore, Mr J's evidence did not corroborate the wife's evidence in several key respects. The wife says Mr J lived at the shed at the rear of the Suburb C property from 2015, however, Mr J gave the following evidence:

"I wouldn't say that I moved back... I say that I had a job that required moving around a lot. I was involved in [media], and so a lot of travel. So at that point I moved my belongings into [Suburb C]... in 2013, thereabouts, for a couple of years... but I wouldn't say I lived there."[14]

(As per original)

1. It was also evident that he had been living at various commercial properties since at least 2018.
2. For all of these reasons, I did not find his evidence to be of great assistance in this case.

1. Numerous other persons had been listed as potential witnesses for the husband at the compliance and readiness hearing, but who were not ultimately called. These included the accountant and neighbours of the wife. It was argued for the wife that an inference should be drawn that they would not have assisted the husband's case.
2. Murphy J in Lavell & Lavell [2012] FamCA 34 summarised the three conditions that must be met to satisfy "the rule" in Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 9, these being:

[130] ... the "missing witness [or evidence] would be expected to be called by one party rather than the other (which implies that the witness must be available to give evidence)"; the "evidence would elucidate a particular matter, which is a live matter at the trial" and "the absence [of the evidence] is unexplained". (ASIC v Rich at [449]).

1. However, the wife gave evidence that after the husband called the witnesses, they rang her, including the accountant, and told her they did not want to get involved. I cannot discount the possibility that the neighbours did not want ongoing conflict with the wife given they live nearby. Furthermore, given the amount of time the parties spent interstate, it seems unlikely the neighbours would be able to shed much light on the nature of the parties' relationship or other controversies, such as if the husband was staying in his caravan or inside the Suburb C property. Whilst the husband's children may have been able to give evidence about visiting the home, even on his evidence this was not very often.
2. In all of the circumstances, I do not draw any negative inference from the failure of these persons to be called to give evidence.

WHAT WAS THE LENGTH OF THE DE FACTO RELATIONSHIP?

1. Section 4AA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") defines a de facto relationship as:

(1) A person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:

(a) the persons are not legally married to each other; and

(b) the persons are not related by family (see subsection(6)); and

(c) having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.

Paragraph(c) has effect subject to subsection(5).

Working out if persons have a relationship as a couple

(2) Those circumstances may include any or all of the following:

(a) the duration of the relationship;

(b) the nature and extent of their common residence;

(c) whether a sexual relationship exists;

(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;

(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;

(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;

(g) whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;

(h) the care and support of children;

(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship

(3) No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.

(4) A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.

...

1. As already discussed, the husband's case is that the de facto relationship commenced in May 2004 and concluded in January 2024, whilst the wife reluctantly conceded the relationship went from 2009 until April 2022. Despite this, counsel for the wife, said the following in his written submissions:

The Applicant continued to provide the [Q Street] address to the Australian Taxation Office in 2013 and 2014. It is significant that the Applicant did not assert a de-facto relationship in any year prior to 2015. For the Applicant to put [Q Street] as his residential address - the address of a prior spouse - is not consistent with the threshold that the Applicant must demonstrate: the "merger of lives" identified as pivotal in Jonah and White. What continued was a business partnership which necessitated the parties living in a mobile home which travelled to shows around Australia.[15]

(Emphasis added, citations omitted)

1. Counsel for the wife appears to be stating that notwithstanding the wife's own evidence that the relationship commenced in 2009, the onus is on the applicant husband to prove it commenced prior to 2015, and he has not done so. This is quite frankly an absurd and unhelpful submission.

