AAI Ltd t/as GIO v Mohammed [2026] NSWSC 991 | Case summary | Zoe

NSWNSWSC

AAI Ltd t/as GIO v Mohammed

[2026] NSWSC 991

Supreme Court of NSW|2026-08-25|Before: Griffiths AJ

View on NSW Caselaw

At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2026-08-25

Before

Griffiths AJ

Catchwords

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — review of medical assessment by Review Panel — judicial review of Review Panel decision — where medical assessment certificate revoked and replaced by Review Panel — whether Review Panel’s decision affected by reviewable error due to making of findings beyond scope of medical dispute — whether Review Panel failed to afford procedural fairness

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — review of medical assessment by Review Panel — judicial review of Review Panel decision — where medical assessment certificate revoked and replaced by Review Panel — whether Review Panel’s decision affected by reviewable error due to making of findings beyond scope of medical dispute — whether Review Panel failed to afford procedural fairness

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Medium Neutral Citation: AAI Ltd t/as GIO v Mohammed [2026] NSWSC 991

Hearing dates: 4 August 2026

Date of orders: 25 August 2026

Decision date: 25 August 2026

Jurisdiction: Common Law

Before: Griffiths AJ

Decision: The summons filed 10 February 2026 is dismissed, with costs.

Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — review of medical assessment by Review Panel — judicial review of Review Panel decision — where medical assessment certificate revoked and replaced by Review Panel — whether Review Panel’s decision affected by reviewable error due to making of findings beyond scope of medical dispute — whether Review Panel failed to afford procedural fairness

The significance of an assessment whether a particular injury is a threshold injury or not lies in the fact that, pursuant to ss 3.11(1)(b) and 3.28(1)(b) of the MAI Act, the entitlement to statutory benefits ceases after 52 weeks if the person’s only injuries resulting from the motor accident are threshold injuries. Further, s 4.4 states that no damages may be awarded to an injured person if the only injuries resulting from the accident are threshold injuries.
The President of the Personal Injury Commission (PIC) is empowered to appoint medical assessors to assess medical disputes: Personal Injury Commission Act 2020 (NSW) (PIC Act) s 33(1)(b). A medical dispute about a claim may be referred to the President for assessment under Div 7.5 of the MAI Act by inter alia either party to the dispute: MAI Act s 7.20(1)(a). The President is to arrange for the dispute to be dealt with by one or more medical assessors: MAI Act s 7.20(2). The assessor or assessors “is or are to give a certificate as to the matters referred for assessment”: MAI Act s 7.23(1). The certificate is, in specified proceedings: (a) prima facie evidence of any matter certified as to the degree of permanent impairment of earning capacity; and (b) conclusive evidence of any other matter certified: MAI Act s 7.23(2). However, a court may reject a certificate as to all or any of the matters certified therein on the ground of procedural fairness but only if the court is satisfied that evidence of the certificate would cause substantial injustice to the party complaining of procedural unfairness: MAI Act s 7.23(3).
A claimant is generally prevented from referring a medical dispute for assessment under Div 7.5 in relation to an insurer’s decision on a claim until the decision has been subject to an internal review by the insurer under Div 7.3: MAI Act s 7.19(1).
Section 7.24(2) of the MAI Act provides that a medical dispute which was previously referred for assessment may be referred again for assessment by the claimant or the insurer, “but only on the grounds prescribed by the regulations (if any) in relation to the medical assessment matter to which the dispute relates”. Section 13 of the Motor Accident Injuries Regulation 2017 (NSW) relevantly states:

