AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruptio

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title: In the matter of an application by Leanne Cover Citation: [2024] ACTSC 197 Hearing Date: 21 June 2024 Decision Date: 25 June 2024 Before: McCallum CJ Decision: The plaintiff’s application for the interlocutory relief sought in paragraph 7 of the application in proceeding dated 18 June 2024 is dismissed. Catchwords: CIVIL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION – application for urgent interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of a special report prepared by the Integrity Commission – where Commission required by statute upon completion of a special report to give it to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly – where statute specifies requirement to afford procedural fairness in respect of a special report before it is given to the Speaker – whether statute codifies the Commission’s obligation to afford procedural fairness – whether plaintiff has established a serious question to be tried as to alleged denial of procedural fairness – consideration of balance of convenience in the case of an application to restrain the performance of a statutory duty Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT) Integrity Commission Act 2018 (ACT) ss 9, 100, 206, 212 Cases Cited: AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission [2024] HCA 10 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia [1986] HCA 58; (1986) 161 CLR 148 Drumgold v Board of Inquiry (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 58 Kolback Securities Ltd v Epoch Mining NL (1987) 8 NSWLR 533 R v Doogan [2005] ACTSC 74; (2005) 193 FLR 239 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1 Parties: Leanne Cover (Plaintiff) ACT Integrity Commission (Defendant) Representation: Counsel P Horobin (Plaintiff) P Walker SC with B D Kaplan (Defendant) Solicitors Mills Oakley (Plaintiff) ACT Integrity Commission (Defendant) File Number: SC 199 of 2024 McCALLUM CJ:

1. On 22 June 2022, the ACT Integrity Commission commenced an investigation known as “Operation Luna” pursuant to s 100 of the Integrity Commission Act 2018 (ACT). The subject of the investigation was the award of substantial contracts by an institution in the ACT. The plaintiff held a senior executive position in that institution.

2. The Commissioner decided to prepare a special report on the investigation for the Legislative Assembly, as allowed under s 206 of the Integrity Commission Act. The preparation of a special report is governed by s 212 of the Act. That section requires that, if the proposed special report or part of it relates to a person, the Commission must give the proposed report to that person and allow the person a period of six weeks to give written comments about the proposed report. I will return to consider the steps taken by the Commissioner under that section and the plaintiff's responses.

3. Section 213 of the Act imposes a statutory obligation on the Commissioner, upon completion of a special report, to present it to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly who, in turn, must present it to the Legislative Assembly on the next sitting day.

4. On 14 June 2024, the Commissioner notified the plaintiff that he intended to provide the proposed special report to the Speaker in a form that had been seen and commented on by the plaintiff, but which remained unamended, by close of business on 19 June 2024, in accordance with his obligation under s 213.

5. On 18 June 2024, the plaintiff commenced these proceedings challenging the special report. The documents filed included an application for urgent interlocutory relief restraining the Commissioner from providing the report to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly or otherwise publishing the report. The application also seeks final relief of the same kind. This judgment determines the application for interlocutory relief.

6. The principles to be applied in determining whether to grant interlocutory injunctive relief are well settled. The plaintiff must establish two things: first, that there is a serious question to be tried and, secondly, that the balance of convenience favours granting the relief sought: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65].

7. The Commissioner submitted that a higher threshold must be met in a case where, as here, the effect of the relief sought is to restrain the administration of a statute, citing the decision of Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia [1986] HCA 58; (1986) 161 CLR 148 at 154 and Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill at [66]. In the passage cited from the decision in Castlemaine, Mason ACJ said, “it may be that in some cases where the public interest would be adversely affected by the grant of an injunction the plaintiff may need to show a probability, even a distinct probability of success, in order to obtain an interlocutory injunction.”

8. As already noted, the Integrity Commission Act authorises the preparation of a special report and imposes a statutory duty on the Commissioner, upon completion of such a report, to give it to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. The remarks of the Acting Chief Justice in Castlemaine emphasise the solemnity of the court's power to interfere with the administration of such a statute, whose object is to provide a framework for the investigation of corruption.