Nature and extent of the parties' common residence

1. The husband asserts he lived with the wife at the Suburb L property from May 2004 until the parties moved from the Suburb L property to the Suburb C property in 2006. The wife denied this under cross-examination.
2. It is common ground the husband was staying at the Suburb C property between late 2007 to 2009, although the wife denied that they were in a de facto relationship at that time.
3. In mid-2008, the husband submitted a Centrelink application which became an exhibit in this matter. The application nominates the wife as his partner and contains personal details including her employment and bank account information. The husband says the wife signed the form. Unhelpfully, the section allegedly signed by the wife was redacted. Counsel for the wife submits that "in cross-examination, the Respondent denied knowing the Applicant had made an application to Centrelink, let alone participating in the application".[16] Whilst that is what the wife said in her evidence (along with not recalling seeing the application), what counsel does not mention in those submissions is that it was the wife's solicitor who insisted the husband file a freedom of information application to Centrelink in the first place. Orders were made to this effect on 25 September 2024. Whilst it appears that it was intended to capture the husbands 2022 application, it revealed the 2008 application. This application was disclosed to the wife in December 2024 and attached to the husband's reply affidavit.[17] At no time prior to cross-examination did the wife assert that she had not seen this application, or that she did not provide the information and/or sign it. Indeed, she conceded that the handwritten date looked like her handwriting.
4. It is difficult to understand how the husband, who on the wife's case was merely recovering at her house, would have had access to details, such as her employer, her hours of work, her banking details and assets in her name. It is equally hard to see what he stood to gain at that time from being in a de facto relationship, such that he would go to the effort to find out that information and forge the wife's signature on that form.
5. I find that on the balance of probabilities the wife provided the husband with her information so that he could complete the form, and that she signed and dated that form. It follows from this that she accepted the contents of that form, including that they were de facto partners as of 8 July2008, and that they had been de facto since 26 March 2004.
6. A lot was made of the husband not having a key to the Suburb C property. It seems common ground that during the period he was recovering the wife gave him a key. From 2009 the key appears to have been kept in a locked box for short stay guests, and the husband did not otherwise retain one. I accept he did not need his own key as he had access to the locked box.
7. It is common ground that after 2009 the parties travelled extensively around Australia. The husband's evidence is that after 2009, when in Victoria, he stayed in the Suburb C property 90 per cent of the time and only in the caravan if the parties were fighting. In addition, the husband said he would not be able to tax deduct the van if he lived in it 100 per cent of the time. The husband relies on an email he wrote in 2014 to the State Revenue Office Victoria[18] as evidence that the parties both understood Suburb C to be his primary residence. The email was written by the husband to dispute unexpected land tax which had resulted from the short stay rental of the Suburb C property. The email was written using the business email account but included both the husband and wife's phone numbers at the conclusion. In that email the husband clearly refers to the property being "our primary residence". [19] It was submitted for the husband that this email is evidence that the wife was aware and did not object to the husband referring to the Suburb C property as his residence.
8. The wife continued to deny the husband ever lived at the Suburb C property but conceded the husband "occasionally" parked the van on the nature strip out the front.[20] Otherwise, her evidence was he stayed at R Caravan Park. However, the husband subpoenaed R Caravan Park and the records showed this did not occur at all until late 2015 and only for four nights that year. Thereafter, there were three occasions in 2016, with a total of 21 nights in that year, 22 nights in 2017, 16 nights in 2018, no stays in 2019 or 2020, eight nights in 2021, 41 nights in 2022 and 15 nights in 2023.[21] In the witness box, the wife changed her evidence under cross-examination to expand the places the husband otherwise stayed, to include his ex-wife's house or other caravan parks, such as S Caravan Park.
9. The caravan park records are consistent with the husband's case that until 2015, when the parties were in Victoria, the applicable caravan for the business was parked out the front of the Suburb C property. After 2015, when the shed at the rear of the property was renovated, the parties were able to stay in the shed when the main house was rented out, however, they could not park the van out the front, and therefore it was left at the caravan park.
10. The wife also asserted that the husband moved majority of his personal belongings out of the Suburb C property in 2009, however, the husband said both parties had to remove their personal belongings due to the short stay guests.
11. In regard to the living arrangements, I make the following findings on the evidence before the court:
    • The parties resided together in the Suburb L property between 2004 and 2006;
    • Between 2006 and 2019, the parties treated the Suburb C property as their primary residence and the majority of the time they were in Victoria, they stayed together in the Suburb C property, either in the shed at the rear of the home or the main property itself (although the husband may have chosen to sleep in the van from time to time);
    • From 2019 the parties considered the Suburb E property to be their primary residence with both changing their address to the property for the purposes of their tax returns; and
    • From 2019 until 2024 the parties both continued to stay together at the Suburb C property when they returned to Victoria.

1. It was common ground that the parties' sex life had substantially reduced early in their relationship and after about twelve months became extremely infrequent. The husband says that hormone replacement therapy he underwent during his cancer treatment impacted his sex drive. The wife appeared to agree with this in the witness box.
2. Consequently, the parties did not have a significant sexual relationship for the majority of their relationship.

Degree of financial dependence or interdependence

1. On the evidence, the parties commenced their first business together in about 2005. The wife revealed in her oral evidence that at that time they commenced attending markets and field days to sell food. In response to a question from the court about when this commenced the wife said as follows:

...Perhaps when we bought the [caravan] and converted, actually... So it would be probably 2005, we started doing markets and stuff.[22]

(Emphasis added)

1. As discussed, this business morphed into a bigger operation in 2009 when the parties determined they would sell outdoors products at caravan and camping shows.
2. The wife's case is that the business was run as a joint venture and that the income was split equally. She was at pains to point out the parties never had a joint account.
3. However, the financial records of the business do not support the assertion that the income of the business was split equally. Firstly, the parties were not allocated the same drawings from the business. For example, in 2009, the first year of the partnership and in which the parties made a loss, a greater share of that loss was distributed to the wife (who had other income that year from employment).
4. Secondly, the wife conceded that from 2009 until 2023 the parties used the business bank account, for which they both had a debit card, to pay for the majority of their day-to-day expenses including groceries, eating out, accommodation and medical expenses. The wife also conceded that they did not keep a ledger to ensure this was evenly spread. Whilst it is true to say the parties did not have a joint personal account, the use of the business account essentially amounted to the same thing.

