The circumstances of these proceedings are heartbreaking. They concern the estate of a young woman, L, who tragically took her own life on or around 6 February 2024.
The proceedings are a powerful reminder of both the fragility, and the great value, of human life.
L was regularly employed in a fly‑in fly‑out role. She was financially stable and had bought her own home. She adored her young niece and nephew. However, L suffered from extremely severe depression and anxiety. And, since at least January 2021 during her time off in Perth, L was a regular user of methylamphetamine, seemingly to reduce the pain of her depression.
The combination of L's mental health conditions, and her methylamphetamine use, led L to believe that her life was no longer worth living.
In November 2023, she attempted to end her life by taking a prescription overdose and then driving her car into a tree. Following this, L received mental health care, but did not fully engage, in part because of her work commitments.
On or around 6 February 2024, L took an overdose of prescription medication (Propranolol) and then placed herself in a bathtub full of water. She died from drowning and Propranolol toxicity. She was found on 6 February by her father, B.
The proceedings relate to the administration of L's estate. The plaintiffs in the proceedings are her brother, A, her father, B and her mother, C. The defendants are the guardian ad litem for each of her young nephew and niece, who are A's children.
L did not leave a formal will. She was not married and did not have a de facto partner, or any children.
The plaintiffs apply for an order that there be a grant of administration to A in respect of L's estate.
If L died intestate, then pursuant to s 14 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA) (), A is entitled to a proportion of her estate. As such, pursuant to of the , the court may grant administration of the estate to A, if L died intestate.
In order for A to obtain a grant of administration, he needs to establish that L died intestate. That is, he needs to establish that she died without having made a formal will, and without having made an informal will. She did not leave a formal will.
The Probate Registrar has raised for consideration, quite rightly, whether two documents may constitute an informal will under s 32(2)(a) of the Wills Act 1970 (WA) (Wills Act). Those documents are defined by reference to the phrases 'B Envelope' and 'A Letter'. They were found near L's body.
None of the plaintiffs seek to propound the B Envelope or the A Letter as an informal will. The defendants filed a notice abiding the result. However, I still need to be satisfied that the B Envelope and/or the A Letter do not constitute an informal will under s 32.
At the hearing, the plaintiffs were represented by counsel, Mr Hannan. He filed in advance of the hearing comprehensive submissions that helpfully set out the applicable principles and factors.
(2) A document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person, even though it has not been executed in the manner required by this Act, constitutes -
(a) a will of the person;
[4]
if the Supreme Court is satisfied that the person intended the document to constitute the person's will ...
[5]
(3) In forming its view, the Supreme Court may have regard (in addition to the document) to any evidence relating to the manner of execution or testamentary intentions of the person, including evidence (whether admissible before the commencement of this section or otherwise) of statements made by the person.
[6]
In order for a document to constitute an informal will, it is necessary to establish that the deceased had testamentary capacity at the time the document was made, that they knew and approved of the contents of the document and that they intended the document to be their will.
The document must be intended to be the legally operative act which disposes of the deceased's property upon their death; that is, it must have been intended by the deceased to have present operation as his or her will.
[8]
The assessment of intention requires me to have regard to all of the circumstances, including L's mental state, and her state of mind.
As to the standard of proof, I would need to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the relevant document was an informal will. In doing so, I need to evaluate the evidence with great care.[2]
[9]
Except in one respect regarding the A Letter, I do not propose to set out the terms of the B Envelope or the A Letter. They are deeply personal. Their terms are known to the people who need to know about them. To set them out in a judgment would likely cause unnecessary distress. It would also be disrespectful to L.
[10]
The words on the B Envelope are written on the outside of the envelope. They comprise just over three lines and their meaning is not certain.
I think it is likely L wrote the words after she had started taking Propranolol. I cannot however be certain as to the extent to which she was affected by Propranolol when she wrote them.
In any event, given that the words were written on the outside of an envelope, and were brief and uncertain, I cannot be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that L intended what was written on the B Envelope to be her will. Thus, I am not satisfied that the B Envelope is an informal will.
[11]
The A Letter is a detailed letter. Given its content and detail, I am satisfied L wrote it after deciding to end her life on or about 6 February 2024, but before she was affected by Propranol.
I am satisfied that in writing the letter, L intended to do a number of things:
[12]
(1) to express her genuine love and affection for her brother A;
(2) to provide helpful information to A about her assets and other matters, including how to access her email accounts;
(3) to set out in general language what L wanted to happen to some of her assets.
[13]
I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the A Letter constitutes an informal will. In this respect, I think the generality of the language used in the letter, the different topics raised in it, and the absence of any language suggesting that it is to be regarded as a will, point against the letter reflecting an intention that it was to be her will. Also, given her distressed state, I am not satisfied that L even considered whether the letter operated in that way.
I think that in writing the letter, L was doing her best, while being so distressed that she had decided to end her life, to leave as little trouble as possible for those that she left behind. This finding is supported by the note on another envelope found near her body that was addressed to A. It said:
[14]
Sorry about the state of the house. I'll empty the bins before hand.
[15]
I therefore am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the A Letter is an informal will.
[16]
The plaintiffs' counsel made a number of submissions to the effect that L did not have testamentary capacity at the time she wrote the B Envelope and the A Letter. In light of my findings so far, I do not need to also make a finding in respect of testamentary capacity.
There is, however, one thing that I want to say. There is a difference between whether a person has testamentary capacity, and whether words said or written by a person shortly before their death genuinely reflected their feelings.
I am satisfied that L's words of affection for A that are set out in the A Letter, genuinely reflected her feelings. This is best illustrated by the following sentence:
[17]
I have admired, cherished [and] idolised you. I'm so very proud of the man you are (HAHA few little things to iron out still).
[18]
This sentence is a genuine expression of affection written in a way that only a loving sister would write of her brother.
[19]
For these reasons, I am satisfied that an order should be made that there be a grant of administration to A in respect of L's estate.
[20]
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.