9. One further principle should be borne in mind in the present case. Where the fate of an interlocutory application will, in effect, determine the fate of the final relief sought, the task for the court is particularly difficult. In the present case, if publication of the report is not restrained, there is an obvious risk of significant damage to the plaintiff's reputation. As submitted by the plaintiff, it will not be possible to “put the genie back in the bottle”.

10. Restraint of publication is not the only relief sought by the plaintiff, but it is likely to be the most effective. The final relief sought by the plaintiff also includes declarations that the publication or proposed publication of the report entails a breach of the rules of procedural fairness and errors of law. Such relief, if obtained, would go some way to restoring the plaintiff’s reputation. However, it may be accepted that, if the report is published now, and it transpires that its preparation entailed a denial of procedural fairness, or was premised on errors of law, the plaintiff will have suffered a great wrong.

11. In such a case, while the court does not and cannot ordinarily embark at the interlocutory stage on a final determination of the merits or undertake a “preliminary trial”, in some cases it is desirable for the court to evaluate the strength of the plaintiff's case for final relief: Kolback Securities Ltd v Epoch Mining NL (1987) 8 NSWLR 533 at 535-6. In that case, McLelland J said: Where a plaintiff's entitlement to ultimate relief is uncertain, the Court, in deciding to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction, must consider what course is best calculated to achieve justice between the parties in the circumstances of the particular case, pending the resolution of the uncertainty, bearing in mind the consequences to the defendant of the grant of an injunction in support of relief to which the plaintiff may ultimately be held not to be entitled, and the consequences to the plaintiff of the refusal of an injunction in support of relief to which the plaintiff may ultimately be held to be entitled. Where the uncertainty depends in whole or in part on a contested question of fact it is not appropriate for the Court to decide that question on the interlocutory application. Where the uncertainty depends in whole or in part on a contested question of law, it may or may not be appropriate for the Court to decide that question on the interlocutory application, depending on circumstances, eg, whether the question is novel or difficult, or is susceptible of resolution on the present state of the evidence, or whether the urgency of the matter renders it impracticable to give proper consideration to the question. If the Court does decide the question of law the uncertainty is to that extent removed (citations omitted).

12. In the present case, the “strength of the plaintiff's case for final relief” means the strength of the case for restraining, on a permanent basis, the presentation to the Speaker of the special report in its current form. The difficult question is to determine what kind or extent of legal error there would have to be to warrant taking that step.

13. I turn to consider the strength of the application against those principles.

14. The application identifies two kinds of grounds for the relief sought. First, paragraph 19 of the application contends that the proposed special report involves errors of law in “at least” eleven respects. The court can, of course, deal only with the grounds actually specified. The addition of the words “at least” is aspirational and, with respect, serves no purpose in a pleading.

15. Secondly, paragraph 20 of the application contends that the Commissioner has failed to provide procedural fairness under the principles of natural justice at common law, s 212 of the Integrity Commission Act and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1989 (ACT).

16. The application does not distinguish between the grounds for interlocutory and final relief. However, as the argument was developed at the hearing before me last Friday, it became clear that the court could not assess a number of the alleged errors of law on the interlocutory application for the simple reason that the evidence did not include the proposed special report. It is accordingly not possible for me to assess any alleged error of law that asserts error on the face of the report. Some of the alleged errors of law, however, do not fall into that category.

17. Ground (a) of the application deals with the circumstance of the Commissioner having evidently made findings in the absence of evidence from a key witness referred to in these proceedings as Person B, while ground (b) contends that the plaintiff “should be recalled” for further examination and that Person B should be examined. I will return to consider those complaints.

18. Ground (c) alleges denial of procedural fairness. That ground duplicates paragraph 20 of the application and does not require separate consideration.

19. Grounds (d) and (e) allege misconception on the part of the Commissioner as to the scope of the plaintiff's duties in the course of their employment. Ground (f) alleges misconception of the relevance or weight of a matter, namely, informal intimations made to the institution by the relevant Minister and his Chief of Staff. Ground (g) alleges the application of a wrong test as to the meaning of “corrupt conduct” under s 9 of the Integrity Commission Act. Ground (h) repeats the allegation of misconception in the understanding of the plaintiff's duties. Grounds (i) and (j) allege certain findings were made without foundation or on the basis of insufficient evidence. Ground (k) again alleges the application of a wrong test under the Integrity Commission Act, specifically, that the conduct identified in the amended proposed special report in relation to the plaintiff does not meet the threshold of “serious corrupt conduct” as defined in the Act.