Medical Assessor Woo examined Mr Mohammed on 18 January 2024. He provided his decision and Certificate on 22 January 2024. Dr Woo found that Mr Mohammed’s cervical spine, right knee, lumbar spine and left shoulder soft tissue injuries were threshold injuries. He issued a certificate under s 7.23(1) of the MAI Act to that effect. The only radiological or medical imaging referred to by Dr Woo concerning Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder was a report by Dr Pradnya Dugal on 13 May 2022 which noted “Mild changes of supraspinatus tendinosis without evidence of tear. Mild subacromial/subdeltoid bursitis” (emphasis added).
By an application dated 20 February 2024, Mr Mohammed requested a further medical assessment under s 7.24 of the MAI Act, alleging that there was additional relevant information about his claimed injuries to his right knee and that Dr Woo had failed properly to assess the injury to Mr Mohammed’s lumbar spine. The application was accompanied by written submissions dated 19 February 2024, which stated that Mr Mohammed sought both a review and/or further assessment of his injuries with respect to his right knee and lumbar spine but did not refer to his left shoulder injuries.
On 13 March 2024, GIO lodged a reply to Mr Mohammed’s application for review and/or further medical assessment. In the accompanying submissions also dated 13 March 2024, GIO submitted that Mr Mohammed’s application for review and/or further medical assessment of the injuries to his lumbar spine and right knee should be dismissed.
On 4 April 2024, a delegate of the President of the PIC determined that Mr Mohammed’s application would be referred for further medical assessment as she was satisfied that there was additional relevant information or deterioration of Mr Mohammed’s injuries to his right knee such as to be capable of having a material effect on the outcome of Dr Woo’s previous assessment. The delegate confirmed that the further medical assessment would “involve consideration of all aspects of the previous assessment afresh and may include all injuries assessed by the original Medical Assessor and any additional injuries listed on the application or reply”. The following injuries were referred for further assessment (noting that they included the left shoulder injury):

The matter was referred back to Dr Woo, who examined Mr Mohammed again on 27 September 2024 and provided his decision and Certificate on 7 October 2024. The further assessment was carried out on the basis that it involved all four bodily injuries, including the left shoulder. Dr Woo found that Mr Mohammed’s cervical spine, right knee and left shoulder soft tissue injuries were threshold injuries (as he had previously found in his 22 January 2024 decision), but that Mr Mohammed’s lumbar spine injury was not a threshold injury. In his summary of relevant radiological and medical imaging concerning Mr Mohammed’s various injuries, the only imaging noted with respect to the left shoulder injury was, again, the report by Dr Pradnya Dugal of the ultrasound of Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder on 13 May 2022 which, as noted above, stated that there were “Mild changes of supraspinatus tendinosis, without evidence of tear”.
On 6 November 2024, GIO applied under s 7.26 of the MAI Act for a review of Dr Woo’s 7 October 2024 Certificate. In the accompanying written submissions dated 5 November 2024, GIO submitted that Dr Woo had not adequately addressed causation in respect of the lumbar spine injury and that the matter should be referred to a review panel. No reply submissions were lodged by Mr Mohammed in response to GIO’s referral application.
On 5 December 2024, a delegate of the President of the PIC determined that she was satisfied that there was reasonable cause to suspect that the medical assessment was incorrect in a material respect and that it would be referred to a review panel. The delegate explained why there was reasonable cause to suspect that GIO had been denied procedural fairness because it had not been provided with an opportunity to respond to the new medical evidence that Mr Mohammed had brought with him to the latest medical assessment, including an MRI scan of the lumbar spine dated 6 September 2024. GIO’s review application was accepted and the delegate stated that the “application ... will be referred to a Review Panel”.
The Review Panel was constituted by Principal Member John Harris and Medical Assessors Christopher Oates and Margaret Gibson. The Review Panel issued various directions during the period 10 December 2024 to 24 October 2025. Relevantly, this included several directions to the parties to provide Mr Mohammed’s general practitioner clinical records. The direction was not limited to records regarding the lumbar spine. Ultimately, the claimant provided two bundles of medical reports from two separate GP practices. The first bundle, from Lakemba Medical Centre, was given to GIO on 30 May 2025. The second bundle, from NAS Advanced Medical Centre, was given to GIO on 23 July 2025. The bundle from Lakemba Medical Centre included a copy of the report dated 22 December 2024 by Dr Manish Chug from Auburn Radiology, who reviewed an ultrasound on Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder carried out on 20 December 2024. Dr Chug reported that (emphasis added):