1. The wife's case is that at all times the parties kept their assets separate and that in keeping with this, she intended to purchase the Suburb E property in her sole name, however, the bank would not approve the loan in her sole name so the husband had to be on title.
2. However, whilst the wife argues that at all times the income and expenses of the Suburb C property were kept entirely separate from the business, a ledger summarising the wife's loan account to the business portrays a different picture.[23] This ledger shows a running total of debits and credits made on behalf of the wife, with many recorded as income from short stay rentals. When the wife was asked about this, she did not deny the deposits were made but explained that this was because the short stay guests required an EFTPOS machine to pay for their stay so they used the business machine. However, if this were true one would expect to see a corresponding withdrawal back to the wife. Instead, there appear to be expenses paid for Suburb C, such as rates and utilities. The wife did not accept this was the case and suggested that the power bills could be attributable to power used at caravan parks. She did not explain why this would be a debt owed to her. I found her evidence to be entirely unconvincing in this regard.
3. Furthermore, whilst the wife sought to distance herself from documents prepared for taxation purposes, including the ledger, if the ledger were inaccurate then she was in a position to produce documents which refuted its contents and she did not. I find the ledger is an accurate reflection of the debits and credits made on behalf of the wife from her short stay rentals. It is evident in this regard there was a significant crossover between the income and expenses of the Suburb C property and the cashflow of the business.
4. The husband also asserts that the business paid the wife's tax on the Suburb C property between 2018 and 2019. The wife denied this had occurred and stressed in her affidavit that the only tax paid on her behalf by the business related to the partnership tax.[24] Nonetheless, the husband relied on transfers from the business bank account which were labelled as tax payments to the wife. Counsel for the wife challenged the validity of these transfers, asserting that just because they were labelled as transfers for the wife's tax, this was not proof of same.
5. The wife relied upon her bank statements evidencing that she paid the income tax and land tax referrable to the Suburb C property. However, it is evident that prior to those payments there are transfers into the wife's account, in keeping with the husband's evidence, labelled as payments by the husband for quarterly tax.[25] It is therefore unclear why counsel for the wife continues to assert on her behalf that there is no evidence the payments were made.
6. The wife argues that the husband always understood that the Suburb C property was hers and that the various incantations of the caravans were the property of the husband. She says the evidence for this is that between July 2017 and July 2018 the husband insisted she pay him rent for the use of the caravan. Indeed, it is common ground that the husband was paid between $300 and $600 per month during that period. However, there are various problems with the assertion this was rent paid by the wife to the husband for the use of his caravan:
   • Firstly, the amounts varied;
   • Secondly, the payments did not commence until 2017 and were for a finite period; and
   • Thirdly, the wife did not make the payments, but rather they were transferred from the business to the husband, so in that sense he was paying himself one half of that "rent."
7. If the amounts paid were not rent, but rather a repayment to the husband of his original investment (with the purchase of a motorcycle being satisfaction of the final repayment), again these were funds transferred from the business to the husband and not from the wife.

1. As discussed, the wife was mostly silent about the status of the parties' relationship between 2004 and 2007 save that she says this in her affidavit as follows:

I had no need or interest in forming any personal commitment with the Applicant and no such commitment was ever given or received. To the contrary I was most guarded, given the state of the Applicant's personal, legal and financial circumstances.[26]

1. Notwithstanding this evidence, the wife volunteered under cross-examination that the parties had purchased a van to convert into a food truck in 2005. She also gave evidence that in 2006 she and the husband purchased two dogs, T and U. It was not in dispute that the wife considered the dogs to be dogs belonging to the parties and that their expenses were paid until April 2024 from joint funds.
2. The wife did not accept that the husband living with her from 2007, when he was unwell, was any indication of an intimate relationship let alone a "mutual commitment" to a shared life. When questioned further about this time, she said the following:

Wife: Well, it was difficult relationship because he was sick.[27]

Counsel for the husband: What do you mean by that?

Wife: He was vomiting constantly.[28]

Counsel for the husband: ... what about being sick makes it difficult to be in a relationship?

Wife: well, a relationship is a loving, caring relationship where you both are loving and caring to each other. That's my interpretation of a relationship.[29]

(As per original)

1. Notwithstanding this evidence, the wife conceded that during his convalescence the husband would drive her to work every day and meet her for lunch, although she said this was because the husband was otherwise "idle" and that she was more than able to drive herself to work.
2. Furthermore, notwithstanding her reluctance to acknowledge anything other than a business partnership (seemingly at any time), in 2023, after the wife's date of separation, she executed a will in which she left all of her assets to the husband in the event Mr J was to pass away and have no children. The wife says she did not realise same, but this seems inherently unlikely given it was drawn up by a solicitor and signed by the wife. Even on the wife's own evidence she intended to, at the very least, leave her half of the Suburb E property to the husband, even though at the time of the will she says he was no more than a business partner. Given the value of the property, this was an extremely generous gift.
3. I find the wife was fully advised when she executed this will, and that she intended to leave the husband all her assets in the event Mr J were to pass without any children.

The reputation and public aspects of the relationship

1. Ms O's evidence, which was not challenged, is that she was introduced to the wife as the husband's partner in 2005, and that she attended the Suburb C property for a number of dinners which were hosted by the husband and wife.
2. Ms P, who was hired to clean the Suburb C property, gave evidence that she and her husband regularly socialised with the parties including dinners.
3. Mr J confirmed that the husband's children used to visit and stay overnight at Suburb L - a fact not mentioned by the wife anywhere in her material. The husband's children were also there sufficiently frequently to become friends with Mr J who attests to same, at least with respect to "[Mr V and Mr W]."[30] The wife stated in her evidence that the husband's children had not been to the Suburb C property other than for one family dinner in the "early days" (which she later clarified meant around 2006). However, when shown a photo of adult children she conceded they may have been there "more regularly".
4. Finally, the wife points to the husband being on online dating sites from March 2021, although this predates the final separation even on the wife's case. Furthermore, the husband concedes there were periods of separation which would not be inconsistent with this.