20. As I have explained, to the extent that those grounds rest on an assessment of the content of the report, it is not possible for me to assess them. To the extent that they allege the application of a wrong test, either in a misconception of the duties of a person in the position of the plaintiff at law or in the application of the Integrity Commission Act, those kinds of contentions are susceptible of some assessment at the interlocutory stage in the manner described by McLellan CJ in Eq in Kolback Securities. I will return to consider how the Commissioner dealt with those contentions.

21. Paragraph 20 of the application raises a matter the Court can more readily assess. That paragraph alleges a denial of procedural fairness in the ways I have indicated. The submissions in support of that ground identified three legal issues: (a) whether s 212 of the Integrity Commission Act codify the Commission's obligation to afford procedural fairness; (b) if not, what extra steps are required at common law; (c) whether the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act applies to the report.

22. As to the third issue, the answer would seem to be that arguably it does not. In his written submissions, senior counsel for the Commission, Mr Walker, set out an argument in support of the proposition that the Commissioner’s report is not a decision to which that Act applies. He submitted: The phrase ‘decision to which this Act applies’ is defined in the dictionary to the ADJR Act as a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made or required to be made, (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) under an enactment. Section 3A(2) of the Act provides that, if a provision is made by an enactment for the making of a report or recommendation before a decision is made, the making of the report or recommendation is, itself, taken for this Act to be the making of a decision. The difficulty for the plaintiff is that part 4.2 of the Act, while it makes provision for the making of a report, does not make provision for the making of a report 'before a decision is made'. That is to say, the making of a report or recommendation must be a legal precondition to the making of the subsequent decision to which the section refers. To satisfy section 3A(2), the Act must treat the report as preceding the subsequent decision rather than as constituting the decision or an element of the decision itself. But the Act does not do this.

23. The exploration of that issue during the hearing before me did not persuade me that the report of the Commission is a decision to which the ADJR Act applies. In particular, counsel for the plaintiff was unable to point to any decision to be made as to which the provision of the report was a precondition.

24. However, it is not necessary to determine that legal question in the present case. That is because, even assuming Mr Walker's submission (appearing as it does to have some merit) is wrong, the plaintiff did not identify any discrete omission or error peculiar to the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act. The critical question, then, is the content of the obligation of procedural fairness plainly owed by the Commission to the plaintiff and whether procedural fairness was in fact afforded to the plaintiff.

25. In correspondence with the plaintiff, the Commissioner has asserted on a number of occasions that he regards his obligation to give advance notice of adverse findings for the purpose of affording procedural fairness to be exhausted by the provision of the proposed report in accordance with s 212. However, there is at least one respect in which the Commissioner has gone further than the requirements of that section and that is that he has willingly provided to the plaintiff transcript of their own examination and of the examination of other persons referred to in the report, to the extent that they provide the support for the findings or comments made.

26. I turn to summarise the steps taken pursuant to s 212 and otherwise by the Commissioner and the responses to those steps. On 9 November 2023, the plaintiff's solicitor received a copy of the proposed special report. On 16 November 2023, the solicitor wrote to the Commission to express his concerns about procedural fairness because the form in which the report had been provided to him included errors, some typographical, some more significant. He said the report was, as he put it, “not ready to be published unamended.” He cited errors in citations and the like.

27. On 15 December 2023, the solicitor requested the transcripts of the examination of the plaintiff and other persons on whose evidence the report, so far as it concerned the plaintiff, appeared to be based. On 19 December 2023, the Commissioner provided the transcript of the plaintiff's examination. On 22 December 2023, he provided the transcripts of others, supplementing that material in early January.

28. In light of the period of time over which those transcripts were provided, the Commission extended the date for the plaintiff's response to the proposed special report to 12 January 2024. On that date, the plaintiff provided lengthy submissions to the Commissioner under the hand of senior counsel. On the same day, the Commissioner contended, in response to concerns that had been expressed by the solicitor for the plaintiff, that the tentative proposed findings in respect of the plaintiff were clearly identified in the proposed special report, together with the reasoning upon which those findings were based. It was indicated that, following the responses received by the plaintiff and others, the proposed report would be reconsidered to take account of those matters and that a final report would then be completed. The Commissioner at that stage took the view that there was no need for him to provide any further version of the report to the plaintiff.