It is convenient to interpolate here that, during the course of the hearing before me, GIO tendered a copy of another medical report obtained from Lakemba Medical Centre. This report is dated 2 January 2025 and was created by Dr Elsadig Mohammed. It is in substantially similar terms to Dr Chug’s report dated 22 December 2024 and contains similar statements to those set out immediately above. In addition, under the heading “Reason for visit”, Dr Mohammed’s report refers to “Partial thickness tear of the supraspinatus”. This report was admitted (without objection) as Exhibit A in the proceedings. It appears that a copy of the report was provided to the Review Panel in late July 2025.
By a direction dated 9 May 2025 issued by the Principal Member, the Review Panel stated that, having reviewed the material provided to date (which at that time did not include the reports dated 22 December 2024 and 2 January 2025 by Dr Chug and Dr Mohammed respectively), the Review Panel’s “preliminary view” was that “the argument is essentially restricted to whether there was an injury properly classified as not a threshold injury to the L4/5 disc”. The Review Panel required the claimant to file and serve, prior to 1 June 2025, a list of any injuries he asserted were non-threshold and any arguable basis for this assertion.
Mr Mohammed’s solicitor provided written submissions dated 3 June 2025, presumably in response to the direction dated 9 May 2025. In brief, it was submitted that the right knee and lumbar spine injuries met the definition of non-threshold injury. The submissions are directed entirely to those injuries. The solicitor did not contend in this document that Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder injury was a non-threshold injury.
In a further direction dated 1 July 2025, the Review Panel noted the further submissions dated 3 June 2025 and that they alleged a non-threshold injury to the right knee and lumbar spine. The Review Panel said that it believed that the threshold dispute turned on the radiological evidence, relevant history and nature of the motor accident and the parties were asked to advise whether they accepted the physical examination findings of the original medical assessment certificate. The Review Panel also stated that, although it did not propose to determine the dispute on the papers, its view at that time was that an examination of Mr Mohammed was not required.
Evidently, both parties responded to the direction dated 1 July 2025 but copies of those responses were not included in the evidence.
In a further direction dated 11 July 2025, the Review Panel noted the parties’ submissions (presumably in response to the 1 July 2025 direction) and said that there must be a new examination. It was also stated that the Review Panel was awaiting the GP records as requested in the directions dated 11 March 2025 and 1 July 2025.
In a direction dated 23 July 2025, the Review Panel acknowledged that the claimant had produced records from the Lakemba Medical Centre but indicated it still required the production of all GP records from 2018 to 2025.
One of the Medical Assessors constituting the Review Panel (Dr Oates) conducted a re-examination of Mr Mohammed on 1 September 2025. According to the Review Panel’s reasons dated 10 November 2025, the re-examination was conducted on the basis that the left shoulder injury was among the threshold injury disputes to be assessed.
In his re-examination report (which is set out in the Review Panel’s reasons), Dr Oates recorded that Mr Mohammed’s general practitioner had referred him for an ultrasound of the left shoulder because of ongoing left shoulder pain and that “this was done on 2/1/2025 showing a partial-thickness tear of the supraspinatus tendon”. I understand that it is common ground that this is a reference to Dr Mohammed’s report dated 2 January 2025 (which substantially reproduced Dr Chug’s report dated 22 December 2024). Dr Oates (whose report was adopted by the Review Panel as a whole) also noted that, although Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder had improved, “he still can’t move it fully overhead”. Dr Oates concluded that Mr Mohammed had suffered soft tissue injuries to his cervical spine, lumbar spine and left shoulder and that all these injuries were caused by the motor vehicle accident.
Returning now to the other events leading up to the Review Panel’s decision, by a direction to the parties dated 24 October 2025, the Review Panel noted that a report of the left shoulder ultrasound contained in the clinical records of Lakemba Medical Centre referred to a partial thickness tear of the supraspinatus. In the present proceedings, the parties appear to agree that this is a reference to Dr Mohammed’s report dated 2 January 2025 (which substantially reproduced Dr Chug’s report dated 22 December 2024). Both reports included a finding that there was a tear of the supraspinatus tendon (which contradicted the 13 May 2022 scan). The Review Panel directed GIO to make any submissions by 31 October 2025 as to whether the partial thickness tear was caused by the accident. No similar direction was given to Mr Mohammed and no further submissions were provided by him to the Review Panel.
In response to the direction, GIO provided two pages of written submissions dated 31 October 2025. GIO summarised the history of the relevant evidence relating to the left shoulder injury, including the various assessments by Dr Woo. GIO referred to the fact that on 2 January 2025, a medical certificate was issued by Dr Elsadig Mohammed “which provided a diagnosis of left shoulder bursitis and a cervical disk problem”, cross-referring to page 150 of the Lakemba Medical Centre records. (It may be interpolated here that the evidence before the Court did not include all the contents of the medical records obtained from NAS Advanced Medical Centre and Lakemba Medical Centre. It is unclear whether, on 2 January 2025, Dr Mohammed provided both a medical certificate and the report described at [29] above).
GIO further submitted that certificates of capacity completed by Dr Elsadig Mohammed during the period 28 February 2025 to 24 May 2025 provided a diagnosis of the accident-related injury to include “supraspinatus tendinosis, subacromial and subdeltoid bursitis of the left shoulder” and that none of the certificates suggested that the partial thickness tear in the left supraspinatus was causally related to the motor vehicle accident (cross-referring to pages 29-44 and 67-70 of the Lakemba Medical Centre Records).
GIO contended that there was no causal link between the partial thickness tear in the left supraspinatus tendon and the motor vehicle accident. It emphasised that the left shoulder ultrasound dated 13 May 2022 (which was only 11 days after the accident) “explicitly revealed that there was no evidence of a tear in the supraspinatus tendon” and that this imaging would have revealed if the accident had caused a non-threshold injury to Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder. It emphasised that Dr Chug’s report dated 22 December 2024 which identified a partial thickness tear was done over two and a half years after the accident.
It is notable that, in its submissions dated 31 October 2025, GIO did not contend that the issue whether there was a tear to the left shoulder was outside the ambit of the medical dispute. GIO’s submissions implicitly assumed that this injury was within the scope of the medical dispute. Hence the issue was addressed by it at some length.