DETERMINATION AS TO THE LENGTH OF THE RELATIONSHIP

1. I accept the submission for the wife that the court in Jonah & White [2011] FamCA 221 described a de facto relationship as "the manifestation of 'coupledom', which involves the merger of two lives so that the parties are for all practical purposes, 'living together' as a couple on a genuine domestic basis".[31]
2. Taking into consideration all of the findings I have made in this matter, I determine the parties merged their lives for all practical purposes and thus commenced a de facto relationship in or about May 2004 with final separation being in early 2024.

IS IT JUST AND EQUITABLE FOR THERE TO BE ANY PROPERTY ADJUSTMENT?

1. The relevant legal principles governing any application for de facto property settlement are set out in Part VIIIAB of the Act. Section 90SM(1) of the Act authorises the court to make such orders between the parties as it considers appropriate. Section 90SM(3) makes it clear that the court cannot make an order for a property settlement unless it is just and equitable to do so.
2. There is no presumption that the parties' entitlements in the existing asset pool should be altered, or that one party has the right to have the property of the parties divided between them. In addition, although both of the parties may urge the court to make orders altering their interests in their property, the existence of such an agreement is not sufficient. The court must be satisfied that such orders are indeed just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.
3. Earlier Full Court authorities have identified a four-step process that can assist the court in reaching a just and equitable decision: see Lee Steere & Lee Steere [1985] FamCA 57; (1985) FLC 91-626; Hickey & Hickey & Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FamCA 395; (2003) FLC 93-143; and In the Marriage of Omacini [2005] FamCAFC 104; (2005) 33 Fam LR 134. These steps have been codified in section 90SM of the Act as follows:

Orders in property settlement proceedings

(1) In property settlement proceedings after the breakdown of a de facto relationship, the court may, subject to subsection (6), make such order as it considers appropriate:

(a) in the case of proceedings with respect to the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them - altering the interests of the parties to the de facto relationship in the property; or

(b) in the case of proceedings with respect to the vested bankruptcy property in relation to a bankrupt party to the de facto relationship - altering the interests of the bankruptcy trustee in the vested bankruptcy property;

(c) an order for a settlement of property in substitution for any interest in the property; and

(d) an order requiring:

(i) either or both of the parties to the de facto relationship; or

(ii) the relevant bankruptcy trustee (if any);

to make, for the benefit of either or both of the parties to the de facto relationship or a child of the de facto relationship, such settlement or transfer of property as the court determines.

Note 1: The geographical requirement in section 90SK must be satisfied.

Note 2: The court must be satisfied of at least one of the matters in section 90SB.

Note 3: For child of a de facto relationship, see section 90RB.

Note 4: Subsection (6) relates to property that is a companion animal.

(2) The court must not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order.

(3) In considering what order (if any) should be made under this section in property settlement proceedings, the court:

(i) the existing legal and equitable rights and interests in any property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and

(ii) the existing liabilities of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; and

(b) is to take into account (except for the purpose of making an order with respect to the ownership of property that is a companion animal):

(i) the considerations set out in subsection (4) (considerations relating to contributions); and

(ii) the considerations set out in subsection (5) (considerations relating to current and future circumstances).

Note: See subsections (6) and (7) in relation to orders with respect to property that is a companion animal.

Considerations relating to contributions

(4) For the purposes of subparagraph (3)(b)(i), the court is to take into account the following considerations, so far as they are relevant:

(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship:

(i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or

(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property;

whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them;

(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the de facto relationship, or a child of the de facto relationship:

(i) to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them; or

(ii) otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property;

whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the de facto relationship or either of them;

(c) the contribution made by a party to the de facto relationship to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the de facto relationship and any children of the de facto relationship, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent;

(ca) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the de facto relationship has subjected or exposed the other party, on the ability of a party to the de facto relationship to make the kind of contributions referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c);

(d) the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the de facto relationship;

(f) any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the de facto relationship or a child of the de facto relationship;

(g) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the de facto relationship has provided for a child of the de facto relationship.

Considerations relating to current and future circumstances

(5) For the purposes of subparagraph (3)(b)(ii), the court is to take into account the following considerations, so far as they are relevant:

(a) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the de facto relationship (the subject de facto relationship) has subjected or exposed the other party, on the current and future circumstances of the other party, including on any of the matters mentioned elsewhere in this subsection;

(b) the age and state of health of each of the parties to the subject de facto relationship;

(c) the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties to the subject de facto relationship and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment;

(d) the effect of any material wastage, caused intentionally or recklessly by a party to the subject de facto relationship, of property or financial resources of either of the parties to the subject de facto relationship or both of them;

(e) any liabilities incurred by either of the parties to the subject de facto relationship or both of them, including the nature of the liabilities and the circumstances relating to them;

(f) the extent to which either party to the subject de facto relationship has the care of a child of the de facto relationship who has not attained the age of 18 years, including the need of either party to provide appropriate housing for such a child;

(g) commitments of each of the parties to the subject de facto relationship that are necessary to enable the party to support themselves and any child or other person that the party has a duty to maintain;

(h) the responsibilities of either party to the subject de facto relationship to support any other person;

(i) the eligibility of either party to the subject de facto relationship for a pension, allowance or benefit under:

(i) any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another country; or

(ii) any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was established, or operates, within or outside Australia;