29. On 29 January 2024, the plaintiff was provided with a copy of a letter to another person of concern in the investigation, referred to as Person A, informing Person A of the Commissioner’s decision that no finding of corrupt conduct on the part of Person A would be made. On 12 February 2024, the plaintiff sought an opportunity to respond in light of that development, which it was apprehended would see substantial revision of the proposed special report.

30. On 14 March 2024, the plaintiff provided further submissions to the Commissioner in light of that development, but still not having seen any further version of the report. It was noted in those further submissions that they were made after the decision of the High Court in AB (a pseudonym) v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission [2024] HCA 10 and also the decision of this Court in Drumgold v The Board of Inquiry (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 58 (Kaye AJ). The asserted significance of those decisions was developed.

31. It may be noted that each raised different circumstances from the present case. The decision of the High Court in AB turned on the construction of the Victorian legislation and, in particular, whether the equivalent Commission in that state was under an obligation, in providing “adverse material”, to provide only the proposed comments or opinions or also to provide the evidence underlying them. The decision in Drumgold v The Board of Inquiry turned on an issue of apprehended bias.

32. In any event, the second round of submissions provided by the plaintiff in March 2024 made a series of complaints additional to the comprehensive submissions previously provided. One of the complaints was that, although the proposed adverse findings were notified and the reasoning upon which those findings were based included in the report, there was no cross-referencing between the findings and the material. It was further complained that there were still incorrect citations in the proposed report.

33. Most importantly, the March submissions addressed the apparent absence of evidence from Person B and that person's role in the preparation of Board Papers for the institution. In that context, the submissions also addressed the circumstance that a particular letter, lately provided to the plaintiff, had not been placed before the Board.

34. On 25 March 2024, the plaintiff repeated their request to receive a copy of the special report as revised in light of the decision not to make adverse findings against Person A. On 26 March 2024, the Commissioner wrote in reply to that letter maintaining his position that he had complied with his obligation of disclosure under s 212 of the Integrity Commission Act but indicating that he proposed, in any event, to provide a further version of the report, not only to the plaintiff but to all persons who remained concerned with the report.

35. On 26 April 2024, the Commissioner provided a response to the plaintiff’s previous submissions and a further draft of the report. He sought comments on that material by 7 June 2024. I pause to note that, in my experience of cases concerning the requirements of procedural fairness, even the fact of the provision of a response by the Commissioner to the plaintiff’s previous submissions is an unusual level of disclosure, let alone the comprehensive content of the comments provided.

36. On 16 May 2024, the plaintiff requested an extension of the time within which to provide comments in response to the further draft of the report and the Commissioner’s response to their previous submissions. The basis for the request for the extension was on medical grounds. Medical information was provided to the Commissioner in support of the request.

37. However, on 17 May 2024, the Commissioner refused to allow the extension sought. In refusing to grant an extension, the Commissioner noted that a report under the Integrity Commission Act does not affect any legal right, that this report involved the interests not only of the plaintiff but of others, and that there was also to be considered the public interest in the subject matter of the report, being the expenditure of substantial sums of public money.

38. On 29 May 2024, the plaintiff wrote to the Commissioner asking whether person B had been examined. The Commissioner refused to say whether or not that had happened.

39. On 11 June 2024, shortly after the date originally specified by the Commissioner, the plaintiff provided further submissions in response to the further draft of the report and response to the earlier submissions.

40. On 14 June 2024, the Commissioner wrote to the plaintiff indicating that he did not propose to amend the report in response to those further submissions. He gave notice of the proposed date for giving the special report to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly as 19 June 2024. In that correspondence, the Commissioner again included lengthy responses to the plaintiff's submissions. Again, in my experience, the provision of those reasons for not amending the report reflected an unusual level of disclosure of the material and reasoning behind any adverse comment or finding in the special report.