The central question in McKee was different from that raised here by ground 1. The question there was whether the ambit of a review under the MAC Act went beyond the scope of the particular ground on which the initial medical assessment was incorrect. Moreover, as noted above, McKee dealt with a review of a medical assessment not under the MAI Act but under the MAC Act. While acknowledging these differences, I consider that the broad construction of the ambit of a review under the MAC Act as described by the majority in McKee also applies to the broadly analogous review regime under the MAI Act. The provisions in Pt 3.4 of the MAC Act, to which Allsop P and Giles JA referred to as supporting a broad construction, are substantially reflected in the relevant provisions of Div 7.5 of the MAI Act which I have outlined above. I do not regard as significant any difference in the two review regimes, such as the fact that review panels under the MAI Act have two medical assessors whereas at the time McKee was decided, review panels were constituted by three or more medical assessors.
There is another important matter that warrants particular emphasis. At the time of both the first instance judgment and the appeal in McKee, the MAC Act did not include s 63(3A). This provision was enacted by the Motor Accidents Compensation Amendment (Claims and Dispute Resolution) Act 2007 (NSW) (Amendment Act) and did not come into effect until 1 October 2008. Section 63(3A) is in substantially similar terms to s 7.26(6) of the MAI Act (see at [11] above). In the Legislative Assembly, the Parliamentary Secretary referred to items 18 to 36 of Sch 1 to the Amendment Act, which included the proposed s 63(3A), as provisions that clarify procedural issues relating to the conduct of review assessments: New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 27 November 2007. Section 63(3A) may have been prompted by the first instance decision dated 4 October 2007 in McKee. It is also confirmatory of the majority’s analysis in McKee and the correctness of a broad construction of the ambit of a review under that earlier legislation.
The significance of s 63(3A) of the MAC Act (and, by analogy, s 7.26(6) of the MAI Act) was emphasised by Leeming JA (Beazley P and Basten JA agreeing) in Frost v Kourouche (2014) 86 NSWLR 214; [2014] NSWCA 39 at [9]:

Mandoukos involved a judicial review of a decision of a medical assessor and a delegate of the President of the PIC under the MAI Act. Both a medical assessor and a review panel found that the appellant's cervical spine injury sustained in a motor accident was a “non-minor” injury (i.e. not a “threshold injury”) for the purpose of the Act. The appellant subsequently lodged an application for the medical dispute to be referred again for medical assessment under s 7.24(2) of the MAI Act based on additional medical information, including an operation carried out on 1 July 2020 in which bone was removed from part of his cervical spine. The medical assessor assessed the soft tissue injury to the cervical spine as being a “minor injury”. The appellant then sought a review of that assessment and claimed that the surgery on 1 July 2020 involving the removal of a small portion of bone was necessarily a non-minor injury. The President’s delegate declined to refer the matter to a review panel. The appellant sought judicial review of both the second decision of the medical assessor and the delegate’s decision not to refer the further medical assessment to a review panel.
There is a lengthy and helpful discussion as to the proper construction of the term “medical dispute” in the leading judgment of Stern JA (Leeming and Kirk JJA agreeing). The following findings are relevant, noting, however, that these findings are directed not to the ambit of a review under s 7.26 of the MAI Act (which issue did not arise) but rather to the ambit of a medical dispute for the purposes for s 7.17.
First, a dispute between the claimant and an insurer about a medical assessment matter, as referred to in s 7.17, is a reference “to the dispute which has in fact arisen between a claimant and an insurer”, albeit that the dispute “must relate to the subject matter of a medical assessment matter” (at [73]).
Secondly, the Court rejected the appellant’s contention that a “dispute ... about a medical assessment matter” in s 7.17 necessarily entails that the medical dispute comprises “the whole of the relevant medical assessment matter”, as regards a particular body part (namely, the appellant’s cervical spine). Her Honour stated at [74] that acceptance of the appellant’s construction would mean that:

Fifthly, at [79]-[81], Stern JA explained why she considered that her preferred construction of the phrase, “a dispute ... about a medical assessment matter” was supported by Skates v Hills Industries Ltd [2021] NSWCA 142 and Scone Race Club Ltd v Cottom [2024] NSWCA 34. Both those cases dealt with what her Honour described at [79] as the construction of the “somewhat analogous and similarly worded” s 319 of the WIMWC Act.
Both Skates and Scone contain some statements of principle which support a broad construction of the concept of a “medical dispute”, but in my view both cases are distinguishable on their facts.
In Skates, Leeming JA observed that the scope of a medical dispute was to be determined by various documents, including correspondence between the worker and the insurer and attached medical expert reports, as well as the referral document itself. The referral form completed by a delegate of the Registrar of the Workers Compensation Commission omitted any reference to the parties’ dispute regarding injury to the worker’s left wrist. Despite the insurer conceding that the referral should have included this body part, the Appeal Panel considered that it was bound by the terms of the referral.
The majority of the Court of Appeal (Basten and Leeming JJA) set aside the impugned certificate and directed that the left wrist had to be included as a body part to be assessed in the terms of any new referral for a further medical assessment. These facts are very different to those here.
Scone related to the issue whether a medical appeal panel had erred in declining to consider documents attached to an Application to Admit Late Documents (AALD) in the context of a medical dispute under s 319 of the WIMWC Act. The functions of an Appeal Panel under that statutory regime were discussed by Basten AJA at [28]ff*.* By operation of s 328(2) of the WIMWC Act, the Appeal Panel was restricted to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal was made. The Court held that the Appeal Panel was correct not to extend the medical assessment so as to include a separate injury to the lumbar spine as sought by the worker in the AALD. Basten AJA explained at [53]:

(a) The injury to Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder was one of the injuries referred for the original medical assessment on 4 May 2023 with a view to determining whether or not it was a non-threshold injury. (b) That application described the injury to the left shoulder as “Supraspinatus tendinosis involving his left shoulder together with subacromial bursitis”. But it is also significant that in its reply to Mr Mohammed’s PIC application, GIO made a specific submission that a report dated 16 May 2022 by Mr Mohammed’s general practitioner on an ultrasound carried out earlier that month revealed “[m]ild changes of supraspinatus, without evidence of tear” (see at [18] above). This submission suggests that GIO did not regard the medical dispute as being confined to the injury description in the application, but extended to the issue of whether there was a tear. (c) Although there was no specific reference to Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder injuries in his application for a further medical assessment (see at [22] above), the injury to the left shoulder was one of the injuries which the delegate referred for further assessment using the same injury description as in the application for medical assessment dated 4 May 2023 (see at [24] above). (d) In his Certificate dated 7 October 2024, following the further assessment, Dr Woo found that the injury to Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder was a soft tissue injury and a threshold injury. Again, he referred to the GP’s report of the ultrasound on 13 May 2022, which revealed “Mild changes of supraspinatus tendinosis without evidence of tear” (see [25] above). Thus, the issue of whether or not there was a tear continued to be regarded as falling within the ambit of the medical dispute. (e) In its submissions dated 5 November 2024 in support of its application for review, GIO noted that injury to Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder was one of the injuries he claimed to have suffered in the motor accident and that this injury fell outside the definition of a threshold injury. GIO said that it disputed that Mr Mohammed had suffered any non-threshold injuries. (f) In accepting GIO’s review application and referring the matter for review by the Review Panel, the delegate noted that Dr Woo’s certificate dated 7 October 2024 included a finding that the injury to Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder was a soft tissue injury and a threshold injury for the purposes of the Act. Although the basis for the delegate’s decision to make a referral related only to the lumbar spine injuries, the referral to the Review Panel was not limited to that particular injury, presumably reflecting the delegate’s understanding of s 7.26(6) of the MAI Act. (g) As a result of directions made by the Review Panel for the production of medical records, the two reports described at [28]-[29] above were produced in the course of the review process, both of which reported that there was a partial thickness tear of the supraspinatus tendon in Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder. (h) On 1 September 2025, as part of the review process, Dr Oates re-examined Mr Mohammed. Dr Oates referred to Dr Mohammed’s report dated 2 January 2025 which identified the tear, a matter which he must have taken into account in conducting the examination and giving his report. On the basis of the re-examination, Dr Oates also noted that although the left shoulder injury had improved, Mr Mohammed was unable to move it fully overhead (see at [37] above). (i) Presumably appreciating the need for procedural fairness, the Review Panel issued the direction dated 24 October 2025, which drew the parties’ attention to the fact that there was a medical report which revealed a partial thickness tear and GIO was directed to make any submissions as to whether that tear was caused by the motor accident. (j) In its detailed submissions in response, GIO raised no objection that this issue was beyond the ambit of the dispute. That may not be determinative but it is part of the overall factual matrix.