(j) if either party to the subject de facto relationship is eligible for a pension, allowance or benefit as mentioned in paragraph (i) - the rate at which it is being paid to the party;

(k) a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable;

(l) the extent to which an alteration of the interests of the parties to the subject de facto relationship in any property would enable a party to undertake education or establish a business or otherwise obtain an adequate income;

(m) the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to the subject de facto relationship to recover the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant;

(n) the extent to which each party to the subject de facto relationship has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;

(o) the duration of the subject de facto relationship and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of each party to the subject de facto relationship;

(p) the need to protect a party to the de facto relationship who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent;

(q) if either party to the subject de facto relationship is cohabiting with another person - the financial circumstances relating to the cohabitation;

(r) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under this Part in relation to:

(i) a party to the subject de facto relationship (in relation to another de facto relationship); or

(ii) a person who is a party to another de facto relationship with a party to the subject de facto relationship; or

(iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or

(iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii);

(s) the terms of any order or declaration made, or proposed to be made, under Part VIII in relation to:

(i) a party to the subject de facto relationship; or

(ii) a person who is party to a marriage with a party to the subject de facto relationship; or

(iii) the property of a person covered by subparagraph (i) and of a person covered by subparagraph (ii), or of either of them; or

(iv) vested bankruptcy property in relation to a person covered by subparagraph (i) or (ii);

(t) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the subject de facto relationship is to provide, or might be liable to provide in the future, for a child of the subject de facto relationship;

(u) the terms of any Part VIIIAB financial agreement that is binding on either or both of the parties to the subject de facto relationship;

(v) the terms of any financial agreement that is binding on a party to the subject de facto relationship;

(w) any other fact or circumstance which, in the opinion of the court, the justice of the case requires to be taken into account.

1. In Stanford and Stanford [2012] HCA 52, the court considered the expression "just and equitable" at [36] and noted that it:

... is a qualitative description of a conclusion reached after examination of a range of potentially competing considerations. It does not admit of exhaustive definition. It is not possible to chart its metes and bounds.

1. The Full Court in Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 at [86], made it clear that the just and equitable requirement is not a threshold issue, "but rather one permeating the entire process". Accordingly, I shall return to this at the conclusion of the judgment.

1. At the conclusion of the case the parties tendered into evidence the following joint balance sheet.

Property interests, superannuation and financial resources

Assets, Liabilities and Superannuation of the Respondent

Assets, Liabilities and Superannuation of the Applicant

1. The wife says she currently owes $10,000 to Mr J which he lent her to pay her legal fees. Pursuant to Chorn & Hopkins [2004] FamCA 633, if this loan was to be included it would be akin to the husband paying the wife's legal fees. I do not propose to include that liability in the asset pool.

1. The wife seeks that the husband be liable for the tax debt that has accrued for the business since January 2024 when she ceased her involvement. Given the husband has had the sole benefit of the profit which generated any such debt, it is appropriate that he pay the associated tax.

1. The parties agreed to each receive $50,000 from the proceeds of sale of the Suburb E property. Orders were subsequently made providing for the husband to receive a further $50,000.
2. Pursuant to Shinohara & Shinohara [2025] FedCFamC1A 126 it is no longer good law to take into consideration notional property such as part-property payments when assessing the existing assets and liabilities of the parties. However, it is a matter that I will take into consideration under section 90SM(5)(w).

1. I have excluded the negligible and/or smaller amounts held in the parties' bank accounts, given they are of little significance to the outcome and are likely to change from day to day in any event.
2. Accordingly, I find the asset pool available for division between the parties is as follows:

Assets, Liabilities and Superannuation of the Respondent

Assets, Liabilities and Superannuation of the Applicant

1. The husband concedes that at the commencement of the relationship he had no property other than a car worth about $11,000, and that he owed $10,000 in child support and $2,000 in parking fines. Otherwise, he had about $159,000 in superannuation. He also concedes that at the commencement of the relationship he was paying child support of $818 per month, although there is no evidence about how long he paid this amount for and if the amount changed over time.
2. At the commencement of the relationship, the wife owned the Suburb L property and had about $45,000 in superannuation. It is not known how much the Suburb L property was worth in 2004 as there is no retrospective valuation. Although, the property sold for $790,000 in 2006 this was after a major renovation which presumably was funded by the mortgage over the property. Given the Suburb C property was purchased for about $645,000 and had a mortgage of about $310,000, it is reasonable to infer the wife received about $335,000 upon the sale of Suburb L.