41. As already noted, the proceedings were commenced on 18 June 2024, the day before the report was due to be given to the Speaker. The Commissioner undertook not to give the report to the Speaker pending the resolution of the present application.

42. In summary, the Commissioner has provided two drafts of the special report to the plaintiff and has evidently amended the report in response to comments made. Whether he has amended the report in response to any comments made by the plaintiff is not clear or possible for me to discern on the material before me. He has also provided to the plaintiff all transcripts of examination sought by the plaintiff.

43. The only thing the Commissioner did not do, so it would seem, was to answer within the timeframe for responding to the proposed reports the plaintiff’s questions about person B (including their request to be further examined about matters concerning Person B). There is good reason why an investigating authority might decline to provide such information. On the other hand, the refusal to provide such information might, depending on the circumstances, deprive a person of a real opportunity to respond to adverse comment.

44. To the extent that I am able to judge this issue without having seen the draft report, the significance of the refusal to say whether Person B had been examined, or to call the plaintiff to give further evidence in response to the late provision of a letter sent to Person B, appears to go to the alleged misconception by the Commissioner of the respective duties of the plaintiff and Person B in providing information to the Board of the institution. The plaintiff has provided lengthy written submissions on that issue. Indeed, it appears to lie at the heart of the plaintiff's response to the proposed special report.

45. In this context, Mr Walker relied on the decision of the ACT Court of Appeal in R v Doogan [2005] ACTSC 74; (2005) 193 FLR 239 where, in determining whether error consisted in a failure to ask further questions of certain persons, the Court said at [27], “[e]ach of these questions could, of course, lead to yet others and, ultimately, to a virtually infinite chain of causation.”

46. Care must be taken in making a comparison between that case and this because the circumstances were very different. The inquiry there was concerned with the cause of a fire. Plainly, the causes of fire can be many and various.

47. Here, the question is whether the Commissioner has taken all steps required of him to meet the plaintiff's entitlement to procedural fairness. Nevertheless, the point about a virtually infinite chain of causation, apart from being beautifully expressed, is apt. That is, that an investigation of the present kind can presumably involve a virtually infinite chain of reasoning as to whether a person is liable to adverse comment or finding in the report. The extent of investigations to be undertaken by the Commissioner in the course of an investigation under s 100 is a matter for him.

48. The content of the entitlement to procedural fairness is ultimately to be measured by reference to considerations of practical fairness: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1 at [37] (Gleeson CJ). The plaintiff placed significant emphasis on the fact that the Commissioner initially refused to confirm or deny whether person B had been examined. The Commissioner has now confirmed that that person was not examined but, as already indicated, that occurred after the completion of the process of procedural fairness in accordance with s 212, or at least after the further round of submissions following provision of the amended proposed special report. As I have indicated, the Commissioner took the view that the provision of that further version of the proposed special report was voluntary, if that is the right word, in the sense that he had already complied with his obligations under the section in the first round.

49. In any event, now that it is confirmed that Person B was not examined, it must be observed that it is not for this Court to tell the Commissioner how to conduct his investigation. I cannot speculate what evidence Person B might have given before the Commission or how the Commissioner might have evaluated any such evidence.

50. What I can say, based on the Commissioner’s careful response to the plaintiff’s submissions in response to the amended proposed special report, is that he has plainly considered the plaintiff’s arguments concerning that person’s involvement in the conduct considered in the report, the tests to be applied and the scope of the duties of a person in the position of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has had several opportunities and has availed themself of those opportunities to respond to what appear to be the central concerns of the Commissioner in the draft reports.

51. In the application before me, counsel for the plaintiff did not attempt to engage with the substance of any of the Commissioner's responses to the plaintiff’s comments on the two iterations of the proposed special report. As already noted, the plaintiff's argument rested primarily on the refusal, until after the conclusion of the third round of submissions, to say whether Person B had been examined or to call the plaintiff to give further evidence in light of that person’s involvement in the provision of information to the Board. Those issues were addressed comprehensively by the Commissioner and no attempt was made before me to demonstrate error in his responses.

52. In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has shown a sufficient likelihood of success to justify preservation of the status quo. In reaching that conclusion, I emphasise the following matters.