In the present proceeding, the Principal Member’s direction dated 24 October 2025 is critical. The terms of the direction are summarised at [38] above. It is notable that GIO responded to the direction in the specified time, made no complaint that the matter the subject of the direction was beyond the terms of the medical dispute and made substantive submissions as to why the Review Panel should not act upon Dr Chug’s report, but rather should give paramountcy to the fact that the 13 May 2022 ultrasound showed no tear to the left shoulder. These submissions directly responded to the direction given on 24 October 2025.
I do not accept GIO’s submission that procedural fairness required the Review Panel to put it squarely on notice that the Review Panel proposed to find that the initial ultrasound report dated 13 May 2022, which stated that there was no evidence of a tear in Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder, was wrong. I do not accept that the Review Panel made any such finding of fact. Ms Gumbert pointed to [110] of the Review Panel’s reasons which is set at [48] above. But read fairly and reasonably, this passage does not involve the making of a clear finding that the ultrasound dated 13 May 2022 showed a tear. Rather, relying upon its medical experience and expertise, the Review Panel was saying that merely because the 13 May 2022 scan did not disclose a tear was not conclusive of the absence of pathology, having regard to the difficulty of reading an ultrasound scan. The Review Panel also made reference to evidence independent of the 13 May 2022 scan which was consistent with a finding that the motor vehicle accident caused a tear to Mr Mohammed’s left shoulder. That other evidence included Mr Mohammed’s contemporaneous onset of left shoulder symptoms of rotator cuff pathology, the failure of physiotherapy to resolve the problems, the absence of any explanation of a prior or subsequent incident which explained the tear, and consistency with Dr Oates's re-examination findings.
Even if I am wrong in my reading of [110] of the Review Panel’s reasons, I consider that the direction dated 24 October 2025 gave GIO sufficient notice of the issue which was addressed by the Review Panel at [109]-[121] of its reasons.
The terms of GIO’s detailed submissions dated 31 October 2026 make abundantly clear that GIO urged the Review Panel to give primacy to the 13 May 2022 ultrasound scan as not revealing a tear, in strong preference to Dr Chug’s report which was obtained much later in the history of the matter. In other words, GIO squarely addressed the issue of the relative weight which the Review Panel should attach to these two contradictory medical reports, an issue which was implicitly raised by the direction dated 24 October 2025.
For these reasons, ground 2 is rejected.

AAI Ltd t/as GIO v Mohammed

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment

JUDGMENT

Key statutory provisions summarised

Chronology of relevant events

The Review Panel’s Certificate and reasons

GIO’s judicial review challenge

Consideration and determination

(a) Ground 1: ambit of medical dispute

(i) McKee

(ii) Mandoukos

(iii) Toole and Cahill

(iv) Zadehfard

(b) Ground 2: procedural fairness

Conclusion

Parties

Legislation Cited (9)

Cases Cited (22)