[2012] VCAT 1233
General information, not legal advice.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2012-08-15
Original judgment source is linked above.
General List Freedom of Information Act 1982 s 3 and s 25A(1) - government school - parent seeking documents related to allegations made against him which were not substantiated - whether request would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the respondent - meaning of words "substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the agency from its other operations"
AB v Department of Education (General) [2012] VCAT 1233
(1) The agency dealing with a request may refuse to grant access to documents in accordance with the request, without having caused the processing of the request to have been undertaken, if the agency is satisfied that the work involved in processing the request -
(a) in the case of an agency - would substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the agency from its other operations; or ...
(2) Subject to subsection (3) but without limiting the matters to which the agency ... may have regard in deciding whether to refuse under subsection (1) to grant access to the documents to which the request relates, the agency ... is to have regard to the resources that would have to be used -
(a) in identifying, locating or collating the documents within the filing system of the agency; or
(b) in deciding whether to grant, refuse or defer access to documents to which the request relates, or to grant access to edited copies of such documents, including resources that would have to be used -
(ii) in consulting with any person or body in relation to the request; or
(c) in making a copy, or an edited copy, of the documents; or
(d) in notifying any interim or final decision on the request.
(3) The agency is not to have regard to any maximum amount, specified in regulations, payable as a charge for processing a request of that kind.
(4) In deciding whether to refuse, under subsection (1), to grant access to documents, an agency must not have regard to -
(a) any reasons that the person who requests access gives for requesting access; or
(b) the agency's belief as to what are his or her reasons for requesting access. ...
(6) An agency must not refuse to grant access to a document under subsection (1) unless the agency has -
(ii) identifying an officer of the agency with whom the applicant may consult with a view to making the request in a form that would remove the ground for refusal; and
(b) given the applicant a reasonable opportunity so to consult; and
(c) as far as is reasonably practicable, provided the applicant with any information that would assist the making of the request in such a form.
(7) For the purposes of section 21, the period commencing on the day an applicant is given a notice under subsection (6)(a) and ending on the day the applicant confirms or alters the request following the consultation referred to in subsection (6) is to be disregarded in the computation of the 45 day period referred to in section 21. ...
Over the time spent processing the 2010 request I found that I had significantly under-estimated the amount of work and time that would be needed from my own Unit, the OGSE and particularly the Regional Office and school staff, in order to process [AB's] 2010 request. As processing progressed and the volume of potentially relevant documents increased it became clear that considerable cross checking of these documents was required, there was almost daily contact with the school and the Regional Office questioning relevant persons about documents and searches conducted, and the like. Preparing documentation in relation to the access decision and queries raised by [AB] throughout the FOI process also took up a lot of time. During processing, [AB] repeatedly raised FOI procedural issues which, in turn, had to be addressed and responded to whilst processing the request.
I also received many time-consuming telephone calls and e-mails from staff and other parents at the school who the Unit consulted. They told me they were concerned about the nature and content of documents sought by [AB], because as a matter of course he pursues and questions the motive and performance of those people he believes have acted inappropriately.
... I wanted to shed light on what had transpired, to understand the decisions of the department in continuing to hold bans upon me despite being cleared both by the DHS and the police and the department is well aware of this, to access records held by the department on me and have false errors, false information and the like rectified, to hold people accountable for their actions, and to do what ever we could to ensure that what has occurred to us could not occur to anyone else in the future. I would contest at preventing these aims from being able to be fulfilled, and allowing this entire saga to continue would be a breach of natural justice. Whilst I admit the allegations of sexual assault may never be stopped, shedding light on the wrongs of the department here would enable us to request appropriate changes to policies and guidelines, or retraining of staff to help them follow existing policies and guidelines that could minimise not only the possibilities of these types of allegations being made, but to allow open and transparent practices to minimise the damage done to people involved in these cases and put an end to the matters as quickly and as helpfully as possible.
Section 25A seeks to balance competing interests. There is a public interest in agency not being diverted from its core work through needing to process a very broad-ranging request for documents. On the other hand, the agency can only refuse to process such a request if it sought to consult with the applicant so as to confine the request to manageable dimensions, and has failed in this endeavour [see 25A(6)]. Section 25A put pressure on agencies to identify voluminous requests quickly and to take steps to narrow such requests so that the requests can then be processed. Only if these steps fail can an agency rely on section 25A as the basis for refusing to grant access to the documents requested.
... it is plain enough that s.25A was introduced to overcome the mischief that occurs when an agency's resources are substantially and unreasonably diverted from its core operations by voluminous requests for access to documents. The emphasis of the amendment was on the prevention of improper diversion of the agency's resources from their other operations. The provision was introduced to strike a balance between the object of the Act to which reference has already been made and the need to ensure that the requests under the Act did not cause substantial and unreasonable disruption to the day to day workings of the government through its agencies.
... in asserting section 25A, an agency cannot be obliged to specify exactly how much time and energy would be spent by the agency in processing the request. Estimates only are acceptable, as to ensure precision would mean the agency would have to do the very work that section 25A is designed to prevent.
The resources of the agency referred to in s 24(1)(a) must be the resources which the respondent had at the time the request was lodged or had as at the date of the hearing. It cannot mean resources which the respondent might be able to obtain or even resources constituted by the filing of establishment positions. It also cannot mean the whole of the resources of a large Department of State. To find this would make the section meaningless. We consider it means the resources reasonably required to deal with an FOI application consistent with attendance to other priorities.
In administrative review it is not necessary to show ... that the extent of the unreasonableness is overwhelming. It is for this tribunal to weigh up the considerations for and against the situation and to form a balanced judgement of reasonableness, based on objective evidence.
In my view, while the request is composed of many individual specifications it is in effect while challenging in terms of detail, a global request which would be difficult to process.
There is a public interest in any person accused of a serious crime being able to access information relevant to those accusations and to administrative actions taken with respect to the person. However, that public interest was, in my view, satisfied by the Department processing the 2010 request. AB's evidence in this proceeding that life at the school has moved on and in large part his family are well regarded, although he is still subject to some restrictions at the school, indicates the limited public interest in taking access under the FOI Act further. While I do not repeat them here, I note SM Davis' conclusions in AB v Department of Education and Early Childhood Development (General) [2011] VCAT 1263 that release of documents in dispute before VCAT following the 2010 request would not further the public interest (paragraph 115 ff).
As I describe above, in my view the request is not reasonably manageable, primarily in terms of the resource requirements in parts of the Department other than at the Unit.
As stated above, I accept the Department's estimates.
I view the Department's initial assessment is both reasonable or perhaps an underestimate. I do not regard AB is having taken a co-operative approach in redrawing boundaries.
The requirement to make decisions within 45 days is clearly relevant. The Unit is to be commended for its efforts to meet the time limit. Meeting the time limit would add to the pressure on all parts of the Department that were involved. However, I add a caveat being that in reality there are many cases across government where 45-day time limit is not met. In my view placing too much weight on this issue is contrary to the overriding right of access to documents, even if the decision is made after 45 days.
In my view that processing time may well exceed the estimate.
AB
Department of Education