53. First, for the reasons explained, it is not possible for me to assess the legal errors allegedly shown on the face of the draft report. Secondly, as to the grounds alleging denial of procedural fairness, in my assessment, the Commissioner has complied with the requirements of s 212 and indeed gone further than required by that section. Thirdly, the central complaint, being the unconfirmed status of Person B and the decision not to recall the plaintiff to respond to anything that person might have said, has been answered by the Commissioner in detail and there has been no engagement with the Commissioner's response on those points.

54. Finally, as concerns the balance of convenience, I accept, as submitted on behalf of the plaintiff, that the refusal of the relief sought in the present application will, in effect, let the genie out of the bottle. That is a factor which has weighed heavily with me. I am mindful of the impact media reporting can have on the reputation of a person. That has been a considerable part of my professional experience in New South Wales.

55. However, as noted by the defendant, the present case is not a contest between two individuals. The Commissioner has statutory obligations in respect of a special report prepared by him. In particular, he has an obligation upon completion of such a report to give it to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. Those statutory obligations are informed by matters of governance that must be taken to be important to the government in the enactment of the Integrity Commission Act.

56. I have not had any regard to a submission made by Mr Walker that it is relevant that this is an election year in the Territory. Good governance and related matters addressed in the Integrity Commission Act are of enduring and constant importance to the government and the community. I have, however, had regard to the solemnity of those matters and the care this Court would take before intervening with the application of the Act.

57. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

58. [The plaintiff then made an oral application for a stay until 4:30 pm on 27 June 2024].

59. I have just now published my reasons for dismissing an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the publication of a special report prepared by the Integrity Commission. After I pronounced the order dismissing the application, Ms Quilty, the solicitor for the plaintiff, sought some accommodation to prevent publication of the special report until 4.30 pm on Thursday to permit the plaintiff to consider appealing from my decision. The application (framed as an application for a stay) is opposed by the Commissioner. Mr Walker SC noted that a stay of an order dismissing an application would not of itself achieve the outcome sought by the plaintiff. However, he indicated that he did not have instructions to give an undertaking in the terms of the injunction sought.

60. Whilst I have given anxious consideration to the issues raised in support of the principal application and concluded that it should be dismissed, this is a case where, as the reasons I have just published will indicate, the refusal of the relief sought in effect lets the genie out of the bottle in the sense that, once published, the report cannot be unpublished. That reason alone, in my view, is sufficient reason to afford a short accommodation to the plaintiff to give them an opportunity to consider appealing against my decision.

61. Accordingly, notwithstanding the refusal of the application for interlocutory relief, and in light of the Commissioner’s position, I make order 7 in the application in proceeding dated 18 June 2024, but not until further or other order as sought. Rather, I will make that order until 4.30 pm on Thursday, 27 June 2024.

Orders

62. For those reasons, I make the following orders: (1) The plaintiff’s application for the interlocutory relief sought in paragraph 7 of the application in proceeding dated 18 June 2024 is dismissed. (2) As to the plaintiff’s oral application to preserve the status quo to allow for the filing of any appeal, I make an order restraining the defendant until 4:30pm on Thursday 27 June 2024 from providing a special report in the form of the amended proposed special report prepared by the Commission in relation to the Commission’s Operation Luna and provided to the plaintiff on 26 April 2024 (or any future iteration of the amended proposed special report) to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the ACT or otherwise publishing the special report. (3) Extend the suppression orders made by Mossop J on 19 June 2024 up until 4:30pm on 27 June 2024. (4) Vary the orders made by Mossop J on 19 June 2024 to permit the plaintiff to disclose matters subject to suppression orders in discussion with their directors’ and officers’ liability insurer. (5) Unless the plaintiff provides written submissions seeking any different order within 14 days, order that the plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-two [62] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Chief Justice McCallum Associate: Date: **************

Amendments

17 July 2024 Replace “MD (a pseudonym)” with “Leanne Cover” under Parties. 17 July 2024 Replace title of the judgment “In the matter of an application [2024] ACTSC 197” with “In the matter of an application by Leanne Cover [2024] ACTSC 197”. 17 July 2024 In [1], omit “The plaintiff, who is referred to in these proceedings only by pseudonym, held a senior executive position in that institution” and substitute with “The plaintiff held a senior executive position in that institution”.