1. At the commencement of the relationship the parties resided at the Suburb L property. The wife was working as a health care worker earning $50,000 per annum. The husband was a transport worker earning a modest income.
2. The husband did not contribute directly towards the mortgage or other outgoings on the Suburb L property. He could only have made modest contributions to the other day-to-day expenses given his limited income.
3. The wife's evidence is that Mr J assisted her to renovate and improve the Suburb L property between 2004 and 2006. Mr J says this was "the largest and most ambitious undertaking we had attempted".[32] Nonetheless, there is no evidence of exactly what was done and how this was paid for nor any evidence as to the cost savings to the parties.
4. In 2005, the parties commenced their first business, purchasing a caravan and converting it into a food truck and selling food at markets and field days. Neither party provides any details about how this was funded.
5. It is common ground that in 2007 the husband withdrew $55,000 from his superannuation to purchase a caravan. As discussed, it appeared this was bought at a time when the husband's future was uncertain and he determined he wanted to go travelling. However, upon recovering from his illness, the parties made a joint decision to start the business, travelling to caravan and camping shows.
6. In mid-2008, the parties traded the caravan in for the first of a series of caravans, using a further $80,000 from the husband's superannuation.
7. In about 2009, the parties commenced their partnership selling outdoors products at caravan and camping shows. Over time they upgraded the caravan on a regular basis, taking advantage of the ability to significantly depreciate the vans as business assets.
8. As the business involved significant interstate travel, this left the Suburb C property empty for large parts of the year. A decision was made to make the Suburb C property available for short term stays. The wife agrees the husband assisted her with the original blurb for the short stays website, and thereafter, he was responsible for compiling the end of year tax deductions for the property. It was common ground the rental income, from the short-term rentals, covered the mortgage payments and other outgoings on the Suburb C property. The husband conceded he made no direct financial contributions to the Suburb C property, although he asserted that he did some maintenance on Suburb C. The wife says the husband did not even change a light globe at the property save that he mowed the lawn once when she was unwell.[33] In any event, given the amount of time the parties spent in Victoria, it is unlikely to have been substantial.
9. The wife says that if the court accepts the husband lived in the Suburb C property, he received rent free accommodation, on her calculations for periods totalling up to eight years. However, the husband says he paid for groceries, dinners, alcohol as well as fuel and car insurance in lieu of rent. Although this was denied by the wife, it is corroborated by the Centrelink application, which I have found was signed by both parties and was an accurate reflection of their situation at that time.
10. In 2014, the parties purchased the Suburb E property in joint names and with a joint bank loan. Thereafter, the parties shared equally in the mortgage instalments and outgoings, although again the rental income appears to have covered most of the expenses. The wife maintains she did most of the manual work on Suburb E and minimised any efforts on behalf of the husband, only conceding (as was common in her evidence) matters that were actually photographed. Indeed, the husband was asked if he had photos of his contribution, with a failure to take a photo said to be a sure sign he did not take the action. I would have been more surprised if he had photos of all of his efforts. For reasons already stated, I am reluctant to place much weight on the wife's evidence in this regard.
11. The evidence would suggest the parties operated the business and day-to-day life as a joint venture. Each party appears to have brought their particular skills to the running of the business, with the husband contributing his IT skills and driving (or towing) the van, and the wife bringing her sales abilities, creative side and manual labour (the wife says she physically assembled the outdoors products and other items in her garage). The wife concedes the parties conducted the business partnership as equals.
12. When travelling around, the wife was primarily responsible for the inside of the van, such as the cooking, cleaning and laundry. The husband would set up the outside of the van and attend to tasks, such as the uncoupling and the sullage. It is likely at times they would both undergo activities primarily done by the other. For example, the wife has produced photos of her hosing down the outside of the van and washing out the trailer.
13. The wife and Mr J gave evidence about renovating both the Suburb C property and the shed at the rear of the property. The wife says this included adding a deck to the front of the house. She says that Mr J had told her it would have cost in excess of $250,000 if she employed tradesman at arm's length. Mr J did not corroborate this assertion and there was otherwise no evidence to support such a conclusion. Indeed, there is now some doubt as to whether the shed is compliant with council regulations and whether any faults will need to be rectified.
14. It is unclear from the wife's submissions whether she is arguing that the husband's child support payments should be considered as wastage. However, even if such an argument had merit (and it is hard to see in what circumstances paying child support could be seen as such), there is no evidence as to the total quantity of child support the husband paid out during the parties' relationship.
15. The wife says she did not contribute to her superannuation from 2010 to 2020, which grew purely due to market forces by $54,000. She says that in June 2021 she paid $17,000 of rent from the Suburb C property into her superannuation, and a further $20,000 in October 2021.[34] Although counsel for the wife submits that his client has proven that this was solely from rental income from the Suburb C property, his client's own evidence clearly shows the wife receiving drawings from the business on the same day as she made the last payment.[35]

1. As noted in the submissions for the wife in reliance on the Full Court decision of Jabour & Jabour [2019] FamCAFC 78 at [61] where the court cited Dickons v Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154:

14. As is plain from earlier decisions of this Court, regard must be had to the use made of contributions of various types so as to compare the contributions made by each of the parties during the course of, and over the length of, their relationship...[36]

(As per original)

1. However as submitted for the husband, the Full Court in the case of Hoffman & Hoffman [2014] FamCAFC 92; (2014) FLC 93-591 at [61], stated as follows:

... In the context of the case such as the present one, the duration of the marriage has an important influence upon what evidence is relevant in respect of contributions. There is no need to conduct a minute forensic examination of the details of contributions over many years with each party extolling their own efforts and attempting to diminish the other's.[37]

(Emphasis added)

1. This authority is equally applicable to de facto relationships and to this case, in which I have found the relationship spanned some 20 years.
2. Nonetheless, I also accept the submission of counsel for the wife, with reference to the Full Court in Cabbell & Cabbell [2009] FamCAFC 205 at [54] that the court should "trace the use of initial assets and consider the foundation they laid". I note counsel's reference to Pierce & Pierce [1998] FamCAFC 74 in which the Full Court held:

28. In our opinion it is not so much a matter of erosion of contribution but a question of what weight is to be attached, in all the circumstances, to the initial contribution. It is necessary to weigh the initial contributions by a party with all other relevant contributions of both the husband and the wife. In considering the weight to be attached to the initial contribution, in this case of the husband, regard must be had to the use made by the parties of that contribution.[38]

(Emphasis added)

1. In this case, the parties' current wealth can be traced to the assets each held at the start of the relationship. In regard to the husband's contributions, the parties relied upon the husband's superannuation to purchase the initial caravan which provided the parties with an ongoing income stream and in turn freed up the Suburb C property for short stay rentals. (Although the parties occasionally stayed in the shed at the rear of the property, the wife's evidence is that until 2015 it did not even have a toilet). In regard to the wife, the equity in the Suburb L property was applied to the Suburb C property and this in turn provided the security for the Suburb E property. However, the Suburb E property could not have been purchased without the income from the business, which in turn was not viable without the husband's superannuation. Although the wife infers that perhaps the van was not so vital to the business, as she stayed at times in caravan parks and cabins, this appears to have occurred when the husband was attending a different caravan show and they were dividing their time between the two.
2. Taking into account the myriad of contributions in this case, including the parties' initial contributions and the springboard they provided to the current asset pool, I assess the contributions favour the wife in the amount of 63 per cent.

1. In assessing the parties' current and future circumstances, each party is of retirement age and otherwise each has a fairly modest income earning capacity.
2. If the wife receives 63 per cent of the pool, she will have total net assets of $1,701,173.25 and the husband net assets of $999,101.75.
3. The husband does not seek an adjustment of the pool based on section 90SM(5).
4. The wife says there should be no adjustment of the parties' property at all but if there is, she should receive five per cent adjustment based on alleged family violence. This was based on two incidents. The first related to the shed on the Suburb C property. It is common ground the husband contacted the council after separation to question whether the shed had a permit for the works done. The wife alleges he did so to impact her ability to stay in the shed, and therefore to continue to rent out the main house. The husband says he did so as the works done to the shed may have impacted the value of the property. However, the husband's actions could only have lowered the value of the property, which was not in either of the party's interests. I find that the husband's actions were vindictive and designed to impact the wife's earning capacity from the short stay rentals, and that this constituted family violence as defined in the Act.
5. The second incident concerns an allegation the husband went into the wife's house uninvited and left two mugs promoting the husband's solicitor, in the wife's cupboard. The husband's explanation for how the mugs came to be in the house was quite fanciful. He said the solicitors must have donated them to barristers' chambers and suggested the wife took them during mediation and planted them herself. I simply do not accept this explanation, which only came to light during his oral evidence. I find that the husband put those mugs in the wife's home with the intention of causing alarm to the wife.

Part-property and business funds used since separation

1. It is common ground that the husband has had the benefit of the following:
   • A part-property payment of $100,000;
   • About $42,000 remaining in the business account; and
   • The proceeds of sale of Motorbike 2 worth $4,200.
2. It is not in dispute the husband paid out the lease on Motor Vehicle 1 of about $23,022 as well as spending about $6,500 on the purchase of the Motorbike 1 which remains in the pool. Otherwise, he says the part-property payment was spent on day-to-day expenses including the following:

Business

• Storage costs - $300
• Expense associated with shows - $1,000
• Rent for Caravan Park - $2,450
• Registrations of Caravan, Motorbike 1 and Motor Vehicle 1 - $600
• Fuel for motor vehicles whilst travelling for shows and/or events - $800
• Tax Return Accountant fees - $1,033
• Motor Vehicle 1 insurance - $1,391
• New tyres for Motor Vehicle 1 - $740
• Payment towards credit card debt used for business - $9,392

• Legal
  • Payment of my share of the invoice for Mr X - $1,100
  • Payment to my solicitors, Belleli King Associates - $8,800[39]

1. The husband's case is it was necessary to use both the funds in the business account and the part-property funds to keep the business afloat. He argues that whilst he had a lot of the same ongoing expenses for the business, he had less income due to the wife no longer working in the business. He also said the caravan market was impacted by the publics' reduction of discretionary spending, and a lot of businesses were going bust. It was put to him he could have simply sold all of the assets and ceased operating the business, however the husband's evidence was that he chose to minimise the business losses by continuing to trade. The husband also points out that the wife continued to use the business bank account until April 2024, including for her mobile phone and groceries, and that thereafter she continued to use it to pay for the dogs' expenses. The husband was also entitled to use the business account for his day to day living expenses, as the parties did during the relationship.
2. In taking all these matters into account, including that some of the funds were paid on legal fees and some of the funds remain unaccounted for, the wife should receive a further one per cent of the pool (being a two per cent differential).
3. I also propose to make a further adjustment of one per cent based on the family violence I have determined was committed by the husband post-separation. In particular, I note that his report of the wife to the council is likely to have impacted her ability to earn income from her short-term rental business. On this basis the total adjustment should be 65 per cent.

Is it just and equitable to make any order for property division in this case?

1. Firstly, I accept the submissions of counsel for the husband, pursuant to the Full Court decision in Fields & Smith [2015] FamCAFC 57 that I ought not rely on tables of comparable cases such as that compiled by counsel for the wife. I note even if these cases were of a similar nature, I am not bound by them in any event.
2. Secondly, I accept that there is no inalienable right to a property division no matter how long the relationship and that there is no such thing as community property. It was also repeatedly said in the written submissions that it is not the role of the court to socially engineer an outcome which was not otherwise intended by the parties. In this regard, I note the decision of Sutherland & Oxley [2025] FedCFamC1A 115.
3. However, in this case, even if I find the parties initially intended to keep their finances separate, over the course of 20 years their finances became intermingled. Notwithstanding the wife's case that the parties intended the Suburb C property was hers and the caravans to be the husbands, by the end of the parties' relationship the wife was claiming an interest in the final itineration of the mobile home.
4. Ultimately, the husband came into the relationship with about $159,000 in superannuation. It is not known what equity the wife had in Suburb L but it appears to have been about $345,000 after the renovation so was likely less in 2004. During the relationship, the parties conducted the business as a joint venture. The husband's original contribution by way of superannuation was funnelled into the business and now exists in the form of a caravan valued at $86,000, and various other bits and pieces. The wife's initial contribution by way of the Suburb C property now has equity of $1.5 million and her initial superannuation has grown to over $200,000. In all of the circumstances, this would not be just and equitable.

What order would be just and equitable in the circumstances?

1. The husband seeks that the court take a global approach to the alteration of the party's property interests, such that the non-superannuation and superannuation pools be combined into one. The court has the discretion whether to take a global or an asset-by-asset approach to the pool.[40] In circumstances where both parties can access their superannuation, I accept it is akin to cash and therefore it is appropriate in my view to take a global approach to the asset pool.
2. In weighing up the myriad of contributions in this case, and assessing the parties' current and future circumstances, I have found the current assets and liabilities should be divided 65/35 in the wife's favour. However, pursuant to Clauson & Clauson [1995] FamCA 10; (1995) FLC 92-595, I must assess what this percentage division means in real terms.
3. The total pool in this case consists of $2,700,275. The wife is to receive 65 per cent of the pool being $1,755,178.75 with the husband to receive a corresponding $945,096.25.
4. The husband is to retain the following:

1. To make up the husband's keep of $945,096.25 the wife would be required to pay him $445,968.25.
2. In all of the circumstances, I find this to be a just and equitable division of the assets in this case.
3. Given the funds held currently on trust by the wife's solicitors, her savings and her ability to access her superannuation, the wife should be able to make this payment and still retain the Suburb C property. However, I shall make the order for the default sale in the event the payment is not paid. The wife will be restrained from selling or further encumbering the Suburb C property pending the payment.
4. Otherwise, the parties' will each be responsible for any capital gains tax on the Suburb E property. If the wife is ordered to pay a greater sum, this would be because she earned a greater income in that year and it would therefore be appropriate that she pay the higher amount of tax. The remainder of the orders do not appear to be controversial.
5. For all the aforementioned reasons I make the orders as set out at the commencement of this judgment.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty-eight (148) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Jenkins.

[1] See the amended response to final orders filed 2 September 2025 by the wife at Part D - the facts in dispute.

[2] See, for example, the wife's trial affidavit filed 4 August 2025 ("wife's trial affidavit") at [109].

[5] Wife's trial affidavit annexure "MSD-3" at [66].

[6] Exhibit A5 - text message chain of the parties dated June 2023.

[7] Transcript of 3 September 2025 p.51 at [20].

[8] Transcript of 3 September 2025 p.51 at [25].

[9] Transcript of 3 September 2025 p.51 at [30].

[10] Husband's reply affidavit filed 19 August 2025 ("husband's reply affidavit") annexure "MRA-18" at [209].

[11] Husband's reply affidavit annexure "MRA-16" at [197].

[12] Affidavit of Mr J filed 4 August 2025 ("Mr J's affidavit") at [4].

[13] Exhibit A16 - invoice from Mr J to his mother, the wife dated 24 June 2023.

[14] Transcript of 4 September 2025 p.135 at [5-15].

[15] Wife's written submissions filed 15 September 2025 ("wife's written submissions") at [37].

[16] Wife's written submissions at [34].

[17] Husband's reply affidavit annexure "MRA-7" at [104].

[18] Husband's reply affidavit annexure "MRA-9" at [164-5].

[19] Husband's reply affidavit annexure "MRA-9" at [164-5].

[22] Transcript of 3 September 2025 p.39 at [10].

[23] Exhibit A13 - spreadsheet ledger in relation to wife's loan account for the business.

[24] Wife's reply affidavit filed 19 August 2025 ("wife's reply affidavit") at [21].

[25] See, for example, the wife's reply affidavit at [61].

[26] Wife's trial affidavit at [112].

[27] Transcript of 3 September 2025 p.18 at [30].

[28] Transcript of 3 September 2025 p.18 at [35].

[29] Transcript of 3 September 2025 p.18 at [40].

[31] Wife's written submissions at [32].

[33] See, for example, the wife's trial affidavit at [14].

[34] Wife's trial affidavit at [102].

[35] Wife's trial affidavit annexure "MSD-25" at [263].

[36] Wife's written submissions at [96].

[37] Husband's written submissions filed 29 September 2025 at [60] quoting Hoffman & Hoffman [2014] FamCAFC 92; (2014) FLC 93-591 at [61].

[38] Wife's written submissions at [94].

[39] Husband's trial affidavit at [15].

[40] Norbis & Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513.